

Critical Analysis of CIA's Failure in Afghanistan:

By

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Abstract:

International watch dog analysis that all security agencies have evolved from state institution tasked to help other government institution has slowly and gradually evolved to such might and power that they have become state within the state. They have role in making state business according to their needs and necessities. In most of the under developed countries they are even considered as the real bastion of power and state institution such as legislation, Executive and Judiciary have become literally paralyzed. These security agencies have symbiotic relations with other security agencies belonging to other states. Throughout the world they are literally shaping the foreign policy of particular country. Hawkish elements in the corridors of power make the security of whole world at stack and doldrums.

In his early weeks as director Tanet was invited by former president Gerald Ford to appear on a panel titled "Does America Need the CIA?" The mere existence of such an event signaled how low the agency had fallen. As he prepared his speech, Tenet returned to the CIA's founding by Harry Truman. The agency's purpose was to prevent another Pearl Harbor. The CIA was "an insurance policy" against that sort of strategic surprise. "It is clear to me that the potential for dangerous surprise is as great as ever," he told Ford's panel. "That is true whether I look at terrorist groups whose sole purpose is to harm American interests, the biological weapons that Saddam Hussein is still trying to build and to hide in Iraq, or the programs Iran has for building intermediate range missiles and nuclear weapons." There were certain undeniable causes for the failure of CIA in Afghanistan. Although to some extent CIA has attained its goals but the overall evaluation reveals that CIA has failed in

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achievement of its cause due to numerous reasons. This study represents as well as focuses the factors which paved the way making C.I.A to be completely failed in Afghanistan to achieve its particular goals.

Keywords: Afghanistan, Strategic war, C.I.A, Pakistan etc.

Introduction:

United States had a very long experience of covert war in Afghanistan during soviet invasion. United states with the help of Pakistan war strategy, Saudi financial assistance and Afghan religious war fighters compelled soviet army to bowed down and leave Afghanistan. Despite experience US failed to understand the real problem of Afghanistan while dealing with them against Taliban or Al-Qaida. They initially considered Taliban and Al Qaida as two different sides of same coin. They are two sides of stream as it goes parallel to one another but these sides were neither same nor will ever coincide although they might have same policy on certain issues but both had and have point of view with different leadership, command and control system. Origin and political scenario of both organizations were different and even today both are at two different edges of situation. Usama Bin Ladin and Mula Umar were two different leaders with their respective organizations. (*Durrani*).

It is deception if one speaks from the powerful position about the weak and fragile but in military it is subject of faith and high morality. The struggle that the terrorist has been weakened is just an illusion. They have rather gain might and power such as Afghan Taliban. The phenomenon that they have become weaker is just wrong. The non-state actors who are temporarily in weak position will wait for five to ten years when they will regain power and might. The alarming situation will be then when the weak will rise in power and the mighty and strong will become on weak position. The then dialogues are such as the negotiation with desperados. In 2002 Rumsfeld said that Afghan Taliban does not exist anymore. He said that they are part of history now. How truth he had spoken it can be justified today. People plead for target and they refuse bluntly. Why should we talk, we are in position to take over the whole Afghanistan while Americans are not going to have its possession forever? Either today or tomorrow they will have to depart. Donald Rumsfeld actually wanted to have a laboratory to testify his hawkish theory of combating small groups of soldiers assisted by air power can win the fierce and decisive battle.

During April 2003 Donald Rumsfeld the then secretary of defense visited Afghanistan to analyze as to what was going on there. He came to the conclusion that US struggle in Afghanistan were not on track. He was of the view to revisit their policies and make new initiatives for the ongoing war in Afghanistan against terrorism. (*Hersh, 2004*).

The report justifies the great difference between the Rumsfeld perception regarding the war and the actual position on the ground. Rothstein wrote, at the beginning of the carpet bombing campaign on Afghanistan Rumsfeld told reporters that terrorists will not be fought with the ordinary potentials. They should be dealt with unconventional capabilities. In December when Northern Alliance empowered by American air power and Special Forces troops moved into Kabul pushing back the Taliban and Al Qaida to the country sides. United States had many media accounts for imposing war. Such as the already publicized reports of American Special Forces on horseback and technologies like Drones. United States continued to stress upon bombing and old type of war but inadvertently that war converted into non-conventional war.

Director of the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Mike Pompeo, visited Kabul stated Abdullah Abdullah CEO of the National Unity Government (NUG) on Monday at the Council of Ministers meeting. (Tolo News, 2017).

Mike Pompeo visited Afghanistan and meet President Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah with renewal of his commitment to Afghanistan support in war against terrorism. The high up delegation was including CIA officials for the reinforcement of their commitment and continued cooperation with Afghanistan. During discussion the issues of threats was discussed, the way out the struggles of Afghan populous and implementation of security and stability in Afghanistan and American support was the main agenda of the meeting. This formal meeting has come just in the mid when American President Mr. Trump has threatened to fire General John Nicholson. The united states and NATO commander in Afghanistan. Mr. President has delayed the announcement of his new political and military policy regarding Afghanistan, which has been wait from last six months anxiously. Nicholson is a top US military official in Afghanistan. He is surviving from the last sixteen months in Afghanistan and represents the Washington in Afghanistan. He has close ties with civilian and military officials of Afghanistan. He clearly and audaciously advocates the extension of US military operations in Afghanistan irrespective to the intensive aggressive attacks of Taliban and AL Qaida though out the length and breadth of the country.

Donald Trump perspective about the failure of sixteen years' war has astonished military and civil authorities of Afghanistan. They said clear indication of support from Washington is instantly needed for the survival of fragile and collapsing Kabul government. In Presence of public unrestrained opposition from organized non state actors in such circumstances the unconditional support is inevitable. (*Steve Coll*).

Afghan Jihad was basically headed by General Akhtar Abdur Rehman who was the founding head of the modern ISI. He was the reforming head of modern Pakistani Intelligence, although General Akhtar and Zia have departed, but they have left expensive and massive legacies for this setup. When General Akhtar took over the charge of DG ISI it was small unit with low morale and short domain of activities mainly focused on security and espionage of India but with his arrival it was converted into a powerful army within the army. It expended its horizon of activities with multiple desks with deep pocketed commands. The financial renaissance of ISI mainly came with the lavish deep pocketed Saudi Prince Turki Al Faysal and his Saudi General Intelligence Department. The operational improvement came in ISI when it joined the CIA during soviet invasion in Afghanistan. There it got access to the most sophisticated intelligence equipment's and technologies for intelligence collection. It was golden opportunity for volunteers from across the Islamic world to come and join Pakistan. In perusal of its foreign policy not only in Afghanistan but across its eastern borders in Kashmir these volunteers were trained in Afghanistan to bleed Indian military. The number of madrasas in Pakistan during 1971 was about nine hundred only but this number flared up to eight thousand by summer 1988 and twenty-five thousand unregistered madrasas. They were mostly on the Pak Afghan border and financed by wealthy Arab Sheikhs. By then this institution had attained the capability of taping telephones calls, bribing legislators and controlling voting boxes though out the country. When it finalized that a cause was ripe. In a period less than ten years this institution was converted into Pakistan most powerful institution with the help of CIA and Saudi financiers resultantly the ascent of ISI was must for any move or step by any other institution.

Dual Policy of CIA:

During soviet invasion in Afghanistan CIA was on the front against soviet army enchanting the volatile slogans of Jihad. Mujahidin were empowered with financial assistance and technical assistance to fight soviet army. when soviet army was defeated and America got its desired result it left the pampered mujahidin to die with tragic death but time once again turned when America came with another goal to end terrorism from whole world but this time it had no innovation in its slogans. The same invaders were grabbing afghan territory while Mujahidin changed their name from Mujahidin to Taliban while their enemy was American rather the Russian. Afghan being Nation was already aware with the fickle minded American during soviet war there for they were ready how to deal with them while Americans did not change their modus operandi.

In two decades before 9/11 the CIA had sometimes failed in its mission to alert president in advance to strategic risks and threats abroad. The agency analysts were late to recognize the forces that swept the Soviet Union away.

Geographical Causes:

The war strategy of America was to deal Afghanistan as colonial area where inelegance based strikes is conducted with the help of raiding Party. Same strategy was applied by CIA with help of Air born which totally failed although for the time being they got some result in hunt and kill policy but in the long run they totally failed to get their desired result. Northern Alliance in Afghanistan developed ideal relations with India resultantly the influence of RAW in Afghanistan increased. It developed number of councils on Pak Afghan border and was clearly fanning the sparks of insurgency in Baluchistan. Baloch separatist in Afghanistan have allegedly being provided with safe sanctuaries on the border near Pakistan with full assistance and backup. These Baloch separatist are allegedly actively involved in sabotage activates within Pakistan this was never ever acceptable for Pakistan. Rather it was question of life and death for Pakistan. Therefore, relations with Northern Alliance of Afghanistan and Pakistan remained strained. Contrary to that Northern Alliance has strategic alliance with CIA from the pre soviet invasion. Thus the relations remained stressful. Geographically Pakistan is feeling itself as sandwich between Indian and its allies in Afghanistan. Therefore, to keep itself liberated from this imminent threat Pakistan is trying hard to clip the wings of CIA and RAW in Afghanistan. Pakistan has long and lengthy border with Afghanistan which is about 2430 km. this border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is basically called as Durand Line which was established by Mortimer Durand a British diplomat and civil servant and Amir Abdur Rehman khan of Afghanistan on a single page agreement on 12 November 1893. This line basically cuts the Pashtun tribes dwelling on both sides of the line. Therefore, it was denied from the very first day of it commencement. In 1947 when Pakistan came into being the same part of British India came in jurisdiction of Pakistan. Since then some fundamentalist Pashtun are against the very existence of Pakistan and rising the slogans of “Azad Pashtonistan” time and again. This was hard nut during the Nationalist of Khan Ghaffar Khan and Abdul Samad Achakzai. This border is open and vulnerable for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Infiltration from one side or other is blame game for both countries. Proper border management is costly enough for both Pakistan and Afghanistan to make fence to stop infiltration. Non state actors from both sides are active in making the relations of ISI and CIA according to

their need and desires. Hawkish elements have made both sides furious and enemies with strained relations.

Opium:

Only after half of the year, Taliban have emerged and are power in many parts of Afghanistan. This country is even now the safe haven for Al Qaida. American troops who are deployed on the mountainous areas on Pakistan borders are about ten thousand hovering here and there for their targets in the form of Al Qaida leaders. The political control outside Kabul is yet within Taliban. American backed so called President Exercises very little control outside Kabul and trying hard to cut down the powers of War lords who are the shareholders with Taliban in production of Heroin in Afghanistan. People are terrorized outside Kabul and few others cites. Violence and crimes have terrorized the laymen. It was reported that undercover agents of CIA were deeply indulged in the trafficking of opium. The most immediate, most intractable social, economic and political problem is the Heroin. This problem has grown such massively that it is not possible for Afghan to deal with it alone, stated Afghan president. Drugs in Afghanistan are threatening the very existence of Afghan State and Nation.

Drugs dealings and it associated criminal business has generated about 2.3 billions of Dollars as revenue last year. According to UN Drug and Crimes annual report a sum equal to half of Afghanistan legitimate GDP is taken by the drug dealings and most of this income goes to Terrorists and non-state actors. That report further reveals that as long as this nasty business prevails the greater is threats to the security with in the country and outside.

The UN report published states that the opium production during the Taliban imposed ban reduced to a hundred and eighty-five metric tons in 2001. This figure has increased to three thousands six hundred tones. This is about twenty-fold increase. the reports further reveals that Afghan nation is at the edge or the cross road that either it will become powerful energetic nation or the drug abuses in Afghanistan will keep nourished and state will sink into corruption, violence and terrorism within the country and beyond its borders. Afghanistan is once again producing worlds three quarter illegal opium. Reports further explains that the opium cultivation has spread to thirty-two provinces and twenty-eight nation of Afghanistan. Former cultivation pappy cops are trying hard to expend their cultivation despite the pressure from all round the world. Most of the densely cultivated areas are under the control of US military. The poppy

cultivating farmers are spreading their crops under shadows of non-state actors either they are in the form of Taliban, Al Qaida or Warlords. According to a senior NGO official, it is as clear as crystal that drug lords are on the payroll of US military. We have put them back with power injections which is terribly wrong.

The easy access of drugs is another threat to the well-being of American troops in Afghanistan. After the injection of US military in Afghanistan increasing reports of heroin addiction has come from the active military personals especially serving from months long in Afghanistan. Intelligence reports reveals that the hawkers and low level service providing staff within the Garrisons or affiliated to Special Forces are the very source of production on the Bases. They are reportedly working as peddlers. These low profiles working Afghan staff can be called as the logistical guys. Such as truck drivers, food suppliers and maintenance staff at large Bases of Bagram near Kabul. Furthermore, reports are there that US marines are using Heroin whom is facilitated with continuous supply by local hired menial service providers. Pentagon based commanders and leaders have head in the sand attitude, although they are aware of this entire situation but they have kept the criminal negligence. They have denied the use of Heroin in Bagram. On the other hand, disciplinary actions have been initiated in Bagram base against the drug users within the US marines and military officials. Some Marines have been removed from Afghanistan as result of disciplinary proceedings while giving them the sheepish cover of Alcohol and Hashish. Before the arrival of US military, the drug lords used to process only Hashish within Afghanistan while all cultivated poppies used to be shifted in raw form to the northern Pakistan for processing to make heroin but from the last two or three years most of the poppy is processed within Afghanistan for making heroin just to lee profit in country.

The CIA officer serving in Afghanistan says that the agency narcotics officials have been independently investigating the narcotics hazards in provinces like Helmand and other strategically important provinces. He further says that Afghan army seems to be losing this war. In Helmand province both Taliban and war lords are in conflict to win the struggle for control of lucrative drugs trafficking in Afghanistan. Government officials of Afghanistan are directly involved in drug trafficking and business. (The New York Times, 2016).

The tax imposed upon the cultivators of poppy moves step by step up to the central government official's residing in Kabul ensuring the local authorities have the blessings of higher up to keep this illicit production continue without any interruption. These officials are no longer simply taxing the traffic but imposing tax on every step of its business. It becomes difficult to distinguish the parties dealing it from the drug cartel. Throughout the year 2017 same increasing trend of production remained. Afghanistan harvested nearly double to 9000 tons more than previous peak recorded production in 2007 which was 8200 tons in Helmand the most strategic province of Afghanistan poppy cultivated area increased by 79% (144,000 hectares) which is about 44% of country total production. It is settled fact that opium is providing 60% of Taliban fund for weapons and other wages.

To win the Afghan war US command with the approval of Donald Trump dispatched F 22 fighter and B-52 Bomber to destroy the ten notorious Taliban Heroin Processing Laboratories in Helmand for the very first time. It was small share of country having more than 500 drug processing laboratories.

Throughout the world the economic activities are considered as the most important point of contact among people and their governments. The most productive and exchanged product is contraband commodity therefore the political affiliations automatically shifts to the economic networks resultantly this illicit items moves safe and secret from field to international markets with security at each and every step of its marketing. The Afghan financial sector is being fueled by narcotics trade. As result it minimizes Afghan efforts for eliminating corruption. The beneficiaries are directly and indirectly Taliban and Al Qaida. The failure goes in the side of CIA.

In the near future production of poppy will occupy the prominent position in Afghan economy, Taliban insurgency, interference and catastrophe of non-state actors will be the collective outcome of Afghan destabilization. (McCoy).

Pakistan and its Defensive Shield Inter-Services Intelligence Agency:

Among so many other causes for the failure of CIA in Afghanistan the role of ISI cannot be denied. CIA was engaged in covert operations in Pakistan as well as in Afghanistan at the same time which was never ever accepted by Pakistani Military bureaucracy. Pakistani Military

Bureaucracy and civilian Government were apparently silent but behind the screen they were totally against the policy AfPak (or Af-Pak) Pakistan was treated as client country although it has huge army with developed institutional structure. Thus the stick and carrot policy of CIA was paid with same coin by ISI. It was not acceptable to CIA at any cost.

CIA was conducting search and hunt policy. Drone attacks were their most effective modes operand. All drones were operated from shamsi air base Jacobabad and Dalbandin situated in Pakistan. This was never accepted by sovereign Pakistani nation. During Drones operations terms and conditions of secret treaty were violated. These violations of terms were never accepted resultantly it was countered by exposing the sitting CIA spy master in Islamabad. The residents of FATA even registered criminal case against the spy master of CIA in Islamabad.

Black water was the security agency which was hired by CIA to meet their needs in Pakistan and Afghanistan. They were hunting and killing their targets in Pakistan which was exposed by ISI in the form of Reman Dawis. Resultantly Black water was to restricted from its activities. Thus the mandate of Black water was restricted and fabricated.

Although officially Pakistan has left moral support of Taliban after their fall in Afghanistan but after the events of 9/11 with the start of new era of war against terrorism, Pakistan has practically become part of this coalition but critics criticize Pakistan for supporting Taliban against US led war against terrorism. Western Military Commanders in Afghanistan says that ISI has maintained its ties with Taliban and support them. Pakistan has officially denied this allegation time and again but says agents maintain links with militants as any security agency would do in the interest of intelligence.

Michael George. explains that topmost United State security officials have serious concerns about some fanatics of Pakistan s main security agency may be interacting improperly with non-state actors and Taliban. Colonel David Lapan a Pentagon spokesman in Islamabad said Pakistani Army Chief General Ashfaq Pervaiz kayani himself served as spy chief was aware of US reservations about Inter-Services Intelligence, these were shared on record. Pakistan is a country with most authoritative intelligence agency and United States sees it as crucial to its efforts to domesticate the rampant Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan.

Mr. Pompeo the serving Secretary of the State not only criticized Pakistan for not helping the US in eradicating militancy from the Pak-Afghan region but also supports the policy of dealing Pakistan with same coin. In his comments at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, Washington, he suggested Trump and his administration should not to keep high-

expectations from Pakistan. Time would stipulate that hops from the Pakistanis' willingness to help us in the fight against radical Islamic terrorism should be set at a very low level, our intelligence would show the same, that we must have a very real discussion with Pakistan about what it is that they are doing and what it is that they could do and about the American expectations for how they would behave."

The CIA director acknowledged that Pakistan was an important country in a strategically sensitive region and that's why it could not be ignored. The success and failure of CIA somehow depends upon the role Pakistan will play. (Dawn, 2017).

HR McMaster United State National Security adviser, in an interview with the MSNBC (Micro soft National Broad casting company) which was aired on Saturday, "Taliban and Haqqani network have bases in Pakistan and we want to really see that changed. There is an extremely successful campaign going on with Afghan forces in the lead. It's an unreported campaign in Nangarhar province of Afghanistan. The president (Donald Trump) has said that he does not intends to place limits on the military that weaken their capability to win battles. McMaster said during the interview that Mr. President has lifted those restrictions.

"The President has also clarified that he wants to see a change in the attitude of those in the region, who are providing safe havens and support bases for the Taliban, Haqqani Network and others. This is Pakistan, in particular, that we that we want to really see a change and a reduction of their support for these groups, "I mean, this is of course, you know, a very paradoxical situation, right, where Pakistan is taking great losses. They have fought very hard against these groups, but they've done so really only selectively."

In response to another question: "There have been some hard hits in Kabul. Do you have confidence yourself in General Nicholson, the combatant commander in Afghanistan?"

There are 8,400 US troops in Afghanistan training and advising the Afghan military in the fight against the Taliban and Daesh.

Donald Trump the President of United States stated that Pakistan has gained too much from partnering with our war in Afghanistan. It has much to lose by continue to harp to criminals and terrorist. Pakistan has also sheltered the same organizations they tried every single day to kill our people. We have been paying Pakistan Billions and Billions of Dollars at the same time they are housing same terrorists that we are fighting but that will have to change and it will change immediately. (Raice, 2017). Taliban

has increased by 15% area control in the last one year. To consider it Pakistan problem by Washington or Pentagon is just foolish. (Reidal, 2010). Hardly ever does a country fight the same war twice in one generation. Even rarer is to fight it twice from differing sides. Yet that is in many ways what America is doing today in Afghanistan. In the 1980s the CIA manipulated the largest secret operation in its history to beat the Soviet army in Afghanistan working from a safe haven in Pakistan. Today America is fighting a Taliban-led rebellion in Afghanistan working from a safe haven in Pakistan. Many suggest that the outcome will be the same for America and its NATO allies as it was for the Soviet Union ultimate defeat at the hands of the insurgency. That analysis misses the many fundamental differences between the two wars. But it is also important to note the one major similarity between them: the key role played by Pakistan, which could again determine the outcome.

The most critical differences are goals and objectives. America intervened in Afghanistan in 2001 on the side of the Northern Alliance to overthrow the Taliban Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan only after it had been used as a base for the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks in America. The role played by Pakistan. In the 1980s, Pakistan was the base for the Saudi-American alliance behind the *mujahidin*. Today, Pakistan is the safe haven of the Taliban rebellion and its logistical supply line. Pakistan also serves as the major logistical line for the NATO forces in Afghanistan. Over 80% of the supplies coalitions forces depend on to survive come via Pakistan from the port of Karachi. Geography effectively prevents an alternative route for its logistics. The coalition is compelled to rely on either Russia or Iran so Pakistan has unusually strong influence on both sides of the war.

Pakistani police for the first time began arresting senior Afghan Taliban leaders this winter, but the operation was not persistent and proved to be demanding more and more like this. It is widely assumed in Pakistan that American and European patience to fight it out in Afghanistan is at lowest ebb, an assumption reinforced by polls that show support for the conflict steady declining on both sides of the Atlantic. Mr. Obama's mid-2011 deadline has been read between the lines by many as indication as early withdrawal, despite that senior officials tried to suggest otherwise.

Pakistan's passive support of the Taliban is thus a useful prevaricate against the day when NATO decides to start pulling out and gives up the struggle. Pakistan will then have a relationship with the Pashto future of southern and eastern Afghanistan and will have an asset in the effort for

post-NATO Afghanistan. Thus it is essential that the alliance makes it clear to Islamabad that the Taliban are not going to succeed on the battlefield and that Pakistan must aggressively weaken both the Afghan and the Pakistani Taliban.

There is no inherent reason for the NATO war in Afghanistan to follow the pattern of the Soviet war. The differences between the two outweigh the similarities, especially in what most Afghans want for their country. While pundits may find the cliché that Afghanistan is the graveyard of empire simplistically attractive, there is every reason to believe smart policies can avoid such an outcome but much depends on Pakistan.

Dubious Goals and Aims of C.I.A:

Jundullah is Sunni group that was targeting Shia in Balochistan. It was supported by US to carry out sabotage and subversion in Iranian province of Sistan. I credit someone who is worse than the devil because he is messed up this country. Zardari under his watch whether it was Shia affiliation or another reason. Pakistan and Iran mounted a joint operation. Abdul Mali Rigi was handed over and executed and ever since agitation is silent. (Durrani).

US were to identify those steps that would enable the Afghan to move ahead faster but without risking the whole enterprise. (Wittmeyer, 2013). Even when the United States did try to tackle with the complexity of Afghanistan, it failed. Most pernicious was the view of the then-CIA Director George Tenet who stated soon after 9/11 attacks, that the Taliban and al Qaeda were more or less the same group. This intelligence failure continues to bother the argument to this day, in much the same way the false belief that Saddam Hussein was sitting on a heap of weapons of mass destruction was the original sin of the Iraq war. It cost American lives and hampered the ability of the United States to deal with Afghanistan's leaders and key power brokers in neighboring countries. The decision of American CIA that Taliban and all its known members will fight for Al Qaida was a very drastic and decisive decision made in early hours on haste. Within the rank and files of Taliban there were great rivalries and rifts which could easily be exploited by political and military efforts which was the essential for unconventional warfare. Few months' hard work by diplomats, intelligence and military personals with anti-Taliban forces and Special Forces would have made significant fruits by widening the gap among the conflicting Taliban. Rather than widening them inter rivalries American Military operation created a vacuum of power resultantly the

condition under which government came to power gave birth to warlordism, Banditry and opium production while basic cause went in oblivion.

Trickeries War Lords in Afghanistan:

The United States enlisted all the notorious criminal warlords of Afghanistan in its war against terrorism through CIA and later on when Afghan government was created as result of Bonn Conference all powers of the state functioning machinery was enthroned to these warlords which itself was creation of new problem.

Results of these lacunas were harsh enough after the war. A leading Scholar on Afghanistan namely Barnett R. Rubin has written in, this month's current history that Afghanistan does not have running state organizations. It has no genuine army or operating police. Its dilapidated provincial administration is barely in contact with central government and its obedience. Most of the country meager tax revenue has been illegally taken over by local officials who are little more than warlords' with the official designation. The basic aim of American Policy in Afghanistan was not to install better government for the Afghan nation but to get rid of the radical Islamic fanatics who are permanent threat for America. (The Guardian, 2002).

A new book, by veteran US journalist Bob Woodward, has exposed that how CIA official with call sign Jawbreaker was appointed with mandate to bribe Afghan prominent political and social figures soon after 9/11. This official was given 3 billion Dollars to win the sympathies of anti-Taliban and making them ready to stand in rebellion against Taliban regime. A team of six Parliamentary members who were already on the payroll of CIA was tasked with aim to spread throughout the length and breadth of country to make the national hype for US leads coalition. This team distributed about 70 million Dollars among the warlords of Afghanistan. After distribution of this money in the last three months of 2001 they ensured and signaled the smooth and swift collapse of Taliban regime. During four hours long interview President Bush described the cost of operation as Bargain in Texas with Woodward.

Same reports were reported by the observer at that time as CIA team had been tasked to destabilize supporters of Taliban but the interview of president Bush was the first official confirmation from the white House that US relied as much on power of Dollars as on the worth of their military equipment.

The modus operandi did not work as it was expected by the CIA. In October, 2001 a prominent anti-Taliban Commander Abdul Haq was killed after a tribal chief failed to respond to his call for setting up resistance against Taliban. Local tribal chief was given 10,000 dollars and one satellite phone by American CIA. That money was kept by that warlord while satellite phone was handed over to non-state actors. Similarly, hundreds of millions were distributed among the fragmented Northern Alliance to bring them on one page to fight against Taliban. The fall of prominent Northern city of Mazar sharif and captured by Taliban was immediately crumbled only when CIA bribed two key opposition commanders into cooperation. Afghan leader's and warlords have looked forward to all helping hands from international community to provide them funds and financial assistant to sustain their operation. Afghanistan has no surplus wealth or revenue for purchasing weapons or financing army or troops. Due to its under developed nature it has always remained as proxy or client of other war players.

Experts and observers see the long term success of war lords and sustained government the result of continuous payments. This continued financial support to warlords has halted the growth of genuine democratic culture in Afghanistan. They quote an Afghan proverb "You cannot buy Afghan; you can only rent him for a while."

Afghan Infra Structure and Institutions Were Ignored:

US were slow enough to develop the national institutions of Afghanistan which were of utmost importance for their retrieval to their native land. In countries like Afghanistan which has been from four decades in continuous civil war the utmost importance is establishment of national security institutions such as Army, Police and Intelligence setups. Rather than developing these institutions the just paper work based policies adherent to the ground realities and hurdles the followed policies of CIA provided a chance of development for the corrupt and self-centered elements whom were mostly either warlords or drug mafia members got chance of injection in these circles which was alternately fanning the renaissance of Taliban back into deceased territories. (The Guardian, 2012).

The assumption of advocates of comprehensive counter insurgency Strategy has flopped badly as it was based on unrealistic approach. It has badly failed to consider the main differences between Iraq and Afghanistan such as the public support and reliance of Taliban insurgency on Afghan community and society, presence of safe havens for the

rebellions outside Afghanistan, Incompetence of Kabul government to tackle its political entities and assumptions that American soldiers will convert into anthropologist more than that is the lacking support from American people for the drawn out counter insurgency campaign. The dame blunder was the trust which was developed by the counter insurgency block that changing the military commanders will ultimately win the war which US army has trapped in Afghanistan. it must be remembered by the history that President Obama was answered in response to a question, it surges of troops to Afghanistan could turn things around in time frame of eighteen months that sir I am confident we can train and hand over to Afghan National Army in that time frame. Time proved Mr. Petraeus wrong. Hundreds of Afghan army, US Army and civilians have paid for his wrong assumptions and over confidence about the worth of US troops. Circumstance reveals that it was not as if Petraeus was innocent bystander in dialogues. He was actually trying hard to persuade President Obama to approve the further injection of troops in Afghanistan. Looking back to his predecessor General Petraeus followed the street military policy resultantly air strikes were increased which lead to civilian casualties, special forces were directed to increase the intensity of operations and political front for ending up the war was almost neglected. Just to get clear military success against Taliban insurgency, this was not possible.

Joshua Rovner, Associate Professor of Strategy and policy in US Naval War College narrates that we have misunderstood our fresh history in Iraq and Afghanistan. We created new hypothesis about policy that will continue for years despite their apparent lacuna we made wrong decisions about interfering in other civil wars on these wrong assumptions.

In an era where military Bureaucracy is out of public access media and politicians are busy in making them glorified and exalted. The continuously defeating military Generals on war fronts and their escape from accountability and enquires have really serious impacts on our national security and integrity.

Cultural and Ethnic Diversity:

The destabilizing effects of regional and ethnic imbalance in the afghan government largely escaped the attention of CIA. The factual achievement is at the village level, but we have no representative there it is needed that we must be there seven days a week round the clock. Now US military is effectively functional and operating above the conflict. Americans are going to lesion same old drums as it was heard in Vietnam. One cannot hit what is not visible to him. From January, 2002, onward, US military was in the course of grasping defeat from the jaws of success.”

Last summer, an alliance of seventy-nine human-rights and relief associations inscribed an open memo to the international community calling for better security in Afghanistan and warning that the Presidential elections there, now scheduled for September, were endangered. The memo noted, "For the majority of the Afghan people, security is unstable and restricted by regional warlords, drug traffickers or groups with terrorist organizations. The circumstances are getting worse, and there is no inclusive plan in place to stop the twist of violence." figures collected by CARE International (group of fourteen members countries who task is to fight poverty in ninety four countries of the world) showed that eleven aid workers were killed in four events during a three-week time ending early last month, and the speed of physical attacks on aid workers in Afghanistan more than doubled in January and February compared with the same period in the previous year. Such attacks, a CARE policy statement recommended, certainly led to cut down in Afghan humanitarian and rebuilding agenda. In early 2003, for example, according to the *Chicago Tribune*, there were twenty-six humanitarian agencies at work in Kandahar, the main Afghan city in the south. By early this year, there were less than five.

Even one of the mainly exposed achievements of the post-Taliban administration, the enhancement in the life slandered of women, has been called into question. Judy Benjamin, who served as the gender adviser to the U.S. Agency for International Development mission in Kabul in 2002 and 2003, told me, "The legal chances have enhanced, but the day-to-day life of women even in Kabul is not as better as depicted. Girls are now legally allowed to go to school and work but when it comes to the actual family life and practice, citizens are worried to let them go out without special scarf and dresses. While outside Kabul circumstances are far poorer. "Family elders do not allow girls and women to travel alone to their jobs or school. One cannot go on roads without being countered up by scoundrels and desperados covered with government designation or Taliban who consider them duty bound to stop female going to their jobs of duties without their family elders. Laymen are observed saying that they were secure under the Taliban regime comparatively to the existing government. As result Taliban are getting more support from the inner core of the community while the governing party is facing tough time."

Nancy Lindborg is the executive vice-president of Mercy Corps deputed in Afghanistan has same feelings she says that Outside of Kabul everywhere I visited from Kunduz to Kandahar I have seen no change for women at all

and security for everybody has become adverse than November of 2002. It is worth mentioning that these are the views of responsible representative of Mercy corps which is one of the major working NGO in Afghanistan. US declarations of amplified assurance to security and reconstruction were increasingly observed policy lies. United States has left Afghanistan to aggravate more than its earlier position.

Religious Aspect while Dealing American and Russian:

For Americans the war against terrorism became a black hole which is engulfing each and every policy of them. War against their sowed seeds of Mujahidin has become such towering and heightened tree that was pious during soviet war while it became terrorism after 9/11.

The Afghan Jihad had lost its founding father, General Akhtar Abdur Rehman was the architect of modern Pakistan Intelligence. It was dead before Zia and Akhtar but they made it a living institution left with pricey, permanent legacies. Statistics reveals that in 1971 there were nine hundred religious Schools (Madrasa) in all Pakistan. By the summer 1988 this number of Madrasa reached to eight thousand according to official record and an extended twenty-five thousand unregistered ones.

Najeebullah had enrolled more than twenty thousand Mullah to counter the rebels religious message which was cashed by the anti-Soviet elements.

The very important reason of CIA failure was its policy towards mullah during soviet invasion CIA was backing all Mujahidin who later on became Taliban while after the events of 9/11 its policy changed once for all. CIA started its campaign to up root Taliban and religious fighters. Among these Taliban there were many living iconic Taliban leader who had observed these Americans as aiding them to fight Russians. Resultantly the stress and antagonism developed. History reveals that American CIA won the war against Russia on the battle field of Afghanistan with the help of Saudi Riyals, Pakistani ISI and Afghan laymen. Afghani was exploited on the mane of Jihad. They number of religious students flared up. When Russians invasion was observed in Kabul the most piercing resistance was faced from the religious class of the society. Therefor Najeebullah the then president of Afghanistan had thousands of Mullah on his pay roll list. He wanted to counter the propaganda of religious classes thorough the Mullah.

Deviating Tasks of CIA and White House:

Three years ago, Mr. Petraeus was interviewed in Washington DC Willard hotel, where he was explaining the only solution for failing war in Afghanistan. Mr. Petraeus was the ardent follower of comprehensive

counter insurgency Strategy. He was presenting Iraq as achieved success of their Policy

This statement of Petraeus came at the annual meeting of Center for New American Security. Washington based think-tank become against the counter insurgency strategy which Washington and Petraeus were at the pinnacle of their powers and it was announced by both democrats and Republicans heralded him as survivor of Iraq from the clutches of depot. General at the peak of his power revealed that they have grasped the local circumstances as key for their success. National security dialogues were dominated by them.

The havoc in Afghanistan has become a political issue for the Bush management, whose general behavior for war on terrorism is challenged by the former National Security Council terrorism adviser namely Richard A. Clarke openly, in his memories written with name, "Against All Enemies," and in controversial hearings before the September 11th Commission he writes that Bush Administration has consistently summoned Afghanistan as a success story which is nothing more than bluff they are making this claim in presence of alarming warnings, from international community, from confederates, and from within its military and Pentagon-commissioned report that is being confined by bureaucracy with their tactics. Conclusion of report proves negative their loud claims. The situation in Afghanistan has worsened rapidly with the arrival of foreign army.

Clarke depicts it in his book that the victory in Afghanistan is as far less decisive than the management has represented it, he sharply condemns the Pentagon's strategy particularly the verdict of relying on airpower rather than U.S. troops already fighting on the ground in very early weeks. The war began on October 7, 2001, but not until seven weeks did the United States injected infantry units to control al Qaeda and Taliban fictions. in Late-November conducted operation did not include any effort by U.S. forces to block border infiltration from Pakistan, arresting the al Qaeda leadership or making their escape impossible,

Clarke told in an interview that the Administration viewed Afghanistan as military and political deep and dark water a bypass along the road to Iraq the war that subject most to the President. Clarke and some of his colleagues had repeatedly warned the national-security leadership that, this war of Afghanistan cannot be won with such a small struggle. Clarke continued, there were more cops in New York City than soldiers on war

ground of Afghanistan. We must have a security presence in addition to development program in every region of Afghanistan with full stay there for months or years.

Pakistan and India are at dagger drawn with one another. They have not accepted one another from the very first day of their birth. When America came with deal in India about civil atomic Agreement it enraged Pakistan who was American Partner in war against terrorism and paying hard in the form of financial as well as human losses. It was expected from America that they will have face saving agreement with Pakistan as well but when it was realized that CIA has no such intentions Pakistan changed its policy of war against terrorism.

The selection and appointment of CIA directors became the born right of politicians rather than evaluating their professionalism, expertise in field of intelligence therefore it is truly said that the CIA directors have become political pawns.

The successive arrest of CIA officials during their officials covered suites showed the damnation of CIA for nurturing a culture of moral decline and profiteering in its headquarters. Arrest of Harold Nicholson in 1996 was its clear example. Throughout the world the officials of CIA are accused of selling commercial and industrial secrets. Side business of oil and diamonds are very usual allegation. The high ups of CIA in Afghanistan are allegedly involved in trafficking and Business of drugs such as opium and cold Ice. The officials of CIA have developed a new trend of depending on desk officers rather than recruiting officials to task with traveling and investigating throughout the length and breadth of the world. Tasked with the recruitment of new contacts and hunting down the terrorists. These desk officers are without any field experience and regional expertise. The officials of CIA proved their incompetency in their approach towards Afghan and Arabs their alliance with Muslim militants in Afghanistan against Russians was irrecoverable loss for whole world and US in particular. These Muslim fanatics were supplied with huge sums of dollars and ammunitions in 1980 by CIA. Same fundamentalist who were against western world in the form of Russians are now countering their CIA master. Ever since despite the best efforts of CIA Taliban, Al Qaida and other terrorists' networks are fully functional and operatives in Afghanistan.

Safe Houses converted into Torture Cells:

During their operation in Afghanistan they were provided with huge powers of bull to complete their multi-dimensional agenda. Among that mighty powers the innumerable safe houses were included which were

torture cells. Third degree was usual thing they applied on the suspects. Bagram Air base was notorious among that torture cells. Reportedly 650 people were handed over to CIA by Pakistani authorities on record while those whom were picked by the CIA off the record were unknown. Among these detainees Affiya Siddique was the most prominent case which shaped the mind set of Pakistani and Afghanistan that US are doing so many things inhuman way. CIA badly failed to justify their position on the issue of Affiya Siddique. Similarly, another detainee Mula Abdul Salam Zaeef the then Ambassador of Afghanistan in Pakistan who was picked by CIA and interrogated in Bagram Air base made an eye opening autobiography. In which he clearly wrote the immodest attitude and way of dealing the detainees in their cells.

“CIA black sites” is book written by Symany Poland which clearly reveals that how were the accused dealt by the CIA officials in the safe houses. They used EIT (enhance interrogation techniques) which were most of the time abusive, immodest and torturous.

In reply to a question the station chief of CIA for Islamabad and Afghanistan says that, CIA captured important Taliban and al Qaida leaders to integrate them .it was not to kill them but to know their links and relations with other co-workers of contraband organizations. Although it was not strategic decision but CIA had no other way to follow this option.

In reply to another question he says that, al Qaida is well disciplined, centralized organization we did not had good intelligence sources within that network. The only inside intelligence was through capturing them and interrogating them by different interrogation officer what came out of that interrogation it actually gives names of members and people but plot and planning are hardly known through them. But the names and where about of these member revealed so many information to counter the imminent events and havocs. He further says that they have professional responsibility to follow through. Although the directions and order are issued from president and they are legal but when officials realize it during its services that certain orders are morally not legal and political controversies are face for acting upon that orders it makes a dilemma for the acting officials resultantly we are facing serious risk in creating a generation in CIA which think that they should be decided for themselves for their own personal and bureaucratic reason, which lawful orders they should follow. Institutionalized subordination is not where we want to go.

Installation of Government without Roots in Population:

The input of CIA in the governmental machinery was not logical. They introduced all those to the government whom were sincere with their own priorities. They were criminals, warlords or drug Mafia personals. Resultantly whenever the broad based prosperity of Afghan nation came under consideration their personal interests were badly affected and they protected them at the cost of Afghan National interest under government offices and designations. Loin share in Afghan government was handed over to those elements that had no roots in the general public.

Three to four Billion dollars were spent by CIA during soviet Afghan war. Therefor CIA considers it cheapest victory for them in their war history. This war continued from December 1979 to February 1989 taking almost one complete decade but though out this period roughly fifteen CIA officials were chairing their offices in Afghanistan. Bob Gates recalls that CIA played the role of quarter master only during Afghan soviet war. The narrative stated that CIA created Al-Qaida was wrong. We never trained any Al-Qaida member. We never get into the war directly.

The highest position of the American participation in Afghanistan came in December of 2001, at a symposium of diverse Afghan factions held in Bonn, when the Presidential candidate, Hamid Karzai, was named as chairman of the provisional government. (His election as President was confirmed six months later at a carefully coordinated Afghan tribal council, known as a Loya Jirga.) It was a significant accomplishment, but there were major flaws and lacunas in this broader settlement. There was no concurrence on establishing an international police force, no measures for collecting taxes, no policy for dewatering the existing militant groups or Afghan individual and no declaration with the Taliban.

The American Administration continued to pay off and work directly with local warlords, many of whom were involved in heroin and opium trafficking and business. Their loyalty was not for sale but for rent. Warlords like Hazrat Ali in eastern Afghanistan adjacent to Pakistan border and Mohammed Fahim from Northern Alliance who had pivotal and essential role in American success during their initial military operation, both of them at first promised to accept Karzai as their elected representative. Hazrat Ali was one of several other commanders who were later on blamed for double-crossing American army resulting unsuccessful sweep for Al Qaeda. Fahim, who is iconic power in Afghan government and used to chair office of defense minister, is deeply involved in a number of illicit enterprises.

Extra Dependence on Modern Signal Intelligence:

Durrani states, “I never rated CIA assessment highly. Never, they don’t believe they have to carry out good assessment because in any case they are going to set the place on fire. Bomb it essentially they rely on technology so much. (Durrani).

The very primitive intelligence was through human intelligence usually known as Humint it used to be the most important source of intelligence. Recruiting and nourishment of source or an informant in the base of Taliban or Al Qaida network needs extra patience, professionalism resources and expertness. Risk of such installations is very vast and frequent while regards are often scant. In war against terrorism the CIA recruitment of informants in the length and breadth of Afghanistan was more than enough and with the passage of time they were benefited from this recruitment in the form of splitting Taliban into TTP and TTA and formation of other militant groups within the Taliban but it never succeeded in getting its requisite results. CIA officials were even fluent enough in Pashto and Dari languages and planted high valued Taliban leadership but all in vain. Instead of achieving the trust of layman, building a touching cover story they failed.

Drone attack on the covert CIA agent Baitullah Mehsod was the result of CIA failure to coordinate with in its setup and officials as the information was about high value target of TTA which was passed on for rapid action which was blindly followed without any scrutiny and evaluation. Actually double agent had infiltrated the system of CIA to getting its aim and it has made its information such value able that they always considered his information above any scrutiny and evaluation.

In 2014 drone attack on Hakemullah Mehsod was result of the dialogues being made by him with the cross intelligence setup? It was felt by CIA that he may not open the decade old secrecies and network of agents before the cross intelligence setup. There for he was killed in a drone attack to make him silent once for all.

Mighty Power without Accountability and Assessments:

Durrani further reveals, “I should admit that we feel that if it is coming from CIA man it must be correct. Their pen is backed by a mighty sword neither of us has that sort of sword.” (Durrani).

Saumur Harsh fact based analysis about the operation conducted by CIA in Abbotabad was clearly revealing that it has been directed and planted rather than actual story. The version of Symure Harsh was stamped by Assad Durrani in his book the spy chronicles.

The reports claim that US President Donald Trump has decided to give CIA an “increasing integral” role in his efforts to end the 16-year-old war in Afghanistan, which is already America’s longest military engagement ever.

The reports noted that while the agency was involved in drone attacks in both Afghanistan and Pakistan, on the ground it primarily focused on combating Al Qaeda and helping the Afghan intelligence service but now Washington has decided to give it a greater role.

The US military will concentrate on accomplishing large-scale operation and the paramilitary division of CIA will perform their “hunt and kill” operations. The bureau is already combating the militant Islamic State group and Taliban in Afghanistan.

“The growth represents assertive role of CIA under its new director, Mike Pompeo, to fight insurgents around the world,” *NYT* observed. (Dawn, 2017).

The agency is already made ready to expand its program of clandestine drone attacks in Afghanistan it had largely been centered on the tribal regions of Pakistan, with occasional strikes in Syria and Yemen,” the newspaper added.

The report also reveals that the new CIA mission is a tacit acknowledgement that is aimed to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table, the United States will need to fight aggressively with insurgents and deal them with iron hand. In his Aug 21 speech President Trump also promised to loosen limitations on hunting terrorists. The killers need to know that they have nowhere to hide, that no place is beyond the reach of American might and Americans arms. He further stated that vengeance will be fast and powerful.

Weak Counter-Intelligence:

Intelligence activities concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage or sabotage or subversion or terrorism is called as counterintelligence. An informant allegedly providing the CIA with

information on al-Qaida and other terrorist networks turns out to be a double agent loyal to the very people on whom he's informing. Taking advantage of his access to a secret CIA base in Afghanistan, the man detonates explosives hidden under his clothing and kills seven Americans, his Jordanian "handler" and himself.

Last week's deadly attack in Khost, Afghanistan, resulted from the failure of what professionals call "counterintelligence," the work of keeping your enemy from penetrating your own defenses. Counterintelligence is not only about spying on your enemy. It means getting information about your enemy's efforts to spy on you.

During the Cold War, counterintelligence was largely a spy-versus-spy game, played between U.S. and Soviet intelligence agencies, each determined to trick and outwit the other. When the enemy is a terrorist organization, the counterintelligence challenge is different but no less important.

To track terrorists, intelligence officials need good informants' agents who can report secretly on what al-Qaida or other terrorist organizations are doing. The counterintelligence task is to make sure informants aren't secretly working for the enemy.

People want to produce, and cutting corners is a way to do it. And the more pressure there is in terms of, 'Bring me the head of Osama bin Laden,' [the more] people begin doing things fast instead of well.

Michael Hurley, a former CIA officer who pursued al-Qaida in Afghanistan, says an intelligence officer working with informants or potential informants must first be convinced that the informants are trustworthy by asking a series of questions.

"They will say, 'I went to this district or province in Pakistan or Afghanistan and I saw this terrorist there. This is someone you should be interested in.' Well," says Hurley, "the first question (for the intelligence official) to ask is, 'Were they really there? Were they really standing outside the house where they supposedly saw this person? Does any of that make sense? Is it logical?'"

Many more questions might follow: Can the agent's information be verified? Would it really damage the people on whom he is informing? Does the agent really have the access he claims to have?

Within the intelligence profession, counterintelligence is a specialty. But Hurley says all field officers need counterintelligence proficiency.

"When an officer overseas is meeting an informant," Hurley says, "it's his or her eyes and ears making the initial judgment about the reliability of this person. And what is seen back in Washington will be based on that officer's judgment."

A good counterintelligence investigation is painstaking work, and attention to details is important. Because it's defensive rather than offensive, the reward may not be immediate. (Steve coll).

Despite several years of field operations and the recruitment of more than one hundred reporting agents inside Afghanistan, ALEC station had not penetrated bin Laden planning. Al Qaeda counterintelligence against potential moles was formidable. In counter terrorism, Strategic warning is vital but tactical warning about dates and places saves lives. The CIA had not attained that fidelity about Al Qaeda.

Sensitization of Laymen:

The atrocities of CIA sensitized the layman to such extent that they became suspicious by nature. Every policy which was put forward for the welfare and good means was observed with suspicion as they became aware with all long run policies of CIA. Resultantly piercing resistance was observed. This situation was truly cashed by the non-state actors whom had roots within the local populations. When the propaganda of non-state actors and the suspicious nature of local population got together the strategy of US and CIA became ultimately failed. CIA and Special Forces of US had trained limited number of Afghan national and CIA officials in Pashto language which never came the need and necessity of time, further more vacuum in administrative hierarchy was created in Afghan dealing CIA staff when most of them were pulled out from Afghanistan and shifted to Iraq where CIA was in hot pursuit of Saddam Regime.

Administrative Failure of CIA:

Mossad intelligence officer speaking from Tel Aviv stated the dismal predictions from Israel intelligence is only comfort for western leader desperate to point out the most sophisticated act of terrorism. Leaders of

international community particularly the western world have been intimated very rarely about the truth and reality. The capability of western inelegance has been terribly lowered down to deal with terrorism in the prevailing world. CIA is afforded at the cost of hundreds of Billions of dollars spent per Annam but the quality of intelligence about the threats flowed from muslin fundamentalist is not equivocal to the need and necessity of time. Although the terrorism has evolved from very rudimentary from to the modern and streamlined one but it is never ever an excuse for the CIA rather their failure is embarrassing fact such as the incompetency poor performance and professional motivation of the newly recruited CIA officials. West has spent billions of dollars on acquiring new technology satellites and computers for streamlining their intelligence against the terrorism but CIA has terribly failed to keep a precise balance between human intelligence and signal intelligence. Resultantly the efficiency of individual intelligence officers working in headquarter of USA was affected across the world consequently the performance of CIA was publically attacked by the congress for incompetency. CIA has been blamed for political and personal affiliation with firms and organizations at the very gross root level the officials of CUA are engaged with launching cases for sexual harassment than exposing the perpetrators of terrorism. the fundamental secret of intelligence based operations are often sacrificed for selfish political advantages a result while working in such circumstances. The performance of CIA has fatally been compromised and ineffective. CIA officials are engaged in plotting unethical plan against the opposition and governments rather than expressing the hidden enemies of America.

Conclusion:

The most horrific war fought on the battle field of Afghanistan in the horizon of south Asia was basically a war between six security Agencies such as KHAD (Khadamat-e Aetla'at-e Dawlati) CIA, ISI, KGB and The General Intelligence *Presidency* (GIP) Saudi Intelligence. Afghan Mujahidin were basically nourished and empowered by CIA, ISI, and GIP. They were candid with the Holly slogan of Muslim Holly warrior and pushed hard to bow down the soviet intelligence KGB. Most of the covert and undercover operations conducted in Afghanistan were planned by CIA with the help of ISI financed by Saudi Arabia. Even the formation of new apparatus Taliban was result of that continued war. The war in

Afghanistan was nothing more than a bad strategy of CIA and Pentagon; it was filthy plan which was obviously reflecting poor military planning and strategy. Self-entertaining and explain interpretations of Iraq war led to predictably hazardous outcome of Afghanistan war. (Steve Coll).

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