
China's Foreign Policy towards the Islamic Republics of Central Asia

****Quaid Ali
Dr. Rais Gul*

Abstract

China has become an important player on the Central Asian landscape since 2000s. In less than two decades, China has been able to make a huge and multiform entry in Central Asia. On the bilateral diplomacy level it has managed to prove itself a loyal friend and has been able to turn the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) into a structure valued by its members. Beijing has also become an important player in infrastructure and hydrocarbon sector as well as trade. Besides this, China has concerns over the Muslim fundamentalist in the region. This study employed the qualitative method in which secondary sources of data are taken. The paper endeavors to analyze the economic engagement of China in the Islamic Republics of Central Asia since their inception.

Keywords: CARs, Oil, Gas, China, SCO, Economy, Investment, Islam

* PhD Scholar, Department of Political Science, Hazara University Mansehra.

** Lecturer Department of Sociology, Islamia College University, Peshawar.

Introduction

The Central Asian region mainly includes Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Direct relations between China and CARs were extremely limited during the lifetime of Soviet Union, as official interactions were channeled almost totally through Moscow. Regional expertise in Chinese foreign policy circles lacked significantly in 1991. China was apprehensive about the creation of a security vacuum and instability in Central Asia as a result of the collapse of Soviet Union that would have an adverse effect on Xinjiang province of neighboring China.¹ China swiftly established relationships with the newly born states, but for many years this region was neither an economic nor a diplomatic priority. Initially China's key objectives were to demarcate borders and to secure support for its policies in Xinjiang province. In order to attain these objectives including demilitarization, in April 1996, the Shanghai Five Forum was established by China. Its other members were Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. At the governmental level this approach was successful, but many ordinary Central Asians viewed border deals with suspicion.²

China started to take note of economic opportunities in Central Asia in the mid-1990s. It signed the first of many deals in September 1997 with Kazakhstan for the development of oil and gas fields and construction of pipelines. There were approximately 1,000 Chinese enterprises in Central Asia by 2005. Between 2000 and 2010, Chinese trade with the five Central Asian states increased 30-fold.³

China wanted economic relationships between Xinjiang and Central Asia to ensure stability in both sides. Consequently it would be another way ensuring China's quest for a "peaceful rise" to great power status. It has been actively started numerous vital infrastructure projects such as, roads and pipelines to link CARs with Xinjiang, since the early 2000s.⁴

Great power rivalry:

The swift entry of China in Central Asian region has get an appearance of respectability and an image of trustworthy partner in the region. The latest Silk Road Economic Belt scheme of China has planned funds of about \$ 40 billion to promote infrastructure, industrial and financial co-operation.⁵ In order to strengthen their ancient relationships with China, the countries of Central Asia have swiftly pledged to support the 'Silk Route Belt' idea of the former. Gen. Liu Yazhou of the PLA has expressed that Central Asia was a large piece of cake given to the people of China by the heavens.⁶

China's goals in Central Asia:

The overall engagement of China with CARs can be divided into four major and coinciding categories. First, the strategic importance of CARs and its possible implications on global events are recognized by China. Second, China is well aware of the fact that an important role can be played by CARs in future economic development of China, as the region has the potential to supply huge energy resources.⁷ Third, China has political and security interest in the region. It wants to make sure the individual states of Central Asia grow in a way that does not become a threat for China, such as by establishing

radical Islamic governments in these states. Lastly, China recognizes that bilateral relations as well as multilateral approach to cooperation in achieving their common objectives.⁸

Economic Relations:

In its trade with the Central Asian countries, one of the most important products for China is the energy sources and other raw materials. In 2003, for instance, about 80% of the exports of Kazakhstan to China contained raw materials in which 58% were sources of energy and 24% were ferrous and non-ferrous metals. The volume of trade between CARs and China is growing swiftly. The bilateral trade volume in 2005 was 4% higher than that for the same period in 2004. In 2006, China–Central Asian trade increased to US\$13 billion according to Chinese figures and US\$10 billion according to Central Asian figures. The economic presence of China in neighboring countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan is already higher than Russian's if we take into account the shuttle trade.⁹

In Sino–Central Asian trade relations, the trade is carried out mostly between China and Kazakhstan. Kazakhstan rose to become the second largest trading partner of China in the region after Russia. Of the total trade, Kazakhstan has 70%, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan each have 9%, Kyrgyzstan 7% and Turkmenistan only 2% of share in trade with China. It is estimated that about 75% of China's exports to Kyrgyzstan are re-exported to other countries Central Asia. The total trade of China with the Central Asia countries reached to US\$ 46 billion in 2012.¹⁰ After gold extraction, the re-exportation of Chinese

goods to other Central Asian states has become the second largest economic activity of Kyrgyzstan.¹¹

Bilateral as well as multi-lateral ties have been established with Central Asian states by China. Primary objective of China has been to make use of huge mineral resources of Central Asia for its economic development; to supply export manufactured goods to Central Asian countries and to defend itself against the menace of “separatism, extremism and terrorism” originating out of Central Asian region. Various kinds of connectivity have been built by China with Central Asia. With the passage of time, the dependence of Central Asian states on China has been rising.¹²

It is the bad luck of the CARs that they are land-locked having no direct access to the sea. Resultantly, they cannot transport their oil and gas to the outside world. In order to facilitate the connectivity of the Central Asian region with the rest of the world, the building of new infrastructure is being in progress.¹³ Nevertheless, there are four routes for the transport of oil and gas from Central Asian region, such as, Northern route, East route, Western route and Southern route. For the transport of its hydrocarbon resources, the land locked Central Asian countries are working in cooperation with the outside world.¹⁴

Russia is favoring and has occupied the Northern route. This route runs from Kazakhstan's Baku and Tengiz field to the Russian seaport Novorossiysk in the black sea.¹⁵ However, due to the monopolistic and dominant policies of Russia over the main transport network of the Central Asian states, the latter are searching alternative routes with the help of extra-regional powers. The Eastern route is

linked with two oil fields of Caspian Sea in Kazakhstan. This route is proposed and supported by China. On 1st August 2012, China Central Asia Gas Pipeline Project was launched. Both the countries have already invested in 2005, in Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline which is 3200 km in length. There is possibility to bring oil through Eastern route from Kazakhstan to South Asia as China has a border with South Asia.¹⁶

The Western route is supported by the United States to use Caspian Sea for the transport of oil to Europe.¹⁷ The Southern route is the proposed route through either Pakistan or Iran.¹⁸ Investment has also been made by Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to join gas pipeline.¹⁹

For the first time, in 1996, China has proposed the construction of Kazakhstan-China pipeline. This project was opposed by both Russia and the United States. Kazakh government was encouraged by Moscow to exclusively use Russian pipelines. It was proposed by Washington that the surplus oil from Tengiz should be sent to Europe by sea across the Caspian Sea.²⁰

Nevertheless, in September 2004, China continued with the construction of the pipeline. On December 15, 2005, the President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev approved the initiation of filling about 1,000 km of the pipeline (Oil, Gas & Energy Law Intelligence, 2006). Atasu, in central Kazakhstan and Alashankou, in Xinjiang is connected through this pipeline. The pipeline had carried about 200,000 barrels a day in 2006 to the Dushanzi refinery in China. It was even claimed by Zhou Jiping, the then Chinese Vice-President of Petro-Kazakhstan that the pipeline was the “new Silk Road”.²¹

Since Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline has been discussed, the performance of the pipeline is less than its maximum capacity; even though oil production of Kazakhstan has increased twofold since the late 90s. Certainly, about 10 million tons of oil has been transported through the pipeline. It has been estimated that it would transport twofold of this capacity.²²

There has been a progressive increase in economic cooperation between China and the five Central Asian countries. From 2005 to 2010, the trade volume between two sides has increased by 40% per year. In 2010, it reached to US \$18–20 billion, and this growth is showing no signs to stop. China can enhance its energy security and can generate revenue for the stimulation of its economic development through economic cooperation with CARs.²³

Central Asia imports about 92 percent of finished products from China. There is abundance of the raw material in the Central Asian Countries. These raw materials are imported by China and the finished goods are exported to these five Central Asian Republics.²⁴

The whole Central Asian region is a large producer of partially processed wet blue skins and raw skin of animals. Uzbekistan is the home of domestic leather production industries. Approximately 90% of the raw skins from Central Asia are exported to China. In the same way, Kyrgyzstan 90% of cattle skin, sheep, and lamb hide to China (Stobdan, 2014).

China's investment policy:

The countries of Central Asia provide new markets for the products of China. Thus the investment card has been played by

Beijing. China is concentrating to build roads and railway lines, to improve electrical grids, to improve hydroelectricity resources, to exploit precious mineral resources, and to develop trade relations with CARs.²⁵

Among the investors in Central Asia, China is the only investors that attach importance to invest in the banking sector. This sector is often neglected by other countries. Almost all the Central Asian states have weak banking systems except Kazakhstan. Chinese Industrial and Commercial Bank and the Bank of China have opened branches in Kazakh state. The Development Bank of China and the Kazyna Development Fund has agreed for the creation of a Sino–Kazakh development fund in 2006, for the purpose of investment in collective infrastructure projects worth US \$ 5 billion.²⁶

In order to gain advantageous access to the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong, Kazyna is also looking forward to send representatives to Beijing, Hong Kong and Urumqi. In 2009, a loan of about US\$10 billion was extended by China to Kazakhstan some weeks before the summit meeting of SCO in Ekaterinburg. Half of the money is to be paid by China for the purchase of the Mangistau Munay Gas by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and for the construction of the Beineu–Bozoi–Akbulak gas pipeline. The other half of the amount would be a loan Paid to the Development Bank of Kazakhstan by the Export–Import Bank of China.²⁷

As it is asserted by some specialists that economic growth produce political stability close economic relations with CARs allows China not to worry about the potential spread of political instability in

its western provinces (China Daily, 2011). Chinese experts are of the view that the problem of political instability will be resolved if financial and economic cooperation among China, Central Asia and Russia will be booted. Its next solution is strengthening of the mechanisms of SCO.²⁸

SCO has been used by China on primary basis to promote its economic interests by putting them in a multilateral framework. China has made generous investment and provides assistance for development particularly to Kazakhstan and Tajikistan. China offered development loans package of a US \$900 million in 2004 to SCO members. Out of the total amount, US \$600 million was received by Tajikistan and the remaining \$300 million was received by Kyrgyzstan.²⁹

Table 1
China's trade with CARs 2012

China as the Exporter and Importer					
Country	Trade value US\$ 1000	Export value US\$ 1000	Import value US\$ 1000	Trade Value %	Export value%
Kazakhstan	25,676,790	11,001,670	14,675,120	2.9	15.0
Kyrgyzstan	5,162,470	5,073,510	88,960	3.7	4.0
Tajikistan	1,856,700	1,747,870	10,883	-10.3	-12.5
Turkmenistan	10,372,710	1,699,330	8,673,380	89.4	116.7
Uzbekistan	2,874,680	1,783,050	1,091,630	32.7	31.2

Source: Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China, Department of European Affairs.

CNPC is regarded as the most flourishing foreign investor in the hydrocarbon sector of Turkmenistan. China has nonstop access to major fields of gas in Turkmenistan. In 2009, Central Asia-China gas pipeline was started. It carries gas from Turkmenistan and other Central Asian states to Shanghai and Hong Kong. On initial stages, the cost of this project was US \$ 8 billion which rose to US \$ 10 billion.³⁰

Significant investment has been made by China in building highways, pipelines, railways and electricity grids for socio-economic development of its friendly Central Asian regimes. Similarly, China is also seeking support for its one China policy from these states. However, Chinese experts are aware of the repercussions caused by this economic investment in the region. Beijing is in dire need to change the perception that Central Asia is used as a 'resource pit' by China.³¹

China's new strategy towards CARs:

Western areas of China more or less completely depend on the continuous trade and contact with CARs. That trade in turn is dependent on people-to-people interactions being as cooperative and friendly as possible. Economic development of the western border area is the main pillar of the strategy to calm down the separatists movements and to stabilize the western border. The trade of Xinjiang with CARs is about 83% of its total trade while 80% of total trade of China with Central Asia is through Xinjiang (Muslim majority region of China).³²

Attempts are being made by China for building political and economic links with Central Asian region. Now China is the main source of foreign investment for Central Asia and its major trading

partner. This country is playing a pivotal role in the SCO. Chinese analysts have certain concerns about the influence of China in Central Asia. It is the Central region which is ready to struggle for resources among major powers.³³

China is attempting to prove itself as a 'good neighbor' for Central Asian States. Since 2009, several trips have been made by Hu Jintao to Central Asia. In November 2010, Wen Jiabao visited Kazakhstan for an SCO meeting. In 1994, 1996, and 2002 agreements were signed by China to end differences with Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan to ensure security of the borders in the northwest.³⁴

In the Central Asian states, the number of sectors in which China is involved is still comparatively very limited. The major commodities which are imported by China from Central Asia are Energy resources (oil and natural gas) and raw materials such as cotton, uranium, iron ore, copper, and other non-ferrous metals. China wants to broaden its investment in Central Asia in the fields of transport, electricity and telecommunications. It has been suggested by Li Xin that loans could be offered by China for oil.³⁵

Chinese threat perception from Islamic groups:

The greatest outstanding security concern of China is Xinjiang and the war against the "three evils" of separatism, extremism and terrorism. It is the desire of China that the countries of Central Asia must take an active part in its clash against the separatist movements of Uyghur. Apart from China, Uyghur are largely inhabited in Central Asia. Numerous fundamentalist, radical and separatist groups of Muslims have their bases in CARs. China is also worried about the

instability in Kyrgyzstan and Fergana Valley. It shares a border of 1,000 km with Kyrgyzstan. Fergana Valley spreads across Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan.³⁶

According to Ling Ji, supporting the economies of CARs is in the interest of both China as well as CARs. China should make investment in infrastructure, energy, and other fields. This could be helpful in improving social stability. Declining growth as well as extremism, separatism, and terrorism has undermined the social stability since the dissolution of Soviet Union. Currently, China has invested more than US\$10 billion in Central Asia.³⁷ Currently, the Muslim fighters of Central Asian Republics are fighting in Afghanistan beside Taliban against the US forces. There is a risk that these fighters may start their struggle against their home governments after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan. This would be a dangerous situation for both China and Central Asia.³⁸

The Chinese government is apprehended that the Muslims may pose threat for the country. They are particularly afraid of the Muslims fighting in Afghanistan and are considering them as terrorists. Nevertheless, the groups fighting in Afghanistan against the US troops claimed that they are waging jihad (Holy War) against the aggressors. They are of the belief that Muslim religion is a religion of peace but it is their religious duty to fight against the wrong doer and it is not terrorism. Terrorism has no place in Islam. Allah says in the Holy Quran,

وَقَاتِلُوا فِي سَبِيلِ اللَّهِ الَّذِينَ يُقَاتِلُونَكُمْ وَلَا تَعْتَدُوا إِنَّ اللَّهَ لَا يُحِبُّ الْمُعْتَدِينَ

“Fight in way of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress. Indeed, Allah does not like transgressors”.³⁹

مِنْ أَجْلِ ذَلِكَ كَتَبْنَا عَلَى بَنِي إِسْرَائِيلَ أَنَّهُ مَن قَتَلَ نَفْسًا بِغَيْرِ نَفْسٍ أَوْ فَسَادٍ فِي الْأَرْضِ فَكَأَنَّمَا قَتَلَ النَّاسَ جَمِيعًا وَمَنْ أَحْيَاهَا فَكَأَنَّمَا أَحْيَا النَّاسَ جَمِيعًا وَلَقَدْ جَاءَتْهُمْ رُسُلُنَا بِالْبَيِّنَاتِ ثُمَّ إِنَّ كَثِيرًا مِّنْهُمْ بَعْدَ ذَلِكَ فِي الْأَرْضِ لَمُسْرِفُونَ

“Whosoever kills an innocent human being it shall be as if he has killed all mankind, and whosoever saves the life of one , it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind”.⁴⁰

وَقَدْ خَابَ مَن دَسَّاهَا, قَدْ أَفْلَحَ مَن زَكَّاهَا

In another verse Allah says, “By the soul and (by) Him who made it perfect, and then inspired it to understand what is wrong and what is right for it. Truly is successful the one who purifies (his soul).⁴¹

Islam is the religion of uprightness and morality. Its followers are ordered have compete faith and to fight also against the inner evils. The Prophet of God dispatched a contingent of the army (to the battlefield). Upon their return, the Prophet said: Blessed are those who have performed the minor jihad and have yet to perform the major jihad, when asked, what is the major jihad? The Prophet replied: The jihad of the self (struggle against self).⁴² On another occasion, a person asked the Prophet: “Should I joined the jihad?” The Prophet asked upon him, “Do you have parents?” The replied yes. The Holy Prophet said: “then do jihad by serving them”.⁴³

The above mentioned versus of the Holy Quran and saying of the Holy Quran means that jihad far more than fighting against the

oppressors. The greatest jihad is against the evils one self and to serve one parents.

Risks Associated With Doing Business in Central Asia

China is interested to maintain the status quo in Central Asia both for economic and security purposes. These republics seem reliable due to the permanence of the presidents of the region, but each regime of Central Asia lack generosity of spirit and are inundated in corruption and socio-economic problems. It has been complained by the Chinese that the intensity of corruption is far more in CARs than what they have experienced in other countries where they work. Corruption is an awfully serious dilemma. While dealing with these governments, serious problems are faced by China. The ruling elites are criticized domestically who at the same time get financial and political benefit by their relation with bureaucrats of China and thus the investment of China is at risk due to these administrators.⁴⁴

Similar problems are faced by China in Kyrgyzstan. It seems those Chinese migrants as competitors who are hardworking, entrepreneurial and who have the ability to work and live in tough environment. There are apprehensions that the Chinese could take up a share of the already limited labour market and some important sectors of the national economy could be controlled by them. About 7,000 to 10,000 Chinese are working in Tajikistan. Their presence has generated concern in that country. Although some unease has been expressed by the local population, the issue has not created so negative perception as in Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.⁴⁵

Beijing has tried to solve the problem on diplomatic level in situations where there were apprehensions that the security of its people was in danger and effective response was not there from the host country. For instance, in August 2011, after the attack on a Chinese-owned gold mine, on three Chinese workers in Kyrgyzstan's Naryn region, concerns were raised publically by the Chinese embassy about poor protection of the rights of the investors.

In the national security and economic development of China, the Central Asian region has a central position. The biggest long-term security Chinese apprehension in the region is internal disorder within these governments and its effects. In addition, major worries for China are the withdrawal of the NATO/US troops from Afghanistan in future. The main reason is the proximity of Afghanistan with China and the threat of increase in activities of Jihadist groups in the region.⁴⁶

Cooperation with Russia may be enhanced by China and it may put more security resources in SCO. In June 2012 a declaration was signed in Beijing at the SCO summit. That declaration may be part of the desire to China for strengthening the security role of the organization in the region in response to the uncertainties and complexities which are facing by the countries of Central Asia.⁴⁷

China is worried about Afghanistan having the potential of a base for the Xinjiang's separatists. This situation has led China to think about engagement with Taliban, which is not only considered by China as a terrorist group but also a political force. There are also worries about extremist Islamic groups flowing into Central Asian region. It would be a major problem for Kabul, and even Xinjiang if US troops

withdraw without a victory from Afghanistan. Towards its strategy in Afghanistan, Pakistan is playing a key role. The interests of Pakistan can be equated with the interests of China in Afghanistan.⁴⁸

Beyond holding talks between members, unwillingness or inability has been shown by SCO to play its role in times of crisis. The mechanism for security cooperation can be worked out and the organization can go ahead of "idle talk" if legal hurdles within the organization are removed. The SCO needs to set up groups or societies to help member countries to settle their domestic issues, particularly where there is involvement of external powers.⁴⁹

Conclusion

China has started taking bilateral and multilateral steps for engagement with the CARs as a key competitor with huge economic interests in the region. The non-interference policy of Beijing put restriction on its actual engagement, but China is aware about the fact this policy will not protect the interest of China in Central Asian region. Obviously, energy cooperation between Central Asia and China is growing very quickly. Rather than directly within the framework of SCO, the energy cooperation is one of the foundations of a cooperative relationship constituted on the sidelines of the organization. The government of China and the Chinese experts are aware that the regional security climate might change due to departure of NATO from Afghanistan. China is trying to avoid the three evils of separatism, extremism and terrorism by controlling the Muslim fundamentalists both in its Uyghur autonomous region and CARs. Muslims are not a threat for either CARs or China's interest. If the Chinese government will

work for the betterment of the Uyghur Muslims, they will not pose a threat for the state. It would have key implications for the interests of China in the region. The visibility and influence of China is growing rapidly in the region. In the Central Asian states, China is already a dominant economic force and within the next few years could overshadow the United States and Russia becoming the pre-eminent external power in the region.

References:

- ¹ Swantrom, N. (2011). China and Greater Central Asia: New Frontiers. *Central Asia – Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program*.
www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2011
- ² Anatoliy, A. Rozanov. (2013). The Shanghai cooperation Organization and Central Asia's Security Challenges. DCAF Regional Programmes Series No.16. Almaty, Minsk and Geneva.
- ³ Cooley, A. (2012). The New Great Game in Central Asia: Geopolitics in a Post-Western World. Foreign Affairs. <<http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137813/alexander-cooley/the-new-great-game-in-central-asia>>
- ⁴ Central Asia's Silk Road Rivalries (2017, July 27). International Crisis Group. Report No. 245
- ⁵ Indeo, F. (2016). The Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt: the impact of the Sino-Russian geopolitical strategies in the Eurasia region. MSM Working Paper No. 2016/5
- ⁶ Stobdan, P. (2014). *Central Asia: Democracy, Instability and Strategic Game in Kyrgyzstan*. Pentagon Press.
- ⁷ Higashi, N. (2009). Natural Gas in China Market evolution and strategy. International Energy Agency . *Working Paper Series*.
- ⁸ Kim, S. (2005). *China-Central Asia Trading Relations*. Tashkent. The Scientific Notes of the Tashkent Institute of Oriental Studies, vol. VIII, 10.
- ⁹ Raballand, G., & Andréys, A. (2007) "Why should trade between Central Asia and China continue to expand?", *Asia Europe Journal*, Vol. 5, No. 2, pp. 235–252.
- ¹⁰ Gupta, A. (2013, October 14) India and Central Asia: Need for a Pro-active Approach, IDSA Policy Brief.
- ¹¹ Peyrouse, S. (2009). Central Asia's growing partnership with China, EUCAM Working Paper No. 4.
- ¹² Joseph Y. S., & Cheng (2011). The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: China's Initiative in Regional Institutional Building. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 41, No. 4

-
- ¹³ Yenikeyeff, S. (2008). *Kazakhstan's Gas: Export Markets and Export Routes*. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. ISBN 978-1-901795-79-0
- ¹⁴ Jacob, H. (2005). *India's Overseas Energy Policy: The Central Asian Factor*. New Delhi. Knowledge World.
- ¹⁵ Yenikeyeff, S. (2008). *Kazakhstan's Gas: Export Markets and Export Routes*. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. ISBN 978-1-901795-79-0
- ¹⁶ Singh, S., & Kaur, A. (2014) Connect Central Asia Policy' Factor In India's Soft Power Initiatives In Cars: Problems And Prospects. *International Journal of Advanced Research in Management and Social Sciences*. Vol. 3, No. 12
- ¹⁷ Fatima, Q., & Zafar, S. (2014). New Great Game: Players, Interests, Strategies and Central Asia. *South Asian Studies*. Vol. 29, No.2
- ¹⁸ Taraporevala, P. et al. (2014, January 6). India Central Asia Backgrounder. Centre for Policy Research. <<http://idcr.cprindia.org/p/page-4.html#a93>>
- ¹⁹ Gupta, A. (2013, October 14) India and Central Asia: Need for a Pro-active Approach, IDSA Policy Brief.
- ²⁰ Fatima, Q., & Zafar, S. (2014). New Great Game: Players, Interests, Strategies and Central Asia. *South Asian Studies*. Vol. 29, No.2
- ²¹ Pala, C. (2006, March 17). China Pays Dearly for Kazakhstan Oil. *The New York Times*.
- ²² Duarte, P. (2014). Cooperation And Conflict: The Dynamics Of Oil And Gas In Central Asia. *Austral: Brazilian Journal of Strategy & International Relations*, Vol.3, No.5.
- ²³ Schwoob, M. H. (2011). The new great game in Central Asia. *European council on foreign relations*.
- ²⁴ Wu, H. L., & Chen, C. H. (2004). The Prospects for Regional Economic Integration between China and the Five Central Asian Countries. *Europe-Asia Studies*, Vol. 56, No. 7.
- ²⁵ Swantrom, N. (2011). China and Greater Central Asia: New Frontiers. *Central Asia – Caucasus Institute & Silk Road Studies Program*.
www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2011
- ²⁶ Cooley, A. (26/ 2015). Russia and China in Central Asia. Policy Brief. Norwegian Institute of International Affair.
- ²⁷ Peyrouse, S. (2009). Central Asia's growing partnership with China, EUCAM Working Paper No. 4.
- ²⁸ Javaid, F., & Khan, M. A. (2015). The Role of Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with special reference to U.S. Rivalry towards Central Asia. *International Research Journal of Social Sciences*. Vol. 4(3), 58-63.
- ²⁹ Joseph Y. S., & Cheng (2011). The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: China's Initiative in Regional Institutional Building. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 41, No. 4
- ³⁰ Javaid, U., & Rashid, A. (2015). Oil and Gas Potentials of Central Asian Republics and Relations with Pakistan. *South Asian Studies* Vol. 30, No.1
- ³¹ Lifan, L. (2012, June 15). China's International Strategy Development: Concept, Trends and Implications. Shanghai. SASS Conference.
- ³² Tukmadiyeva, M. (2013). Xinjiang in China's Foreign Policy towards Central Asia. *The Quarterly Journal*, vol. 12, Issue 3.
-

³³ Doyon, J. (2011). The new great game in Central Asia. *European council on foreign relations*.

³⁴ Joseph Y. S., & Cheng (2011). The Shanghai Co-operation Organisation: China's Initiative in Regional Institutional Building. *Journal of Contemporary Asia* Vol. 41, No. 4

³⁵ *ibid*

³⁶ Doyon, J. (2011). *Opcit.*

³⁷ Schwoob, M. H. (2011). *Opcit.*

³⁸ China's Central Asia. (2013, February 27) International Crisis Group. Problem Asia Report N°244.

³⁹ Quran: Sura e Bakara; 2:190

⁴⁰ Quran: Sura e Al- Maieda; 5:32

⁴¹ Quran: Sura e Shams; 91: 7-9

⁴² Al-Majlisi, Bihar al-Anwar, vol. 19, p.182, Hadith no. 31

⁴³ Sahih Bukhari 2842, Sahih Muslim 2549

⁴⁴ China's Central Asia. (2013, February 27) International Crisis Group. Problem Asia Report N°244.

⁴⁵ *ibid*

⁴⁶ Iram Khalid et al. (2016). China-Central Asia Relations: A Socio-Economic and Security Analysis of Bilateral Ties. *Journal of Political Studies, Vol. 23, Issue – 1, Pp. 49:62.*

⁴⁷ China's Central Asia. (2013, February 27). *Opcit.*

⁴⁸ Huasheng, Z. (2012). China and Afghanistan: China's interests, stances and perspectives. Centre for Strategic and International Studies.

⁴⁹ Doyon, J. (2011). *Opcit*