Intelligence Collaboration between Law Enforcement, Military and National Security Agencies in Pakistan

Ihsan Ghani[1]

Pakistan had remained at the centre stage of Cold War, Afghan war and Global War On Terror for more than five decades. Few countries have been in the forefront to help the Western world in first countering the Soviet threat and then fighting an extremist ideology.

Face of terrorism, over the last seven decades has changed dramatically. If we compare the Irish problem, the Palestinian issue, the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), The Red Army Faction (RAF), The Red Brigades, The Japanese Red Army or even the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) with Al-Qaida, Taliban or Daésh, there is clear distinction in the modus oprendi, reach, spread and level of violence. Terrorist organisations today have become corporate entities. These have franchise all across the globe. Having an ideological appeal, their reach is almost unlimited. In the recent times, their use of latest technology for spreading their ideology, propaganda, recruitment, funding has been unmatched. Attracting and radicalising, both the educated and uneducated youth has been their biggest success and a significant threat.

Pakistan is not the only country affected by militancy, extremism and terrorism. Winds of terror have swept all across the region and the world. Countries in the region have seen some of the worst terrorist attacks in history. A whole civilisation has seen nothing but war, destruction and mayhem. Be it religious extremism, right-wing extremism, politico-religious extremism or left-wing extremism, innocent people have been the target.

The evolution of extremism and terrorism in Pakistan can be divided in two distinct phases. The first phase can be referred to as the era of upheavals starting from the Afghan war until 2001, whereas the second phase started with the beginning of Global War on Terror (GWOT) after the 9/11 attacks.

- In the first phase, Pakistan took up the gauntlet against the Soviet invasion to help the West in turning the tide of the war, ultimately resulting in the breakup of the Soviet Union. Pakistan also had to host

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[1] Was a senior Police Officer, who remained as Inspector General of Police, KP Province and National Coordinator, NACTA, Islamabad

millions of Afghan Refugees, who despite four decades are living in the country.

- The second phase was more violent as the US and its NATO allies toppled the Taliban regime and tried to establish a moderate system in Afghanistan. Despite an early declaration of "Mission Accomplish" the war is still raging across the country with more and more players still pouring in from around the world to fill in the vacuum in the vast and ungoverned wilderness in Afghanistan.

These two phases have created lasting rifts and fault lines within the Pakistani society and developed extremist mind-set which will take time, effort and resources for reversal. The Afghan Refugees crisis and the porous border has compounded security situation which has been further aggravated by the rise of Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs). The country had to divert critical resources away from education, health, infrastructure and economic development during these troubled decades. This further exacerbated the frustration among the population as unemployment shot up, development work suffered, economic disparities increased and population tilted toward further polarisation, intolerance and extremism.

Pakistan's internal security challenges emanate from multiple factors, which include ethnic/sectarian fault lines, socioeconomic or political grievances etc. Since 2001, more than 18,000 terrorist attacks were perpetrated by various global, regional and local terrorist organizations killing thousands of Pakistanis. Terrorist activities of foreign sponsored sub nationalist groups particularly in Balochistan are of serious concern. Associated problems aggravating internal security include presence of Afghan Refugees, proscribed organizations, capacity issues of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs), weaknesses of the Criminal Justice System and overall poor social indicators of the country.

As compared to 2010, a significant decline in the number of terrorist attacks occurred in 2017; this highlights improvement in internal security situation of Pakistan. The downward trend in the number of terrorist attacks as compared to the previous years can be attributed to a hybrid mix of kinetic and non-kinetic state response.

Essential ingredients for sustaining terrorist organisation

A terrorist organisation needs certain ingredients to sustain itself. Two of the most important ingredients however are steady supply of recruits and funds. People join terrorist organisation for various reasons. By formulating and implementing

Countering Violent Extremism policies, recruitment can be reduced. For choking financing for terrorism, Pakistan has taken a number of measures. Financial Action Task Force is a regularity authority established to monitor and reporton states which do not put in place measure required to stop terrorist financing and anti money laundering. Financial restrictions are placed on states so reported.

Most of the time, we tend to ignore an extremely vital part of counter terrorism i.e intelligence gathering, dissemination and sharing. It is however a historical and established fact that protocols established by governments to exchange intelligence with a friendly country can yield significant benefits. The British- US Communication Intelligence Agreement, 1943 (BRUSA) is a case in point. Such arrangements involve certain risks like compromise of intelligence sources, exposing methodologies etc., but extraordinary problems demand extraordinary solutions and states have to weigh pros and cons of such arrangements. Multilateral cooperation has been developed in the intelligence field. Some experts have deemed such cooperation unlikely, irrelevant or even dangerous due to low gains and high risks. However, multilateral intelligence cooperation both exists and seems to be on the increase.

Since the 9/11 attacks, foreign intelligence sharing has taken the centre stage. Many attacks have been foiled through foreign intelligence sharing. States have to put in place protocols for sharing intelligence in the Counter Terrorism realm. Countries in the West are already countering terrorism through active intelligence cooperation and collaboration. If this is not done voluntarily, international regimes can be established to ensure sharing, cooperation and collaboration of intelligence.

Da'esh Threat in Pakistan

Da'esh phenomenon in Pakistan is closely linked to Afghanistan. Rise of Daésh in both countries has to be analyzed simultaneously. Start of military operations in Pakistan in June 2014 and eventual fleeing of Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to Afghanistan coincided with sudden successes of Daésh in Iraq and Syria, giving new hope to these defeated terrorists.

Da'esh appeared first in Pakistan in July 2014, with the unilateral announcement of allegiance to Daésh by an unknown Karachi based terrorist group Tehreek-e-Khilafat. Thereafter, six Tehreek Taliban Pakistan (TTP) defeated commanders of various agencies of the erstwhile Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) who fled to Afghanistan also pledged their allegiance to Daésh between Sep-Oct 2014. At this point, Hafiz Saeed Khan Orakzai, TTP head of Kurram was

appointed overall Ameer of Daésh Khorasan region. Mullah Fazalullah, then the head of TTP, endorsed activities of Daésh but did not announce any formal allegiance. Though Daésh has claimed responsibility for a number of attacks inside Pakistan, its organizational infrastructure is missing. Distribution of pamphlets/leaflets, wall-chalking and presence on the internet has been the major visible marks.In December 2014, Women of 'Jamia Hifza'- an extremist religious seminary for women in the heart of Islamabad, pledged allegiance to Daésh and released a video supporting Daésh ideology.

TTP is hemorrhaging cadres to Daésh, as foot-soldiers are abandoning TTP to join Daésh, finding the latter to be more aggressive, barbaric and effective in terms of operational capabilities. Moreover, other terrorist organizations such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Jamaat-ul-Ahraar (JuA) are also believed to have operational alliances with Daésh. Notwithstanding above, Daésh is exerting itself to establish a base in the Subcontinent and pockets of Western Pacific Region, which needs an appropriate response. Daésh is a global threat and we need to respond to this threat through global connectivity.

Law Enforcement Agencies in Pakistan:

The frontline Law Enforcement agency like the rest of the world, is the police. As per the Constitution of Pakistan, law and order in the country is responsibility of the provincial governments. Police as such are under the provincial governments. At the federal level, Frontier Constabulary and Frontier Corps are available for maintenance of order and deployment in aid of civil power.

Intelligence agencies in Pakistan:

Pakistan has over 30 different intelligence agencies. These include military intelligence agencies, civilian agencies, provincial and federal agencies. The most significant and prominent in terms of influence, resources among these are the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Intelligence Bureau (IB), Military Intelligence (MI), provincial Special Branches and the Counter Terrorism Departments. ISI is headed by a 3-star Army general and is staffed mostly by army personnel. Director General ISI reports to the Army Chief and the Prime Minister. IB is the premier civilian intelligence agency. Established in 1934, it is traditionally headed by a police officer though during Martial law days, army officers have been appointed as its Director Generals. IB reports directly to the Prime Minister. MI deals primarily with army

related intelligence but has at times transgressed into domain of other agencies. DG MI reports to the Army Chief.

Types of Intelligence
HUMINT:
HUMINT is the most significant component of every intelligence gathering exercise. In order to improve upon HUMINT resources, every intelligence organization develops its own "tradecraft", which is a term used for techniques and methods used by human actors in modern espionage. In Pakistan, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Military Intelligence (MI), Intelligence Bureau (IB) andSpecial Branches of provincial police etc.have extensive HUMINT capabilities.In terms of acquiring quality intelligence on Da'esh, HUMINT inputs remain the most important means.

Communications Intelligence (COMINT):
COMINT includes:
i.   Signals intelligence (SIGINT),
ii.   Computer Intelligence and
iii.   Satellite Intelligence (SATINT)

These are the intelligence gathering disciplines concerning modern means of communication being used by the terrorist groups and merits effective monitoring. Da'esh uses modern technology, including encrypted peer-to-peer (P2P) software / services like "Telegram", for planning, recruitment, and secure communication. Pakistan has well developed capabilities in the aforementioned facets which are utilized for gathering intelligence. This enhancescapability of preventing terrorist organizations / sleeper cells from actualizing threats in Pakistan.

OSINT
With the advent of the world wide web (WWW) and the internet, knowledge and information has become more readily available. exhibits familiarity and comfort with media, particularly electronic and social media; it employs public accounts on social media to spread propaganda, attack its ideological adversaries and opponents, and develop a uniqueaura which fascinates young, misguided, lonely youth exhibiting identity crises and radicalization potential.'s online and cyber capabilities – and its particularly powerful propaganda and information operations – have magnified the importance of

developing ways and means to monitor, if not regulate, social media and public spaces on the Internet.

FININT

Financial intelligence is essential to choke financing for terrorism. Ministry of Finance has established a Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU). Designated CFT units have also been created in provincial Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs).

Intelligence gathered through any of the above means is shared with LEAs and other security agencies both at tactical and strategic levels. At the tactical level, depending on the type of intelligence, concerned agencies use such intelligence to protect and secure national assets or conduct operations against those planning to carryout terrorist attacks. At the strategic level, intelligence so received is analysed, predictions and forecast are made and are presented to the policy makers.

Terrorist threats are intercepted/ received in the form ofThreat Alerts (TAs). These are formatted into Essential Elements of Intelligence, containing intelligence as communicated/ transmitted by a reliable source. This intelligence is transmitted through secure means to relevant quarters for verification, analysis, assessment, and other processing stages, after which it is formulated into a product for consumption of political and bureaucratic leadership. Threat alerts are thus processed and transformed into threat assessments, which are prepared on regular basis and presented / submitted to the concerned quarters. Threat assessments contain specific data on the type and magnitude of threat(s), the locations and entities which are threatened, and the overall threat matrix / environment that the country is experiencing.

National Security Council(NSC)&Cabinet Committee on National Security(CCNS) also provides national-level guidance, direction and authorization for intelligence activities.

At the provincial and district levels, police forces of all provinces have Special Branches which perform the functions of police intelligence. Dedicated Counter Terrorism Departments (CTDs) have been established at the provincial and district level to focus on counter terrorism duties and responsibilities. Through their own sources and a very wide network, these entities gather intelligence for their daily operations against criminals and terrorists. Due to the spread and influence, police Humint is considered to be the most authentic.

The State Bank's Financial Monitoring Unit (FMU) receives data and information from all banks and financial institutions in Pakistan, including the Securities and

Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP), which is analysed and processed for a variety of purposes, such as anti-money laundering (AML), countering financing of terrorism (CFT), Narcotics control, violation of income tax laws and financial legislation in force, and other monetary / financial crimes.

Mechanism for Intelligence Sharing

In line with its functions and mandate as enshrined in the NACTA Act 2013, the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA) performs the role of a national focal point for coordinating counter terrorism activities, developing and formulating counter terrorism and related policies, serving as an institution which synchronizes the functions, operations and trajectories of various national and local counter terror organizations, and conducting regular international exchanges and maintaining liaison with international partners in order to acquire as well as communicate international best practices in Counter Terrorism (CT), Countering Violent Extremism (CVE), Choking Financing of Terrorism (CFT), Anti-Money Laundering (AML), preventing cyber terrorism or promotion of hate speech or intolerance, sectarianism, ethno-linguistic separatism, etc.

Joint Intelligence Directorate (JID)NACTA, is designed for optimum processing of intelligence products. JID, when fully functional will serve as a platform for sharing, coordination and collaboration between thirty-three Pakistani security agencies/ organizations operating in different spheres. Intelligence collaboration at JID will optimize the capabilities of officers and operatives in all these agencies, and enhance efficiency of the exploitation, processing and analysis stages which convert raw information/ data into intelligence, and finally into an intelligence product. JID is already processing threat alerts into fortnightly assessments, and also generates issue-specific and organization-specific assessments on as required basis.

Mechanism for Intelligence Dissemination

Threat assessments produced by NACTA are provided to concerned stakeholders so that they have improved situational awareness and better response mechanism(s).

Intelligence analysis also has a very important role in improvement of law enforcement capacity and defensive capability of deployed security forces, particularly in terms of preventing and deterring terrorist threats, as well as in terms of reacting / responding to attacks and threats as they manifest.

Effectiveness of the Intelligence Mechanism / Process against & Daésh

The effectiveness of Pakistan's counter terrorism apparatus has an objective measurement in the form of number of terrorist attacks experienced throughout the country. Lately, a downward trend has been witnessed i.e less than 800 attacks per year (785 in 2016 and 681 in 2017[2]) as compared to 2,061 attacks reported in 2010.

Kinetic Operations provided the framework and initial experience of Intelligence Based Operations (IBOs) through an Integrated Security Apparatus(ISA).It consists of local police in the front line as the first line of defence, to be assisted by paramilitary forces (Rangers/ Frontier Corps)as the second line of defence and Pakistan Army as the last resort reserve force.

As of 31st December 2017, a total of 12,859 IBOs had been carried out across Pakistan. Increased public security is directly attributable to surge in IBOs, which effectively prevent manifestation of terrorist threats. IBOs also serve as an indicator of effectiveness of Pakistan's operational CT paradigm. Development, evolution, improvement and perfection of entire CT operations paradigm is responsible for the fivefold increase in IBOs from 2016 to 2017.

The experiences of these kinetic measures and the lessons learned from operations in North Waziristan, were thereafter extended to the entire country in February 2017. IBOs and kinetic operations are undertaken wherever required across Pakistan to root out terrorist operatives and sleeper cells. IBOs are complemented by Combing Operations which provide the fundamental basis for clearance of areas where terrorists were attempting to operate / attack targets.

Other hard components to improve the effectiveness of the intelligence mechanism against terrorists (particularly) include strengthening of NACTA, Capacity Building of LEAs, and establishment of dedicated Counter Terrorism Forces (CTFs) at the provincial level.

To complement kinetic CT measures, Non-Kinetic Measures (soft component) have also been instituted in order to consolidate the gains achieved and to deal with threats such as extremism, sectarianism, radicalization, and other factors contributing to terrorism and lawlessness.

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[2] National Action Plan Review – December 2017.

The first National Internal Security Policy (NISP) of Pakistan was formulated in 2014, and was effective till 2018; subsequently, the second NISP (2018-2023)[3] has been instituted. The National Action Plan (NAP 2014) was formulated after the ghastly terrorist attack on the Army Public School at Peshawar on 16th December 2014, in which over 150 students and faculty members lost their lives. Objective of the NAP was to provide overall direction to the national Counter Terrorism effort in the country and to ensure that the whole political and military leadership and the citizens of the country (whole of the government and society approach) join in to uproot terrorism in all its forms. The NAP had both counter terrorism and counter violent extremism components.

Such holistic reforms can empower state structure to combat threats posed by terrorists in both kinetic and non-kinetic dimensions. These transformations will modernize the state, make it more effective in terms of public service delivery and more sensitive to the needs of its citizenry, thus neutralizing many enticing aspects ofand many propaganda tools used by it.

Current system of intelligence is marred with problems and that is the reason why despite efforts, it is not as successful against terror network as it should have been. There have been major intelligence successes and a significant number of attacks pre-empted and terrorists neutralised. It can be significantly improved. Some of the issues are listed as follows:

Issues with the present system

There are no clear cut lines to demarcate areas of operation of the different intelligence agencies. As such these agencies tend to transgress into areas of operation of other agencies and at times even try to clip the wings of others. ISI, because of its influence and resources generally encroaches upon domain of other agencies. This gives rise to interagency rivalries which are counterproductive and defeats the whole system of intelligence gathering, sharing and dissemination.

There are still gaps with in the nascent system. Some of the issues are:

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[3] Iftikhar A. Khan. (2018). "New internal security policy aims at reconciliation with radicals willing to shun violence". Dawn News, May 31, 2018. Accessed https://www.dawn.com/news/1411174; Tahir Niaz. (2018). "Govt unveils National Internal Security Policy 2018-23". The Nation, June 01, 2018. Accessed https://nation.com.pk/01-Jun-2018/govt-unveils-national-internal-security-policy-2018-23

Political ownership of CT efforts:

During the last ten years, government of Pakistan did not take ownership of the Counter Terrorism efforts. There has been significant legislative work by government of Pakistan. These include passage of NACTA Act, Pakistan Fair Trial Act, Protect of Pakistan Act, Pakistan Electronic Crimes Act by the parliament, formulation and approval of the National Internal Security Policies(NISPs 2014-18 & 2018-23)by the federal cabinet, approval of the National Action Plan (NAP)by an All Parties Conference, was framed. There is however still gap between paper and ground.

Kinetic measures in the form of military operations, (Intelligence Based Operations) IBOs were conducted. Efforts to strengthen the civilian CT agency, NACTAwere not made inearnest. The mandated meeting of the Board of Governors (BoG) of NACTA has not been convened even once during the last 5 years. The premier intelligence sharing and dissemination agency, NACTA's Joint Intelligence Directorateis still non-functional. NISPs largely remain unimplemented and implementation of NAP after the initial efforts, too is a forgotten document.

Keeping pace with terrorist groups

Terrorists are continuously changing their tactics and through use of technology are ahead of the state's Intelligence sharing system which despite adequate investment is still relying on orthodox techniques. Intel agencies are apparently stuck in time and are not adopting latest networking, intelligence sharing and dissemination protocols. Efficient mechanism for better intelligence agencies coordination is leaving much to be desired.

Bureaucratic hurdles:

Pakistan is marred with acute bureaucratic lethargy. Ministries and departments do not talk to each other and decisions are not taken. Some important ministries are mockingly called as the black-holes. This is seriously hampering system's progression. While funding for NACTA are allocated in the budget, these are not released on time resulting in hopeless delays in improving efficiency.

Turf issues:

There are serious turf issues between the top intelligence agencies. There is some level of cooperation at the tactical level, the same is lacking at the

strategic level. Interagency rivalries are nothing new as long as the competition is healthy. Intelligence agencies look at each other with suspicion to the extent of undermining each other. This is an issue of grave concern, more so as there is hardly any attempt to address it.

Intelligence Fusion:

There is no mechanism of intelligence fusion. NACTA receives intelligence primarily from two sources (ISI & IB) whereas provincial CTDs and Special Branches generally share intelligence at the provincial level. At NACTA, there is at present no system whereby intelligence from different sources is compared to confirm its authenticity, is analysed and then shared with security forces. NACTA is at present more of a post office where every piece of intelligence received is forwarded to everyone thus inundating law enforcement leadership with raw intelligence.

Law Enforcement Agencies' response to Intelligence reports:

As there is no intelligence fusion system and there is a continuous stream of intelligence, LEA officials do not pay heed to Threat Alerts received by them. Ignoring threat alerts have proved to be disastrous at times, resulting in loss of precious lives. Even in cases where intelligence agencies were able to provide precise and accurate intelligence, in certain cases attacks have been carried out by terrorists.

Way forward:
Political ownership:
- With the new government in place, it must make CT & CVE efforts national priority and take complete ownership of these endeavours. Let the military and paramilitary forces continue with the kinetic measures and the civilian must be tasked to take charge of the soft components of the struggle.
- Information sharing on Terrorism and Extremism should not only be at the tactical level but more importantly at the strategic level.

- There should be sharing of working procedure between the intelligence agencies. Currently, intelligence agencies in Pakistan guard their assets, working procedures from their own agencies.

- To ensure that there is adequate collaboration among all intelligence agencies in the country, Joint Working Groups must be established.

Joint Intelligence Directorate:

- NACTA's JID must be operationalised on war footings. Culture of the top intelligence agencies at the strategic level must be changed through reforms aimed at improving intelligence sharing and dissemination mechanisms.

- Jurisdictions of all agencies must be clearly demarcated and enforced. Acquisition and Use of Joint Intelligence. Establishing Mechanism for Cooperation & Communication in Emergency Situation.

- Hardly any analysis of intelligence gathered or shared is carried out. Intelligence is gathered, shared and forgotten about. Same is generally the fate of threat alerts issued. It is imperative that a thorough and scientific analysis of all intelligence gathered is carried out to predict trends, terrorism hotspots, organisations involved in terrorism are mapped and recommendations prepared for policy makers.

- JID is supposed to carryout all these tasks, which is currently non-functional and chances of its becoming so are slim even now.

- Law enforcement agencies response to terrorist threats is generally indifferent. One of the main reasons for this lethargy is that the alerts are vague, sketchy and lack substance. Even in cases where adequately precise intelligence is provided, these are lost in the deluge of such flood. A system of accountability for the security agencies as well as intelligence agencies needs to be put in place. Intelligence agencies should be questioned about accuracy and authenticity of the intelligence provided and security agencies should be taken to task for not heeding terrorist attack alerts.

Pakistan needs to completely overhaul its intelligence sharing protocols. Whereas intelligence collection system in place is effective, it is the dissemination, analysis and sharing that is defeating the whole raison d'être of the intelligence network in the country.

Regional and Global connotations

Global terrorism threat, particularly the one posed by Daésh and the resurgent Al-Qaida cannot be countered by a single intelligence agency or a country. Terrorists, extremists and militants have no boundaries or jurisdictions, treaties or bureaucratic hurdles. They operate regardless of borders. Intelligence agencies and law

enforcement agencies have borders, protocols and jurisdictions. It is thus imperative that states match their adversaries through cooperation, collaboration and sharing of intelligence. This is easier said than done. At the regional level, states have their own peculiar problems with their neighbours.

International Intelligence sharing is done on the principle of quid pro quo. There is a huge concern of trust between these countries. We are still stuck in definitions while militants are running free and attacking at will. As a first step, regional powers must initiate confidence building measures to remove small irritants out of the way-small steps. If we try and start cooperation from joint operations against terrorists, many states would be reluctant and would not come forward. If countries, however come to an initial understanding that the mantra of "terrorism is a global threat and must be countered through global cooperation" is not just a rhetoric but is a reality and must be addressed like the world addressed global issues like famine, HIV, drugs etc., there will be hope that countries despite their rivalries will come together. The realisation that "your terrorist is not my freedom fighter but is a terrorist" would bring countries together at a single platform.

If we focus specifically on the region around Pakistan, most countries are embroiled in militancy, extremism and terrorism. Almost all of them have internal polarisations and regional rifts bordering on outright animosities. This complicates issues and makes cooperation and collaboration extremely challenging.

Currently there is hardly any intelligence sharing. Through the regional cooperation mechanisms, protocols under SCO-Rats and other similar organisations are being put in place but the progress is extremely slow, to say the least. These organisations deal with a number of regional issues where one is intelligence sharing. There is a need to setup an exclusive regional intelligence mechanism. As mentioned the cooperation could start with small steps like holding workshops, seminars, joint training sessions etc. This could then be upgraded to collaboration in countering violent extremism. Further counter terrorism cooperation and collaboration can be build up on these foundations.

The next step could be creation common terrorism databases. All states in the region have their own comprehensive terrorism databases. As a start, data that has little operational value can be shared among regional countries. Further sharing can take place as countries start to realise value of intelligence sharing.

Further collaboration can take place as states come together to counter militancy, extremism and terrorism. This could be exchange of personnel and sharing of expertise, resources and experiences. Some of the countries are already engaged in this practice but there is a need to make it formal, more focussed and inclusive.

Another important step could be joint trainings of intelligence operatives. Countries can even consider establishing centres of excellence for training of their intelligence operatives where participants from regional countries could be invited. Faculty exchange programmes could also be considered as icebreaking measures.

As we all understand that the menace of militancy, extremism and terrorism do not recognise any boundaries and as such states too have to reduce barriers and improve cooperation in the fields of intelligence and move further towards joint operations against terrorism. Most countries at present are not ready for this owing to their own strained peculiar situations. They are looking for safeguards and guarantees that such intelligence sharing and joint operations would not be used to undermine their sovereignty and independence.

At this point in time, intervention from global players is essential. The world has to move from rhetoric to actual international CT cooperation. We have to find and agree upon a least common denominator and start building from there. Find common grounds for intelligence sharing, cooperation in countering terrorism and collaborating in our efforts to root out militancy from the region.

There are systems and protocols available and in some cases put in place. These have to be energised, a conducive environment created and countries lured in to not only cooperating but also collaborating in global Counter Terrorism effort. Their fears, apprehensions and reluctance need to be addressed by the global players. A monitory body like the FATF must be put in place to ensure that countries cooperate on counter terrorism intelligence sharing. Restrictions on countries not cooperating or sharing intelligence on vital issues may be held accountable.

It is essential to establish a systematic empirical evaluation of current and proposed procedures for enhancing the collaboration that is essential to fulfilling intelligence community requirement vital for the mission of eliminating terrorism.

Three immediate actions are recommended:

- Conduct field evaluations of best global practices that are frequently used for collaboration in Counter Terrorism between countries. These can then be offered to countries for adoption.
- Countries may be asked to rigorously evaluate collaborative tools to enhance their utility; and
- Member states may be asked to develop databases to characterize collaborative analyses in terms of features that might be related to their effectiveness. These databases should be used not only for intelligence sharing but also for forecasting and predicting future attacks.

It is equally important to implement scientific evidence-based protocols for ensuring that analysts and relevant stakeholders understand one another.

Three following immediate actions are suggested:

- Develop and evaluate standard protocols for communicating analytic judgments, predictions and forecasting;
- Evaluate the efficacy of current methods for requesting analyses in terms of how well they convey stakeholders intentions to analysts; and
- Evaluate the impact of internal review processes on how well the resulting reports convey analysts' intended meaning. Members states may carryout these reviews individually and also on regional levels.

Intel collection, dissemination, sharing and regional, global cooperation and collaboration is the ultimate requirement for the region. This dialogue must pursue the recommendations it puts forward to ensure that it results in concrete steps towards realising its cherished goal.