

Susceptibility to Radicalization: A Case Study of Young Women in District Dera Ismail Khan, Pakistan¹

*Syed Sami Raza,
Ghazala Rafi & Hassan Shah*

Abstract

Dera Ismail Khan (D.I.Khan) has been a peaceful district for long time until the War on Terror began in 2001. Peaceful co-existence of diverse ethnic and religious communities was first harmed by both sectarianism and terrorism. As a result youth were among the most affected member of the society. We carried out a survey in the district to gather empirical evidence regarding youth's susceptibility to radicalization. We noticed an interesting aspect of this radicalization i.e., that young women were relatively more radicalized than young men. In this article we present the empirical evidence that demonstrates that young women in D.I. Khan are more susceptible or vulnerable to radicalization than young men. We also throw light on the socio-political conditions that make women susceptible to radicalization.

Keywords: Susceptibility, Radicalization, Young, Women, Dera Ismail Khan

Introduction

Geographically, D.I. Khan enjoys a unique position as it abuts on the Punjab province to the east, and South Waziristan tribal agency and Tank district in the west. In the north it borders with Bannu and Laki Marwat districts, and in the south it shares border with Balochistan province. However, its strategic location has lately become a challenge to peace in society. In the wake of the War on Terror, especially the operations in South Waziristan, D.I. Khan became one of the most geo-strategically and security-wise crucial districts of Pakistan. Its very geography made it crucial to national and local security plans. Moreover, its diverse demography but troubled socio-economic conditions ostensibly made D.I. Khan crucial ground to fight the War on Terror.

As the War on Terror prolonged, its violent effects began to emerge in both the tribal areas and settled districts of KP. For D.I. Khan the violent effects become visible by 2007, and by next year, D.I. Khan became one of

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the most violence-torn districts in KP. Although much of this violence took place on religious-sectarian and ethnic fault lines, there were many other factors that directly and indirectly fed into the tensed environment and violence. Many peaceful and affluent families, as well as non-Muslim minorities, began to move out to the Punjab. Later with the South Waziristan operation (2009) hundreds of thousands of IDPs began to pour into D.I. Khan. At the end of the operation many chose not to return to their homes, thus causing impact on the already tensed demographic fault lines of the district.

Moreover, the need for increased security in the district also cast adverse impact on district level sports and recreational activities. For instance, the famous Polo Ground, which for a long time remained one of the central play grounds for youth, as well as host to big circuses and festivals every year, was taken over by the army and closed down to civil recreation activities. Moreover, due to fear of bomb attacks on public gatherings, government discouraged sports events. While the War on Terror and security conditions cast negative impact on the youth overall, young women have suffered more, and accordingly, their views on social and political issues began to become more radicalized than those of young men.

Method

This study is based in mixed method i.e., both quantitative and qualitative. However, the tilt is toward the former as we present a large amount of empirical data. The primary data was collected through extensive fieldwork visits in district D.I.Khan. We employed two different data collection tools— questionnaire and interview. The purpose of employing these different tools was to a) provide choice to respondents, b) to reach out to otherwise inaccessible respondents like female students in *madrasas*, and c) to increase the prospects of collecting as much detailed responses as possible.

We took a wide range of population sample of district D.I. Khan. Apart from interviewing young men and women, we interviewed parents and elders, teachers, *ustads* (workshop seniors/masters) and *aalims* (madrasa teachers both male and female), politicians and local government officers, and lawyers and media persons. Institutionally, we chose a wide range of educational institutions to give as much representation to overall student body of the district as possible. Accordingly, we chose the district's only university—Gomal University—degree colleges for both boys and girls, two madrasas of different denominations from D.I. Khan tehsil and one each from the other two tehsils. We included a Church and a Temple in D.I.Khantehsil to give representation to minorities.

Who are Youth?

Defining youth is debatable at best. It is difficult to give an age range. A UNDP report, for instance, takes account of this difficulty and says:

To a large extent, youth is socially constructed, and it has less to do with age than with status and behaviour... The concept of youth is intrinsically linked with the idea of transition from childhood to adulthood – from a phase of life in which the individual needs protection, sheltering and guidance to one of self-determination, maturity, independence, responsibility and accountability for decision-making. (Ebata, Izzi, Lenton, Ngjela, & Sampson, 2006)

Similarly, in our essay we take a broader view of the socially constructed category of youth. We also see youth as a category that has less to do with age than with status and behavior. However, for the purposes of fieldwork we chose to interview young men and women above the age of 18 and below 35.

What is Radicalization?

Radicalization is a socio-political attitude that involves group identity formation and unwillingness to negotiate discursive public space or simply political space with others. It is an attitude that potentially leads to violent imposition of one's beliefs and thoughts on others. Based on this definition we identify and analyze the following triggers/drivers of radicalization in D.I.Khan: geographic proximity to the war-torn Waziristan, fragmented ethnic diversity, securitization and shrinking of democratic public space, closing down of sports and recreating facilities, religiosity and sectarianism, unemployment and the arrival of IDPs, and religious symbolism in local politics.

Even though there is considerable literature on the phenomenon of radicalization in Pakistan, it however shows peculiar neglect of southern districts of Khyber-Pukhtunkhwa (For instance see, Azam, 2009; Iqbal, 2013; Khan & Khan, 2012; Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2009a, Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2009b; Rathore & Basit, 2010; Zaman, 1998). Much of this literature is focused on either tribal agencies or the Malakand region. There are also writings available on radicalization in the Punjab (Hussain, 2012; Siddiq, 2013). This study will contribute to fill this gap in the body of radicalization literature in Pakistan.

I. Radicalization Among Young Women and Men in D.I.Khan: An Empirical Estimate

We argue in this article that young women are more susceptible/vulnerable to radicalization than young men in D.I. Khan. We explore this hypothesis by comparing female and male views on certain socio-political aspects of the society. We also provide reasons/factors for their radicalization.

1. Islamic Considerations while Choosing an Educational Institution


Islamic ethical environment in educational institutions is a part of the public debate on providing better educational service in DIKhan. For some people, it turned out from our interviews, that having institutionally enforced ethical environment is a duty on the part of every institution. While some education administration members and teachers believed it as an extra duty even if they perform. From our questionnaire it turned out that 0% of female respondents (students and teachers) disagree that they take ethical Islamic environment in the institution as a factor while choosing an institution. On the other hand, 3.2% of male respondents disagree to the same. The figures show that although 69% of young women were unsure about considering Islamic environment as a factor in their choice, there is still considerable percentage of young women who give attention to it.

Table 1

Q. 1. While choosing an educational institution for yourself or your child do you consider Islamic ethical environment?							
Gender	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure	Other	No answer	Total
Male	9	19	3	62	2	0	95
	9.5%	20.0%	3.2%	65.3%	2.1%	.0%	100.0%
Female	5	18	0	69	1	6	99
	5.1%	18.2%	.0%	69.7%	1.0%	6.1%	100.0%
Total	14	37	3	131	3	6	194
	7.2%	19.1%	1.5%	67.5%	1.5%	3.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Test =10.799, p-value=.056

Figure 1



2. The Morality of Use of Social Media


The use of social media among young men and women is often a matter of debate. There are both positive and negative sides to the use of social media. Conservative sections of the society in DIKhan are impervious to social media. For instance, it turned out from our general survey of madrasas in DIKhan that not a single madrasa allows students to have mobile phones or use social media. From our questionnaire it turned out that around 43% of young women compared to 24% of young men do not use social media at all. Many of these women responded in interviews that they considered social media as detrimental to their religious and cultural life. The Chi square test provides highly significant p-value. The p-value < 0.05 showed a significant correlation of gender and the use of social media in District DIKhan.

Table 2

How often do you use social media?								
Gender	Very Often	Often	Not Much	Not at All	Not Sure	Other	No answer	Total
Male	10	45	13	23	2	1	1	95
	10.5%	47.4%	13.7%	24.2%	2.1%	1.1%	1.1%	100.0%
Female	15	15	11	43	7	3	5	99
	15.2%	15.2%	11.1%	43.4%	7.1%	3.0%	5.1%	100.0%
Total	25	60	24	66	9	4	6	194
	12.9%	30.9%	12.4%	34.0%	4.6%	2.1%	2.9%	100.0%

Chi-square=31.936, p-value= 0.000

Figure 2



3. Government Policy on the Taliban after 9/11


Almost 16 years after the change of policy on the Taliban, and the violent experience of their presence in the society, there is still debate on their armed-religious movement. In our interviews we noticed that a number of respondents would go completely silent on any question relating to the Taliban. Some would clearly excuse for personal safety reasons. This result can be seen in our questionnaire, which shows that 35% of male and 42% of female respondents were not sure how to respond to a question about government's policy to stop support to the Taliban in Afghanistan and elsewhere. It is also interesting to notice that around 18% of young men and 12% of young women disagreed to government's policy. (However, it is encouraging that 36% agreed that it was a good decision to change the policy).

Table 3

Do you think that changing the policy about the Taliban after 9/11 was a good decision in the context of Pakistan's national security?								
Gender	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not Sure	Other	No answer	Total
Male	1	36	2	16	33	7	0	95
	1.1%	37.9%	2.1%	16.8%	34.7%	7.4%	.0%	100.0%
Female	12	24	2	10	42	3	6	99
	12.1%	24.2%	2.0%	10.1%	42.4%	3.0%	6.1%	100.0%
Total	13	60	4	26	75	10	6	194
	6.7%	30.9%	2.1%	13.4%	38.7%	5.2%	3.1%	100.0%

Chi-square=21.699, p-value= 0.001

Figure 3



4. Participation in the On-going War in the Middle-East

The current war in the Middle-East is a hot international issue of debate in the society of DIKhan. There are reports that young Pakistani men have participated in this war. This war is often thought as a sectarian war, and it has cast its impact on the already tensed sectarian lines in the district. From our questionnaire it turned out that a big number of respondents (35% male and 46% female, including non-Muslims respondents) hesitated to give their opinion on participation in the war. This was again partly because of personal safety concerns. And the safety concerns often become strong when respondent knows that her/his views could go (or interpreted as) against government's policy or interests. However, some did not hesitate to answer clearly: 15% of young women and 7% of young men responded in favor of going to war in the Middle-East. This figure is striking comparison between male and female respondents: the percentage of women in favor of young men's participation in war in the Middle-East is double the percentage of men.


Table 4

Do you think that young men should go to war in the Middle-East?								
Gender	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not Sure	Other	No answer	Total
Male	2	5	6	45	33	4	0	95
	2.1%	5.3%	6.3%	47.4%	34.7%	4.2%	.0%	100.0%

Female	4	11	9	18	46	6	5	99
	4.0%	11.1%	9.1%	18.2%	46.5%	6.1%	5.1%	100.0%
Total	6	16	15	63	79	10	5	194
	3.1%	8.2%	7.7%	32.5%	40.7%	5.2%	2.6%	100.0%

are=22.554, p-value= 0.001

Figure 4



II. Susceptibility to Radicalization: The Conditions Making Young Women Susceptible to Radicalization

There are a number of conditions making young women susceptible to radicalization in DIKhan. We focus on the indirect ones. Our focus on the indirect ones is done partly with the view that respondents feel it easy to answer and partly because these factors often go ignore even though they carry considerable impact in the long run.

1. Security Concern in Educational Institutions

Security and radicalization are linked to each other in a variety of ways. In our research we assume the debate on radicalization is linked to increased presence of security. In the environment where there is increased presence of security (like in district DIKhan), there is also increased debate on why there is more security. This debate inevitably leads to debate on sectarianism, terrorism, and the clash between the state and the Taliban (the secular and the religious).

On the other hand, security has become the one of the foremost concern of parents and students themselves. It is evident from the responses


collected in our research that a big majority of young men and women consider security plan of the institution they choose to study in. Around 80% women respondents and 60% male respondents consider security plan of the choice of their institution. Accordingly, we make this assumption that living in high securitized environment leads to questioning that environment, which in turn creates the condition for radicalization (both against the terrorists and the state).

Table 5

Q. While choosing an educational institution for yourself or your child do you consider security plan?					
Gender	Strongly Agree	Agree	Other	No answer	Total
Male	5	52	27	11	95
	5.3%	54.7%	28.4%	11.6%	100.0%
Female	3	75	11	10	99
	3.0%	75.8%	11.1%	10.1%	100.0%
Total	8	127	38	21	194
	4.1%	65.5%	19.6%	10.8%	100.0%

Chi-Square test value=11.372, p-value=0.010

Figure 5



2. Lack of Creative Learning and Extracurricular Activities at Educational Institutions

Indeed educational institutions have considerable role in enhancing the quality of social life of a society, especially by providing creative learning environments. Modern teaching methods encourage

interactive and creative learning. Higher Education Commission of Pakistan (HEC) also encourages modern teaching methods in a number of ways by introducing semester system, new syllabi, enhanced attention to extra-curricular activities, and the best teacher awards. Even though it is difficult to establish a causal relationship between creative learning environment and reduction of susceptibility to radicalization with the data we collected, however, we can know people's perception and lived-experience about the relationship of creative learning environment with the susceptibility to radicalization. In other words, we can give a rough co-relation, especially in the backdrop of our definition of radicalization as unwillingness to negotiate discursive public space or simply political space with other members of society.


In our research, we found out that more than 52% of young female students (compared to 34% male students) do not participate in creative learning and extracurricular activities at all. One of the reasons for this lack of participation is the lack of initiative on the part of institutions' administration, which in turn makes the excuse of security concern. The other major reason is the lack of facilities. Thus creative learning and extra-curricular activities are increasingly diminishing.

Table 6

Q. How often do you (Student) or your child (Parents) participate in extracurricular activities at your school?									
Gender	Extremely often	Very often	Modera tely often	Slightly often	Not at all often	Not Sure	Other	No answer	Total
Male	1	35	4	6	32	15	2	0	95
	1.1%	36.8 %	4.2%	6.3%	33.7%	15.8 %	2.1%	.0%	100.0%
Female	1	16	7	12	52	4	1	6	99
	1.0%	16.2 %	7.1%	12.1%	52.5%	4.0%	1.0%	6.1%	100.0%
Total	2	51	11	18	84	19	3	6	194
	1.0%	26.3 %	5.7%	9.3%	43.3%	9.8%	1.5%	3.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square =27.289, p-value=.000

Figure 6



3. Lack of Recreation and Sports for Women

Recent research studies on radicalization suggest that sport is one of the healthy alternatives for young men and women to focus their energies on. A study by Schanzer *et al*, for instance, suggests that youth centers providing opportunities of sports, creative arts, and community volunteering help build a strong community that can cope with radicalization and provide guidance and positive experiences for youth (Schanzer, Kurzman, & Moosa, 2010). Similarly a local psychiatrist in DIKhan emphasized on the significance of sports for improving physical and mental health of young men and women. He said, "There is no alternative to sports for improving the overall health." It is worth mentioning that Pakistani government in its radicalization efforts has considered sports as one of the de-radicalization tools. For instance, the government once offered the Taliban to play cricket match with it. The latter, however, declined the offer by saying that cricket was Un-Islamic ("Taliban Fefuse Nisar's Cricket Match Offer," 2014).

While sport is crucial to improving health as well as a way to cope with radicalization, the conditions of sport in the district are not encouraging. There is hardly any sports center for women in the district. The only opportunity of sports for them is in their schools and colleges, but that is obviously a limited opportunity because it is available only in morning school time and for a period of 40 minutes or so. These sports grounds and indoor infrastructure remain closed in the evening. A local social activist suggested that there is need to bring to use the sports grounds at schools and colleges for local women in the evening. He said that the local government has now been elected (May 2016) and it should make some efforts in this line.

Local *madrasa* students are also faced with the lack of sport


infrastructure. While *madrasa* administration and teachers admit the significance of sports for health of students, they blame local government for not providing them with sport grounds and equipment. A number of teachers demanded funds and land for making sport centers for their students. They said although students are provided sport time in their daily routine, they cannot play any game because of lack of sport ground. Some of them play on local streets. Similarly, administration of female *madrasas* stressed on the necessity of sport for health of female students. However they also complained that they lacked space for grounds. They also said they lacked sports equipment. It turned out from our research that only 1% female respondents said that there are enough parks and sports in their neighborhoods.

Table 7

Q. Are there enough parks and sports grounds in your neighborhood/town/village?							
Gender	Enough	Not Enough	None	Not Sure	Other	No answer	Total
Male	4	45	32	13	1	0	95
	4.2%	47.4%	33.7%	13.7%	1.1%	.0%	100.0%
Female	1	30	28	31	4	5	99
	1.0%	30.3%	28.3%	31.3%	4.0%	5.1%	100.0%
Total	5	75	60	44	5	5	194
	2.6%	38.7%	30.9%	22.7%	2.6%	2.6%	100.0%

Chi-Square Test =19.156, p-value=.002

Figure 7



Similarly, around 64% young women (compared to 39% young men) do not go to public parks in their neighborhood. Around 35% young women

believe that there are no other healthy alternatives available either.

Table 8

Q. How often do you visit the public parks in your neighborhood/town/village?								
Gender	Very often	Somewhat often	Not so often	Not at all often	Not Sure	Other	No answer	Total
Male	4	4	8	37	39	3	0	95
	4.2%	4.2%	8.4%	38.9%	41.1%	3.2%	.0%	100.0%
Female	0	0	1	63	26	3	6	99
	.0%	.0%	1.0%	63.6%	26.3%	3.0%	6.1%	100.0%
Total	4	4	9	100	65	6	6	194
	2.1%	2.1%	4.6%	51.5%	33.5%	3.1%	3.1%	100.0%

Chi-Square Test =28.734, p-value=.000

Figure 8





Table 9

Q. If there are not enough parks and/or sports grounds in your neighborhood, town, or village then what alternatives do you have?								
Gender	(Sports that don't need large spaces)	Gymnasium	Social Media	No healthy Alternative	Not Sure	Other	No answer	Total
Mal	1	0	19	43	11	21	0	95

e	1.1%	.0%	20.0%	45.3%	11.6%	22.1%	.0%	100.0%
Female	4	1	21	35	10	24	4	99
	4.0%	1.0%	21.2%	35.4%	10.1%	24.2%	4.0%	100.0%
Total	5	1	40	78	21	45	4	194
	2.6%	.5%	20.6%	40.2%	10.8%	23.2%	2.1%	100.0%

Chi-square=7.889, p-value= 0.246

Figure 9



3. Local Politics: Low Participation and Social Activism among Women

The social status of women and their rights can improve if they actively participate in local politics. For long time women in DIKhan district did not see it an imperative to participate in local politics, or the cultural-religious environment did not encourage them to do so. However, lately the local politics in DIKhan has taken an interesting turn, especially by the Election of 2013. This was the first general election after the general election of 1970 that not only focused on youth voters, but also mobilized a large number of young men and women to take roles in political parties. This turn came with Imran Khan's political party's (PTI) focus on the youth. However, other parties, especially the JUI(F), whose headquarter is in DIKhan, followed suit and invested much energies on their own youth followers for getting large turnout. Another major change in the local politics was the introduction of young politicians and community leaders in the election.

Despite the focus of local politics on the youth, young women were remained under-represented and neglected. Political parties could not think of ways to increase women participation and taking of roles in campaigns. Our survey shows that a large number of young women did not take part in election (both in casting vote and campaigning). In our sample of young men and women at colleges and Gomal university, around 50% women respondents did not caste vote compared to 19% men. Moreover, 59% said they did not participate in election campaign in any way compared to 42% men respondents.

Table 10

Q. Did you vote in the General Elections of 2013?						
Gender	Yes	No	Not Sure	Other	No answer	Total
Male	57	18	19	1	0	95
	60.0%	18.9%	20.0%	1.1%	.0%	100.0%
Female	25	49	15	3	7	99
	25.3%	49.5%	15.2%	3.0%	7.0%	100.0%
Total	82	67	34	4	6	194
	42.3%	34.5%	17.5%	2.1%	3.1%	100.0%

Chi-square=35.234, p-value= 0.000

Figure 10





Table 11

Q. Did you participate in election campaign as well?								
Gender	Considerably participated	Mildly participated	Passively participated	Not at all	Not Sure	Other	No answer	Total
Male	19	4	8	40	23	1	0	95
	20.0%	4.2%	8.4%	42.1%	24.2%	1.1%	.0%	100.0%
Female	8	5	10	58	11	1	6	99
	8.1%	5.1%	10.1%	58.6%	11.1%	1.0%	6.1%	100.0%
Total	27	9	18	98	34	2	6	194
	13.9%	4.6%	9.3%	50.5%	17.5%	1.0%	3.1%	100.0%

Chi-square=18.282, p-value= 0.006

Figure 11



5. Ethnic Movements and Sectarianism

DIKhan has been a diverse district, both ethnically and religiously. A local teacher gave a logical reason for its diversity. He said, "Because it is on the border of so many regions in Pakistan, diversity is natural to DIKhan." As we explained above DIKhan is located on the juncture of at least four different regions or administrative geographic divisions—K-P, the Punjab, Baluchistan,


and Waziristan. It has various ethnic groups that include Seraikis, Pushtuns, Urdu speakers, and Punjabis. On the other hand, its various religious groups include Muslims, Christians, Hindus, and Sikhs. Within Muslims there are further sectarian groups, including Sunni-Barailvi, Sunni-Deobandi, Sunni-Alh-al-Hidth, and Shiite. All these various groups have lived peacefully up until late 1990s, and freely intermingled in each other's cultural as well as religious events. Today in the wake of the War on Terror when this diversity is at stake the local people long for it ever more. From our survey it turned out that more than 70% of both male and female respondents say that ethnic movements like Pushtunistan and Seraiki movement caste negative impact on the harmonious cultural diversity of the district.

Table 12

Q. DIKhan has always been a culturally diverse district. How are the new ethnic-political movements, Seraikistan and Pashtunistan, affecting the cultural diversity in DIKhan?								
Gender	Worse	Bad	Mildly Affected	Not Affected at All	Not Sure	Other	No answer	Total
Male	2	66	1	7	11	8	0	95
	2.1%	69.5%	1.1%	7.4%	11.6%	8.4%	.0%	100.0%
Female	6	53	11	9	15	0	5	99
	6.1%	53.5%	11.1%	9.1%	15.2%	.0%	5.1%	100.0%
Total	8	119	12	16	26	8	5	194
	4.1%	61.3%	6.2%	8.2%	13.4%	4.1%	2.6%	100.0%

Chi-square=25.547, p-value= 0.000

Figure 12




Around 69% of male and 59% of female respondents think that these ethnic movements have negatively affected the youth.

Table 13

Q. How much have these movements affected the youth of DIKhan?								
Gender	Worse	Bad	Mildly	Not at All	Not Sure	Other	No answer	Total
Male	0	65	1	5	17	7	0	95
	.0%	68.4%	1.1%	5.3%	17.9%	7.4%	.0%	100.0%
Female	1	48	10	10	25	0	5	99
	1.0%	48.5%	10.1%	10.1%	25.3%	.0%	5.1%	100.0%
Total	1	113	11	15	42	7	5	194
	.5%	58.2%	5.7%	7.7%	21.6%	3.6%	2.6%	100.0%

Chi-square=26.040, p-value= 0.000

Figure 13




In the context of sectarian and religious harmony, more than 70% of male and 62% of female respondents think that people of various religious and sectarian followings are not living in harmony.

Table 14

Q. There has been also another level of diversity in DIKhan—the religious and sectarian diversity. Do you agree that the people are living in harmony today?								
Gender	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not Sure	Others	No answer	Total
Male	1	8	3	66	15	2	0	95
	1.1%	8.4%	3.2%	69.5%	15.8%	2.1%	.0%	100.0%
Female	0	15	3	59	16	1	5	99
	.0%	15.2%	3.0%	59.6%	16.2%	1.0%	5.1%	100.0%
Total	1	23	6	125	31	3	5	194
	.5%	11.9%	3.1%	64.4%	16.0%	1.5%	2.6%	100.0%

Chi-square=8.809, p-value= 0.185

Figure 14




It is also interesting to observe that a big number of youth are not sure if they can play any role in bringing around harmony in the society of DIKhan.

Table 15

Q. Do you agree that Youth can play role in bringing around harmony in DIKhan's society?							
Gender	Strongly Agree	Agree	Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Not Sure	No answer	Total
Male	11 11.6%	40 42.1%	1 1.1%	0 .0%	43 45.3%	0 .0%	95 100.0%
Female	9 9.1%	37 37.4%	0 .0%	3 3.0%	44 44.4%	6 6.1%	99 100.0%
Total	20 10.3%	77 39.7%	1 .5%	3 1.5%	87 44.8%	6 3.1%	194 100.0%

Chi-square=10.250, p-value= 0.068

Figure 15

6. Lack of Peace and Frustration with Western Wars

It's been more than 15 years now that the War on Terror has been going on. As mentioned above, the district of DIKhan neighbors South Waziristan agency where the active army operations and drone attacks are still going on. This state of warfare in the neighborhood has casted negative impacts on the social environment of the district in which the youth are growing. Around 43% of female and 58% of male respondents believe that the War on Terror has casted negative impact (of radicalization) among the youth in DIKhan. Moreover, 78% of female and 90% of male respondents believe that the life in DIKhan is not peaceful anymore. The Chi square test provides insignificant p-value. The p-value > 0.05 presented that there is no correlation of gender and the impacts of war on terror on the youth of DIKhan.

Table 16

Q. Do you agree that the War on Terror has caste negative impact (of radicalization) on the youth in DIKhan?						
Gender	Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Not Sure	No answer	Total
Male	14	42	2	37	0	95
	14.7%	44.2%	2.1%	38.9%	.0%	100.0%
Female	16	37	0	40	6	99
	16.2%	37.4%	.0%	40.4%	6.1%	100.0%
Total	30	79	2	77	6	194
	15.5%	40.7%	1.0%	39.7%	3.1%	100.0%

Chi-square=8.488, p-value= 0.075

Figure 16





Table 17

Q. In terms of peace how would you describe DIK's social life today?						
Gender	Peaceful	Not Peaceful	Not Sure	others	No Answer	Total
Male	7	86	1	0	1	95
	7.4%	90.5%	1.1%	.0%	1.1%	100.0 %
Female	6	77	0	11	5	99
	6.1%	77.8%	.0%	11.1%	5.1%	100.0 %
Total	13	163	1	11	6	194
	6.7%	84.0%	.5%	5.7%	3.1%	100.0 %

Chi-Square test=15.164, p-value=0.004

Figure 17



Conclusion:

In district D.I. Khan young women are more susceptible to radicalization than young men. The empirical data we presented above clearly shows that views of young women are more prone to radicalization and violence than views of young men. For instance, around 43% of young women compared to 24% of young men do not use social media at all. Many of these women consider social media as detrimental to their religious and cultural life. On the question about government's policy to stop extending support to the Taliban in Afghanistan and elsewhere after 9/11 35% of young male and 42% of young female respondents were not sure about the policy. Similarly, on the question whether young men from Pakistan should go to war in the Middle-East, 15% of young women and 7% of young men responded in favor. This figure is striking comparison between male and female respondents: the percentage of women in favor of young men's participation in war in the Middle East is double the percentage of men. In the article we throw light on the socio-political conditions that make women susceptible to radicalization. We explain that there are a host of factors that make young women more susceptible to radicalization than men. These factors are a) security concerns, b) lack of creative learning environment and extracurricular activities at educational institutions, c) lack of public parks, sports and recreational activities, d) sectarianism and ethnic movements, and d) lack of peace and frustration with the War on Terror.

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About the Authors

The author **Syed Sami Raza** (PhD) is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar. He earned his PhD from the University of Hawaii at Manoa, HI, USA. His research focuses on issues relating to war, political theory, comparative politics, law and critique. He can be reached at samiraza@upesh.edu.pk.

The author **Ghazala Rafi** is a Lecturer at the Department of Political Science, Islamia College University, Peshawar. Her research focuses on feminist theory, war rehabilitation, and institutional development in Pakistan. She can be reached at ghazala.rafi87@gmail.com.

The author **Hassan Shah** is a PhD scholar at the Department of Political Science, University of Peshawar. He can be reached at hassanpaki1986@gmail.com.