War and Game Theory: Reflecting on the War on Terror on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Borderland

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Abstract

James P. Carse in *Finite and Infinite Games* defines finite a game that is played to win between two exclusive opponents within an established period of time and according to agreed-upon rules. There is one winner and one loser. There is much in international diplomacy that seems to fit this model. Carse introduces a second category that he calls infinite games—games that are played without time constraints or specific rules; the goal is simply to continue the game. The effort to strengthen the relationship between parents and a child might be an example, where the focus is on the relationship rather than exclusive agency, and the goal is to deal effectively with complex situations as they arise. Can this distinction be used productively to theorize the ongoing violence and terror that is consuming Pakistan? This article engages game theory and demonstrates that the Pakistan Army and the Taliban exhibit quite different understandings of and strategies for the ongoing war. It is this difference in understandings that underpins the inability to engage each other and also explains why this war has become protracted.

Introduction:

The War on Terror is essentially "asymmetric warfare" (Thornton 2007). The Taliban are fighting it as a drawn-out war, while the armies of Pakistan and the United States plan to contain it in a temporally delimited framework. We can engage James P. Carse's game theory to make sense of this asymmetric warfare in its conceptual understanding (Carse 1997). The theoretical paradigm that Carse provides enables us to read the warfare's asymmetry and therefore its indecisive character. The general starting assumption is that the Taliban have been playing an infinite game while the two armies a finite one.

The Taliban have long-term stakes. They have been fighting not just because they like to fight, but because they have a cause: to implement an Islamic state system on the borderland and subsequently in neighboring countries. We need not forget that they established one in Afghanistan during the 1990s. Today, however, their cause might not be accepted as legitimate or realizable but still they do not stop from waging the perpetual war for their cause. Because the creation of their version of an Islamic state in the region is a tremendous goal, their understanding of war (*jihad*) is

"infinite." It is because of this understanding that the Islamic teachings that emphasize lifelong *jihad* are stressed to their followers. My argument here is that because their goal is infinite, their entire understanding and organization of war is infinite. It is the latter that I focus on in this essay.

Finite Versus Infinite in the Asymmetric warfare

Symmetry is not about quantity but about quality. Asymmetric "does not mean unequal." It rather "implies a relationship that cannot be considered to be alike" (Thornton 2007, 4). Christopher Bellamy defines asymmetric warfare in the following words: "Whatever differences there may be in numbers and quality, conventional military forces are still designed, trained, and equipped to fight near mirror images of themselves; forces with broadly similar infrastructures. A true asymmetric conflict is where the means used are quite different" (Bellamy 2002, 152). In a similar vein Roger Barnett writes, "True asymmetry [involves] those actions that an adversary can exercise that you either cannot or will not" (Barnett 2003, 15). While Bellamy and Barnett define asymmetric warfare from actions and means point of view, Steven Metz and Douglas Johnson present a more holistic view. For them asymmetric warfare is:

> [A]cting, organizing and thinking differently than opponents in order to maximize one's own advantages, exploit an opponent's weaknesses, attain the initiative or gain greater freedom of action. It can be political-strategic, military-strategic, operation or a combination of these. It can entail different methods, technologies, values, organizations, *time perspectives* or some combination of these. (Metz and Johnson 2001, 5) (Emphasis mine)

What interests us in the last definition is the reference to time perspective, which I think gives this formulation a broader and more basic understanding of asymmetric warfare. Now if we engage James P. Carse it will help us generate a more paradigmatic way of defining and thinking about asymmetric warfare. Let us first address the question, often raised after engaging game theory, whether war can be treated as a game. We think yes. Carse, for instance, cites the example of World War II. He sees war as a game and not outside the frames of application of game theory. On a broader and more basic level, temporal, spatial and numerical dimensions of warfare need our emphasis to read their symmetry. While we agree that current geopolitical conflicts between states and insurgent groups have asymmetry in actions and means used on two sides, what appears clearer is the understanding that the two sides have of the temporal and spatial aspects of their entanglement in these conflicts. For instance, the American and Pakistani armies plan operations which are bound by time frames and geographic areas, as well as by the capacity to mobilize soldiers, units, etc. On the other hand, insurgents and the Taliban fight without temporal and spatial bounds, and they do not take account of their fighting strength in calculated figures. Even when

they have plans, which remain not formalized or institutionalized and are very much improvised; these are like small, finite games inside the larger infinite game.

From the vantage point of Carse's theory of finite-infinite games we can describe the asymmetric warfare as juxtaposition of finite game against infinite game. In other terms, asymmetric warfare is a conflict between parties one of which employs the infinity of temporality, spatiality and numericity while the other remains circumscribed in its self-made temporality, spatiality and numericity.

Before we begin to explore the temporal, spatial and numerical dimensions of the asymmetric warfare on the Northwestern frontier of Pakistan, I want to foreground one basic aspect of finite and infinite games as well as that of restricted and unrestricted warfare. Carse points out that finite games have rules while infinite ones don't: "A finite game is resolved within the context of its rules…The rules exist to ensure the game is finite." In infinite games "rules exist to ensure the game is infinite," and rules are flexible enough to "be changed to allow continued play." The nature of contemporary conflicts, for instance the War on Terror and other insurgency wars in the region, demonstrates this fact. Armies normally exhibit a conventional understanding of war, which has specific rules (not necessarily the ethical ones, but the rules of game). On the other hand, insurgents like the Taliban fight without the bounds of rules. In their short and concise book, *Unrestricted Warfare: China's Master Plan to Destroy America*, about the nature of current conflicts faced by the United States, Chinese army officers Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui call such conflicts "unrestricted warfare" (Qiao and Xiangsui 2002). Colonel Qiao in an interview put it clearly: "the first rule of unrestricted warfare is that there are no rules, with nothing forbidden." He claims that not having respect for rules can be attributed not only to insurgents, but also to states: "The United States breaks [UN rules] and makes new ones when these rules don't suit [its purposes], but it has to observe its own rules or the whole world will not trust it" (Qiao and Xiangsui 2002, 3).

Temporal dimensions of the Asymmetric Warfare in Pakistan:

"A finite player puts play into time. An infinite player puts time into play."

---(Carse 1997, 95)

"NATO has all the watches, but we have all the time," says a Taliban spokesman.

---(Shinn 2009)

Figure: David Klein's Illustration in "NATO has all Watches," Courtesy WSJ.

The War on Terror has become an "unending" war and many time frames given by the NATO forces to wind it down have only proven frustrating. Pakistani participation in the War on Terror is also becoming increasingly frustrating, sapping public patience and military endurance. In this section we draw attention to three temporal dimensions, or dissymmetry, of the engagement on the battleground between the state armies and the Taliban.

Temporal Boundaries: External Time against Lived Time

I want to begin with the above cartoon by David Klein. As Obama *views* his wristwatch while a *Talib* (singular form) sits outside the hourglass, it represents fairly well what Carse has to say about time-dissymmetry among the finite and infinite players: "The infinite player in us does not consume time but generates it. Because infinite play is dramatic and has no scripted conclusion, its time is time lived and not time *viewed*….Time does not pass for an infinite player"(Carse 1997, 94). The Talib is sitting outside the clock-time. He sits in the "lived time." The gun in his hand instead of a watch defines his preoccupation—gun (jihad) is his time, his calendar. Like a Chinese calendar, which measures years and ages with reference to events and objects, the Taliban measure time with reference to war events. The lived time is measured not by a clock (the Western way of measuring time) but by the event itself as Carse explains: "For an infinite player there is no such thing as an hour of time. There can be an hour of love, or a day of grieving, or a season of learning, or a period of labor" (Carse 1997, 94). Similarly, for the Talib sitting outside the hourglass, war is not commanded (divided and controlled) by time. Conversely, it is the war that commands time and constitutes a period whose time dimensions are immeasurable. For instance, the War on Terror is now being realized as an "endless" war. Thus the primacy is not the time itself but the event that gives meaning to time, "its specific quality" (Carse

1997, 7). In this line of argument then, we can say that Western (Pakistan follows that too) time is clock-time while the Taliban time is eventual (from event) time. The difference between the two can be further understood by the following categorization by Carse:

> While finite games are externally defined, infinite games are internally defined. The time of an infinite game is not world time, but time created within the play itself. Since each play of an infinite game eliminates boundaries, it opens to players a new horizon of time. For this reason it is impossible to say how long an infinite game has been played, or even can be played, since duration can be measured only externally to that which endures. (Carse 1997, 7)

The often-quoted Taliban remark, which I mentioned above as one of the epigraphs of this section, instructs about this difference between the Taliban and their Western and Pakistani adversaries. The former give primacy to the event itself from which time will gain its meaning, while the latter seek to contain the event within their clock-time. Pakistan's War on Terror in the Northwestern frontier and the American one in Afghanistan are cases in point. Both plan military operations whose time dimensions are fixed. The operations also have fixed funding. Even if victory is not achieved at the end of an operation, it is nevertheless unilaterally declared because they run out of their operation-time. Hence victory is a "scripted conclusion," in the sense that like the beginning and other details of the plan, it is always already on the script. Carse calls these operations theatrical: they have scripts, players and an audience.

Military operations like any finite games have a precise beginning and definitive ending, which are temporal boundaries. For instance, each time the Pakistan Army launched a military operation, it announced the timeframe in a press conference. Accordingly, press conferences like these demonstrate the theatrical dimension of operations. A time frame announced in press conferences is often tentative, primarily because it is addressed to domestic and foreign audiences, however, it gives the idea that operations are temporally limited. On the other hand, for the Taliban, it is time of jihad—there is no beginning or ending. As a result, it is difficult to tell when this jihad began: after the American invasion of Afghanistan, during the 1990s Afghan civil war, during the Cold War, or during colonial rebellion movements.

An argument can still be made that the Taliban also do make plans, but we counter-argue that their plans need to be understood as certain finite plans within the larger strategy of their infinite *jihad*. Carse gives us a good explanation of this argument: "Finite games can be played within an infinite game, but an infinite game cannot be

played within a finite game. Infinite players regard their wins and losses in whatever finite games they play as but moments in continuing play" (Carse 1997, 7).

Protraction against Acceleration in Warfare

Engaged in operations on the Northwestern frontier of Pakistan, the Army has the capacity and propensity to achieve acceleration, to speed up, and to push to the victory. On the other hand, the Taliban engage in reverse tactics—slowing down and protracting the conflict. This tactic not only demonstrates asymmetry in the ongoing war, but works in favor of the latter. The reason for the acceleration-against-protraction tactic can be figured by juxtaposing Paul Virilio's theorization against Mao Tse-Tung's. Virilio, the theorist of speed in warfare, argues that historically, improvements in warfare have constantly followed the imperatives of acceleration. The victory has gone to the party which has had greater capacity for generating speed/acceleration as well as ability to effectively exploit it (Virilio 2006). Virilio's thought stretches as far back as Sun Tzu, who wrote: "War is such that the supreme consideration is speed" (Tzu 1993, 157). On the other hand, Mao, partly due to peculiar conditions in his own country, developed a different model of warfare that depended on opposing the accelerated tactics. He made slowness, protraction, and careful use of weakness of the adversary central to his warfare strategy, which was developed to engage a much stronger enemy (Tse-tung 2014). Similarly, we see that the Taliban, faced with this type of enemy, employ the tactics of exhaustion and protraction aiming at draining the energy, resources, and support of their adversaries. Their strategy is to render the frontier borderland (and Afghanistan) ungovernable--where putting more resources would appear to be wasting them and result in the exhaustion of the armies. As Sun Tzu writes, "A state is impoverished by its armies when it has to supply them at a great distance" (Tzu 1993).

Element of Surprise in Warfare

Surprise has been one of the significant elements of conventional warfare. For instance, Sun Tzu, in *The Art of Warfare*, says, "Generally in battle use the 'straightforward' to engage the enemy and the 'surprise' to win the victory" (Barnett 2003, 119). Similarly, Carse argues that in finite games surprise ensures victory. On the other hand, in infinite games (the asymmetric warfare) surprise has a different significance since victory or defeat is not the end:

> Surprise in finite play is the triumph of the past over the future…Infinite players, on the other hand, continue their play in the expectation of being surprised. If surprise is no longer possible, all play ceases…Surprise in infinite play is the triumph of the future over the past. Since infinite players do not regard the past as having an outcome, they have no way of

> knowing what has been begun there. With each surprise, the past reveals a new beginning in itself. Inasmuch as the future is always surprising, the past is always changing. (Carse 1997, 18)

For all finite games players are trained and strategies detailed to reduce the risk of surprise. In fact, training aims to making players "Master Players": "to be so perfectly skilled in their play that nothing can surprise them, so perfectly trained that every move in the game is foreseen at the beginning. A true Master Player plays as though the game is already in the past, according to a script whose detail is known prior to the play itself." This focus on training and details of making strategy before going to the play is reminiscent of Sun Tzu (see that "Sun" means master in Chinese) instruction about great commanders: "the expert in using the military subdues the enemy's forces without going to battle, takes the enemy's walled cities without launching an attack, and crushes the enemy's state without a protracted war" (Tzu 1993, 92)

Modern armies are trained and equipped to make them Master Players and to eliminate surprise. Let me point to three different schools of thought in war philosophy. First, the mainstream Western philosophy of war does not think that it is possible to master, that is, completely plan and control, the event of war because of surprises. For instance, Clausewitz, who is regarded as the father of modern Western war philosophy, warns strategists about what he calls "friction"—that is difficulties in foreseeing and manipulating the progression of war. He gives *chance* an important value in the equation of success or defeat. Second, it is in Chinese classic war philosophy, which is still read today in war colleges around the world, that the element of surprise or friction are also thought to be controllable. Thus, the old Chinese war philosophy attempted to eliminate the element of chance by preparing the right combinations that could allow army to attain strategic advantage (*shi*). Third, in the recent asymmetric warfare against terrorism, it is the non-state actors who wage a war that rests on the idea that the element of chance/surprise should be made internal and something from which to benefit. Therefore, they fight like infinite players, for whom surprise is what constitutes and continues the game.

I further draw attention to the element of death in game theory as a kind of surprise in finite play, but not infinite play. As Carse writes, "Infinite players die. Since the boundaries of death are always part of the play, the infinite player does not die at the end of play, but in the course of play. The death of an infinite player is dramatic. It does not mean that the game comes to an end with death; on the contrary, infinite players offer their death as a way of continuing the play" (Carse 1997, 24). Again, he writes, "Infinite players play best when they become least necessary to the continuation of play. It is for this reason they play as mortals" (Carse 1997, 26). In 2007 NATO forces killed one of the top leaders of the Taliban, Mullah Dadullah, and it was expected that his death would be their defeat. That did not happen. Waheed

Muzhda, a former Taliban official explained: "The Taliban are used to this. When Mullah Dadullah was killed, some people thought that the Taliban would give up. But it didn't happen, because the Taliban are waging an ideological war, and in an ideological war, this kind of thing doesn't have a big impact" (Ghosh 2010, 29).

Spatial dimensions of the Asymmetric Warfare in Pakistan:

"The terrorists are nowhere and everywhere," Lt. Col. Nisar Mughal said as he looked out on a landscape devoid of people, crops, animals or any sign of normal life [in Makeen, South Waziristan]. "This is a strange kind of warfare." (Perlez and Shah 2010)

There is in fact a profound difference in the understanding and use of space by the Taliban and the armies. The above statement by a Pakistani soldier demonstrates shock and an inability to come to terms with the expanse of the battlefield. In traditional military training, soldiers are taught that the battlefield is limited, circumscribed and calculable space. In effect, one of the old preoccupations of militaries involving their "geographical politics" has been, according to Paul Virilio, "complete unveiling" of the (world) battlefield (Virlio 1998, 22). This has entailed scanning geographical space in all three dimensions, thanks to the development of scanning technology. The finite dimensions allow military commanders to plan strategies and deploy soldiers with effective organization. On the other hand, the battlefield is an infinite expanse for terrorists. In fact, the battlefield is not a given and predetermined space where encounters should take place. As Carse explains, time is produced in the infinite game rather than outside it; space in infinite warfare is also produced from within. Moreover, since the space is produced from within and/or with movements of the warrior the battlefield keeps on expanding.

To shed more light on the dissymmetry of space or spatial understanding and the exploitation between finite and infinite warfare, I turn to Deleuze and Guattari who in their *Treatise on Nomadology: The War Machine* invoke game theory to explain this dissymmetry (Deleuze and Guattari 1987). Although the war machine is a complex concept, in its simplest terms it can be equated with modern insurgent groups or infinite warriors.

Just as Carse talks about how infinite players/warriors produce space Deleuze and Guattari call it "construction." Comparing the strategy of the pieces of Go with those of chess, Deleuze and Guattari observe that the former *construct* their territory. They proceed from within, avoiding confrontation, seeking infiltration. Deleuze and Guattari also name this strategy "the insertion." On the other hand, chess pieces in

principle seek confrontation. They move from without, conquering, capturing or covering as many spaces as possible (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 352–354). Just like the pieces of Go, the Taliban produce or expand space/battlefield by avoiding face-to-face confrontation because confrontation leads to concentration of men and logistics. Therefore, it leads to delimiting the spatial encounter. Even when they confront the army, on some occasions they pursue a hit-and-run encounter in order not to delimit their space/battlefield.

Carse's finite and infinite understanding of space can be compared with Deleuze and Guattari's smooth and striated spaces. The former is constructed by the "war machine" and the latter by the State (army). The smooth space is unlimited, infinite space like that of ocean, desert, and mountain ranges. The striated space refers to limited, finite space, like the spaces of a state that are divided and controlled by law, authority, and customs. These two spaces are different in nature and therefore enact different patterns of movement and warfare. Deleuze and Guattari compare the space in chess with space in Go and call the former a striated space while the latter a smooth space:

> [T]he space is not at all the same: in chess, it is a question of arranging a closed space for oneself, thus of going from one point to another, of occupying the maximum number of squares with the minimum number of pieces. In Go, it is a question of arraying oneself in an open space, of holding space, of maintaining the possibility of springing up at any point: the movement is not from one point to another, but becomes perpetual, without aim or destination, without departure or arrival. The "smooth" space of Go, as against the "striated" space of chess. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 353)

The quote from Deleuze and Guattari identifies two major spatial dimensions: 1) organization of/in space and 2) movement in space. Under the first dimension we see the typology of the space divided into striated and smooth spaces and the strategy of arranging against and arraying in those spaces respectively. Under the second dimension we analyze perpetual movement as strategy, the mode of springing up (exhibited by the Taliban) against marching (exhibited by the Army), and the mode of renouncing (exhibited by the Taliban) against retreating (exhibited by the Army).

For Deleuze and Guattari "the space is not all the same," because the space in chess is coded and regulated while in Go it is least coded. The former constitutes what

they call "striated space" while the latter constitutes the "smooth space." On the other hand, we know that they compare Go with the war machine and chess with the State. In this way, the war between the war machine and the State is like war between the pieces of Go and chess. And the battlefield is a juxtaposition between the smooth and striated spaces. This exactly is the situation on the real battleground of the Northwestern frontier of Pakistan where the Taliban confront the Army. The Taliban make a war machine and move in the "lawless borderland" (the smooth space). The Pakistan Army, on the other hand, makes a state army, which moves in legal territory, holds it, and helps the State to expand it by capturing the lawless space. This confrontation between the Taliban war machine against the Army, like the juxtaposition between Go and chess, is what makes it asymmetric warfare.

The Pakistan Army stations a limited number of soldiers on the Northwestern frontier. They are normally strategically positioned, because the Army has to *arrange* the space so that it closes and covers it. Forts, compounds, outposts, and check-posts are the material consequence of this arranging. However, in doing so it has successfully covered only major towns, villages, and highways. On the other hand, the Taliban are also limited in numbers, but must spread themselves so that they seem to be "everywhere." Their strategy is to spread themselves in the mountain ranges and valleys to open, expand, and thus hold them. In other terms, in arraying "space is occupied without being counted," and in arranging the "space is counted in order to be occupied" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 362). Thus, they *array* themselves in the borderland against the arranging of the Army.

By arraying themselves on the smooth space of the mountainous tribal borderland, the strategy of the Taliban is not only to avoid confrontation, but also to make movement a "pure strategy" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 353). Making movement pure strategy means ease of movement, non-departing, and unimpeded by the borders. The ease of movement is due to their logistical lightness compared to the Army, whose movement is laborious, energy-consuming and time-intensive. As early as the eve of 20th century, the British Army encountered this problem in its wars against the restive tribes in this mountainous borderland. Winston Churchill, who was commissioned in Malakand Field Forces and sent to Swat Valley, wrote about the difficulties of Army movement in this borderland: "People talk of moving columns hither and thither as if they were mobile groups of men who had only to march about the country and fight the enemy wherever found; and a very few understand that an army is a ponderous mass which drags painfully after it a long chain of advanced depots, stages, rest camps and communications, by which it is securely fastened to a stationary base. In these valleys, where wheeled traffic is impossible, the difficulties

and cost of moving supplies are enormous" (Schofield 2009, 111). One hundred years after Churchill's experiences, the Pakistan Army is faced with similar logistical problems and the Taliban know how to use this mountainous territory for their advantage.

Their movement is non-departing because it is more akin to nomadic movement. Pakistani, as well as American, generals believe that their military operations (and in the case of the latter, drone attacks) keep the Taliban on the move. This claim has some validity, however, it is not operations or drone attacks that keep them on the move. Instead, it is pure strategy to cope with these attacks. Moreover, they do not depart the borderland, like the nomads do not depart the smooth space. Supporting Toynbee's thesis that the nomad is one who does not move, Deleuze and Guattari write "the nomad is one who does not depart, does not want to depart, who clings to the smooth space…the nomad moves, but while seated, and he is only seated while moving." The nomad who has the territory and paths and moves with speed does not depart or arrive because the space is infinite. Departure and arrival cannot be measured in a space which resists spatial measurement dimensions.

Because the mountain ranges run into Afghanistan, the Taliban move unimpeded through the border from and to Afghanistan. A report says that in January 2009 "hundreds of Taliban militants poured into northwestern Pakistan in a large frontal attack on…an outpost of the Frontier Corps paramilitary force in the Mohmand…in a reversal of usual patterns, it involved a large number of Taliban forces from Afghanistan attacking into Pakistan" (Cloughley 2008, 203). One senior Pakistani official commenting on this attack refers to the criticism that Pakistan received from the coalition forces in Afghanistan for not controlling the Taliban says that it "might shut [them] up" now (Cloughley 2008, 203). The fact is that for the Taliban the Afghanistan-Pakistan mountainous borderland (or the Northwestern frontier) is a "smooth space," and their movement is not from one side of the border to the other; there are in fact no sides or the border. Ambrose Dundas, who served as Governor of the North West Frontier province in 1948-9, writes how the infinite/smooth space of the mountainous country does not give itself to the drawing of borders. He writes that the contemporary border "is a vague sort of line, sometimes following watershed, and sometimes not. There is the same mountainous tangle of country on both sides of it, and nowhere is there anything artificial or natural to tell you when you have reached it" (Quoted in Schofield 2009, 60)

Go pieces and nomads renounce the territory--"deterritorialize oneself by renouncing, by going elsewhere" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 353)—while the chess

pieces and the Army retreat from the territory, for example an advance position, to its original position. Like Go pieces and nomads the Taliban deterritorialize themselves and go elsewhere. This phenomenon has by now become visible in numerous military operations carried out on the tribal borderland since the beginning of the War on Terror. For instance, when the Army marched into Swat Valley, the Taliban gave it up and went into the neighboring tribal agencies of Bajuar and Mohmand. When the Army marched into Bajuar and Mohmand, they moved to south to Khyber, Orakzai and Waziristan agencies. From South Waziristan, as the Army marched in, they moved upward to North Waziristan.

Conclusion:

He who knows the enemy and himself
Will never in a hundred battles be at risk.
--Sun-Tzu (3:113)

The war on terror has become an asymmetric war because we, although powerful, do not understand the enemy well, while the enemy, although weak, understands us well. The military strategists' reliance on modern technology and sophisticated weapons that generate speed, precision, and lethality might be quite effective in traditional warfare, but they are almost useless in the infinite war. The enemy's poor technology and weapons are on the other hand quite suitable to the infinite war. I feel provoked to summon Arthur C. Clarke's militarily instructive fiction, *Superiority*, for a lesson here. The fiction's setting is a distant future. It is written from the perspective of a captured military officer who sits in a prison cell of the enemy. He narrates how his side lost a war despite having better weapons. He recalls and says, "We were defeated by one thing only—by the inferior science of our enemies." "I repeat, by the inferior science of our enemies" (Arthur C. Clarke 1997, 110). As his side keeps developing new technologies in the hope of changing the battlefield and terms of warfare, they were unable to use their technology in the battlefield that also changes with war. The inferior side takes advantage of their weakness and eventually wins. In the context of the War on Terror, modern technologies are proving unsuitable. These technologies develop speed, lethality, and precision, but what we actually need are the technologies to counter slow, protracted, and spatially expanded war.

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