Motivations for Pakistani Religious Extremists to Become Terrorists

Raza Rahman, Khan Qazi, Shahid Ali Khattak & Shakeel Ahmad

Abstract

Terrorism cannot and must not be considered as a phenomenon that unfolds in isolation. In most instances terrorism is the outcome of protracted process of radicalization of some political or religious movement. Political or religious movements splinter when they lose public support and influence. At times the relatively more extremists among the fundamentalist groups resort to terrorism in order to revive the group's social influence and political clout. Moreover, terrorism is not possible sans an extremist ideology that guides and justifies the actions and plans of the perpetrators of terrorism. On the other hand one of the dominant paradigms in terrorism studies, the Strategic Model, contends that perpetrators of terrorism are fundamentally rational actors and their actions politically motivated. Furthermore, the terrorists are political 'utility maximizers' as they employ violence because from their standpoint the cost-benefit analysis reveals to them that the expected benefits of using violence would be far more than other forms of agitation and pressure. This had typically been the situation which Pakistani state and society experienced between 1980 to 2010 with one important exception, that the goals of Pakistani terrorist outfit operating in the name of Islam had not been political per se. These groups have the only common objective of capturing the state power through sheer violence. In the later decade of that period, specifically in its second half, Pakistan faced its worst ever terrorist attacks. The perpetrators of these attacks, in most of the cases, were various so-called Islamist groups or Mujahideen. These groups included the Tehreek-e-Nifaze-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM), the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Al Qaeda, the Lashkar-e-Jhanghvi (LeJ), the Punjabi Taliban and the Lashkar-e-Islam (LI). In this period not only certain entirely new terrorist groups, for instance the TTP, emerged but several of the formerly Islamist extremist groups adopted terrorism to carry forward their respective agendas. Earlier during that period the mother of most Pakistani Sunni sectarian, militant organization, Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), grew out of the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (JUI), one of the oldest fundamentalist political party and groups of Pakistan. This paper deals with motivations and conditions that have been responsible for the surfacing of totally new terrorist groups operating in the name of Islam in the country and transmutation of the formerly extremist (and in some instances militant) Islamist outfits into terrorist groups. Seemingly various factors interacted to produce the effect that is terrorism. The paper also explains the objectives which the terrorist groups operating in the name of Islam want to attain through unleashing a reign of terror across the country in particular the FATA and parts of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) like Swat. These motivations have been explained in detail below.

1. Motives of Individuals and Groups to Employ Terrorism

Terrorism may be a rational choice from the standpoint of the terrorists but the strategy is not rational as such. Here rational means that terrorism is employed by individuals and groups after threadbare analysis of the prevailing conditions, individual/group aims, objectives, advantages and disadvantages as well as practicability of various courses of action to attain these objectives. But the terrorists' rationality is relative and subjective and not absolute or objective. In other words terrorists may believe that no other way but terrorism could achieve for them which is otherwise unachievable by adopting other ways. However, there is substantial evidence that terrorism as a strategy has failed to achieve its aims. The Rand Corporation in the 1980s concluded that "terrorists have been unable to translate the consequences of terrorism into concrete political gains." Around the same time on the other hand Crenshaw was of the view that terrorist organizations were unsuccessful to get "the long-term ideological objectives they claim to seek, and therefore one must conclude that terrorism is objectively a failure." (Crenshaw, 2001: 15, as cited by Abrahms, 2008: 49) In the 1990s Thomas Schelling arrived at the same conclusion observing terrorism "never appear to accomplish anything politically significant." (Schelling, 1991) Due to the ineffectiveness of terrorism as a political strategy scholars have questioned the so-called rationality of its employment. For instance, Crenshaw questioned the purpose of terrorism when it cannot be justified. In response most terrorism experts argue that terrorist outfits have a compulsive proclivity to employ terrorism. This assertion contradicts the validity of the assumptions of the *Strategic Model* that terrorism is the weapon of last choice when all other non-violent ways lead to nowhere.

Regarding the motivations of terrorists a world-renowned terrorism expert Alex Schmidt stated:

Those who are willing to sacrifice their lives for class, race or religion are promised certain rewards. In the case of religious terrorism these rewards are supposedly delivered in another world which makes it special. The objectives of terrorism are the same for secular and religious groups-gain or maintain power here on earth-but the rewards promised to the foot-soldiers who do the killing and dying are different in the case of religious terrorism.[4]

These findings and observations are very important from understanding the objectives of perpetrators of terrorism in Pakistan and the formulation of a counterterrorism strategy. At the same time it must be remembered that each

country and society has its own peculiar political environment and socio-cultural dynamics as well as the nature of terrorist outfits, which provide either permissive conditions for or inhibitive atmosphere to terrorism and therefore, the findings of one country cannot be generalized across several states or societies. Therefore, in order to understand the phenomenon of terrorism and to devise effective counterterrorism policy, the phenomenon should be studied within the cultural and political context of each country. In Pakistan the terrorist groups have justified the adoption of terrorism in the name of Islam, therefore, unlike the Western countries, where all the above findings were documented, at least Pakistani terrorist groups have a very strong engineered justification for violence. Although it is equally true that overall terrorism cannot achieve for its perpetrators what they desire—to compel the state to replace the existing political and governance systems with such political and social structures as desired by the terrorists.

In the context of Pakistan, the leaders of the terrorist outfits operating in the name of Islam seem to have an innate compulsion to use violence. As most of the commanders of Pakistani terrorist outfits have come from extremely tribal and rural background particularly from the FATA, the KP and the Punjab, so feeling powerless to carve a niche for themselves in the urban power centres of the country as well as are unable to understand how modern world, systems and institutions operate and how one can move forward in these systems and structures, they resorted to violence. For other terrorists like Omar Saeed Sheikh, who got education at the London School of Economics, the psychopathological reason seems to have compelled them to resort to terrorism. Nevertheless, to fully comprehend why groups and individuals have been resorting to terrorism in Pakistan a comprehensive analysis is required which is as follows.

2. Motivations for Extremists to Become Terrorists & New Terrorist Groups

There have been a number of general motivations cited by experts, scholars and researchers in the terrorism studies literature for the transformation of radical outfits into terrorist groups and the emergence of purely new terrorist outfits. These motivations crosscut national boundaries. The following sections of this paper would analyze most important of the general motivations and their relevance in the context of Pakistan

2.1 Culmination of Radicalization & Islamists Failure to get State Power

Like the rest of the world particularly Muslim countries terrorism in Pakistan in the name of Islam has been the climax for about 30 years of

the process of radicalization due to the resurging clerical forces heretic or neo-interpretation and exegesis of Islamic scripture. "It (9/11) was the culmination of a rising tide of radicalization which has been sweeping the Muslim world over the last couple of decades from Palestine to Iran, from Pakistan to Sudan, from Afghanistan to Somalia, from Egypt to Algeria, and elsewhere". (Ferrero, 2005) However, the case of religious terrorism in Pakistan at the same time has also been quite different from other Muslim countries. Terrorism in the name of Islam in Pakistan is partially the outcome of the decades-long radical Islamic narrative at the state or official as well as the societal level. The Islamist movement in Pakistan historically has had disparate elements including the Majlis-e-Ahrar-ul-Islam (Association for the Knights of Islam, the Khaksar Tehreek, the Jamaat-e-Islami (Party of the Islam), the Tableeghi Jamaat (Party of the Propagators) and the Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Islam (Party of the Scholars of Islam). An array of religious groups, the Jamat-e-Islami, the Ahrars and the Khaksars for instance, opposed the demand for Pakistan on account of its being insufficiently imbued with the tenets of religion. After partition, these same groups became the loudest proponents of an 'Islamic state'. (Jalal, 1999: 278) Although having different agendas and modus operandi these groups and parties in Pakistan have somewhat common aim of establishing a fundamentalist Muslim state in Pakistan, albeit in their own peculiar manner. However, all of these groups have utterly failed to attain the aim through political and social struggle spanning several decades.

Two important factors played instrumental role in their failure. The first has been the inability of these outfits to win majority in elections and get political power. The collective voting strength of religious parties, which was 21.5 percent in 1970, reduced to mere 6.7 percent in 1993. These religious parties lost so much of their political clout that they could win only a couple of National Assembly seats in 1997. (Waseem, 2002: 23)

The second and more important factor behind failure of religious parties of Pakistan in getting political power has been their inability to rally mass public support behind them and to effect change through it. This inability disenchanted most of the leaders, members and followers of the religious parties of Pakistan, who increasingly lost faith in the capacity of their organizations to bring about an *Islamic* revolution in the country created in the name of Islam. On the one hand the failure of different components of the Pakistani Islamist movement to grab political power and on the other hand disillusionment within and without these parties, in turn, curtailed these parties social influence they once had. In the meanwhile

seeing this situation with utter dejection, the radical among those parties started resorting to terrorism as the preferred way to regain social influence and ultimately political power. This change of *modus operandi* is not something unique to Pakistani ideological Islamist parties and movements as historically many fundamentalist religious parties across the world adopted terrorism eventually. "But what happens if the ideological movement or organization has not yet been able to grasp secular power, or if it has lost it, for instance by war like the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and a branch of the Anabaptists after their Muenster kingdom had been routed. (Stayer, 1976: chapters 12 and 13: as quoted by Bernholz, 2006) Then probability is great that the movement turns to guerrilla warfare and terrorism to finally gain or regain secular power against the forces of evil depicted as such by its ideology." (Bernholz, 2006)

There are some very important examples that could be cited as ready reference regarding concocted grievances of Pakistani religious groups. The TNSM founder Maulana Sufi Muhammad was a the JI renegade (Rana, 2002: 184) who left the JI after disagreeing with its *modus operandi* of struggling for Islamic system in the country through the constitutional means and participation in mainstream politics resting on electoral system. Consequently, Sufi formed the TNSM to enforce *Shariah* in Malakand region by the force of arms, mass agitation and sit-ins through crippling state machinery and building pressure on the state to give in to its unconstitutional demands.

The Sipha-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), the mother of Pakistani militant and terrorist organizations, as mentioned earlier, was the outgrowth of the JUI (Abbas, 2005: 204) because the former concluded that the latter failed to implement the Deobandi brand of doctrinaire Islam in Pakistan, a regime in which Shiites, the bête noire of the group, would be declared non-Muslim. The SSP although has been a radical and militant organization but it has taken part in democratically-held elections (Grare, 2009); thus it at least did not have disagreements with the JUI on the methodology of attaining power and enforcement of *Shariah*. The SSP by resorting to militancy and vitriolic anti-Shiite rhetoric radicalized its ranks and files until some of the extremist within the group detached from the mother party, considering it *pacifist* and *soft* on its enemies and incapable to bring about an *Islamic* revolution in the country. Consequently, the radical factions of the SSP formed Lashkar-e-Jhanghvi (LeJ), a purely terrorist organization. (Rana, 2002: 204)

Many of the TTP top brass like its first and long-serving deputy commanders Maulvi Faqir Muhammad and Maulvi Wali ur Rahman and many other had formerly been the JUI office-bearers. Others TTP commanders like Qari Hussain, the master-trainer of suicide bombers; its second head Hakimullah Mehsud, had been associated with the LeJ while another commander Maulana Fazlullah was a member of the TNSM. On this basis it can be argued that ". . . the JUI has long been a political patron of the Taliban and other Deobandi militant groups . . ." (Fair & Jones, 2009-2010: 10) This shows that radicalization of the fundamentalist groups went on but their concomitant failure resulted in relatively more extremist groups resorting to terrorism.

3 Factors in Gradual Process of Resort Terrorism

Insofar the abrupt emergence of entirely new terrorist organizations like the TTP is concerned, although many of its leading commanders may have been part of extremist parties like the JUI-F and the LeJ but a sizable part of these organization ranks and files comprise of those who chose terrorism as a first option to press for their objective(s) and their ultimate attainment.

3.1 Minority's Grievances: As First Condition of Terrorism

The first condition that can be considered as a direct cause of terrorism is the existence of concrete grievances among an identifiable subgroup of a larger population, such as an ethnic minority discriminated against by the majority. (Crenshaw, 1981: 383) The extremist groups of Pakistan can be termed as identifiable subgroups because they have their brand names and signature tactics like suicide bombings. In the context of Pakistan, one of the direct causes of terrorism and the transformation of Islamic radicalism into terrorism in the name of Islam is the grievance of the religious parties and groups, backed by a sizable part of population, is the non-enforcement of *Shariah* in the country. This has provided a pretext for groups like the TNSM, TTP, SSP, and LI among others to resort to terrorism to achieve the same goal through violence. Pakistani Muslim ideologues categorize Jihad into two main types—external and internal. The former is to wage a holy struggle against those non-Muslim forces and countries which oppress Muslims, the latter is to create a true Islamic society in Muslim states. (Boivin, 2007: 112)

Many minority groups conduct terrorist activities as a way to bring about social change (Kruglanski, 2003). Usually, these groups represent beliefs and positions on political and religious issues which are not readily accepted by the majority. These terrorists are what some social

psychologists define as "active minorities." (Moscovici, Mugny Perlez, 1991; Moscovici, 1996). The TTP objective of overthrowing the existing state dispensation and imposition of its brand of Islam or *Shariah* in Pakistan is tantamount to bringing about a social change. The TTP, the TNSM, the Punjabi Taliban or generally all shades of Pakistani Taliban beliefs of imposing their doctrinal brand of *Shariah*, formulation of their own ultra-radical domestic and foreign policy for the state, has been unacceptable to the majority Pakistani population but more importantly to the existing power centres and cannot be enforced through the extant power structures. Therefore, for these 'active minorities' the most desirable way to achieve their aims is terrorism.

The desired social change of this active minority of Pakistani religious terrorists can be attained by destroying the existing governance and state structures through large-scale terrorism. This requires terrorizing the population of which most are unsupportive of the cause of the extremists. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the so-called religious parties failed to win popular public support as is evident from the negligible percentage of votes they got in different elections. Thus these groups could not mould the public opinion in their favour. Therefore, the dominant Islamic religious parties started supporting the agenda and tactics of religious terrorist groups. The motive of religious parties for extending this support is that if people cannot be won over through political means they at least could be silenced through terrorism by making opposition to the violence and radicalization extremely costly. The religious parties believe *terrorizing into silence* would create a situation as is explained by the theory of Spiral of Silence in which the religious parties would dominate the public discourse as well as the public sphere by taking advantage of the terrorizing of the people. In this process the religious parties would become a *Loud Minority* and making the people a *Silent Majority*.

The social change which Pakistani terrorist groups have perceived as 'Islamic Revolution' in essence is the replacement of the existing Pakistani constitution and political and administrative structures with the dictatorship of the former in which state policies are determine by the illiterate or partially-literate clerics.

3.2 Conservative Religious Elite Equating "Own-Craving" For Power With Popular Sentiment

The contextual factors behind terrorism have their specific dynamics which are aptly explained by Crenshaw:

Context is especially significant as a direct cause of terrorism when it affects an elite, not the mass population. Terrorism is essentially the result of elite disaffection; it represents the strategy of a minority, who may act on behalf of a wider popular constituency who have not been consulted about, and do not necessarily approve of, the terrorists' aims or methods.(Crenshaw, 1981: 383)

This is typically true of Pakistani dominant religious or conservative elite, which believes it represents the popular sentiment while demanding *Islamic* government and social structures in the country. The ultimate aim of the religious elite in Pakistan is to replace the traditional social-political elite. However, this craving of the clergy for state power could not be satiated in the context of Pakistan having western political system and state institutions as well as the traditional ruling elite, which only wanted to use the clergy for strengthening its own power base without sharing state power with the latter. "In Pakistan's formative years, the political elites and the civil-military bureaucracy wrestled for power but held the clergy at bay. Some leading *Ulema* were co-opted to give the new state a symbolic Islamic identity, but by and large the clergy were excluded from the power game." (ICG, 2002) This has been the main cause of the frustration of members of the clergy with the state. The JI founder Maulana Maududi once said: "The ultimate aim of all the Prophets' missions in the world has been to establish the kingdom of God on earth and to enforce the system of life received from Him". (Zainuddin, 2000: 4) Thus having state and the governmental powers are essential to implement the teachings of Islam. So out of frustration and in a hope that the terrorist groups operating in the name of Islam would destroy the existing state structure and institutions and thus would create for the clerical groups the rare opportunity to rule the religious elite, sans the Barelvi sect parties, started supporting religious terrorist groups. Rather, as partially explained above, the religious elite on many instances played an instrumental role in creating terrorist groups. For instance, the JUI affiliation with and support to Harkat-ul-Ansar, the TTP, various other Pakistani Taliban groups and above all the Afghan Taliban are cases in point which are not without any objectives.

The JUI links with the Taliban are admitted by a top leader and parliamentarian, Maulana Gul Naseeb but with certain reservations.

No, we have acquaintances, relationship with Taliban; many of them remained our disciples. It is wrong that we don't have any

links with them. In Pakistan the same objectives religious forces are trying to get through political means but in Afghanistan Taliban have adopted a militant way to stop Allied forces and US aggression, because the latter has usurped their independence. We disagree with the imitation of modus operandi of Taliban in Afghanistan in our country; they have their own country and they should do what suit them.

On the other hand the JI has supported Al Qaeda; Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and other terrorist outfits; whereas TNSM founder Sufi Muhammad was one of Jamaat's renegades and mentored the TTP head in Swat, Maulana Fazlullah, who also was his son-in-law. The JI relationship with Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups has been explained in these words by Ahmed Rashid.

On behalf of the ISI, it (the JI) had spawned numerous extremist groups to fight in Kashmir and had twice helped the military, undermine the government of Benazir Bhutto in the 1990s. Opposition politicians alleged that the Jamiat was protecting al Qaeda militants. Several alleged militants had been arrested from Jamiat members' homes in Karachi and Lahore, while the Jamiat leader, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, denied that al Qaeda even existed. (Rashid, 2008: 226)

The majority of Pakistanis have little interest, whatsoever, whether the religious elite is able to grab political or for that matter state power. However, to satisfy their personal craving for power, pelf and perks the members of the religious elite of Pakistan have portrayed their demands as the cherished goal of the entire population but did not receive any mandate from the latter. Had the majority of Pakistanis been approved of the aims and methods of the dominant religious community, it should have voted for the religious parties candidates in elections? But hardly the religious parties got a fraction of votes of the people. For the religious elite, without state and political power, neither its members can implement their radical agenda nor could satisfy the personal or group craving for power so as to become the new ruling elite. Therefore, it is also necessary for the members of the religious elite to use the pretext of working for the enforcement of *Islamic* system in Pakistan to masquerade their personal urge for power. Pakistani religious elite instrumental support to terrorism in the name of Islam is motivated basically by this drive. This is also a significant factor behind the transformation of religious extremist groups increasing use of terrorism in the name of Islam. Here it may again be recalled that the religious elite got its present privileged status within the

Pakistani society and state structure because of the ruling-elitedominated state consistent patronage to use the social influence rather nuisance value of the clerics for the purposes of nation-building and perpetuation of its (traditional ruling-elite-dominated) control over the state and its polices. (Behuria, 2007: 10).

Still there is a significant difference between the two elites. Despite of possessing the privileged status, the traditional Pakistani ruling elite has never given the religious elite or clerics a decisive say in the country's policy making institutions and processes. Therefore, to reach the echelons of power, the religious elite has seemingly thought it expedient to support terrorist outfits operating in the name of Islam. In other words, the religious elite wants to reach the power corridors riding the tidal wave created by terrorist groups.

3.3 Mass Passivity and Elite Disattisfaction

Terrorism is most likely to occur precisely where mass passivity and elite dissatisfaction coincide. Discontent is not generalized or severe enough to provoke the majority of the populace to action against the regime, yet a small minority, without access to the bases of power that would permit overthrow of the government through coup d'état or subversion, seeks radical change (Crenshaw, 1981: 379). In other words "terrorism is the resort of an elite when conditions are not revolutionary." (Crenshaw, 1981)As explained earlier majority of Pakistanis has been indifferent to religious parties and never supported them to get state power by voting in their favour. The history of Pakistani elections is testimony to the fact. Therefore, enforcement of Islamic *Shariah* has never been an 'obtrusive' issue for the mass of Pakistanis. As mentioned earlier this situation also left the religious elite disaffected and somewhat frustrated because its members cannot expect attaining state power through the political process. Therefore, they started supporting terrorists because the members of the dominant religious elite think that in the event Islamic terrorist groups would overthrow the existing political system and the power configuration the opportunity of would arise for them to get hold of the state itself as the terrorist, in such an event or eventuality, would not have the capacity to run the *state* affairs. Therefore, the religious elite members have expectation that terrorists eventually would hand over the state to them to run it. This hypothetical scenario seems unrealistic to come to fruition as the terrorists might not be able to run over the Pakistani state. Given the low educational levels and non-cosmopolitan personality - type of members   of dominant religious elite of the country, such

farfetched expectations are understandable. For the sake of argument if philosophers and social thinkers like Karl Marx and Frederick Engels could foresee the evolution a classless and stateless communist societies, the revolution that has never happened after the passage of almost 120 years of the death of both, then wishing of ultimate control of the state power by Pakistani mullahs should not seem strange.

Conclusion

The transformation of Islamist extremist crosscurrents in Pakistan into a terrorist wave in the name of Islam, is a relatively new phenomenon. Likewise, the emergence of entirely new and out-and-out terrorist groups hitherto (when such groups surfaced) had been an unfounded trend. There are various reasons for both this transformation of religious extremist crosscurrents into terrorism and the surfacing of terrorist groups. The foremost reason is that terrorism in the name of Islam has simply been the culmination of long-drawn religious extremism in Pakistani society. Additionally the failure of Islamist religious parties in gaining political power through elections and influencing the public opinion, has been other key causal factor for many of these parties to support terrorism in the name of Islam and its perpetrators and to allow certain of their ranks to get militant training. These parties have supported terrorism both out of frustration and in hope. In the latter case, they had anticipated that once the terrorist were able to overthrow the existing state dispensation, they would have their biggest opportunity to get hold of the state as the terrorist would lack the wherewithal necessary to run the state affairs. The utter lack of faith of the new generation of Pakistani Islamist extremists in the existing state structure and political system and their belief in the necessity of overthrowing them has also contributed to the rise of religious terrorism in Pakistan. The urge among the extremists, terrorists and certain sections of the population to bring about a desirable social change has also been an underlying factor in the transformation of religious extremism into terrorism and the rise of purely terrorist organizations. Seeking economic fortune, localized power and status by leaders of terrorist outfits have also been responsible for the emergence of terrorist groups in the name of Islam in Pakistan. Communication also has played its part in the employment of terrorism by certain groups. By supporting terrorism the religious extremist wanted to display the prowess of their community and also to intimidate their rivals and the state about what could happen if power is not ceded to the radicals. Thus the rise of terrorist tide since the 1990s apart from other factors could also be understood from the standpoint of the motives of extremist outfits and only then a viable counter strategy could be devised by the state.

End Note

Raza interview with Alex Schmidt, a former head of UN anti-terrorism unit (by email, April 2010).Shmidt held chair of International Relations at the University of St. Andrews, where he was Director of the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence CSTPV. At the time of the interview he was the Director of the Terrorism Research Initiative.

A question may arise in some people minds that if it is innate and compulsive than it is a predetermined behaviour thus it contradicts the argument, as explained above, that terrorism is a rational choice for many of its perpetrators. However, having natural proclivity to use violence among individuals drive them to rationalize the employing of terrorism.

Sheikh was convicted by a Pakistani court of beheading US journalist Daniel Pearl in 2002 alleging him to be a spy in the garb of journalist.

Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi was the founder of Khaksar Tehreek which basically was a social movement later developed militaristic leanings but did not become a militant outfit. The movement established in 1931 was mainly based in Lahore, however, had millions of followers in the entire British India. The initial aim was to free India from the rule of the British Empire and to establish a Hindu-Muslim government in India. (Amalendu, 2009: 71-72) On March 14, 1937, Allama Mashriqi delivered his 14 points, which became the guiding principles of the movement. (Amalendu, 2009:128). These points suggested that the group had both dictatorial and militaristic objectives. At this point Khaksar Tehreek aims were to establish its rule over India and then perhaps over the entire world. The reflections of these objectives could be found in the arguments of TTP and the LeT commanders. However, unlike the TTP and the LeT, which believe in enforcing their version of *Shariah* rule through naked use of violence, *Khaksars* believed in success of Muslim rule in India dependent on certain conditions, such as: "(a) regard for the religious and social sentiments of the various communities that live in this county: (b) maintenance of their particular culture and customs, and (c) general tolerance." (Amalendu, 2009: 130-131). Khaksar Tehreek was disbanded by Mashriqi in October 1947 and then founded Islam League. After the death of Mashriqi his followers revived Khaksar Tehreek which operates in pockets in different parts of Pakistan.

Majlis-e-Ahrar-ul-Islam also known in short as *Ahrar*, was a conservative Sunni Muslim political party in the Indian subcontinent during the British rule. Syed Ata Ullah Shah Bukhari created All India Majlis-e-Ahrar-e-Islam with Maulana Mazhar Ali Azhar, Chaudhry Afzal Haq, Maulana Habib-ur-Rehman Ludhianvi, Sheikh Hissam - ud - Din, Master Taj - uj - Din Ansari and Maulana

Zafar Ali Khan on December 29, 1929 before the partition of India. The party opposed founder of Pakistan, Muhammad Ali Jinnah and the establishment of an independent Pakistan.

See Chapter 3 for the origin, complexion and tactics of TNSM.

However, there is a radical difference in the conception of extremist parties and groups and general masses regarding *Shariah* and so-called Islamic system. While the former consider enforcement of *Shariah* as virtual dictatorship of a specific brand of clerics or sort of Muslims, people generally think *Shariah* as good governance as explained above.

The spiral of silence is a political science and mass communication theory propounded by the German Political Scientist, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann. Spiral of silence theory describes the process by which one opinion becomes dominant as those who perceive their opinion to be in the minority do not speak up because they fear isolation from society. For details see (Neumann, 1974)

The detailed relevance and application of the theory of the Spiral of Silence in Pakistan has been discussed in Chapter 1.

Social change according to sociologist Wilbert Moore (1967: 3) is a process of significant alteration over time in behaviour patterns and culture, including norms and values. (Schaefer &Lamm: 1992: 603)

Raza interview with Senator Maulana Gul Naseeb, who remained the JUI-F parliamentary leader in the Senate of Pakistan and president of the party in the KP province (Peshawar, December 2007)

The ruling elite here means feudal and industrialist so-called politicians as well as the military and civilian establishment.

Obtrusive issues are those issues which gives us some kind of personal experience, (e.g., city-wide crime or inflation at the gas pump). Unobtrusive issues are issues which cannot be directly observed (e.g., national unity). To learn about unobtrusive issues, we must turn to news media. As such, there tends to be a higher correlation between the salience of unobtrusive issues presented in the news media and audience's perceptions of these issues as important problems. Research performed by Zucker in 1978 suggested that an issue is obtrusive if most members of the public have had direct contact with it, and less obtrusive if members have not had direct experience. (Zucker 1978: 225–246)

Reference

Abbas, H., 2005. *Pakistan Drift into Extremism.* New Delhi: Pentagon Press.

Abrahms, M., 2008. What Terrorists Really Want: Terrorist Motives and Counterterrorism Strategy. *International Security,* 32(4), p. 78–105.

Amalendu, D., 2009. *History of the Khaksar Movement in India, 1931-1947.* Kolkata: Parul Prakashan.

Behuria, A. K., 2007. 'Fighting the Taliban: Pakistan at war with itself. *Australian Journal of International Affairs ,* Volume 61: 4, p. 529 — 543.

Bernholz, P., 2006. The Political Economy of Terrorism. *Public Choice: International Political System, Supreme Values and Terrorism,* July, Vol. 128 (1/2), pp. pp. 221-231.

Boivin, M., 2007. Jihad, National Process and Identity Assertion in Pakistan: The Dialectic of Metaphor and Reality's. In: S. Shafqat, ed. *New Perspective on Pakistan: Visions For the Future.* Karachi: Oxford University Press.

Cordes, B. et al., 1982 and 1983. *Trends in International Terrorism,* Santa Monica, Calif: RAND, 1984.

Corte, D. l., 2006. *La lógica del terrorismo (The Logic of Terrorism).* Madrid: Alianza.

Corte, L. d. l., 2007. Explaining Terrorism: A Psychosocial Approach. *Perspective on Terrorism,* 1(2).

Crenshaw, M., 2001. Theories of terrorism: instrumental and organizacional approaches. In: D. C. Rappoport, ed. *Inside terrorist organisations.* Londres: Frank Cass Publishers.

Fair, C. & Jones, S., 2009-2010. Pakistan's War Within. *Survival,* Decembe-January , 51(6), p. 161–188.

Ferrero, M., 2005. Radicalization as a Reaction to Failure: An Economic Model of Islamic Extremism. *Public Choice,* 122(1/2), pp. 199-220.

ICG, 2002. *Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism, and the Military,* Brussels: International Crisis Group.

Jalal, A., 1999. *The State of Martial Rule: The origins of Pakistan political economy of defence.* Lahore: Sang-e-Meel Publications.

Moscovici, S., 1991. Silent majorities and loud minorities. *Communication yearbook,* Volume 14 , pp. 298-308.

Moscovici, S., 1996. *Psicología de las minorías activas.* Madrid: Morata.

Moscovici, S. & Mugny, G. y. P. J., 1991. *La influencia social inconciente. Estudios de psicología social experimental.* Barcelona: Anthropos.

Rana, M. A., 2002. *A to Z of Jehadi Organizations in Pakistan.* Lahore: Mashal.

Rashid, A., 2008. *Descent into Chaos : the United States and the failure of nation building in Pakistan.* New York: Viking Penguin.

Reinares, F., 1998. *Terrorismo y antiterrorismo.* Barcelona: Paidós.

Richardson, L., 2006. *What Terrorists Want: Understanding the Enemy, Containing the Threat.* New York: Random House.

Schaefer, R. T. & Lamm, R. P., 1992. *Sociology.* New York: Mc GRAW-HILL INC..

Schelling, T. C., 1991. What Purposes Can International Terrorism Serve?. In: R. Frey & C. W. Morris, eds. *Violence, Terrorism, and Justice.* New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 20.

Waseem, M., 2002. *Pakistan Under Martial Law 1977-1985.* Lahore: Vanguard.

Zainuddin, S., 2000. Economic Internationalisation and Islamic Resurgence in India. *The International Scope Review,* Winter.2(4).

The author Raza is a Pakistani researcher and political analyst and a PhD research scholar at the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar researching on the topic *Extremism-Terrorism in the Name of Islam in Pakistan: Causes and Counter strategy.*

The author Shahid Khattak is a Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, University of Peshawar and a PhD scholar at the same department.

The author Shakeel Ahmad is an Assistant Professor at the Department of Social Work, University of Peshawar.