

Identification of Potential Terrorism: The Problem and Implications for Law Enforcement in Pakistan[★]

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Abstract

In South Asia, Pakistan is in a situation to prevent the growth of terrorist activities. In this context, it is necessary to identify and define certain important components of terrorism and characteristics of terrorists that have shown to be of relevance to the phenomenon of globalization of terrorism. The immediate effects of all terrorist activities in Pakistan are dealt with at a local level by law enforcement agencies and other institutions responsible for disaster management. We know that there are definitional difficulties in explaining what terrorism is, however, lack of definitional consensus does not mean that common characteristics of terrorist activities within the existing definitions of terrorism do not exist. This applies to all kinds of terrorism, the list of which is generally found in a plethora of relevant literature. This paper is an attempt to identify the potential terrorist activities in Pakistan from a law enforcement perspective and analyze the problems and implications for police officials.

Keywords

Terrorism; Law Enforcement; Pakistan; Terrorists; Victims.

Introduction

Knowledge Based Management and Terrorism

Knowledge is an important organizational resource. Unlike other inert organizational resources, the application of existing knowledge has the potential of generating new knowledge. Once created, knowledge can be articulated, shared, stored, and re-contextualized to yield options for the future. Organizations, in the modern day, are turning to knowledge management initiatives and technologies to leverage their knowledge resources. Knowledge-management is seen as a systematic and organizationally specified process for acquiring, organizing, and communicating knowledge of employees, i.e., knowledge workers, so that other employees may make use of it to be more effective and productive in their work (Gottschalk, 2007). However, the law enforcement agencies (LEAs), especially the police, have two basic tasks: the generation of police knowledge (which

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refers primarily to the conclusions and understandings reached by the LEAs as to what crimes have been or are likely to be committed, by whom, how, and why), and the production of evidence (which refers to the material that may be presented in the court to help establish whether an alleged criminal offence has been committed). Numerous factors, including information sources, stereotypes, prejudices, methods, care, and skills can play a part in shaping this knowledge and evidence production processes. One of the branches of LEAs and especially the police work that seems extremely knowledge intensive is police intelligence, the challenging part of which is the identification of potential criminals i.e., proactive or preventive intelligence or threat assessment. Gottschalk quotes Lahneman, that intelligence agencies were the world's first knowledge companies (Gottschalk, 2007).

The key to this knowledge based management is the conceptual clarity of what one is concerned about, i.e., the proper acquisition of knowledge related to problem identification. By this is meant the correct form of knowledge which is preceded by information, data collection and analysis and followed by dissemination and policy options. Law enforcement officers spend years studying criminal behaviours in order to prevent crimes and to capture and prosecute criminals. Public safety roles for LEAs now require the use of some of these same skills in identifying the criminal behaviours of potential terrorists. As noted by Haffman (1998) and others, the most difficult and critical component of homeland security is to recognize and prevent a terrorist attack (Shusta et al., 2008).

In view of the above academic discussion which has remarkable implication for policy options and response strategies in law-enforcement, we need to identify and define certain important components of terrorism and relevant characteristics of terrorists which can be considered to be of greater importance to the phenomenon of globalization of terrorism. In Pakistan, the immediate effects of all terrorist activities are felt and dealt at a local level by the regional LEAs and other institutions responsible for disaster management. We know that there are definitional difficulties in explaining what terrorism is, however, lack of the constraints of definitional consensus does not mean that common characteristics of terrorist activities within the existing definitions of terrorism do not exist. This applies to all kinds of terrorism, the list of which is generally found in every relevant literature. Schmidt surveyed 100 scholars and researchers regarding their definition of terrorism and found certain common elements in them with some major characteristics of all kinds of terrorism (Birzer & Roberson, 2007).

Martin (2004) has pointed out certain hypothesis on the basis of empirical findings vis-à-vis terrorism and Schmalleger (2007) quoting Nettler has given six characteristics of all types of terrorism. Apart from commonality in goals and modus

operandi, terrorists are inspired by many and diverse motives which can be classified distinctly in three categories: rational, psychological, and cultural. Many combinations and variations of these factors may shape a terrorist (Simonsen & Spindlove, 2007). Not all terrorists share the same motivation. The US academic circles generally describe two kinds of terrorism: domestic and international. However, the Washington, D.C. based Council on Foreign Relations offers a typology of terrorism consisting of six types of terrorism (Schmallegger, 2006).

For a better conceptual understanding of terrorism by the LEAs, Table I provides plenty of guidance to potential “knowledge workers” in law enforcement agencies in comprehending, preventing, assessing and managing terrorist activities which otherwise had never been their primary concern until the deadly attacks of 9/11. Obviously, the enhanced demands from the LEAs have given rise to certain questions in terms of civil liberties, human rights, increased capacity-building and the limit and scope of the authority of various LEAs (Ortmemeire, 2006). It is basically the acquisition of this fundamental knowledge that guides the LEAs in their counterterrorism strategies, whether short-term or long-term and whether event-specific or a generalized warning system. This obviously puts stress on the people and resources within the law enforcement mechanism, especially the police. Careful studying of the traits, history and characteristics of a terrorist, the features of a terrorist attack, the way an incident is prevented, managed or investigated and the manner in which security and safety of the public is secured in the aftermath of a terrorist activity are all important elements for shaping an organizational structure and redefining the role of law-enforcement in any given system. A kind of comparative research will enable us to look at the core knowledge in our native places because, as stated above, the immediate effects of all terrorist activities are local in nature. Like every criminal activity, a terrorist act is characterized by and dealt with in the same routine process of law enforcement.

However, new concepts and approaches are regularly being evolved for more comprehensive and targeted results, mostly adopted and adapted in the light of constantly changing dynamics of international terrorism. The core knowledge on terrorism will help the LEAs bring a change in the desired direction. This is what is meant by conceptual understanding and knowledge based management of terrorism.

Table I: Basic Knowledge about Terrorism, Terrorists and TGs


<i>Identifying Common Elements of Terrorist Groups (TGs)</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The meaning of terrorism derives from the target or victim • Terrorist Groups (TGs) adapt as times change • Majority of TGs are unsuccessful in their long-term goals • Tgs network and pool resources • Tgs work with other organizations, including organized crime groups, to finance activities and mobilize resources • Tgs are creative in their tactics and leave open the possibility that anything can happen
<i>Identifying Six Common Characteristics of All Terrorist Activities</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • No Rule: There are no moral limitations on the type or degree of violence that terrorists can use. • No Innocents: No distinctions are made between soldiers and civilians. Children can be killed as easily as adults. • Economy: Kill one, frighten 10,000 • Publicity: Terrorists seek publicity, and publicity encourages terrorism. • Meaning: Terrorist acts give meaning and significance to the lives of terrorists. • No Clarity: Beyond the immediate aim of destructive acts, the long-term goals of terrorists are likely to be poorly conceived or impossible to implement. Terrorism that succeeds escalates (Schmallegger, 2007).
<i>Identifying Common Qualities of Terrorists</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Must believe passionately in the justness of their cause. • Must possess a "killer instinct". • Must possess an ability to act effectively as a loner (60 % cases). • Must have a very high degree of physical courage (Simonsen & Spindlove, 2007).
<i>Identifying Common Hypotheses underlying Terrorism</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Usually planned, instrumental, purposeful, politically motivated, and premeditated. • Fundamentally a psychological warfare to generate irrational and emotional response. Derives advantage of personal freedom and civil liberties in a democratic system. • Capitalizes on fresh recruitment from next generations. • It is a perennial, ceaseless struggle with its adaptability to adjust to challenges and countermeasures
<i>Identification of Types of Terrorist Groups</i>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Nationalist (Kurdistan Workers' Party, IRA) • Religious (Al-Qaeda, Hamas) • State-Sponsored (Hezbollah backed by Iran) • Left-Wing (Red Brigades (Italy) • Right-Wing (Neo-Nazis) • Anarchist (anti-globalization groups)

Stages of a Terrorist Attack related to Law Enforcement

Like all criminal activity, a terrorist attack ought to be prevented before it happens, but we know that terrorist attacks could never be stopped completely by any nation or agency, even though effective preventive intelligence has played a significant role in reducing the number of activities and minimizing their damaging effects. The routine process of investigation and prosecution of a terrorist attack is similar to other violent or ordinary crimes. However, the emerging phenomenon of police intelligence, intelligence analysis, risk-analysis or intelligence-driven policing (IDP), or intelligence-led policing (ILD) has added a new dimension to the overall counterterrorism or post-attack response by LEAs. This process is outlined in Diagram I.

Preventive intelligence is not counterterrorism; it is only awareness and is an indispensable element in the identification and investigation of terrorist activity. Federal, state, and urban police agencies usually provide local police agencies with intelligence data on persons and groups having a serious potential for future criminal involvement in acts of terrorism. Preventive intelligence is a focused inquiry. The intelligence operations, thus suggested in the light of such inquiry, may include informants (paid or unpaid), police undercover agents, and various surveillance techniques. However, legal standards must be considered before preventive intelligence operations can be initiated. The nature of the existing grounds for suspicion must be examined in relation to the anticipated or past terrorist activity (Weston & Lushbaugh, 2006). Good intelligence is rarely produced solely from one-off 'tips' from informants. Rather, it emerges from a long-term process of incrementally increasing knowledge which is a continued effort and may be triggered by a vague report or by rumors about a criminal enterprise about which little is currently known (John & Maguire, 2007).

Diagram No. 1
Prevention - Investigation - Prosecution and Preventive
Intelligence - A Knowledge based Management Paradigm



Intelligence-Led Policing (ILP) and Potential Terrorism

Many reasons and factors that account for an increased interest in ILD are enumerated by academics and practitioners, e.g.:

- Perceived ineffectiveness of reactive policing;
- Limitations of interviewing and interrogation evidence;
- Advances in technology;
- Increased focus on serious and organized crime; and
- Pressure on efficient and effective use of resources.


The basic elements of ILP revolve around the crime, the criminal, the community and the context (4Cs). It oscillates from one element to another with the sole aim of reducing the actual or potential threats of terrorism. Intelligence is the information that has been analyzed and integrated into a useful perspective.

The information used in the development of effective intelligence is typically gathered from many sources, such as newspaper, surveillance, covert operations, financial records, electronic eavesdropping, interviews, the internet, and interrogations. Law-enforcement or criminal intelligence is the result of a 'process that evaluates information collected from diverse sources, integrates the relevant information into a cohesive package, and produces a conclusion or estimate about criminal phenomenon by using a scientific approach to problem solving. Schmallerger (2008) describes two forms of criminal intelligence:

- 1) Tactical Intelligence which, “includes gaining or developing information related to threats of terrorism or crime and using this information to apprehend offenders, harden targets, and use strategies that will eliminate or mitigate the threats.”
- 2) Strategic Intelligence which, in contrast, “provides information to decision makers about the changing nature of threats for the purpose of developing response strategies and reallocating resources to accomplish effective prevention.” (Schmallegger, 2008)

The 4Cs work in a composite whole, which are in constant interactive processes in the minds and hands of the knowledge workers of LEAs. From crime trends and patterns, the LEAs analysts anticipate and recognize potential or actual perpetrators and the community where they operate or whom they affect. The context is related to wider social, economic and cultural factors that may impact the levels of crime and patterns of offending (Diagram II).

Diagram No. II
The 4Cs of Intelligence - Led Policing (ILD)



As a result of this interdependence and interplay of the information derived, assessed and analysed, both clockwise and counter-clockwise, in the analytical and critical minds of LEAs, certain intelligence products are produced by the analysts, which helps facilitate accurate prioritization and effective response decisions. We are compelled to borrow the nine analytical intelligence products of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) which was first piloted in UK in 2000 by the National Criminal Intelligence Service (John & Maguire, 2007). The interested parties could develop their own model on a similar pattern. This is not an exhaustive measure and has been tabulated to provide a brief and easier understanding (Table: II).

Table II: Developing a Native Model on Criminal Intelligence

S. No.	Name of Intelligence Product?	Description and Identification
1.	Crime Pattern Analysis?	Crime series, crime trends, hotspots, general profiles of the criminals/terrorists.
2.	Market Profile?	Details of criminal markets - key factors, networks, criminal assets and associated criminal trends
3.	Demographic /Social Trend Analysis?	Long-term predictions of future demands on LEAs+ In depth analysis of social factors underlying crime /terrorism + identification of fluctuation in criminal / terrorist activities.
4.	Criminal Business Profile?	Criminal modus operandi, selection of victims + methods of disposing and removing the proceeds + weaknesses in the systems and procedures which the terrorists exploit + identification of legislative or policy needs.
5.	Network Analysis?	Complete breakdown of the individuals and activities that comprise an identifiable criminal network + guidance for strategic planning and tactical operational decisions.
6.	Risk Analysis?	Identification of risks posed by criminal individuals/terrorists/TGs to the public, to individual victims or categories of victims or the LEAs.
7.	Target Profile Analysis?	Complete picture of the activities, associations and lifestyles of individuals identified as high-value targets + includes a breakdown of techniques that have worked or failed against the target meriting special attention.
8.	Operational Intelligence Assessment?	Constant assessment of ongoing operations and consequently the generation of new intelligence about associates or activities
9.	Results Analysis?	Assessment of the impact of the responses adopted which is used to identify 'what works' and to disseminate good practices.

Identification of Terrorist Groups in Pakistan

Pakistan is a multicultural, multilingual and semi democratic society. However, more than 160 million Pakistanis have seen many social, political and religious movements and unrest since its independence in 1947. Ethnic groups and political non-accommodation led to its division in 1971, when Bangladesh (East Pakistan) was separated from its larger west wing, the present Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Ethnicity still has its insidious venom in the metropolitan city of Karachi. Political disturbance and unrest amongst the local tribal associations and parties in the Province of Baluchistan have a long history of political disharmony and armed conflict with the federal law-enforcement agencies since the 1970s and with an upsurge in the current decade. Sectarian turbulence and target killings of rival religious groups, routinely involving the two primary Islamic sects, the Shia and the Sunnis, with their motivated young militants (one could consider them as gangs) have left the worst scars on Pakistan's political system. In the background of this bleak picture and history of intolerance, non-accommodation, religious animosities, ethnic frictions, political turmoil and continuous breaking and wrecking of social and political institutions, the would-be terrorists find Pakistan a safe haven for their acrimonious activities.

However, one can state that the most terrible situation arose when Pakistan joined the 'war on terror' after 9/11 and withdrew its support for the Taliban government in Afghanistan. The Taliban were reportedly dismantled politically, but have made a tactical retreat and resorted to guerrilla tactics against the NATO/ISAF forces in Afghanistan with a considerable displacement towards and inside the adjacent Pakistani tribal areas known as FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas). Pakistan, as a committed ally in the war on terror and as a first line country, has deployed more than 90,000 forces on its western frontier to search the Al-Qaeda militants who are gradually making inroads in the contagious territories and now in the settled districts of the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and the Province of Baluchistan.

It should be clarified that the term "Taliban" is rather a misnomer for all the Al-Qaeda militants/terrorists. Taliban, the students of Islamic schools, are wrongly mixed up with the Taliban of Afghanistan who are highly trained, motivated and committed to the cause of taking out the Allied Forces from their native land of Afghanistan. The Taliban insurgency in the settled districts of Pakistan is a different phenomenon, which demands a true Islamic polity and the imposition of Islamic laws (Sharia) in the country. As far as the Taliban in the tribal areas are concerned, they are aware of the rugged terrain and have socio-tribal cohesion in their attitude towards the 'war on terror.' They have inflicted huge losses on the national and local LEAs, killing more than 1000 security personnel and a 100 of the

pro-government tribal chieftains, called 'Malik.' The government has entered into a political dialogue with these militants in FATA and struck a few periodic peace agreements with them but due to the United States, uneasiness with these agreements and due to the mutual distrust amongst the parties, the political solutions failed to bring peace in the territory. This is one of the most tragic developments in the history of war and peace where political accords could not bring tranquility and peace to an area.

Unfortunately, the LEAs, especially the Pakistani intelligence agencies lack analytical tools to discern, differentiate, identify and classify meticulously the various kinds of typology and characteristics of each such group. One cannot formulate meaningful and effective policies unless one knows the true nature, structure, development, history, organization, demands and modus operandi of all these groups which are loosely netted at the moment. The intelligence agencies' failure to forewarn the LEAs about potential terrorist attacks before 9/11 has been a debate in the government and academic circles in the U.S. as well.¹

Much has been written against America's intelligence failure in the wake of the September 11 attacks and their insufficient attention to the suspicious activities of the suspects (Brener III, 2004). Some think that "the state security agents had been aware for years of the growing extremism and terrorism but nothing significant was done to mitigate or prevent violent confrontations such as the 9/11 attacks" (Oliverio & Lauderdale, 2005). However, the reasons for this failure should be searched in non-professional, non-academic, unsystematic and superficial treatment by the LEAs and their analysts. A knowledge reservoir is the first key element in identifying, tracing, sensing and feeling of an underlying pathogenesis. The Taliban in Pakistan are now scattered and have engaged the LEAs at various flash points to which the UK Risk Assessment has given the name of 'Neo-Taliban' (The News International, February 6, 2008). The UK assessment has given an early warning that they can spread around the globe. All such reports and warning signals are of little policy value as most of the western think tanks are not well versed with the realities on ground and the lack of such conceptual understanding of the Taliban phenomenon has made the war on terror a losing battle for the Allies. The situation on the Pakistani side is also not promising and the same intellectual and analytical scarcity has made things difficult for the LEAs in identifying the various TGs and their scope, strength, strategies and survival (4Ss). To arrive at a conceptual clarity on the subject of Taliban terrorists, one has to


¹Add the allegations that Pakistani government and intelligence officials were aware of Osama bin Ladin's residence just mere yards from a Pakistani military training facility to the American suspicions of Pakistani complicity with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

identify their various forms, activities and interdependence on fresh recruitment and other criminal gangs. Unfortunately, the LEAs with their intelligence wings have been a failure in handling the groups separately and to dissuade and deprive them from fresh and continuous inflow of material and resources from within and abroad. Mere speculation and elusive Information Reports (IRs) without empirical research, assessment and proper intelligence are of no use to the LEAs in their practical endeavours. There are limited findings on the financial and material support of these groups. Conversely, accusations and allegations are in abundance and have not been put to serious intelligence analysis.

Some foreign experts, officials and media analysts express their concern about a possible linkage of Taliban in FATA with the Muslims in Europe, who may be unhappy due to one or other reason such as lack of job opportunities, problems of identity, and immigration policies, etc. The western media and situational analysis reports prepared by some U.S. think-tanks and other government agencies are constantly engaged in throwing allegations of a possible takeover of Pakistani nuclear arsenals by the Taliban who, in their view, are rapidly growing, proliferating and gaining popularity in the country. Hardly a day passes by when the local media does not carry such reports and news items from abroad. The Pakistani government, from time to time, has expressed its concern over such reports. However, these reports are more political and diplomatic in nature, rather than being based on true and honest threat assessment. No authentic and verifiable linkages have been established by the critics and analysts amongst the local Taliban and their potential effects on the Muslims in Europe or the Taliban's initiative of overthrowing the established national institutions. Some government officials express their concern and doubts about the possible interference by 'foreign-hands,' 'intelligence services of unfriendly countries,' and so on, but there are no verifiable or undeniable findings on this subject. If one can not rule out the possibility, then one has also not supported the suspicion through solid evidence and proof.

For an 'Early Warning' episode, such reports may be taken as an alarm for the rising, preparation and sensitization of both sides. However, little impact has been observed on LEAs in their approaches and strategies towards potential terrorist attacks in the country. Such 'warning bells' have created little or virtually no change in the attitude and response of the LEAs to ascertain, assess, predict and prepare for any potential eventuality, provided any of the suspected/weak linkages are established beyond any doubt. The LEAs within Pakistan are still anachronistic, traditional, primitive ill-equipped, under-staffed, poorly paid and deficient of analytical vision and knowledge to predict and respond to potential threats of terrorism. A diagrammatic scheme of the actual and potential TGs is illustrated in Diagram III.

Diagram No. III: Different Categories of Taliban



———— Strong Link

----- Potential / Weak Link

Another important factor which has escaped the attention of analyses conducted by LEAs is the dispersion, disintegration and displacement of the defunct sectarian violent and the militant organizations which were once instrumental in the Afghan war against the Soviet invasion, and their re-integration into fighting Taliban's ranks. The LEAs can not be absolved from the charges of being incompetent to forestall and forewarn the potential re-emergence of defunct sectarian and militant organizations that find a safe haven in the shape of new banner holder against any foreign invasion. No doubt that the Islamic political parties have many Taliban sympathizers in their ranks but any strong evidence of financial or material support to them has not been openly presented. However, the directed or imperceptible indoctrination of young and tender minds with jihadi teachings in their Islamic schools, called Madrassahs, cannot be ruled out. The symbiotic association of street criminals, drug pushers, poppy cultivators, arms dealers and other Taliban/terrorist groups should be a focus of extensive research in identifying the potential for terrorism.

Potential Terrorist Activities and the Crime-Terror Continuum

Makarenko (2003) has developed a hypothesis of 'crime-terror continuum' (CTC), which explains the relationship of the 'crime-terror nexus' in the contemporary security environment. It is called a 'continuum' because it may be used to trace past, current and the potential future evolution of organized crime and/or terrorism. It also alludes to the fact that a single group can slide up and down the scale depending on the environment in which it operates. The most instable and threatening point along the CTC is the fulcrum point, where criminal and political motivations simultaneously converge and are displayed in the actions of a single group (Makarenko, 2003). Though the 'Convergence Thesis' is a good linear transformation hypothesis of political organizations turning into criminal/terrorist groups, the difficulties of identifying such groups and predicting the exact time of such transformation and its precipitating factors are always a challenge to the security people who are required to be a step ahead of such triggering processes.

Most criminal and terrorist groups in the security environment of the post Cold War era have developed the capacity to engage in both criminal and terrorist activities. Criminal groups have increasingly developed and engaged in the rising number of weak states, whereas terrorist groups have increasingly focused on criminal activities to replace lost financial support from state sponsors (Makarenko, 2003). They live in symbiosis and in a state of interdependent equilibrium. They rely on each other's capabilities, technical know-how, experiences, training, motivation, contacts and resources. The support of drug mafia and poppy-grower to the ruling Taliban in Afghanistan before 9/11 is still resonating in the academic and

official circles. The same is the case in Pakistan where people involved in white-collar crimes, car-snatching, serial killing, vehicle theft, drugs pushing, kidnapping, chronic non-payment of taxes, arms dealing, smuggling of non-custom paid vehicles, etc have identified themselves with the invisible Taliban groups in various parts of tribal and settled areas. Certain hardened criminals within settled districts have joined various Taliban groups for the purpose of shelter, economic benefit and group synergism. Some strongly religiously oriented groups within the Taliban do not approve of these notorious gangsters and criminals but due to the ongoing war on terror they have welcomed them as a matter of convenience. The LEAs have not worked hard to stop such criminals who could be potential terrorists in their nearby vicinity. There are a number of examples of known criminals turning into terrorists, but an organizational assessment of the CTC is yet to be accomplished which could rightly predict the burgeoning ranks within terrorist groups. Should organized crime and terrorist groups converge in the central fulcrum of the CTC and gain political authority, the subsequent results will be either a failed state or a criminal state with no central authority or an environment of anarchy. The formulation of future counter-terrorist and anti-crime policies will significantly overlap and continuously evolve in relation to the changing security environment. Failure to recognize the benefits of tracing the relationship between crime and terrorism, especially in vulnerable regions such as Southeast Asia, may contribute to the rising complexity of the regional security environment. It is the failure to seek alternative ways to understand the various dimensions of these threats that contributes to the age-old dilemma of the state constantly being “one step behind” (Makarenko, 2005).

Identification of Moral Religious Policing or Potential Terrorists

In the poverty and terrorist stricken areas, the local traditional justice system had been deteriorated for a long time and the socio-political reform agenda of any government never received introduction in these areas. People need justice and the speedy dispensation of justice has a quick effect on the parties as well as on the general public. The Taliban of Pakistan rightly identified the reasons of success and popularity of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 1996-2001 and developed their indigenous model. The model is based on simplicity, tribal bravery traits, commitment to religious tenets, historical resistance to foreign invaders, tribal revengeful nature, action against criminals, awarding of punishment to them and relief to the aggrieved party. This is known as vigilant or “moral policing” by the Taliban. The potential terrorists capitalized on these scoring points and very cleverly turned the local Taliban administrative organization into a formidable force which became a challenge to the government authority in almost all of the tribal areas. When the Taliban of one area got successful and received applause, welcome,

and support from the general population, the spill-over effects were unstoppable in other tribal areas. A story of success in one part had greater psychological effects on the adjacent areas, thus a cascade of uprising and challenging gangs started their own moral policing, opening new fronts for the LEAs. The LEAs have been a failure in identifying this cascade or infiltrating "Talibanization" (the process by which the Taliban move and make advances socially, politically, religiously, psychologically or 'militarily'). The LEAs analysis should have identified this phenomenon in its totality. Neither similarities in these areas were identified as soft ground for the increasing wave of Talibanization, nor concrete and stringent measures were taken to plug the infiltration into other areas which was not only psychological but also a request of defective operations by LEAs. More were displaced than killed and arrested. The failure to timely predict the potential terrorist activities is one of the most important reasons behind the spreading extremism in other parts of the country. The urban areas are also struck by the same wave of terrorism. Two examples will be examined:

i) Situation in Swat

District Swat was hit by an extremist religious movement, Tehrik-i-Nifaz-i-Shariat (Movement for Implementation of Islamic Law) of Maulana Sufi Muhammad in 1994. The insurgency, after resulting in innumerable killing, was quelled by military operations. The remnants were still there and the residual fighters, under the command of Sufi Muhammad crossed into Afghanistan via Bajaur Agency to fight with the American forces in 2001. Since 1994 to 2001, no ground work was done to stop this upsurge again which could be easily ignited and triggered by a incident involving the next door neighbour. The son-in-law of Maulana Sufi Muhammad, Maulana Fazlullah, started his own movement in District Swat with humble religious teachings and a seemingly sincere effort to resolve the local problems with honesty of intention and in the light of Islamic laws. He was allowed to gain, willingly or unwillingly, with support and popularity till the time he challenged the government with his self-styled vigilante moral policing and dispensation of justice. The dispersed terrorists found this place a safe-haven and flocked together around Maulana Fazlullah and went on to fight with the LEAs. The LEAs started their operation with delay and the laxity of such a long period of time provided Maulana Fazlullah ample opportunity to organize, prepare and even train and dispatch suicide bombers in case of severe military operation. As a result, they put up a strong resistance to the LEAs. The failure to identify this movement as a potential terrorist organization or a strong ally of terrorism could not be excused by the responsible analysts within the LEAs of Pakistan. The events that led to the development of this organization are described in detail in Table III.

**Table III: Military-Cum-Police Operation in Swat (Malakand Division):
Leading Events**

Dated	Leading Events
Nov. 9, 2006	Suicide attack on Army Recruitment Centre in Dargai, Malakand, killing 42 recruits.
May. 23, 2007	Maulana Fazlullah, civil administration and police strike peace accord
July. 03, 2007	Rockets attack on Matta Police Station, Killing one constable + many injured
July. 04, 2007	Remote-controlled bomb attack on Police Lines, Mingora, killing 06 + 09 injured including District Police Officer, Swat + Maulana Fazlullah started armed patrolling in the area
July. 06, 2007	Attack on Police + FC convoy in Matta, 4 injured including senior police officers
July. 06, 2007	Attack on army convoy in Chakdara, 4 killed including senior army officers
July. 12, 2007	Suicide attack in Mingora killing 3 policemen + 06 civilians
July. 14, 2007	Militants taking control of many Government offices in Kabal and Matta.
July. 15, 2007	Suicide attack on Army convoy, killing 14 security forces + 20 civilians + 40 injured
July. 17, 2007	Religious Leaders (e.g. Qazi Hussain Ahmad) demanded withdrawal of security forces from Swat
July. 27, 2007	Maulana Fazlullah promised cooperation for bringing peace to the area with the grand consultative body of religious leaders (ulema)
August. 01, 2007	Suicide attack on parents of District Nazim, killing 3, many injured
August. 05 - 08, 2007	Sporadic shelling and attacks on various police stations + FC camps.
August. 23, 2007	Pak army spokesman Major. Gen. Waheed Arshad announces that Swat will soon be freed from Fazlullah's militants
August. 26, 2007	Suicide attack on Police vehicle, killing 4 policemen + civilians
August. 27, 2007	Armed clashes and firing between militants and security forces
August. 31, 2007	Militants attack on police vehicle in Khawazakhela, injuring many police officers+ Security forces start vacating important offices including Swat Airport.
Sept. 07, 2007	Markets in divisional headquarters, Mingora attacked, destroying 50 shops.
Sept. 10, 2007	Armed militants closed down a private musical function in a hotel in Fazagut
Sept. 11 - 29, 2007	Sporadic clashes, explosions and attacks continue, killing and injuring many security forces and civilians+ Damaging Buddha statue in Jahanabad
Sept. 29, 2007	Fazlullah orders his commanders to arrest anti-social/criminal elements in Swat and be presented to him at his place in Imam Dheri
Oct. 2 - 12, 2007	Besides clashes and explosions, Fazlullah imposed Islamic laws in certain areas, and sentenced many criminals to prison and whipping
Oct. 19, 2007	Fazlullah announces strong resistance to any potential military operation
Oct. 24, 2007	Fresh security forces started coming in Swat
Oct. 25, 2007	Suicide attack on security forces near police lines, Mingora, killing 30 persons.+ 35 injured

Dated	Leading Events
Oct. 26, 2007	Severe fighting between militants and security forces, resulting in many casualties
Oct. 27, 2007	Three hundred Taliban put on fire the house of District Nazim Swat, Mr. Jamal Nasar
Oct. 28, 2007	Gunship helicopters started shelling /bombardment on Taliban's hideouts
Oct. 30, 2007	Air-shelling on 70 villages which were under the control of Taliban militants.
Nov. 01, 2007	40 FC forces surrendered before Taliban + 8 others security forces surrendered
Nov. 02, 2007	Taliban releases 48 security forces in front of media
Nov. 03, 2007	Another 120 Security forces set free by Taliban. They were allowed to go home.
Nov. 02 - 05, 2007	Many Police stations vacated by police + FC and took over by Taliban
Nov. 07, 2007	Bahrain and Kalam were given back to the local population by Taliban 07
Nov. 10, 2007	Security forces including senior army officers arrested and made hostages by local Taliban
Nov. 12, 2007	President Musharraf announces military operations in Swat till the end of militancy and talibanization
Nov. 12, 2007	Pak Army took over the operation and Swat administration in their hands.
Nov. 13, 2007	Taliban, is now in possession of 5 out of 8 tehsils (subdivisions) of district Swat , marched towards the adjacent district Shangla
Nov. 14, 2007	Taliban occupied District headquarters Shangla + Alpuri police station
Nov. 14, 2007	Army imposes "Curfew" in many areas; it is for the first time in the history of district Swat
Nov. 14 - 17, 2007	Clashes and gunship shelling continued. Army started recapturing and regaining the lost civil administration and government offices. In a total population of 1.5 million in district Swat, hundreds and thousands of civil people were displaced/have migrated to other areas, facing serious socio-economic problems, and even creating many problems in other areas. Refugee camps are being established in other districts by NGOs. The initial police strength in Swat was 2165 which was supported by Frontier Constabulary, Frontier Corps (2015) and Pak Army (now 15000). The total death toll for law-enforcement personnel was 68 with 157 injuries. A total of 50 civilians lost their lives and 120 got injured. 120 militants were put to death and 200 received injuries. The number for the militants' arrest was unknown; however their potential strength was calculated as 4600 with hardcore militants (both local and foreigners) of 600-700 in district Swat.
Nov. 14 - Dec 31, 2007	

ii) The Red Mosque Debacle

The story of Lal Masjid (Red Mosque) was carried by almost all important international media where the students and teachers of an Islamic school, Jamia Hafsa, took an assumed 'divine duty' of implementing the 'word of God' on the 'earth of God.' Even the female students in their black clad veils came out to enforce the Islamic law in a way they deemed correct. Their activities went on to the extent where they kidnapped a few Chinese beauty-parlor workers who had created the indignation of the international community and also a negative response from the government leaders of the People's Republic of China. After a long drawn psychological war and a lenient view of their moral policing by the LEAs in the

capital city of Islamabad, a bloody military operation was carried out. The facts and figures involving the casualties of that operation are still not clear. The cascade of the events at the Red Mosque are shown in Table IV, which clearly indicates that the LEAs had no system of Early Warning or a Potential Terrorist Indicator System (PTIS), whereas there were a number of suggestive factors and glaring indicators that could be observed in the development of the Red Mosque story. The LEAs must realize that without any legal authority, such naïve, self styled and irrational imposition of Islamic Laws could easily be hijacked by terrorists. This unfortunate incident later on led to a series of suicide attacks in the country, and the record of the arrested suicide bombers and terrorists' shows that they were deeply moved by the atrocities allegedly perpetrated by the LEAs during the operation. The failure of intelligence or identification of any future eventuality in the aftermath of this incident is painfully evident. The disconnection between tactical and strategic operators is the main obstacle in developing an 'Early Warning System.'

Table IV: Red Mosque (Lal Masjid) Operation-Leading Events

Dated	Leading Events
January 2007 (Land Grabbing)	Female students armed with canes occupy a Children's Library in Islamabad + Protests against government plans to demolish mosques / seminaries built without official permission.
February 13	Authorities agree to rebuild one demolished mosque in a bid to end the library standoff. Religious Affairs Minister Ijaz-ul-Haq lays brick for the new mosque.
March (Moral Policing)	Female students abduct 3 women they accuse of running a brothel + detain 2 policemen. They are released after reportedly repenting.
March 27 (Active Taliban - Style Policing)	Male and female students begin Taliban-style anti-vice patrols targeting music and video shops in Islamabad bazaars and brothels
April 6 (Model Judiciary Suicidal Threats)	The mosque sets up a Sharia (Islamic Law) Court + Senior cleric Maulana Abdul Aziz vows to launch thousands of suicide attacks if the government attempts to close it down.
April 9 (Kangaroo's Decision)	The Sharia Court issues a religious edict against Pakistan Tourism Minister Nilofar Bakhtiar, accusing her of committing a sin after she is shown in newspaper photographs embracing a parachuting instructor following a charity jump in France.
April 10 (Government in Action)	The government blocks the mosques illegal website and radio station.

Dated	Leading Events
May 19 (Targeting Police)	Students associated with the mosque kidnap of 4 policemen after the arrest of a dozen of mosque supporters. 2 policemen were arrested two days later. All were eventually freed.
June 23 (Chinese Abducted)	Dozens of students kidnap 9 people including six Chinese women and a Chinese man, from an acupuncture clinic, claiming it is a brothel. All are freed following protests from Beijing.
June 27 (Reaction from China)	China, Pakistan's closest ally, tells Islamabad to step up its protection of Chinese workers, state press reports
July 3 (Operation Silence?)	Escalating tensions erupt into street battles around the mosque between security forces and the militants. 16 people killed, including a soldier, a journalist, eight students and several bystanders + 150 got wounded.
July 4 (Mosque Siege)	Security forces lay siege to the mosque, demanding unconditional surrender and the release of alleged hostages, mainly small children and women. The chief Maulana Aziz is arrested sneaking out of the mosque in a female veil (burqa). His brother Ghazi Abdul Rashid takes over as mosque chief. Hundreds of students surrender but many remain inside. Shoot-on-sight curfew imposed.
July 7 (President's Message)	President General Pervez Musharraf says all militants will be killed if they do not lay down arms.
July 10 (Negotiations Failed)	After negotiations fail, security forces storm the mosque. 8 Soldiers + 50 militants are killed. Chief rebel cleric Ghazi Rashid amongst dead.
July 11 (Operation Sunrise- Official Recoding)	Government announces that military commandos will wipe out all militant resistance in 8-days operation + media not allowed to visit + No verified figures on civilian casualties.
July 12 (Burial Unattended)	Local authorities bury 69 coffins filled with mutilated bodies of the civilians' dead from the mosque battle in the darkness of night in a city graveyard, with only grave diggers and journalists as witnesses and no relatives of the dead in attendance. Officials say there were 73 people in the coffin. Government says 248 people are injured in the whole operation. Opposition parties claim civilian death toll is in thousands, not hundreds. President General Pervez Musharraf says operation was inevitable and declares that no mosque or seminary would be allowed to be misused like the mosque and associated Jamia Hafsa. (Islamic seminary)
July 13 (Litigations in Supreme Court on Dead People)	Supreme Court of Pakistan takes up suo - motu action on the mosque issue and the problems being faced by the residents due to the curfew imposed in the surrounding area. The Inspector General of Police, Islamabad says that from July 3 to 11, 1096 people: 628 men, 465 women and girls and 3 children had come out or had been rescued from the complex. The SC declines to entertain a request to order a judicial inquiry into conflicting reports about the number of people killed in the operation.

Dated	Leading Events
July 31 (Statements in Supreme Court)	Deputy Commissioner of Islamabad stated that 662 men and 470 women were arrested in the Lal Masjid operation, out of which 604 men and 467 women had been released. According to Jamia Hafsa's enrolment register there were 1770 registered female students, out of which 1526 were boarders. However, Maulana Abdul Aziz and his wife Umme Hassan claimed 3600 regular female students, and among them 3000 were boarders.

Source: Daily Dawn, (International Newspaper, Jan–July 2007) Islamabad, Pakistan.

Identification of Potential Breeding Houses for Terrorism

“Law enforcement's knowledge and responsiveness to local and regional issues is central to the success in war on terrorism” (Shustra et al., 2008). Law enforcement intelligence should be able to track the movements and interactions of the terrorists so that they can figure out who the terrorist organizations have targeted for recruitment.

This will give the law enforcement agencies the opportunity of early intervention by working with parents or local authorities of these potential terrorists before it is too late. In this manner, law enforcement officials could provide consultation to the potential terrorists, their families, and the schools in an effort to save them from the hands of the terrorists” (Yayla, 2007). The role of breeding houses for potential terrorists in Pakistan cannot be overemphasized. There may be a weak link between such suspected sanctuaries and the actual terrorists but a possibility of potential terrorism should not stop the LEAs from constant vigilance, intelligence and precautionary measures of early intervention. The first step in the Early Warning System is to shortlist all such places and segments of the society which could be a soft belly or sitting ducks for the looking terrorists.

In Pakistan, the Islamic schools are generally targeted for easy indoctrination into a commitment to the 'holy war' (jihad). Not all Islamic schools have the same intentions. The draw to the local population is that many of these schools provide poor students given free food, free accommodation and free education. However, a few of these institutions should be investigated and evaluated for the same reasons. Their linkage with foreign governments and associations with suspicious funding should be a question of priority. However, a proper reform agenda for their registration and modernization will bring them into the mainstream of the civilized society. Another area of concern is the FATA region, which is being painted as the 'safe-haven of Al-Qaeda.' Many questions can be asked. What kind of people from

FATA are attracted to Al-Qaeda or Taliban and why? Are the officers of the regional criminal justice system competent in recognizing the Terrorist Attack Pre-Incident Indicators (TAPIs), a term used to describe actions and behaviours by terrorists before they carry out any attack? An analysis into such questions will reveal the simmering problems of poverty, ignorance, injustice, delayed-justice, non development, illiteracy and social isolation and political marginalization of these areas. Reevaluating military operations and addressing the unresolved problems of terrorist breeding houses will help mitigate the chances of future generations slipping into the hands of terrorist groups. During interrogation, the detained terrorists have disclosed the financial support provided to them and their families by terrorism related groups and this demands the complete evaluation of the issue. Sachs's (2005) advice holds true:

“Moreover, terrorism has complex and varying causes, and cannot be fought by military means alone. To fight terrorism, we will need to fight poverty and deprivation as well. A purely military approach to terrorism is doomed to fail. Just as a doctor fights disease by prescribing not only medication, but also by bolstering a person's immune system through adequate nutrition and by encouraging a healthy lifestyle for his patient, so, too, we need to address the underlying weaknesses of the societies in which terrorism lurks; extreme poverty, mass unmet needs for jobs, incomes, and dignity; and the political and economic instability that results from degrading human conditions. If societies like Somalia, Afghanistan, and western Pakistan were healthier; terrorists could not operate so readily in their midst” (Sachs, 2005).

Coordination Between LEAs and Counter-Terrorism Officials (ILP)

There are clear policy implications for policing agencies in Pakistan. Law enforcement is called upon to respond to threats of terrorism as well as to actual incidents and acts of terrorism. Therefore the law enforcement agencies' knowledge, skills and resources are reflected in its response to the different stages of terrorism incidents: before, during, and after an act of terrorism (Shusta et al., 2008). Government devises, designs and develops multi-pronged strategies, which may either be immediate (short-term) or futuristic (long-term) responses. The LEAs are generally not included in the proactive approach to terrorism which is focused on the long-term solutions that deal with the social aspects of terrorism. The LEAs are expected to develop their own operational and investigative units to respond to the criminal aspects of terrorism. However, given the growing complexity, severity, pervasiveness, and international aspects of terrorism, the LEAs are compelled to redefine, re-organize and re-construct their structures and functions

not only to arrive at the crime scene but also to sense, predict and prevent the incident long before it happens or contain its further damage in some other places. Particularly, after 9/11/01, nearly all LEAs and police agencies have been forced to re-think their real capabilities and competence in the new era of terrorism. White (2007) describes:

“Departments have been forced to revise training, deployment, and communication strategies and to create counterterrorism units within their departments. Police now provide extra patrol and guard around critical infrastructures such as power plants, food and water sources, and transportation hubs. Police departments now receive briefings from federal authorities in the FBI and Homeland Security about potential threats and terrorist plans garnered through electronic surveillance and interrogations of incarcerated terrorists” (White, 2007).

One of the approaches developed after 9/11 is Intelligence Led Policing (ILP), the use of criminal intelligence to guide law enforcement agencies. Much literature is available on the subject. Unfortunately, the LEAs in Pakistan have not yet embraced this concept. The US Department of Homeland Security could have been taken as a model for the disparate, disjointed and independently working LEAs of Pakistan. Constitutionally, responsibility of the maintenance of law and order rests with the four provinces whereas the intelligence agencies, whether military in role and structure or semi-civilian, are controlled by the federal government, which further aggravates the situation if the opposing political parties are returned to the office with a conflicting and split mandate. This often happens in Pakistan. The intelligence agencies are so strong that even the democratic forces cannot claim to have an administrative control over them. Intelligence disconnect, i.e., the failure of an agency to share intelligence information with other agencies, is one of the grandest problems within the LEAs in combating terrorism in Pakistan.

The initiatives of the Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) group, a Los Angeles based regional multi-agency and multidisciplinary task force, could be taken as a guideline for the federal and regional LEAs within Pakistan. This model attempts to provide remedy for many of the problems inherent in gathering, analyzing, and sharing information amongst agencies that have unrelated missions and diverse operating styles (Birzer and Roberson 2007). Amongst the variety of theoretical and operational duties of the LEAs in combating terrorism, one should focus on the need and importance of a knowledge-based approach to threat assessment of potential terrorism. Threat assessment, a phrase commonly used in counterterrorism, refers to the evaluation of a potential terrorist act—whether it will happen, where it will happen, and what the expected damages or injuries would be if it happens—has become one of the major duties of US Department of Homeland Security.

Threat assessment measures involve investigation and analysis of situations and individuals who may pose threats to the public (Birzer & Robson, 2007). In the case of Pakistan, it has been previously mentioned how to identify potential terrorists and create a system of criminal intelligence by developing the multitude of LEAs in their dealing with the issue of terrorism. The traditional role of prevention, investigation and prosecution of a criminal act and the offender involved now seems to be added to the brain storming and energy demanding and intellect-consuming job of criminal intelligence, crime analysis or preventive intelligence, which are the basic elements of ILP. The specialists in threat analysis will pass on the credibility and potential of the threat. For the practical purpose of the daily work of law enforcement officers, the following preliminary investigation is important:

- Date and time of threat
- Mode of receiving the threat
- Who received the information or intelligence?
- Nature of act threatened
- Potential target/victim (e.g., high-value, general crowd and site)
- Expected weapons (e.g., bomb, chemicals, fire, suicide jackets,)
- Demands or grievances accompanying the threat
- Stated political, religious or sectarian organizational affiliation (e.g. Taliban or Al-Qaeda)
- Any claim or hints of responsibility for prior terrorist threats or acts
- Any clue or hint of a relationship with other organized, white-collar crime gangs/syndicates
- Other data, such as background noises (telephone threat, speech characteristics), or handwriting identification (Taliban's letters, selection of language, words and style).

Assessment of potential damage to person and property and demand for early protection of the possible victim and the general public and consideration of the officers' personal security with an estimated demand for cooperation, preparation and collaboration of other cooperating agencies.

The list is not complete but these are the primary considerations at the first arrival of a threat that will permit an earlier response to the potential event. Apart from this operational preparedness, the major task within the LEAs is the

identification of any potential terrorist who could be intervened socially, politically, diplomatically, religiously and/or economically in order to prevent him/her from slipping into the hands of a terrorist organization. The 'think tanks' in the LEAs clearly have a great responsibility in this respect.

Intelligence Led Policing does not emerge solely from a concern about terrorism, but rather builds on major developments in law enforcement effectiveness and leadership in the last two decades of the 20th century. These include community policing, strategic problem-solving, and some other promising practices like COMPSTAT of the NYPD and the Project Safe Neighbourhoods (PSN) of the U.S. Department of Justice (Mc Garrel, 2007). But a centralized unit with a collection of analysts from all intelligence agencies in Pakistan should shoulder the responsibility of collecting and analyzing the available information/data which could be disseminated to operational units for actions and political administrations for policies targeted at the causes of terrorism. The review of various reports, legal instruments and commissions (e.g., 9/11/01 Commission Report, the new anti-terrorism legislation in USA and UK, etc) could form the first guidelines of such an indigenous Counterterrorism Unit within Pakistan. This knowledge-based model should focus on the building process of international terrorist organization (Figure I), which if carried out by the efficient “knowledge workers” capable of high caliber analysis, and with the support of modern technologies, will result in an accumulated wisdom that can be shared with all the LEAs. Such profound, meticulous and penetrating insight could conceivably be used in predicting the future trends in terrorist group activities, the identification of terrorist groups, and their potential targets, and could assist in identifying the need for modification, adaptation and overhauling of the existing law enforcement mechanism and organizational structure.





Figure I

International Terrorist Organization's Building Process - originally developed by US National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, Washington DC, White House, 2003

Since the pressure on local LEAs is so dramatic, this highly sophisticated responsibility cannot be left to the existing working apparatus currently present within Pakistan. The capacity to compile and analyze the data to predict threats and potential terrorist acts will clearly be difficult as most of the LEAs are already too strained and over-worked to do this task competently and accurately. More funding and new technologies are needed for this purpose. Centralized coordination of the Pakistani LEAs is recommended with a special reference to the introduction of ILP at the level of civil society where police are the first line of defence. A few officers from the various LEAs in Pakistan have, at least theoretically, suggested such a centrally functioning unit, the National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC), the organizational structure of which is given in Figure II. However, those who have recommended this phenomenon have failed to provide recommendations for any

Fig: II Organizational Structure of National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) Islamabad (Proposed)



constitutional or legal legitimacy for this unit and could not clearly indicate the service structure for the officers from different organizations. One could recommend a separate, specialized and independent unit, within the integrated framework of the presently disjointed LEAs, staffed by experts from their respective intelligence analysis units.

Improving the Existing Capacity of Law Enforcement Agencies

Apart from the introduction of a single 'unified' theory of policing, and a highly advanced centre of data analysis and prediction, one should not overlook the existing capabilities of LEAs which could be harnessed, refined and channelized with a little effort in change in behaviours and proper reallocation of responsibilities and resources. Clearly it is important for law enforcement officers to be aware of the different stereotypes of potential terrorists. They need to change their perceptions of who the terrorists are before they can effectively detect terrorist activities (Shusta et al., 2007). For example, (a) not all terrorists are Arabs or Muslims; (b) although their actions may appear insane or irrational, the terrorists are generally intelligent, rational, decisive and clear thinking; and (c) most terrorists may be semi-trained but the training and experience of some of the terrorists render them as skillful in their craft as any law enforcement professional in the United States (Shusta et al., 2007).

In addition to this change in perception and to the development of a knowledge-based approach to combat terrorism, the existing LEAs in Pakistan can attempt to adopt community oriented policing (COP), problem-oriented policing (POP), and COMPSTAT (crime mapping and strategic deployment of police resources), since all three prominent ideologies are not incompatible, and when they are applied in concert, they achieve noticeable success. In the USA and the UK, as well as other countries, a compilation of the three has led to dramatic reductions in serious crime. Programs for standardization in training, equipment, and processes should be implemented to remove or mitigate the variation in competency levels within organizational structures, and amongst the expected results from varying available techniques, administrative structures, quality of crime analysts, and other message delivery systems (Mc Donald, 2005).


For this purpose, it is recommended that Pakistan consider the:

- Establishment of small intelligence analysis units at the local district level with officers/staff reasonably qualified in developing profiles of and reports on any potential threats, e.g. a centralized intelligence organization as outlined in Police Rules of 1934;
- Adoption of a situational crime prevention strategy or environmental design (e.g., target hardening, enhanced surveillance, ease security checks, etc);

- Fresh recruitment and the engagement of 'honest brokers' in importing education and training about new technologies and skills for compilation and analysis of data;
- Development of plans for early warning of potential terrorist threats or attacks that should be immediately forwarded to a central intelligence unit for policy options and the formulation of response strategies;
- Mobilization of existing resources to terrorism 'hot spots' so that the intensity of the problem is reduced and its future implications and repercussions are identified and evaluated;
- Full utilization, revitalization and modernization of separate operative units such as the Criminal Intelligence Department (CID) delineated with the Police Rules of 1934;
- Planning for the effective and rapid mobilization of reserve armed forces;
- Modernization and redeployment of paramilitary and civil armed forces like the Frontier Constabulary, Frontier Corps, Levis, Khasaddar, etc., along and across the tribal and semi-tribal borders and regions;
- Improvement in logistic weapons and training capabilities of all LEAs; and Deployment of properly equipped rapid response capabilities with support from local CIA, provincial CID, and local and national intelligence agencies like Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Military Intelligence (MI), Intelligence Bureau (IB) and the Special Branch.

The organizational structure of the existing agencies at the federal and provincial levels is summarized in Diagram IV. In addition, this proposition would require the integration of certain larger agencies with some smaller units, both at the analytical (intelligence) and operational (investigative and enforcement) levels. The arrangement would not preclude the introduction and establishment of other departments/units in the future, however, they all should be interconnected at the central level. Today, there is a 'central vacuum' for all of these existing agencies and departments which could conceivably be filled by a national homeland security apparatus. The government of Pakistan strongly needs new legislation, new vision and a firm commitment to this cause. Unfortunately in this age, the cadre of law enforcement and security agencies are operating independently and separately with a clear intelligence disconnect. The new proposed apparatus will reduce the chances of error, overlapping, and overlooking, and would remove the difficulties of academic and operational capabilities.

Diagram No. IV A Visualized Homeland Security Department for Pakistan- Integrating the disjointed and multi natured LEAs of Federal and Provincial Governments in Pakistan.



Reforms in Actual / Potential Terrorism Breeding Houses

The reform of strategies to counter potential breeding houses is a very important subject and includes all kinds of social, political, religious, institutional, and economic reforms in the tribal belt, the FATA, and other under-developed areas and segments throughout Pakistan. Briefly, in political reforms Pakistan needs strong democratic institutions, fully developed on the basis of fair play, transparency, justice, equality, rule of law and civil liberties. The tribal areas should be brought to the mainstream of civil life through proper presentations on all political forums, and the traditional legal tribal administration should be gradually reformed with insight into modern democratic values, mechanisms and institutions and with full realization of fundamental human rights for men and women alike. This will obviously take time and definitely need the support and confidence of the people in the area. Before these full-blown political and administrative reforms can be implemented, there is a need for comprehensive educational and social reforms in the area through 'education for all' policies with technical and vocational training and through a policy of transparency, cultural diffusion and steady introduction of modern technologies with an explanation of their benefits.

The international community has given an incredible amount of aid to different Pakistan based NGOs for this purpose, but honestly speaking, many NGOs are not trusted by the local people and they often regard them as 'agents of the foreign hands.' These aid initiatives should be coordinated through honest national and local government officials and with an auditable and accountable mechanism of transaction. About the religious reforms, there needs to be a full concentration on the curriculum, methods of teaching, selection of students, and with a full evaluation of the socialization/indoctrination into the Islamic schools called Madrassahs. Revised and acceptable legislation and meaningful rules and regulations are required for this purpose. Alternative educational facilities and good opportunities for training, accommodation and future prospects will ultimately reduce the demands by poor people in the tribal areas to seek out Madrassahs as the only educational option. It is the distribution of free food and free accommodation that serves as an incentive for these impoverished people to send their children to these Islamic schools, rather than an assumed divine duty to learn an engineered curriculum with no practical education. Clearly, the reforms within LEAs is a big challenge, and unfortunately, the judicial, legal and police reforms proposed within the internationally funded Access to Justice Programme (AJP) have not yet been fully realized. Pakistan clearly requires a number of visionary changes within the justice and law enforcement sectors, and there is strong need for their integration through administrative and legally protected reforms. The economic development in the tribal areas is a long awaited dream. The recently announced 750 million dollars in

US aid is subject to lengthy procedures and scrutiny (and unfortunately often much is lost through government corruption). Only time will reveal the ultimate results of this potential economic boost, as there are many transactional and implementation difficulties in the utilization and disbursement of all such international aid. Clearly and ultimately, there is a strong need for an atmosphere of procedural fairness, mutual trust and honesty of intention and commitment. There is hope for Pakistan, but the political leadership must believe in this cause.

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