Policing The Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan: Practical Remarks From A South African Perspective

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Abstract:

The Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan needs a special form of policing model by the Frontier Police. This model must focuses on the needs of the people and must incorporate the insights of the community, intelligence-led and indigenous policing models. Terrorism is an intelligence war and the police constantly needs to enhance and expands their intelligence abilities to prevent any form of terrorist activities. While a strong-man's approach is recommended in terms of policing it is important that the police must win the hearts and minds of the people in order to win the fight against crime and to be successful in the war on terror.

keywords:

Policing, Community Policing, Intelligence Led Policing, Indigenous Policing Models, Terrorism, Extreme Beliefs, Counter terrorism

Introduction

There is no doubt that growth and economic development cannot take place if there is no peace and social order in any society (Nadeem 2004). This is true, not only of Pakistan, but also of any other country. It is the task of the police to see that proactive and reactive policing measures are in place to ensure that criminal incidents are reduced and that citizens can feel safe and secure. This is of special importance when it comes to terrorism and any form of serious crime (Ras 2009b; 2009c). Although Pakistan was faced with major challenges during the period of 1969 to 1996, and was seen as one of the most disturbed period's in this country's history (Nadeem 2004:2; Ras 2007b:492-493), it seems that this state of affairs did not really have altered (Gillani, Rehman & Gill 2009:79-98). The War on Terror that is ongoing in *inter alia* the Northwest Frontier Province and the seven tribal agencies is a reflection of this (Fasihuddin 2008).

The North West Frontier Province

The North West Frontier Province (NWFP) comprises 74 521 square kilometers and has a population of over 22 million people comprising mostly from the Pathan tribes (http://nwfp.gov.pk/nwfpgov/aboutus/index.php) who live according to the unwritten ethical Pushtunwali code ("the way of the Pushtun" http://www.joshuaproject.net/peopctry. php?rop3=107909&rog3=AE). It is home to diverse ethnic groups and languages such as Pathan, Khowar, Hindko, Kohistani, Shina, Torwali, Kashmiri, Kalasha and Kaghani. The presence of Afghan refugees

also has brought Ghilzai and Durrani tribes and hundreds and thousands of Farsi speaking Taijks and Hazaras who have settled there.

According to the government of the NWFP nearly all the inhabitants of this province are Sunni Muslims with a minority of Shias', Ismailis', Animists and Shamanists (http://www.nwfp.gov.pk/nwfpgov/aboutus/index.php).This conglomerate of ethnic and language diversity necessitates in my opinion a special form of policing model by the Frontier Police under Inspector-General Malik Naveed Khan that can truly address safety and security needs and issues that can ensure lasting peace and stability (Ras 2009a; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frontier_Police). This is in particular an imperative when it comes to the prevention of terrorism and the combating of extremism (Martin 2010:4).

Geographical Divisions and Policing

According to the government's Directorate of Information Technology in the NWPF, the province comprises of three major administrative parts. One part, that is regarded as settled areas, consists of districts like Abbottabad, Bannu, Battagram, Charsadda, Dera Ismail Khan, Hangu, Haripur, Kohistan, Kohat, Karak, Lakki Marwat, Mansehra, Mardan, Nowshera, Swabi, Peshawar and Tank. Another part is known as the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) and consists of the Malakaland Agency, and the districts of Upper Dir, Lower Dir, Chitral, Swat, Buner, Shangla, Kala Dhaka ("Black Mountains"), Kohistan and the State of Amb (submerged in the Tarbela Dam Reservoir). The last and third part is well-known as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and comprises of seven Tribal Agencies (Bajaur, Mohmand, Khyber, Orakzai, Kurram, North Waziristan, South Waziristan) and six Frontier Regions (Frontier Region Bannu, Central Kurram, Frontier Region Dera Ismail Khan, Frontier Region Kohat, Frontier Region Lakki, Frontier Region Peshawar and Frontier Region Tank). These three mentioned main geographical areas are directly controlled by the Governor of the NWFP (http://www.nwfp.gov.pk/nwfpgov/aboutus/index.php).

This geographical-administrative division, characterized by people whose tribal relationships have been formed through centuries of matrimonial alliances and socio-economic covenant-treaties and business relationships (Fasihuddin 2008), underlines for me something that I have learned in South Africa, and that is, normal westernized policing models and measures cannot truly address the ethnic and religio-cultural underlying currents in the NWFP to ensure lasting peace. The only sustainable policing model that will work in this legendary and vigorous religious-cultural *ummah* must come from within. In other words, police experts in conjunction with and in collaboration with indigenous groups within the NWFP must come up with a *sui generis* policing model that will work. (Ras 2009a).

The Establishment of A North West Frontier Province Policing Model

Worldwide, police scholars, experts and practitioners know that no policing model will really work without the constant input and cooperation from local communities (Albrecht 2008:26-47; Bezuidenhout 2008:48-67). This reality is felt much more intense when one is confronted with very serious crimes in especially rural and remote communities that are very often characterized by more homogenous social networks and cognitive thought-patterns that are soaked in religio-cultural language, traditions and customs (Ras 2009a).Crimes are committed by people and it is only people who can share intelligence, whether it is crime intelligence or intelligence related to national or international matters like terrorism (DCAF Intelligence Working Group 2003:3).

In South Africa, especially in rural settings like northern Zululand, people very often survive by relying on themselves and the support and goodwill of their neighbors when there are real dangers, instead of waiting for the police who are very often too far away to respond immediately (Ras 2007a:93-110). In line with contemporary worldwide developments, I am of the opinion that the situation in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province necessitates that an integrated policing model must be developed by Pakistan's policing experts that will incorporate the community policing model, the intelligence-led policing model, and the indigenous policing models of the Frontier tribes (Ras 2009a).

A critical assessment of the existing state of affairs in the NWFP, especially focusing on the needs of the people and the challenges to address it, must form the basis of this proposed policing model. This developed model must be filtered through a critical-assessment of all the *pros'* and *cons'* of each model (community, intelligence-led, indigenous). It is of great importance to especially focus on the indigenous models that are most of the time based on Pushtunwali codes like *badal* (the right of blood feuds or revenge) and *ghayrat* (defense of property and honor) (http://www.joshuaproject.net/peopctry.php?rop3=107909&rog3=AE).

Insights and lessons learned through the many decades of war and conflict that have formed and shaped the existing state of affairs in this important province seriously need to be considered. The presence of the military and militia, the past examples of collaboration between different role-players in law enforcement that have brought successes, peace and stability to this part of the world are all critical ingredients that need to be identified in order to come up with an unique policing model that will bear fruit in future (Ras 2009a).

The fact that the Afghan, the Pukhtun and the Pathan are three names of the same people despite shifting political boundaries (http://www.nwfp.gov.pk/nwfpgov/aboutus/index.php), indicates that this

province is truly a mixture of many civilizations. The incorpo-ration of local indigenous knowledge (cf. Ajibade 2003:99) related to policing and security issues within a policing model for the NWFP will ensure that local tribal leaders will not feel marginalized and may assist in creating the necessary confidence that is seriously needed to ensure the success of any attempt to ensure social order and harmony (Nadeem 2004:221-232, 271-274).

Community and Intelligence -Led-Policing Within The NWFP - Policing Model

Community-driven policing models, whether they are coined as problem-oriented, problem-solving models or sector policing, or whatever name or acronym may suit the user, they all have in common the central idea that people are involved with one another and that the police and community members are in an active partnership (Ras 2009; Van Heerden 1995). It is not really important if the police are making use of paramilitary methods in achieving their goals or not. What is more important is that their relationship with local community members must be so cemented in trust that there is mutual respect, a definite share of information, and a willingness and boldness, not only to tackle the real issues, but to cooperatively alter the existing state of affairs to the good of both parties. In short, the reduction of crime and the fear of crime must be ultimate goals (Ras 2009a).

Community-driven models have worked in the Gujranwala Divison (Nadeem 2004:264) and can be rolled out to the NWFP but only, and only, if a thorough analysis has been made to assess the strengths and weaknesses of the Gujranwala model before it is applied. The revival of the *panchayat*-system (community meetings where everyone is present and their problems sorted out), the implementation of *numberdars* (persons who act as a link between the local union council and the police), *chowkidars* (persons in charge of villages that must coordinate all their village activities with that of the police), and neighborhood watch programmes, for example, must form an integral part of police-community relations (Nadeem 2004:221-232,271-274; Ras 2007:492-493).

The implementation of the Intelligence-Led. Policing (ILP) model is for me part and parcel of any form of community policing because it basically has to do with the gathering of intelligence (crime and criminal-specific information), the implementation of clandestine methods and operations, and the sharing of information between all role-players that can assist in the reduction of crime (Kalidheen 2008). However, it is central that the NWFP-policing model must be driven by a focus on local needs. If the needs and expectations of the local inhabitants are not met then their frustrations and angers will find expression in conflict and attacks aimed at the police and the military. The involvement of the

police in addressing village councils (cf. Fasihuddin / Whisenhunt 2008:21) where relationships can be established, nurtured and developed are of critical importance to ensure police successes (Ras 2009a).

Indigenous Policing Models Within The NWFP - Policing Model

The tapping into the indigenous knowledge-systems of the Pashtun and other tribes, who through the centuries had to sort out their own differences and problems can, in conjunction with police facilitation and in line with Pakistan's criminal justice system, be incorporated into the newly proposed NWFP - policing model. Wide consultation, the sharing of ideas and recommendations by different tribal, cultural leaders and religious, are all examples of what need to be done in order to develop a practical but workable policing model for the Frontier Police (Ras 2009a).

If one thinks that the Frontier Police owes its origin to the Indian Rebellion of 1857 and that the force was created in 1861 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Frontier_Police), then there is no doubt in my mind that the NWFP - police force owns a *thesaurus* of policing knowledge and experiences that is available to assist and to guide them in developing their own unique policing model. Past policing encounters with locals, interactions, tropes / stories, previous problems and the implementation of possible solutions, lessons of the past, publications, and whatever information that may shed light and add value to the establishment of an own policing model for the NWFP, are without doubt available to the leaders of the Frontier Police to come up with their own policing model.

Policing Extreme Beliefs

Worldwide community-policing models are all implemented in line with democratic policing principles, and that is, human rights issues determine the behaviour of police officials. The embracement of democracy necessarily leads to an embracement and implementation of human rights and the establishing of a culture of human rights (Nel & Bezuidenhout 1997). Any extremists like terrorists and suicide-bombers, whether they are members of Al-Qaeda (Ras 2009a; 2009b; 2009c), Lashkar i Jhangvi (Army of Jhang) or part of the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (Army of the Righteous) (Ronczkowski 2007:285-287), pose a very serious threat and challenge to any police and military official.

From a military perspective, the identification, neutralization and elimination of extremists after 9/11 are practical realities in the ongoing War against Terror. If people do not change their radical beliefs or plan to destroy innocent lives and symbolic targets in order to achieve their own political aims, then terror deeds and counter-terrorist measures without doubt will lead to bombs, bloodshed and tears.

The police cannot escape this reality but is regrettably drawn into this internal religio-political unfortunate power-struggles. They cannot escape these attacks - they can only minimize it (Ras 2009a, 2009c).

To prevent terror attacks, they have to gather intelligence, infiltrate extremist groups and proactively prohibit them from executing what they plan to do. Through clandestine methods and techniques (human and electronic intelligence) they have to identify, arrest and prosecute those who want to establish a new socio-political order or dispensation (Ras 2009). The presence of the Pakistani military in the FATA and NWFP and the assistance of the United States of America in the ongoing War on Terror, whether in Afghanistan or within the Pakistani regions, are already winning formulas.

The Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) secret war through the use of drones (the Predator and the Reaper) in the tribal belts of Waziristan, in which high-tech video-surveillance with the ability to use deadly fire, is used in order to target Al-Qaeda operatives and Taliban fighters like Abu Omar, are examples of this (http://img.timeinc.net/time/daily/2009/0905/wdrones...). However, the marginalisation of police personnel in the city areas must never happen because it is the police who are always the first responders and who form the first line of defense between the people and criminals / enemies on the ground.

The existence of radical terror groups that seemingly move freely at night over the Pakistani and the Afghan border or FATA and settled districts boundaries remains a policing and military challenge. This how-ever, must not discourage the Frontier Police. Terrorism is an intelligence war (Wilson 2006) and the police need to enhance effective communication technologies through partnerships with those that want and can assist (e.g. the USA). The constant gathering of human intelligence through infiltration and clandestine operations must never stop (Ras 2009a).

Best Practices in Counter Terrorism

Terrorism is a special crime that requires special laws. This reality necessitates that Pakistani's police leaders need to look at laws in this regard that can greatly assist them in ensuring that they have the necessary legal backing to do their job without fear and hesitation. Not only must relevant legislation be put in place to prevent and combat terrorism, but diplomatic relationships with other countries must also be established and maintained in order to fight terrorists. One also needs strategies to win the hearts and minds of passive sympathizers of terrorism something the police can do through their community engagement and involvement with members of the public (Wilson 2006; Ras 2009a).

The criminalization of financial support to terrorist groups need to be tackled more seriously and the freezing of assets to supporters need to be continued.

Intelligence needs to be shared and covert actions need to be coordinated through the enhancement of regional cooperation. The existing military operations against the Taliban who supports Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda need to be supported. From a preventative policing point of view Frontier Police members always need to be proactive and must know exactly who their enemies are. Specific assertiveness training must be given to them in this regard (Fasihuddin 2008:21-22).

Knowledge-sharing about the enemies of the police, their tactics and modus operandi, their organizational structures, their hiding-places, and especially their criminal intent and terror deeds need to be clearly stated so that the police in the NWFP knows exactly who is friend and who is foe. To know your enemy is one of the most accepted maxims in warfare (Wilson 2006). The Frontier Police must also implement aggressive efforts to identify terrorists and their organizations, map out their command and control and support infrastructures, and implement counter-terrorism measures to prevent their attacks. Disruption of all their planned activities must be at the order of the day (Ras 2009a).

Religious Leaders and Terrorism

There is no doubt in my mind that the reasons why many Al-Qaeda members are willing to carry suicide belts and to blow themselves up are simply because of the religious indoctrination and erroneous belief, and fundamentalistic interpretation of the Holy Qur'an (Ali 1946) that they will please Allah if they do so (Ras 2009c). These so-called martyrs (s*haheeds*) are willing to die because they are told by religious extremists or fanatics that they will inherit heaven and reap rewards if they do *jihad*. Police needs to identify the religious leaders, for example, at the *masjid,* and members of the *ummah* who teach this, and simply neutralise them. It is only through infiltration and counter-terrorism techniques and methods that attacks, sabotage, the *al kannas* (sniper) and the suicide bombings will be stopped (Ras 2009a).

I believe that if the majority of peace-loving Muslims, who are in favor of law and order, will stand up and reject all these senseless killings by radical extremists in the name of Allah, then alone, peace will return to Pakistan. It is the task of the Pakistani police, especially those working in crime intelligence, who must infiltrate radical groups and organizations and start to identify members and neutralize their planned actions through arrests and prosecution. Globally-speaking, outsiders are expecting that military and national intelligence operators must disrupt the planned activities of extremists, even if it means that they have to penetrate much deeper into the enemy lines to neutralize and eliminate those who want to kill innocent people through terror campaigns (Ras 2009b; 2009c; 2009d).

From a policing point of view, an integrated approach is recommended where there is greater communication between the police, intelligence, the military and the

government (Kalidheen 2008:136). In South Africa, for example, the Department of Home Affairs is responsible for the issuing of identity and travel documents. A close collaboration between these important role-players will ensure that terrorists cannot move freely and that information is shared so that no-one works in isolation (Ras 2009a).

Partnerships between the police and private security companies are another important example that take place in South Africa in order to win the fight against crime (Potgieter, Ras & Neser 2008:33-43). Despite all the criticism that they receive because of poor service delivery, there are four times more private security officers in South Africa than police officers on the ground. This means there are more visible private security (police) officials on the ground that can assist the police in their search for suspects and criminals. The visibility of private security officials makes a difference and do act as a crime deterrent, and it is recommended that Pakistan also look more in depth at this matter (Ras 2009a).

The Pakistan Society of Criminology

The NWFP is privileged to have the President of the Pakistan Society of Criminology in their midst. This Society is very important, just like the positions of each member of the steering committee because the aims of this Society are basically the dissemination of scholarly knowledge, the giving of advice, and to look at sound criminological and policing practices and experiences of different role-players from around the world, to see how the interests of Pakistan can be served. Knowledge-dissemination is one of many critical elements that can be used to win the war against criminal elements, especially against extremists or terrorists who are radical and violent in order to achieve their idiosyncratic religio-political aims.

Information gathering from different scholars,criminologists, police organizations and practitioners can be fruitfully used by this Society to come up and to develop an unique and indigenous policing model that may bring more peace and stability, not only to the NWFP, but also to the rest of Pakistan. Knowledge is power, and it was the wise Solomon who once said that "Being wise is better than being strong; yes, knowledge is more important than strength. After all, you must make careful plans before you fight a battle, and the more good advice you get, the more likely you are to win" (Good News Bible: Proverbs 24:5-6)

Police and Control The Borders

Most of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and the Northwest Frontier Province of Pakistan are adjacent or near to the Afghanistan border. The people who live on both sides of the border speak the same language and are mostly of the same ethnic group and as a result of this there is a strong social bond that exists

between them for hundreds of years (Fasihuddin 2008). This means in practice that whatever happens in Afghanistan is felt in Pakistan and *vice versa*. This impacts upon policing. Although all criminal activities pose problems and challenges to law enforcement officials in Pakistan, it is especially the War on Terror, after 9/11, which led to the presence of foreign troops (e.g. United States of America) and drone attacks in areas like Waziristan that impact upon this Province.

If the Frontier Police effectively can control their borders with the tribal territories and in conjunction with the military and assistance of the United States of America ensure that radical elements, drug smugglers, human traffickers and weapon smugglers, for example, are restricted in terms of their movements and activities, then a lot of crime and social disruptions will be reduced. Effective border control means there are less criminal and enemy movements and activities that can contribute to disorder and lawlessness in Pakistan. Strategic planning and international assistance and cooperation can ensure that the Frontier Police will be in control (Ras 2009a).

Policing Challenges

Fasihuddin (2008) recently has pointed out that the police in the NWFP were never trained for the War on Terror and do not know how to respond in a warlike situation. They are not only under equipped, understaffed and poorly paid, but there are also careless attitudes of high-ranking police officers who did not take the war in Afghanistan seriously enough and as a result did not prepare Pakistan for the consequent spill-overs The NWFP is now experiencing terrorist attacks in greater numbers than the FATA with 28 suicide bombings that were recorded during 2007 (Fashuddin 2008).

Fasihuddin's Recommendations

When interviewed by John Whisenhunt, the editor of *IO Sphere*, Fasihuddin, the Director of Research and Development in Pakistan's NWFP and President of the Pakistan Society of Criminology, has pointed out that he believes that the whole police model need to be revamped because of the fact that terrorists are using the most modern equipment and communications gear. He uses the acronym TASK to emphasize that training (T), Attitude (A), Skills (S) and Knowledge (K) are the key ingredients that need to be implemented in order to ensure that effective policing, including counter-terrorism strategies, can take place. There is no doubt that his first-hand knowledge and experiences in the NWFP are of great importance in order to make progress in the War on Terror. To support his remarks I would like to conclude with a few brief remarks about police developments in South Africa that may help the Frontier Police to develop their own policing model that will work in their own situation as pointed out earlier.

Police Developments in South Africa

Dutch traders under Jan van Riebeeck have established a stopover on the spice route between Holland (the Netherlands) and the East (India) on 6 April 1652 that led later to the founding of the City of Cape Town. Policing duties were performed by soldiers and felons from Batavia and as time goes on by ordinary "vrije burghers" (free citizens) who have assisted with law and order duties through the formation of commandos (Van Heerden 1995). In essence, commandos were local people who have fought their enemies with rifles and horses, using indigenous skills and experiences in order to survive (Ras 2009).

After the British have seized the Cape of Good Hope area in 1806 many of the Dutch settlers (the Boers) trekked north to found their own republics. This has led to the expansion of the commando-system. The discovery of diamonds (1867) and gold (1886) spurred wealth and immigration and intensified the subjugation of native inhabitants. The Boers resisted British encroachments but were defeated in the Second Boer War (1899 to 1902). The British and the Boers (who later became known as Afrikaners) ruled together under the Union of South Africa. In 1948 the National Party came into power and instituted the policy of apartheid where a white minority racial group erroneously have dominated all other races, especially the black majority (http://www.theodora.com/wfbcurrent/south_africa/south_africa_ introduction.html; Van der Watt 1976:1-3; Giliomee & Mbenga 2007).

The first official police force was established in 1912 after the four provinces in South Africa have become part of the Union of South Africa. The police force was centralized and the force was standardized in terms of uniforms, weaponry, tactics, duties, and law enforcement duties. It was a police force and not a paramilitary or military force. The understanding of people was that the police represent the public and are doing duties on the public's behalf. Where and when necessary, the police also have taken over the functions of the traffic police and they also got involved in military duties when and where necessary, but only in assisting the military, not to take over their role functions (Ras 2009; Van Heerden 1995).

South Africa became an apartheid state from 1948 where the white minority has implemented a policy of separate development based on racial and ethnic lines. The state has used the police and military to enforce their laws, including racial-discriminatory laws. As a result of this non-Whites have rejected the authority of the police and later start to reject their authority. This has led to bloody clashes with the police.

During the apartheid-period South Africa was also involved in protecting the border of South West Africa (now Namibia) with military and police personnel. Although South Africa's Koevoet police and the South African National Defense Force (SAND / military) have won their battles during the Bush Wars (Afrikaans:

"Bos Oorloë") from 1965 to 1990 on this border between Namibia and Angola (Geldenhuys 2009; Nortje 2003; Stiff 2004; Williams 2008), they have lost the war because they did not win the support of the local people / communities (Ras 2009a).

The apartheid government has also lost their political power when unconventional guerilla tactics and warfare were introduced by underground community members like the ANC's (African National Congress) military wing, Umkhonto weSize ("The Spear of the nation") who fought against the apartheid system (Ras 2009a). Pakistan must not make the same mistake. It is the task of the Frontier Police to win the hearts and minds of the people. If the people reject them, then the War on Terror will be lost.

In 1994 the apartheid state was replaced by a democratic-elected black majority rule under President Nelson Mandela of the existing ruling party, the African National Congress (ANC). Community policing was introduced and it was succeeded by sector policing and problem-oriented policing. However, crime did not really go down but has escalated. Mandela was succeeded by Thabo Mbeki who could not manage the high levels of crime. In fact, crime was not regarded as a very high priority, rather the provision of water, electricity, houses and the providing of jobs. One of the main reasons for the high crime rate in South Africa is the economic inequalities that still exists.

After the ANC's Polokwane Conference in December 2007, Mbeki was forced during May 2008 to resign because of pressure by radical elements within the ANC Youth League and members of the South African Communist Party and intelligence operators who have worked in a planned and very long manner to ensure that Jacob Zuma, that was ousted earlier by President Mbeki as Deputy President on so-called corruption charges related to an arms deal worth billions of rands, became the people's president.

When Zuma took office during 2009 he has appointed new police and intelligence leaders and moved away from the concept of a police "service" to a police "force." In short, there is a war going on a war against criminal elements. The police service was seen as a too "soft approach." What people want is action and absence of crime in their areas and a visible manifestation of police personnel who can reduce crime. Zuma and his cabinet have committed themselves to do just that. They even have started to use the military where necessary in order to portray a strong man's image and to assist with road blocks and searches (Ras 2009a). The present situation in Pakistan necessitates that the police and military have to work very closely together at this stage.

According to 2007-figures the South African population stands at 47 850 700 and comprises of 79,7% Blacks, 9,1% Whites, 8,8% Coloureds and 2,4% Indian / Asians (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Demographics_of_South_Africa). For many

years the police force comprises of about 150 000 members and it has been announced recently that this figure is going to be expanded to 180 000 members and promises were made that this number will escalate to about 210 000 within the next few years. There is also a strong indication that the intelligence capabilities of the state is built out and that the privacy of individual members of the state are now replaced by national demands that carry more weight.

There is a definite trend that after 9/11 that the community policing model in the United States of America and the United Kingdom is now expanded, even replaced, through the incorporation, assimilation and absorption of the intelligence-led policing model. The same can be said of South Africa although at a lesser scale because of the government's official point of view that community policing is and must be the policing model that must be used in order to reduce crime (Ras 2009a). Pakistan can consider these options and then, as pointed out earlier, come up with their own policing model.

According to the intelligence-led policing model, the gathering of specific intelligence, the doing of clandestine operations, the integration of all law enforcement personnel through the sharing of information, and the implementation of more integrated law enforcement approaches are typical features of this approach (Kalidheen 2008; Ras 2009a). Although Brown (2007:239-251) is correct in pointing out that community-oriented counter-terrorism measures *in praxis* have led to highly aggressive tactics, there is no doubt in my mind that community-oriented counter-terrorism measures definitely includes the intelligence-led policing model (Ras 2009a). The intelligence-led policing model cannot be separated from community-oriented approaches because it is people within communities who are providing the necessary human intelligence that is needed to ensure the safety and security of human lives and their property (Ras 2009a).

At present South Africa's top policing leadership are characterized through verbal war rhetoric like "We will fight criminals! Shoot to kill! Zero tolerance! We will fight them with everything that we have!" and so forth. The author was part of a four-person panel discussion on 29 October 2009 where the Minister of Police, Nathi Mthethwa, explicitly mentioned that the police are going to expand their crime intelligence capabilities. He also mentioned it directly and very boldly that the police is now officially no longer a police service but a police *force*.

This underlines the present reality that South Africa, after President Zuma came into power in 2009, deliberately is moving towards a more hard-line approach or a strong man's approach to policing. Police members are instructed to shoot to kill when confronted by serious criminals and they are busy to change section 49 of the Criminal Procedural Act, Act 51 of 1977, to make it more clear to the police when to shoot so that they do not hesitate to do so when they have to make that split-second decision (Mtheth-wa 2009; Ras 2009).

Because South Africa and Pakistan have a lot in common in terms of their past and present histories (e.g. diverse culture and language groups, both were former British colonies, both have a high crime rate, etc.), and in the light of our own challenges here on the southern tip of Africa, *in conclusion*, I recommend the following for the police in the NWFP to be successful:

To Be Successful in Policing The NWFP

Have a political will. There must be an absolute determination to positively change the crime situation around. Although the enemy is sometimes within, there must be a strong will and determination to make an about-turn. A strong-man's approach is necessary at this stage and the implementation of the police as a force and not as a service may sound too militaristic, but it will have the desired effect. Develop your own policing model that does not replace the community service model, but strengthen it via intelligence-led and indigenous policing models and a no-nonsense (zero crime tolerance) approach. In short, create your own policing model that will work.

Motivate existing police members and underline the important role that they place despite all their challenges. Stay focused and stick to the set-goals without giving up or to slow down until reaching the objectives. Very important is discipline. It is crucial if one wants to succeed. One cannot have combat discipline if there is no personal discipline. Be knowledgeable and know who are you fighting (Ras 2007:93-110; 2009a).

In terms of terrorism, local and international terrorists are normally well organized and engage in thorough preparations that normally take long. Terrorists preparations normally go through ten main phases that are indicative of their activities and modus operandi. These relevant issues are: recruitment, training, selection of action / targets, planning, finances, logistics, transportation, security (their own protective measures), execution (the actual attacks) and propaganda (Wilson, 2006). Because terrorists need time to prepare themselves in order to strike, police must utilize this time-factor to infiltrate and disrupt their activities before they can strike. Expand your intelligence capabilities and infiltrate and disrupt the enemy from within. Definite collaboration with the military and intelligence agencies is critical in order to ensure success (Ras 2009a).

The specific identification of leaders, whether political or religious, who advocated hatred and who oppose any form of peaceful means that will ensure social harmony in the NWFP, needs to get special attention. Win the hearts and minds of the people through community engagement, addressing their social needs, and through positive communication operations. Keep on expanding your general

knowledge-base in terms of criminology and policing matters via the Pakistan Society of Criminology and build out your existing friend-networks to ensure help, advice, assistance and support at all levels when needed. The collaboration with the United States of America and their allies are encouraged because they stand and fight for sound democratic principles and human rights despite all the criticism.

The Frontier Police has many challenges but I believe they are in the best position to know how to police their own people. Be brave and continue to fill the gaps and track down criminals and those who want to destroy the good work that been done in the past. I conclude with a sailor's image: Sometimes you have to sail against the wind, at times with the wind, other times with no wind; no matter what the circumstances, keep on sailing, reach your destination, ensure the safety and security of all inhabitants of the NWFP.

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