

Problems of Data Collection and Constraints in Investigation Management of Cases of Terrorism in Pakistan

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Abstract:

In the absence of properly maintained and verifiable data on terrorist activities a research leading to policy options for countering terrorism remains a mere desire. The absence of uniform statistics or faulty data hampers the job and assessment of the investigation management of terrorist incidents. Likewise, the poor quality investigation management will not create proper information indicators for data collection systems. This paper briefly examines this issue in the context of terrorist activities in Pakistan.

Keywords:

Data, Crime Statistics, Investigation Management, National Police Bureau, National Crisis Management Cell, Joint Interrogation Team, National Counter Terrorism Authority, Police.

A. Introduction:

Much depends on the successful investigation of any criminal offence recorded with a law-enforcement agency anywhere in the world. Investigation generally starts from arrival at the scene of crime, collection of evidence, compilation of recovered and recorded material, examining the witnesses and making of a case file for prosecution and trial by the competent court. In the usual police work in Pakistan, the preventive intelligence or prior information sharing or analyses are beyond the scope, competence and authority of the police force as far as the serious organized crimes like terrorism or human trafficking are concerned. The modern investigation tools like geographic profiling, deductive profiling, voice analysis, technological interceptions, etc are neither tried by the Pakistani police nor do they have resources for modernizing and equipping the investigation wing and the Forensic Sciences Laboratory (FSL). Poor investigations result in low conviction with acquittals or untraced cases, which are not taken as good indicators for police performance and efficiency. Investigation staff often complain of the non-professional or non-cooperative attitude of the prosecution (separated from the police in 2005), but there exists no such mechanism to critically evaluate the outcome of an investigation and trial of case. The usual practice of writing Police Brief, Chalan (Final Report) Memo at the conclusion of an investigation and a report on the Conviction Slip receipt are now no more in vogue or very poorly done due to lack of effective

monitoring and supervision of investigation management. Another big issue is the lack of properly collected and documented data on terrorist activities. In the absence of verifiable and authentic data, even the uniformed police statistics, create serious implications for law-enforcement, criminal justice and crime prevention policies. In this paper, both these issues are briefly discussed. Let us take the second issue first:

Methodology:

This paper is written on the basis of information generated and recorded by various provincial and federal departments and authorities. Efforts were made to collect, analyze and organize the available data. Extensive interviews were held with those police officers who are responsible for conducting police investigation in troubled areas.

B. Terrorist Activities & Problems of Data Collection:


The first and foremost indication of the severity and magnitude of a crime is evident from the authentic and verifiable or official statistics. Though the official figures may be challenged by impartial observers or opponents, yet they are endorsed, recorded, kept for longer period and at times published and disseminated. In Pakistan, there is no single department to collect data from local police offices, intelligence and law-enforcement agencies on a single standardized format. No effort is being made to gather the maximum of information indicators on terrorist activities. All what available are the routine police statistics, generated at a police station and sent through higher offices to the provincial and federal governments. Mistakes are generally expected during the upward flow of information. Information on standardized formats or information which are computer-friendly and accessible are generally not seen in this process. The round-figure statistics with no calculation of crime rate, arrest or clearance rate, incarceration rate, conviction rate or percent increase or decrease, are the only available crime figures we have in Pakistan. Even this kind of available crime figures suffer from difficulties of uniformity, consistency and availability. These are not easily available to the general public. At times, the print and electronic media calculate and compile their own statistics on the basis of media-reported incidents or NGOs-generated data or quoting some anonymous source in the government or on the authority of a think-tank report, mostly foreign. Most often the police at district and provincial level classify the kind of crime into so many sub-categories without any legal justification like robbery at banks, on highways, at petrol pumps, etc. This is not done for any research purpose, but to mitigate the overall round-figure effect. This 'specification' is generally known as the 'purification of

statistics' in China. However, it gives rise to contradiction and creates difficulties for the officers and researchers who want to study the exact nature of any single crime and the outcome of the investigation processes. Let us examine the various kinds of data produced by the different government departments:


1. The National Crisis Management Cell (NCMC), the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, collects the statistics related to terrorist activities in the country. They usually do tabulation of these figures according to year and provinces. They are provided data by the intelligence agencies, special branch and the respective provincial governments. There is a two way flow of information between NCMC and the primary and secondary sources. **Annexure-A** (Table-I) describes the details of the terrorist incidents as tabulated by NCMC. This is kind of aggregated data. Without these wholesome figures no further description or classification can be found with the NCMC. This tabulation is for the settled districts as well as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).
2. The National Police Bureau (NPB), the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, receives the police crime statistics for the settled districts of Pakistan. All the provinces and the Islamabad Capital Territory Police regularly provide the crime statistics to the NPB on monthly basis. Earlier to the war on terror, such statistics on terrorist activities were rarely provided. Even the NPB didn't design any detailed information sheet with maximum of indicators for terrorist incidents which could be easily used and analysed for research purpose and policy options. **Annexure B** (Table-II) shows the available data with the NPB which too are in wholesome figures. In the NPB, no separate or specialized unit is established for this purpose to collect, analyse and disseminate data on terrorist incidents, terrorist profiling or the outcome of the investigation of such incidents. The NPB Research Office has no staff or resources for this job.
3. The National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), which was established in 2009, eight years after Pakistan joined the global war on terror, has started working on some indigenous research and collecting the available data on terrorist acts in the country. In an effort the NACTA has acquired the number of religious militants in the prisons of all the provinces. NACTA found that there are 12 religious militants in the prisons of Baluchistan, 80 in Sindh, 220 in the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and 173 in the Punjab. We have tabulated the NACTA provided figures in **Annexure C** (Table-III) with percentage. These figures also don't show the exact nature of the offence, the relevant section of law, the individual characteristics of the offender and the under trial or convicted status of the inmates, etc.

4. In addition to these three available data systems at the federal level, the provincial governments generate and present their separate crime statistics which, at times, are slightly different from the statistics already provided to the various setup at the federal level. It may be due to the additional information or cancellation of cases in the due course of time, but failing updating at the higher level. For example, the NWFP Police Department provides the following data which we have shown in the two graphs (I-II) pertaining to terrorist activities, one for the overall incidences and the other for the suicide attacks. The Research Section of the NWFP Police has further done some classification of the various kinds of terrorist activities alongside the geographical distribution of such incidents. Though a little detailed, it also suffers from the usual difficulties of data collection as seen in the case of NACTA, NPB and NCMC. Moreover, the statistics from the Operation or Research sections, occasionally, are somewhat different from the statistics compiled by the Special Branch of the concerned police departments. One of the reasons for this obvious discrepancy is that the Special Branch usually records all the registered/reported and un-registered/non-reported cases. In a way, the record of Special Branch is like a picture of victimization. In addition, the police have generally the total number of arrested, killed or injured terrorists whereas the Special Branch also maintains a record of the arrested and interrogated terrorists or suspects brought to the Joint Interrogation Team (JIT) exercises. The JIT is composed of almost all law-enforcement agencies. According to the NWFP Police headquarters a total of 1764 terrorists were arrested and 150 killed in 2008 and 904 arrested and 138 killed in 2009. However, the complete details of the arrested and interrogated terrorists by the JIT referred to the NWFP Special Branch are given in Annexure D (Table-IV). In Table-V, we have calculated the percentage of the outcome of the interrogation which will be discussed shortly.

Graph 1



Persons Killed





Total Persons Killed: 1906

Source:

Office of the Additional Inspector General of Police (Investigation), NWFP Police Department, Peshawar.

Graph 2

Persons Injured



Total Persons Killed: 4758

Source:

Office of the Additional Inspector General of Police (Investigation), NWFP Police Department, Peshawar.

C. Discussion:

The different data collection systems as mentioned above have serious implications for situation analysis, research, policy-options and decision-making. It also indicates the in-coordination amongst the various agencies at federal and provincial level. We have no reasons to disbelieve the NWFP Police crime statistics for the arrested terrorists but the available figures for the religious militants in the prisons of the NWFP are comparatively too low as

provided by the NACTA. The available data doesn't classify and indicate the exact details of the more than two thousand arrested terrorists. If it includes the arrested terrorists currently undergoing the JIT after the military operations in Swat, even then the number of the religious militants (if it is not a separate category of the arrested terrorists) is far below than the police record. The most important implication of this record is for the investigation management. We simply can't determine how many arrested terrorists are under police detention and for how many maximum days, and whether the Final Report (Chalan) of investigation is submitted in a complete or in-complete form, to the competent court; and how many are awarded punishment, and again what type of punishment. In the absence of such basic data the researchers are unable to comment upon the performance of the investigation management for those terrorist activities which have happened in the settled districts and are under the police jurisdiction. The total number of the arrested terrorists undergoing the JIT as compiled by the Special Branch is different from the total number of the arrested terrorists as given by the Police headquarters. Again, it is not clear whether JIT examination is being held for all the arrested terrorists or not. If this is not a mandatory stage in the process, then it has serious effects on the findings of an individual police investigation officer (IO), who in such cases needs greater support and detective insight from his colleagues in the JIT, representing their individual intelligence agencies. To my mind, the data collection at the federal level is very hopeless in the eyes of unbiased researcher. The absence of any consolidated data at the national level often creates problem for the government and policy-makers. It also provides an opportunity for critics and opponents. The discrepancy in the data of NPB and NCMC for the same year and province (except FATA as NPB doesn't record anything related to FATA) is not an encouraging sign for a respectable research-oriented institution of a national character in a country. The situation needs immediate attention from the higher decision-makers and a proper research is to be conducted into the causes and effects of these discrepancies and steps taken for removal and correction of these anomalies.

D. Constraints in Investigation Management of Cases of Terrorism:

Academic literature offers surprisingly little commentary on or analysis of the management of criminal investigations (Neyroud and Disley, 2007). This remark holds good for most of the cases, but perfectly applies to the investigation of terrorist activities. The inherent complexity of investigation practices like complicated and overlapping targets, requirements and auditable standards with which the investigation managers must comply and the different targets and requirements imposed by federal and provincial

governments, is further augmented due to lack of approved priorities, resources constraints, absence of independent and public scrutiny and cross-agency oversight, to name a few. The terrorist incidents are generally dealt as issues of national security and at times the local police are not entrusted with the legal responsibilities they ought to perform in case a terrorist act is committed in the area jurisdiction of a police station. Though police are the first to arrive at the scene of occurrence and are supposed to preserve the scene of crime as their prime duty in all such events, but in this case they may not be able to do the same due to a number of reasons, especially when the target or victim belongs to some other law-enforcement agency or a sensitive installation is attacked. Police in such cases may not even be allowed to enter and collect evidence. This may be the case in many countries that terrorist incidents are considered as high profile cases of national security concerns, so the local police may not be considered as competent or resourceful enough to deal with such cases. It may be due to security and intelligence considerations also. As a matter of fact, in case of this shift of responsibilities, there must be another legally authorized or specialized department to carry out the requisite responsibility of an efficient investigation management, which unfortunately is not the case in Pakistan. However, the police normally register the criminal cases of terrorism and thus are bound to conduct investigation, whether the offence is committed or attempted.

As noticed earlier, there is no uniform data available on the outcome of the total registered cases of terrorism. We definitely don't know the exact results of the registered cases so far. To measure the effectiveness of the investigation management, we must know how many cases are successfully worked out; how many nominated or suspected terrorists are arrested; how many are charged with undeniable evidence, and resultantly, how many are properly prosecuted and convicted. If we look at **Annexure E** (Table-V), we find that during a period of thirty years (1981- 2009), a total of 3569 suspected and arrested terrorists were sent for JIT to the Special Branch of the NWFP to determine the status of their involvement in a terrorist activity. It was found that only 16.11% were declared as black, whereas 25.20% were declared as white and another 52.03 % were declared as white and the fate of another 2.38% was left as undecided. This huge number of grey suspects leads to 'investigation coma or suspended animation' which can't be cogently explained as far as the collective performance of the members of the JIT is concerned. Police Officers and others generally avoid responsibility in such cases, ultimately resulting in faulty investigation. This is an area which is normally inaccessible for an outside researcher and the official record is not easily available to the general public.

Though this black, white, grey debate is not a legal debate yet the outcome of the interrogation is a good guideline for an investigation officer or manager. Different interrogation teams use different profiling systems; however, the NWFP Police (Investigation) has developed recently a comprehensive profiling for the detainees in Swat. This is a good initiative on part of the local police. However, critics may challenge the legality of this initiative as the JIT is put before any formal arrest or referral by any agency under proper legal documents.

The police generally apply the routine investigation techniques even for the deadliest terrorist or suicide attacks, where in the absence of CCTV or eye-witnesses, or huge destruction, the evidence is badly destroyed and lost. The lack of properly trained, equipped and responsive disaster or crisis management departments further overburdens the first respondent team of the police with emergency and rescue activities at the scene of a terrorist attack. The police thus start the investigation after the registration of the case in a police station. Following are the much debated constraints faced by the police detectives in investigation management of terrorist incidents:

1. Police are often confronted with public anger, non-cooperation, disorderliness, commotions, media race for early coverage and too many cameras at the scene of crime, which hamper their job of quick preservation of the scene of crime and providing social and emergency services.
2. There is no separate directorate or wing of the police investigation in any province to deal with serious organized crime investigations. In Pakistani police culture, the emphasis on prevention strategies like more patrolling, more check posts, more barricades, etc is always greater than the scientific investigation, criminal profiling, community involvement or creation of an indigenous form of intelligence-led policing.
3. No efforts were made to implement the Police Order 2002 in letter and spirit. The police reforms brought the worst days for the investigation and after separation of the two wings of prevention and investigation, the police officials prefer to rush to the lucrative postings and jobs in the prevention than to stay in the more scientific and professional job of conducting investigation. It seems time-consuming, responsibility-binding and a disinterested activity to most of the police officials due to priority problems at the level of top police leadership. Investigation didn't get its due place and respect after the new police law in 2002. The basic police training, the in-service police training courses and the Forensic Sciences Laboratories were not reformed and modernized in the wake of creating specialized units in the police under the new Police Order 2002. Vision, leadership and professionalism will work hard for a change in the

overall policing styles, overhauling of police training systems and allocation of ample resources for detective instruments and up gradation and modernization of Forensic Sciences Laboratories in the country.

4. During interviews with the senior police officers I found that the subordinate staff often avoid to conduct investigation of terrorism cases. The major reason for shirking responsibility in this respect is not the availability of resources or competence, but a fear of tracing the investigation pathway back to the terrorist groups and militant gangs in some unidentifiable place in a remote tribal area, which obviously is beyond the jurisdiction and competence of the local police. Moreover, the police subordinate officials fear repercussions of dealing with such cases. The stories of targeting the police officials are not few in number. Police need more authority, more incentives, and definitely stress management programmes to overcome this problem.
5. Police have no system of local intelligence or a say in the information-sharing processes amongst the national intelligence agencies, therefore, they fail to devise and design a rational profiling of the potential terrorists or groups-at-risk in a locality. It needs an academic and intellectual input from senior intelligence analysts and an immediate revitalization of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) at the district level and the Criminal Intelligence Department (CID) under the Investigation wing with the same role as given in the Police Rules, 1934. New amendments can be made to it in accordance with the circumstances and requirements. This will undoubtedly overcome the intelligence gap of the investigation management of the terrorist incidents.
6. Police in such cases may not be the first and prime agency of arrest, so the ocular or circumstantial evidence may not be verified by the lower police officials during the investigation process. It needs a fresh legal insight on the subject.

References:

1. Neyroud, Peter and Disley, Emma (2007): The management, supervision and oversight of criminal investigations in *Handbook of Investigation*, Willan Publishing, London, UK
2. Official Record of the National Police Bureau, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
3. Office Record of the National Crisis Management Cell, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.
4. Office Record of the National Counter Terrorism Authority, Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

Table III: Details of Religious Militants in Pakistani Prisons (As in March 2009)

5. Office Record of the Additional Inspector General of Police (Investigation), NWFP Police Department, Peshawar
6. Office Record of the Additional Inspector General of Police (Special Branch), NWFP Police Department, Peshawar.
7. Interview with Naushad Khan, Superintendent of Police/Research, Central Police Office, Peshawar
8. Interview with Zuhrab Gul, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Swat.
9. Interview with Superintendent of Police (Investigation), District Tank, NWFP.

Fasihuddin (Police Service of Pakistan) is currently working as Director General, Human Rights, Conflict-Resolution & Peace-Making, NWFP Police Department. His other publications on this subject include:

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2. Talibanization and Terrorist attacks in the North-west Frontier Province: The Local Police Response and Some Recommendations (Chapter, Page 157216) in Samih Teymur, Ph.D, et.al (Ed), *Combating Terrorism*, published by the Turkish Institute for Security and Democracy (TISD), Washington DC, USA, (2009); and
3. Identification of Potential Terrorism: The Problem and Implications for Law-enforcement in Pakistan in *International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences*, Volume: 3 Issue 2 July - December 2008 (<http://www.ijcjs.co.nr/>)

In addition, he has made a dozen of presentations on this issue at various international conferences.

Annexure: A

Table 1: Details of Human Losses in Terrorist Activities (For the Period 2006 to 2008)

Province	2006						2007						2008						2009					
	No of Incidents	Killed		Injured		No of Incidents	Killed		Injured		No of Incidents	Killed		Injured		No of Incidents	Killed		Injured					
		LEAs *	Others	LEAs	Others		LEAs	Others	LEAs	Others		LEAs	Others	LEAs	Others		LEAs	Others						
Punjab	41	5	12	17	49	44	32	38	58	126	47	42	131	96	271	54	80	236	115	814				
Sindh	29	20	10	2	157	28	8	12	48	478	19	10	16	17	95	48	15	66	39	228				
NWFP	55	24	66	52	85	216	160	412	293	729	244	187	389	464	834	584	284	810	719	2714				
Balochistan	139	23	35	42	91	129	24	72	74	244	211	40	103	151	307	566	62	112	256	744				
FATA *	256	61	244	162	162	228	238	513	614	431	199	96	1602	238	2065	671	251	406	676	957				
ICT ❖	0	0	0	0	0	2	7	20	23	97	5	17	68	34	325	11	14	12	21	43				
AJK ⚡	3	3	1	1	0	2	0	0	0	7	2	0	0	0	18	5	2	15	6	31				
Gilgit Baltistan	1	0	1	0	0	2	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	8	0	17	0	14				
Total:-	524	136	369	276	544	651	469	1067	1110	2114	727	392	2309	1000	3915	1947	708	1674	1832	5545				

* Law Enforcement Agencies

★ Federal Administered Tribal Area

❖ Islamabad Capital Territory

⚡ Azad Jammu Kashmir

Source: National Crises Management Cell (NCMC), Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad

Annexure: B

Table II: Details of Human Losses in Terrorist Activities (For the Period 2001 to 2008)

Year	Punjab			Sindh			NWFP			Balochistan			Islamabad			Railways			Northern Areas			AJK*			Total		
	Cases	Person		Cases	Person		Cases	Person		Cases	Person		Cases	Person		Cases	Person		Cases	Person		Cases	Person		Cases	Person	
		K*	I*		K	I		K	I		K	I		K	I		K	I		K	I		K	I		K	I
2001	24	29	122	27	10	77	1	0	0	16	9	21	2	1	31	3	1	18	1	0	0	5	22	79	55	291	
2002	18	30	135	19	38	133	2	0	9	7	0	3	1	5	35	0	0	0	2	0	1	4	1	4	53	74	320
2003	10	52	176	31	1	54	0	0	0	18	42	52	0	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	0	5	7	66	102	299	
2004	8	134	238	25	75	267	22	10	57	70	85	54	0	0	0	6	0	0	2	0	0	2	0	3	135	304	619
2005	21	9	38	28	4	23	10	5	10	109	43	65	1	19	100	6	2	15	15	0	3	1	0	191	83	254	
2006	20	9	65	13	62	194	36	53	104	237	52	298	0	0	0	8	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	316	176	661	
2007	21	101	311	0	0	0	281	388	819	268	83	229	3	30	123	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	574	602	1483	
2008	15	186	592	7	0	36	450	527	1246	332	100	389	6	83	367	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	810	896	2630	
Total	137	550	1677	150	190	784	802	983	2245	1057	414	1111	13	138	656	24	3	33	24	0	5	17	14	46	2224	2292	6557

* Political Agent # Assistant Political Agent

\$ Frontier Region * Superintendent of Police © Dera Ismail Khan

Source: National Police Bureau (NPB), Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad

Annexure: C

Table III: Details of Religious Militants in Pakistani Prisons (As in March 2009)

Baluchistan		Sindh	
Prison	No. (Religious Militants)	Prison	No. (Religious Militants)
District. Jail, Quetta	8	Central Prison, Karachi	71
Central Prison, Mach	3	Central Prison, Hyderabad	7
Central Prison, Gaddani	1	Central Prison, Sukkur	2
Sub Total	12 (2.47%)	Sub Total	80 (16.49%)
NWFP		Punjab	
Central Prison, Peshawar	83	Central Prison, Lahore	36
Central Prison, Haripur	43	District. Jail, Lahore	3
Central Prison, Bannu	20	Central Prison, Gujranwala	2
Central Prison, D.I. Khan	41	District Jail, Sialkot	6
District. Jail, Mardan	2	Central Prison, Faisalabad	13
District. Jail, Kohat	4	District. Jail, Jhang	4
District, Jail, Daggarr	27	District. Jail, Sargodha	7
Sub Total	220 (45.36%)	District. Jail, Mianwali	6
		Central Prison, Multan	37
		Central Prison, Sahiwal	6
		Central Prison, Rawalpindi	36
		Central Prison, Bahawalpur	17
		Sub Total	173 (35.67%)
Grand Total		485 (100%)	

Source: National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

Table IV: Details Suspect/Accused Terrorist Referred For Joint Interrogation Team / Special Branch NWFP, Peshawar (For the Period 09 - 04 - 1981 to 31 - 12 - 2009

Year	Pa ⁺ Khyber	Mohmand	Bajaur	Kurran	Miranshah	Peshawar	Comm: AR**	FR ⁺ Lakki	SP ⁺ Mardan	PA Tank	SP Chitral	SP Karak	SP Swat	Islamabad	SP Kohat	SP Hangu	SP Bannu	SP Lakki	SP Dir	Mansehra	SP Swabi	SPP Abbottabad	SP Kohistan	SP Noshetra	SP Charsada	APA FR D.L Khan [®]	APA ⁺ FR Bannu	FR Kohat	Total
1981	5	2	9	2	-	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	
1982	58	-	1	2	128	-	-	-	-	-	4	-	-	2	0	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	197
1983	12	1	-	4	-	38	21	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	80	
1984	32	7	6	2	16	36	90	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	193	
1985	41	5	1	2	26	41	46	-	-	3	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	170	
1986	57	11	7	1	18	46	6	-	1	14	2	-	1	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	167	
1987	67	2	4	65	14	17	9	19	5	-	10	1	2	-	5	-	2	-	16	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	240	
1988	252	-	5	20	3	18	4	2	-	3	-	3	-	11	3	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	325	
1989	27	-	3	6	1	11	2	-	-	4	2	5	2	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	64	
1990	10	-	1	9	-	28	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	52	
1991	18	1	2	13	9	23	1	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	-	-	-	78	
1992	6	2	4	4	36	8	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	61	
1993	19	-	-	5	10	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	2	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	
1997	54	-	5	-	10	23	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	96	
1998	181	6	7	3	44	17	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	259	
1999	130	79	26	26	8	9	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	16	298	
2000	158	1	-	-	4	11	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	-	-	181	
2001	97	19	38	22	14	5	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	197	
2002	57	38	4	1	19	18	-	-	-	15	-	1	-	1	-	-	-	-	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	171	
2003	84	2	6	4	11	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	115	
2004	41	5	3	1	14	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	68	
2005	48	3	13	6	13	-	-	2	-	3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	6	96	
2006	41	1	6	1	-	3hd	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	56	
2007	96	2	2	13	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	117	
2008	101	-	-	-	3	7	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	3	15	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	1	-	132	
2009	30	-	-	-	-	8	-	-	12	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	6	-	-	14	-	11	8	-	-	-	90	
Grand Total	1722	187	152	206	270	512	179	23	22	44	24	9	10	14	25	15	18	10	21	16	15	5	1	19	14	1	2	3569	

Source: Additional Inspector General of Police, Special Branch, NWFP Police Department.

Table V: Result of JIT/SB for Referred Suspected & Accused of Terrorism

Year	Black	%age	Gray	%age	White	%age	Return	%age	Pending	%age	With out Gradation	%age	Other	%age	Total	%age
1981	10	37.04%	17	62.96%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	27	100%
1982	60	30.15%	36	18.09%	103	51.76%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	199	100%
1983	19	23.75%	20	25.00%	41	51.25%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	80	100%
1984	39	20.21%	44	22.80%	110	56.99%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	193	100%
1985	25	14.71%	22	12.94%	123	72.35%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	170	100%
1986	42	25.15%	52	31.14%	72	43.11%	1	0.60%	-	-	-	-	-	-	167	100%
1987	92	38.33%	79	32.92%	69	28.75%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	240	100%
1988	48	14.77%	252	77.54%	17	5.23%	8	2.46%	-	-	-	-	-	-	325	100%
1989	15	23.44%	39	60.94%	-	-	10	15.63%	-	-	-	-	-	-	64	100%
1990	13	25.00%	14	26.92%	-	-	25	48.08%	-	-	-	-	-	-	52	100%
1991	36	46.15%	24	30.77%	3	3.85%	15	19.23%	-	-	-	-	-	-	78	100%
1992	14	22.95%	38	62.30%	2	3.28%	7	11.48%	-	-	-	-	-	-	61	100%
1993	4	10.26%	16	41.03%	8	20.51%	11	28.21%	-	-	-	-	-	-	39	100%
1997	26	27.08%	64	66.67%	6	6.25%	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	96	100%
1998	8	3.09%	242	93.44%	6	2.32%	3	1.16%	-	-	-	-	-	-	259	100%
1999	17	5.70%	278	93.29%	2	0.67%	1	0.34%	-	-	-	-	-	-	298	100%
2000	12	6.63%	148	81.77%	14	7.73%	7	3.87%	-	-	-	-	-	-	181	100%
2001	6	3.05%	100	50.76%	84	42.64%	7	3.55%	-	-	-	-	-	-	197	100%
2002	12	7.02%	34	19.88%	116	67.84%	9	5.26%	-	-	-	-	-	-	171	100%
2003	4	3.48%	44	38.26%	54	46.96%	13	11.30%	-	-	-	-	-	-	115	100%
2004	5	7.35%	28	41.18%	29	42.65%	6	8.82%	-	-	-	-	-	-	68	100%
2005	22	22.92%	62	64.58%	8	8.33%	4	4.17%	-	-	-	-	-	-	96	100%
2006	7	11.67%	41	68.33%	3	5.00%	7	11.67%	-	-	-	-	2	3.33%	60	100%
2007	22	18.80%	56	47.86%	29	24.79%	8	6.84%	-	-	2	1.71%	-	-	117	100%
2008	11	8.33%	86	65.15%	2	1.52%	3	2.27%	-	-	30	22.75%	-	-	132	100%
2009	7	7.78%	24	26.67%	-	-	6	6.67%	-	-	53	58.89%	-	-	90	100%
Grand Total	576	16.11%	1,860	52.03%	901	25.20%	151	4.22%	-	0.00%	85	2.38%	2	0.06%	3,575	100%

Source: Additional Inspector General of Police, Special Branch, NWFP Police Department.