

## Rise and Decline of Muslim Philosophy: A Causal Analysis

### Abstract

*When Muslim world came into contact with different cultures, and religions, interaction engendered challenges. This invoked different philosophies which tried to reconcile alien ideas with Islamic thought. Development of Islamic philosophy is a magnificent theme. The Muslims interpreted and reconciled the Greco-roman tradition of scientific thinking and philosophy. It was later on transferred to Europe where it blossomed into a renaissance era. On the other hand, a wave of theology and mysticism in the Muslim world shunned this scientific and logical thinking. The aim of this paper is to analyze causes of rise and decline of Muslim philosophy to re-emphasize the spirit of scientific thinking and logical analysis which is the way to progress in this world.*

**Key Words:** Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism, Islamic Philosophy, Mysticism, al-Farabi, Ibn-i-Sina, Al-Ghazali, Ibn-i-Rushd, *Tahafut al-Falasifah*, *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, God, Creator, Divine Knowledge, Causation, Immortality of Soul, Bodily resurrection.

Islam is a progressive religion. It has continued to adapt itself to the changing circumstances. With the spread of Islam to various nationalities and traditions, Islam had to face new intellectual challenges.<sup>1</sup> The first challenge was its confrontation with paganism and Christianity. Besides, there were numerous questions regarding overwhelming supremacy of God and responsibility of human agents in the world as depicted in the Quran. Furthermore, the Greek ideas and Greek spirit of intellectual curiosity generated tensions.<sup>2</sup> Consequently, systematic attempt was needed to bring conflicting data of revelation into some internal harmony.

Under contemporary circumstances, Islamic thought responded and manifested itself into four main directions Mu'tazilism, Ash'arism, Islamic Philosophy, and Mysticism. Mu'tazilism claimed that with the help of reason, all sorts of problems can be solved. Ash'arism emerged as counter movement which relied heavily on revelation against reason.<sup>3</sup> Mysticism is "ultimately rooted in the religious experience growing out of man's overwhelming awareness of God and his sense of nothingness without Him and of urgent need to subordinate reason and emotion to this experience".<sup>4</sup> These four schools can be resolved into two categories Mu'tazilism and Islamic Philosophy believing in reason as the only effective instrument of knowledge and Ash'arism and Mysticism relying on revelation directly through *Ilham* or the agency of Prophets.<sup>5</sup>

Mu'tazilism emerged during a discussion in which, someone asked Hasan al Basri, whether grave sinner is a believer or a non-believer. On Basri's hesitation, one of

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his pupil Wasil bin 'Ata replied that grave sinner must be placed in an intermediary position between infidelity and faith.<sup>6</sup> He resorted to another pillar of the mosque with some people and continued this discussion. On this Hasan remarked, 'Wasil has withdrawn (itazala) from us'. From this event this group used to be called Mu'tazilah.<sup>7</sup>

Wasil ibn 'Ata and Amr ibn Ubayd were mainly responsible for the early development of Mu'tazilism. The real breakthrough came during the reign of al-Mamun and his successors, al Wathiq and al-Mutasim. These caliphs tried to impose the Mutazilite doctrines on people. This generated severe opposition from Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal and his followers who were severely persecuted yet they did not accept Mu'tazilism. Mu'tazilah movement declined when Abbaside Caliph al-Mutawakkil, third successor of al-Mamun prohibited preaching of Mu'tazilism. During this period Mu'tazilah movement lost political influence and never regained it.<sup>8</sup> Mu'tazilah movement assimilated Greek ideas and methods of argument which exercised an indirect influence on Islamic theology.<sup>9</sup>

Ash'arism emerged as a counter movement which declared Mu'tazilism a heretical movement in Islam. Al-Ashari founded a rationalistic form of Sunnite theology which persisted ever since.<sup>10</sup> Later on, Sultan Alp Arslan and his minister Nizamul-Mulk facilitated its expansion and progress in the Muslim world.<sup>11</sup> Ash'arism was opposed by *falasifah* due to its traditional beliefs limiting and restricting Aristotelian doctrine, and by orthodox due to employing philosophical methods on theological subjects.<sup>12</sup> The final phase of Ash'arism triumphed with the works of Al-Ghazali who mixed Ash'arite theology with mysticism.<sup>13</sup>

Mu'tazilism and Ash'arism diverged intellectually on the following fundamental points. Asharite held God has eternal attributes such as knowledge, sight, speech, therefore, he is seeing, knowing, speaking, whereas Mu'tazilah asserted that God has no attributes distinct from his essence. Mu'tazilah interpreted Quranic expressions, such as God's hands and face figuratively to mean 'grace', 'essence' and so on, but Ashari consider them real attributes though their precise nature is unknown.<sup>14</sup> Mu'tazilah claimed that God could not be seen as this means that he is corporeal and finite. On the other hand, Ashari declared that the Vision of God in the next world is a reality though we cannot comprehend it.<sup>15</sup> Mu'tazilah asserted that the Quran was created whereas Al-Ashari stressed that Quran is uncreated as speech is an eternal attribute of God.<sup>16</sup>

Mu'tazilah emphasized the powers of choice in human beings but al-Ashari insisted on God's omnipotence as everything good and evil is willed by God and He creates the acts of men by creating in men the power to do each act.<sup>17</sup> Mutazilah considered any Muslim guilty of a serious sin neither a believer nor an unbeliever while al-Ashari insisted that he remained a believer but was liable to punishment in the hereafter.<sup>18</sup> Al-Ashari corroborated the reality of the Basin, the Bridge, the Balance and intercession by Muhammad, which were either denied or rationally interpreted by the Mu'tazilah.<sup>19</sup>

Philosophy means 'love of wisdom'. It is derived from a Greek word 'philosophia'. Philosophy aims at discovering truths regarding fundamental problems of universe, soul and God by rational methods and arguments irrespective of their conformity or non-conformity to religious dogma. In medieval

Islam, a series of brilliant and original thinkers developed a comprehensive and systematic view of universe and of man on the basis of Greek philosophical thought synthesizing with concepts and doctrines of Islam.<sup>20</sup>

The development of philosophy in Islam coincides with the advent of the 'Abbasid dynasty in the middle of eighth century. A vigorous translation movement started during Al-Mamun's tenure (813-833). He established Bayt-al-Hikmah (House of Wisdom) in Baghdad, which was a centre for scientific activity and translations that was continued by his successors and families attached to royal court.<sup>21</sup>

Al-Kindi was first genuine philosopher who believed in the absolute oneness of God. Besides, al-Kindi considered God a creator and an agent and act through intermediaries who produce desired result through cause and effect mechanism. Al-Kindi's philosophy rendered Islamic thought compatible with Aristotle's 'First Cause' and 'unmoved mover'. He did not entirely subordinate faith to reason as he considered the knowledge of prophet superior to philosophers.<sup>22</sup> Al-Razi was another great philosopher. He was influenced by Plato's *Timaeus*. Al-Razi asserted that world was created at a finite moment in time, not out of nothing. Besides, he claims salvation is possible only through philosophy. He thus, maintains that there is no need for prophets. All men are capable of discovering truths. Many men fail to pursue rational course due to their unwillingness.<sup>23</sup> Both al-Kindi and al-Razi prepared ground for the blossoming of philosophy in medieval Islam.<sup>24</sup>

In tenth and eleventh centuries, Islamic philosophical thought was dominated by al-Farabi (d. 950) and Ibn-Sina (d.1037). Both philosophers had convergence of thought on many points yet remained quite distinct.<sup>25</sup> Al Farabi wrote commentaries on Greek works. According to Al-Farabi world is an eternal emanation from God. There is a hierarchical series of existents and closest to Him is the highest in rank. The First Intelligence is highest existent overflowing directly from God. The First Intelligence undergoes two acts of cognition; an act of knowing God and an act of self-knowledge. From First Intelligence proceed two existents; a Second Intelligence and outermost body of universe. The Second Intelligence undergoes a similar act of knowing God and knowing itself, resulting in the emanation of Third Intelligence and sphere of sun and moon. The last of the intelligences is Active Intellect that is the source of our world.<sup>26</sup>

Ibn-i-Sina built his philosophical system on the foundations of metaphysics laid down by al-Farabi. Ibn-i-Sina was one of medieval Islam's leading physicians, astronomers and scientists. He was a prolific writer and his two works Encyclopedia *Al-Qanun fi al-Tibb* (canon of Medicine) and philosophical work *Al-Shifa* (Healing) particularly influenced Europe.<sup>27</sup> He maintains that there are self-evident intuitive concepts, independent of sense perception. These intuitive concepts include existent, thing and necessary. The necessary is related to the possible and the impossible. Through rational consideration of these concepts, God's existence can easily be demonstrated. In itself, an existent is either necessary or only possible. If it is necessary in itself then it must be only such existent, uncaused and devoid of multiplicity. If it is only possible in itself, it must be necessitated by another existent, the latter by yet another and so on, ending at the existent necessary in itself, which is God.<sup>28</sup>

Ibn Sina transformed the dyadic emanative scheme into a triadic system. God, the existent necessary in Himself, undergoes an eternal act of self-knowledge that results in the existence of the First Intelligence, which is possible in itself but necessary through another. This intelligence then undergoes three acts of cognition that is knowledge of God, knowledge of itself as a necessitated being, knowledge of itself as a possible being. These three acts produce three other existents respectively, intelligence, a soul, and a body (the outer most body of universe). This process is repeated by each successive intellect, giving existence to the various heavenly spheres each with its soul and intelligence, until from last celestial intelligence Active Intellect emanates.<sup>29</sup>

The human rational emanates from Active Intellect that is immaterial. It retains its individuality when it joins and then separates from the body. After departing from the body, good souls are blessed and bad souls are punished through deprivation from the contemplation of God and celestial intelligences. All theoretical knowledge is received from Active Intellect. This knowledge consists of primary intelligible, which are self-evident to all people without necessitating experience and learning. It also consists of secondary intelligible (received only by abstract thinkers). Reception of this intelligible from Active Intellect requires training of soul. They receive all or most of secondary intelligible directly. This theoretical knowledge is then translated through prophet's imaginative faculty into symbols and images for common people to understand. These constitute revealed word in total harmony with philosophy.<sup>30</sup>

After al-Farabi and Ibn-i-Sina, philosophical tradition carried on with great vigor in Muslim Spain. It produced many great philosophers, but the most influential of them was Ibn Rushd. He refuted accusations of Al-Ghazali against philosophers. His response to Al-Ghazali's attack represents a monumental effort to re-establish philosophy on firm grounds.

Al-Ghazali's *Tahafut al-Falasifah* is a polemical work in which he destroys philosophical edifice constructed by Muslim philosophers particularly Al-Farabi and Ibn-i-Sina. Ghazali tried to reconcile orthodox Islam with mystical teachings. Consequently, Sufism gained an assured place in orthodox Islam. Al-Ghazali critically examined methods and doctrines of philosophers in *Tahafut*<sup>31</sup> to demonstrate their inconsistencies on logical grounds.<sup>32</sup> He argued that philosophy and religion cannot be reconciled as religion is derived from revelation and intuition.<sup>33</sup> He records twenty points on which Islam and philosophy contradict. He charges philosophers with infidelity on eternity of the world, denial of God's knowledge of particulars and denial of bodily resurrection.<sup>34</sup> The debate on these points is summarized below.

Al-Farabi and Ibn-i-Sina argue that world must have a cause because every effect has a cause. This cause cannot be physical as none yet existed. This cause may be the Will of God according to the religion. God's Will must have been caused by an external cause, but none was existed at that time, therefore, the world is eternal.<sup>35</sup> Al Ghazali attacked the philosophers' assumptions that every effect has a cause; secondly, cause must be action of some external force other than the effect; thirdly, cause or an act of will when executed must immediately lead to the effect. Ghazali replies that none of these assumptions have logical necessity. He argues

that it is possible that God has no external cause or His will may have “delayed effect”.<sup>36</sup>

The philosophers assert on the basis of Aristotelian assumption that time is the measure of movement, so if it is proved that time is eternal, then moving being, world, is also eternal.<sup>37</sup> Al-Ghazali claims that there is no evidence, that our world is infinite; therefore, any extension of time beyond this world is imaginary.<sup>38</sup> Al-Ghazali refutes philosophers’ argument that world was possible so it came to existence. He says that if possibility needs matter to be related, then impossibility also needs something to be related to. Thus, possibility and impossibility are mere concepts.<sup>39</sup> The philosophers prove incorruptibility of the world with the example of sun. After thousands of years, there is no sign of decay in it.<sup>40</sup> Al-Ghazali refutes by arguing that sun is hundred and seventy times bigger than our earth and its decay cannot be perceptible to our eyes.<sup>41</sup>

The philosophers claim that world emanates from God, (First Principle) necessarily, just as effect emanates from cause or light from the sun. Ghazali claims that an agent must have ‘knowledge’, ‘free choice’ and ‘will’ therefore God is Agent who has these attributes.<sup>42</sup> Ghazali refutes philosopher’ thesis that every cause is an agent and every effect is an agendum. Ghazali objects that then there would be no difference between animate and inanimate beings.<sup>43</sup> Ghazali concludes that philosophers’ theory regarding the eternity of the world is self-contradictory<sup>44</sup> because they consider body of world as eternal attributing no cause yet advocating an uncaused cause of series of effects. Therefore, he challenges that the philosophers cannot prove regress of causes with an argument.<sup>45</sup>

Regarding the unity of God, philosophers argue that if there were two gods, each would be called necessary being, but necessary being is called necessary if its existence is essential to it. Ghazali points out that this does not mean that if a necessary being is uncaused and necessary, other being cannot possess the attribute of necessity.<sup>46</sup> Besides, al-Ghazali indicates that First Principle does not know anything other than itself, whereas First Intelligence emanating from the First Principle; knows its cause, itself and three effects; Second Intelligence, soul of highest sphere and body of sphere. Al-Ghazali claims that it depicts First Intelligence superior to the First Principle (God) thereby limiting God’s knowledge to self-knowledge; reducing Him to the status of dead.<sup>47</sup>

Ibn-i-Sina contends that particular event takes place at particular time and changes with passage of time. Change in object means change in subject. God is changeless; therefore, perception of a particular event is not possible for Him. God’s knowledge is not perceptual; it is conceptual or universal in nature.<sup>48</sup> Al-Ghazali argues that it is not possible for the agent to be unaffected by its objects, which has so much multiplicity and diversity. When God is agent, He must suffer change due to His object. He asserts that philosophers’ arguments are against the very essence of Islam. It has created a gulf between men and God. It means that God is not listening to prayers of men and He is not aware of His creature.<sup>49</sup>

The philosophers argue that cause must succeed by an effect, but Ghazali asserts that the relation between the two is not of logical necessity. Objects succeed one another, but this proves succession, not causation. For example, fire being inanimate thing cannot burn. Only observation shows that one is with the other.

The effect happens with cause and not through it. It is when something happens again and again that it is impressed upon mind. Ghazali concludes that cause act only through the power and agency of God. The only will is the absolute free will of God.<sup>50</sup>

The philosophers assert that bodies are constantly dissolving. For example, a child changes in manhood and old age but, despite of, physical change; he carries his cognition with him. This shows that soul is its instrument. Ghazali clarifies that soul comes into existence with body, so it is possible that it perishes with body as well and will be resurrected by God as it is in al-Quran.<sup>51</sup>

The philosophers are skeptical about the physical resurrection in the hereafter. They deny physical pain and pleasure, and existence of paradise and hell in the physical sense. They insist that life hereafter is purely spiritual and paradise and hell are the states of one's soul and not localities. They assert that the language of Quran's passages is symbolic and metaphorical for common man to comprehend. Ghazali argues that philosophers seek naturalistic explanations for all things, particularly in terms of cause and effect.<sup>52</sup> All their arguments also stand openly refuted by al-Quran, which states:

They also say 'when we are turned bones and dust, shall we be restored as a new creation? Say, you shall, whether you turn to stone or iron, or any other substance, which you think unlikely to be given life, they will ask; Who will restore us? Say He that created you first.'<sup>53</sup>

Ibn-i-Rushd tried to reconcile philosophy with the teachings of Islam in his book *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, arguing that philosophy is recommended by religion because its function is speculating on beings to ascertain knowledge of the Creator.<sup>54</sup> Ibn-i-Rushd (Averroes) responded Al-Ghazali and defended philosophy against his charge that Islam and philosophy were incompatible.<sup>55</sup> In his book *Tahafut al-Tahafut*, Ibn-i-Rushd quotes Al-Ghazali's *Tahafut*, commenting on it paragraph by paragraph.<sup>56</sup>

Ibn-i-Rushd clarifies that Divine Will is not like human will. God must have created world eternally. Besides, question of eternity of world cannot be solved considering divine will, because the nature of that Will cannot be known.<sup>57</sup> Ibn-i-Rushd responds with the Aristotelian dictum 'what has no beginning has no end', therefore there is never an end of time.<sup>58</sup>

Ibn-i-Rushd elaborates that extinction and annihilation are synonymous. If God cannot create annihilation, He cannot create extinction either. He clarifies that a thing becomes non-existent when it changes from actual being to potential being. In this way, non-existent is related to Agent.<sup>59</sup> Ibn-i-Rushd does not deny creation of world, but offers a different explanation. He makes a distinction between eternity of world and eternity of God. God is eternal without a cause but world is eternal with a cause.<sup>60</sup>

Ibn-i-Rushd asserts that the agent transforms something from potency to actuality and from non-existent to existence through deliberation, choice or by nature. Secondly, he insists that an agent is separated from his action.<sup>61</sup> For example,

shadow of a man cannot be treated as an action of an agent since shadow cannot be separated from man himself, therefore God cannot be a natural cause. The act of God proceeds from Him through knowledge. He is necessarily endowed with will and choice in the highest form.<sup>62</sup> The philosophers' only concern is that these attributes without denying the 'divine attributes of perfection' should not be applied to God and creature alike. He admits that mode of divine knowledge is entirely transcendent and can only be known to God as Divine Agent Himself.<sup>63</sup>

In response to Al-Ghazali's claim that an inanimate thing cannot be an agent, he asserts that fire is an inanimate being with power in itself to actualize when anything warm and dry are put together. Thus, he concludes that if a thing actualizes another's potency, it is an agent in the true sense of the word.<sup>64</sup> He further explains that there are two kinds of agents. First kind of object after its potentiality to actuality does not need its agent. Second kind of object for its actualization needs and entirely depends on agent. Thus the philosophers believe that the world has come into being from an eternal agent having an eternal act, without beginning or end, which does not mean that the world is eternal itself.<sup>65</sup>

Ibn-i-Rushd clarifies that if there were two existents, and then it was possible that both were numerically different, then they would agree in species. Secondly, both must have specific difference, and then they would agree in genus. In both cases, the necessary existent would have to be composite. In the third case, necessary existent would have to be one and will be the cause of all separate existents thereby necessitating absolute uniqueness of necessary existent. He considers third case as true one.<sup>66</sup> He further elucidates that the essential attributes of essences are not additional to their essence. He says that Ghazali has founded his discussion on the doctrine of Ibn-i-Sina who says that existent is something additional to essence outside the soul, and is like an accident of essence. Ibn-i-Rushd rebuffed Ibn-i-Sina's argument.<sup>67</sup>

Ibn-i-Rushd believes that God's knowledge is timeless and eternal. He rejects Ibn-i-Sina's thesis and says that 'universal, and 'particular; are the categories of human and not of divine knowledge. In fact, mode of God's knowledge is entirely transcendent and can only be known to God Himself. Even then he attempts to rationalize divine knowledge through demonstrating its relation to Divine essence as self thinking thought, in knowing Himself. God knows all things, which exists due to Him. He further clarifies that since God is not body, He cannot have senses or sense knowledge. Al-Quran ascribes hearing and seeing to God to remind people that God is not deprived of any kind of knowledge and understanding.<sup>68</sup>

Ibn-i-Rushd asserts that it is self evident that things have essences and attributes, which determine particular functions of each thing and through which essences and names of things are differentiated. Intelligence is the perception of things with their causes. Effects can be studied more accurately through knowledge of their causes. Denial of cause implies denial of knowledge and denial of knowledge implies that nothing in this world can be really known.<sup>69</sup> In short, Ibn-i-Rushd expresses that if everything happens with the absolute will of God, no rational pattern can be traced in this creation. This also denies the existence of a wise creator, as it is no longer possible to prove the Existence of God from the beauty of order in this world. Such a thesis is incompatible with the teachings of

philosophers and contrary to the expressive pronouncements of al-Quran, which describes the world as a perfect workshop of God.<sup>70</sup>

Ibn-i-Rushd asserts that soul is distinguished from intellect. Intellect in man is the faculty through which he knows the eternal truths without sense organs. Active Intellect is source and origin of intellect. During its temporary abode in body, intellect of man suffers separation from Active Intellect. After body perishes at death, it merges once again into the Active Intellect to live in eternity along with other intellects. Thus, the immortality of intellect is not individual but collective. This, however, is not the case with human soul. Soul is a kind of energy, which gives life to matter. Ibn-i-Rushd claims that soul forms the body; therefore, it does not entirely depend upon it. Thus, destruction of soul cannot be established from that of body. He concludes that soul is independent of body in an individual capacity, but immortality of human soul cannot be proved through philosophical argument.<sup>71</sup> Regarding bodily resurrection, Ibn-i-Rushd explains that human beings may be provided similar yet superior to earthly body in the next world. Life hereafter is not mere an end, but a perpetual growth and continuation of this very life.<sup>72</sup>

Both al-Ghazali and Ibn-i-Rushd converged on God's ultimate unity; al-Quran as the highest truth; God has created earth; God's will and knowledge differ from human will and knowledge; and Divine cannot be measured by the standards of man.<sup>73</sup> Ibn-i-Rushd charges Al-Ghazali that his polemics against philosophers are merely to win the favor of the orthodox. Besides, he accuses that al-Ghazali's teachings are sometimes detrimental to religion and sometimes to philosophy and sometimes to both.<sup>74</sup> Dialogue between Ibn-i-Rushd and al-Ghazali reflects contemporary debate between theology and philosophy.<sup>75</sup> Majid Fakhry comments on this debate that,

Ibn-i-Rushd's defense of philosophers is as subtle and vigorous as is Al-Ghazali's attack on them. He indeed handles the arguments with accomplished understanding and ingenious skill, yet in the considered opinion of those who are competent to judge. Al Ghazali's arguments are in the final analysis more telling than those of his adversary.<sup>76</sup>

Al-Ghazali attacked the entire system of philosophy helping theology to triumph in the controversy between theology and philosophy. Ghazali is generally considered responsible for the decline of Muslim interest in philosophy, which is far from truth. Anti-intellectualism and anti-liberalism of Muslim community is a highly complex sociological phenomenon. It would be a simplification to ascribe it to a single personality.<sup>77</sup> In order to refute *falsafah*, he explained the complicated doctrines of philosophers and in this way made philosophy intelligible for the common people. Therefore, he legitimized and popularized the study of Ibn-i-Sina's logic and this made Greek modes of thinking accessible to more traditional Muslims.<sup>78</sup>

To some extent, cause of decline of Muslim philosophy can be searched in mystic movement of twelfth century, which reached its peak with Ibn-i-Arabi. Philosophy drowned in the ocean of sufi contemplation of God.<sup>79</sup> Besides, Nizamul-Mulk Tusi established a series of madrasa of sunni theology in Baghdad, Nishapur, Amol,

Heart, Balkh and Isfahan in the eleventh century. The curriculum mainly focused religious subjects and shunned philosophy.

By the end of twelfth century, movement against philosophy took momentum in the Muslim world and in Baghdad all books of philosophy were burned because of the opposition of 'ulama'. Philosophy as a subject ceased to be taught and the philosophers kept their views secret. Ibn-i-Rushd survived as long as his royal patrons protected him but as soon as his views were known and opposed by orthodox, he was disgraced and exiled. All his books were burnt. Renan laments that there was end of philosophy in the Muslim world after Ibn-i- Rushd.<sup>80</sup>

To curb extremism and intolerance from our society, difference of opinion should be cherished as it is through contradicting and opposing views that consensus and truth gradually emerge. As the prophet Muhammad (salallahu alayahe Wassalam) had said, "Difference of opinion is blessing for our community".<sup>81</sup> Philosophy, therefore, is an intellectual need. It should be promoted for its own sake and for the sake of other disciplines. Muslim world must take Fazlur Rehman's warning very seriously who cautions that "a people, who deprive themselves of philosophy commit intellectual suicide."<sup>82</sup>

The function of philosophy is logical thinking and analysis. Philosophy inculcates analytical and critical spirit that generates new ideas. It is the basis of scientific knowledge and progress. We need to train our youth in logical thinking and develop their analytical skills. The object of Islamic theology is to build a world view on the basis of al-Quran with the help of intellectual tools, in other words with the assistance of philosophy. Therefore, philosophy is not a rival of theology. Certain philosophical views may seem contradicting certain theological doctrines but that must not be an excuse for discrimination against philosophy. Through encouraging the study of philosophy, we can develop critical thinking among our youth which is the only way to our salvation now. The government must give priority to social sciences like philosophy and history in their curricula to produce thinking beings, who can question everything and then accept instead of producing blind followers, whom anybody can use for their own selfish ends.

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- <sup>1</sup> S. Muzaffar-ud-din Nadvi, *Muslim Thought and its Source* (Lahore, 1947), 3-4.
- <sup>2</sup> Majid Fakhry, *A History of Islamic Philosophy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), 6.
- <sup>3</sup> Umaruddin, *The Ethical Philosophy of al-Ghazali* (Lahore, 1970), 18.
- <sup>4</sup> Fakhry, *Islamic Philosophy*, 7.
- <sup>5</sup> Umaruddin, *The Ethical Philosophy of al-Ghazali*, 18.
- <sup>6</sup> W. M. Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought* (Edinburgh, 1973), 250.
- <sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, 251.
- <sup>8</sup> Josef Van Ess, "Mutazilah", *Encyclopedia of Religion*, vol. 10. (New York,, 1986), 220.
- <sup>9</sup> Allama Iqbal, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (Lahore, 1964), 75.
- <sup>10</sup> Watt, *The Formative Period of Islamic Thought*, 252.
- <sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 253.
- <sup>12</sup> De. O' Leary, *Arabic Thought and its Place in History* (London, 1922), 212.
- <sup>13</sup> W. M. Watt, "Al-Ashari", *Encyclopedia of Islam*, vol. I, new edition. (Leiden, 1960), 694.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 695
- <sup>15</sup> Sharif, *Muslim Philosophy*, vol. I, 230.
- <sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 231.
- <sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, 232.
- <sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 232-236.
- <sup>19</sup> Leary, *Arabic Thought*, 220-221.
- <sup>20</sup> M.E. Marmura, "Falsafah", *Encyclopedia of Religion*, vol. v. (New York, 1986), 267.
- <sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>22</sup> T. J. Boer, *The History of Philosophy in Islam* (London: Luzac & Co., 1903), 105.
- <sup>23</sup> Marmura, "Falsafah", 271.
- <sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>25</sup> W. M. Watt, *Muslim Intellectual: A study of Al-Ghazali*. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University, 1963), 31.
- <sup>26</sup> Oliver Leaman, *An Introduction to Medieval Islamic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1985), 35.
- <sup>27</sup> *Ibid.*, 35.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ibid.*, 36.
- <sup>29</sup> Marmura, "Falsafah", 272.

- <sup>30</sup> Ibid., 273.
- <sup>31</sup> Sharif, *Muslim Philosophy*, vol. I, 593.
- <sup>32</sup> Leaman, *Medieval Islamic Philosophy*, 15.
- <sup>33</sup> Ibid.,16.
- <sup>34</sup> Watt, *Muslim Intellectual*, 26.
- <sup>35</sup> G. F. Hourani, “Al-Ghazali and the Philosophers on the Origin of the World”, *The Muslim World*, vol. xlvii, No. 3 (1958)183-91.
- <sup>36</sup> Al-Ghazali, *Tahafut al Falasifah*, English trans. Sabih Ahmad Kamali (Lahore; Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1958), 16-34.
- <sup>37</sup> Leaman, *Medieval Islamic Philosophy*, 47.
- <sup>38</sup> Ibid., 48-50.
- <sup>39</sup> Ibid., 191.
- <sup>40</sup> Al-Ghazali, *Tahafut al Falasifah*, 54.
- <sup>41</sup> Ibid., 55.
- <sup>42</sup> M. Yousof Hussain, “*Ibn-I Rushd’s Response to Al-Ghazali’s Refutations of the Philosopher Conception of The Agent in the Theory of Emanation*”, *Hamdard Islamicus*. vol.xvi. No 2. 1982, 2.
- <sup>43</sup> Ibid., 29.
- <sup>44</sup> Van Den Bergh, *Averroes’ Tahafut al Tahafut (The incoherence of the incoherence)*,trans.(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954), 69.
- <sup>45</sup> Al-Ghazali, *Tahafut al Falasifah*, 16-34.
- <sup>46</sup> Ibid., 130.
- <sup>47</sup> M. Saeed Sheikh, *Studies in Muslim Philosophy* (Lahore: Sheikh-Mohammad Ashraf, 1974), 151-52.
- <sup>48</sup> Sharif, *Muslim Philosophy*, 609.
- <sup>49</sup> Saeed Shaikh, *Muslim Philosophy*, 141.
- <sup>50</sup> Sharif, *Muslim Philosophy*, 615.
- <sup>51</sup> Al-Ghazali, *Tahafut al Falasifah*, 211-16.
- <sup>52</sup> Ibid., 151-52.
- <sup>53</sup> I have used Muhammad Y. Zaid’s translation, *The Quran*, xvii, 49-51.
- <sup>54</sup> Sharif, *Muslim Philosophy*, vol. I, 545.
- <sup>55</sup> Leaman, *Medieval Islamic Philosophy*, 39-40.
- <sup>56</sup> Marmura, “Falsafah”, 267.
- <sup>57</sup> Hourani, “Al-Ghazali and the Philosophers on the Origin of the World”, 183-91.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>59</sup> Saeed Shaikh, *Muslim Philosophy*, 196.
- <sup>60</sup> Leaman, *Medieval Islamic Philosophy*, 39-40.

- <sup>61</sup> Bergh, *Averroes' Tahafut al Tahafut*, 89-90.
- <sup>62</sup> Yousof Hussain, "Ibn-I Rushd's Response to Al-Ghazali's Refutations", 27.
- <sup>63</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>64</sup> Fakhry, *Islamic Philosophy*, 253.
- <sup>65</sup> Bergh, *Averroes' Tahafut al Tahafut*, 156.
- <sup>66</sup> Ibid., 173-74.
- <sup>67</sup> Ibid., 177-85.
- <sup>68</sup> Fakhry, *Islamic Philosophy*, 137-38.
- <sup>69</sup> Bergh, *Averroes' Tahafut al Tahafut*, 318-19.
- <sup>70</sup> Fakhry, *Islamic Philosophy*, 319.
- <sup>71</sup> Saeed Sheikh, *Muslim Philosophy*, 198-99.
- <sup>72</sup> Bergh, *Averroes' Tahafut al Tahafut*, 360-62.
- <sup>73</sup> Ibid., iv.
- <sup>74</sup> F. Rehman, *Prophecy in Islam* (Chicago; University of Chicago 1979), 112.
- <sup>75</sup> Titus Burckhardt, *Moorish Culture in Spain* (London: Allen and Unwin LTD., 1970), 143.
- <sup>76</sup> Majid Fakhry, *Islamic Occasionalism* (London; Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), 103.
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>78</sup> M. L. Jummah, *Ta'rikh-I Falsafah-I Islam* (Urdu trans), Mir Wali-ud-Din (Karachi: 1964), 92-93.
- <sup>79</sup> R.N Frye, et al. (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Iran*, Vol. iv (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), 421.
- <sup>80</sup> P.M. Holt, et al. (eds.) *The Cambridge History of Islam*, Vol. 2B (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 319.
- <sup>81</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>82</sup> F. Rehman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 158.