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### Abstract

Karachi represents a multi-dimensional intra-state conflict that has claimed thousands of innocent lives due to rampant ethnic, political, sectarian and criminal violence. Gauging the origins and development of the ethnic conflict in Karachi, it seems that the city has seen different patterns of ethnic conflict and violence during the last 70 years of Pakistan's independence. This study is dedicated to evaluate and assess different stages of ethnic conflicts in Karachi by applying Conflict Life Cycle Model. The model entails seven stages of conflict formation and management and finally resolution. Though unique, Karachi has passed through almost all stages of the conflict formation but missed the most mature stage of conflict ripeness i.e. Mutually Hurting Stalemate stage, which often encourages conflict actors to seek a way out through negotiation or peace process. This paper suggests a sustainable conflict management and resolution mechanism to the ethnic conflict in Karachi.

Keywords: Life Cycle Model, Conflict Emergence, Escalation, Peacemaking Effort

# Introduction

Conflicts are unique and considered as disease to be diagnosed properly for sustainable conflict management and resolution process. Most of the time, conflicts are mismanaged or poorly or insufficiently managed by conflict actors themselves and conflict management organizations. The reason behind this mismanagement lies in the insufficient diagnosis of the conflict and its stages. Conflict has a variety of stages to reach to the level where it can be prevented, managed, transformed and/or resolved. The treatment to deal with a conflict varies from one stage to another. Not every stage requires management or resolution or prevention. Conflict stages have to go through certain symptoms and elements, levels of intensity or violence or reduction, involvement of more conflict parties or actors etc. To deal with stages of conflict, there are various treatments such as pro-active and reactive conflict prevention, conflict management, crisis management, diplomacy with various tracks, confidence building measures, conflict transformation and conflict resolution.

Karachi is referred to as one of the vulnerable conflict fault-lines in Pakistan. It has a history of spurring up deadly and sporadic politicized, ethnic, sectarian violence over an issue as a reaction within an hour and to be sustained for a longer period of time. While having this history, Karachi is an abode of 15 million people with diverse cultural and religious backgrounds. It is a welcoming mega city for migrants,

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immigrants and refugees where they have been living since long. Unfortunately, Karachi has been in the grip of continuous violence during various phases and decades since 1947. In academic literature, Karachi is defined as a volatile city with issues of governance, ethnic friction, street crimes, inefficient performance of law enforcement institutions, sectarian violence and many other problems. The ethnic conflict between and among various communities and their respective political representatives has been a constant feature in Karachi's ethno-political dynamics since past seventy years. In order to manage and resolve the ethnic conflict between or among communities in Karachi, it requires a thorough diagnosis of various stages under a technical conflict analysis model known as "Conflict Life Cycle Model." Therefore, this paper is an attempt to identify different stages of conflict emergence, escalation, prevention, transformation and management of Karachi's ethnic conflict. The study is not bound to any specific time period since it is adopting a conflict life cycle model which requires to see the formation of conflict right from the very beginning and its growth in 70 years. The study is divided into three parts; Conceptual Framework of Conflict Life Cycle Model; Ethnic Conflict formation and management of Karachi; and suggestions for sustainable management and resolution of Karachi conflict.

## **Theoretical Construct**

Smaller issues and differences follow a development process to grow as a full fledge phenomena which is referred as a conflict. Initially, the smaller differences are considered as differences between or among individuals, communities, organizations or states. Scholars and practitioners of Conflict Resolution and Peace Studies have been utilizing the conflict life cycle model to develop better understanding of the contemporary conflicts. Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, and Eric Brahm Miall (Ramsbotham , 2016 and Brahm, 2003) explanations have been adopted to diagnose the ethnic conflict in Karachi.

According to Eric Brahm (Brahm, 2003) a conflict goes through seven stages to grow mature and then manage and resolve. The stages include; latent conflict, conflict emergence, conflict escalation, mutually hurting stalemate, de-escalation/negotiation, dispute settlement and finally post conflict peacebuilding (Diagram 1).



In the first stage, Brahm defines the latent conflict stage as the situation of negative peace when things and circumstances are unstable. In this stage, there is no or probably lesser media coverage about the issues and differences. In the second stage grievances, frustrations, agitations occur due to the persistent discriminatory policies of the state or the first eruption or triggering incident distinguishes sides of the conflict actors and violence becomes a pattern to express the differences or grievances. From irregular to sporadic spread of violence is the trend which announces the emergence of the conflict. The third stage of conflict life cycle is 'escalation.' Conflict, if not managed or prevented well at second stage, goes to escalation. This is the stage where conflict parties may multiply, tactics go advanced, options are in good variety, alliances are made and conflict expands geographically. (Noll, 2000) There is a fourth stage; Peace-making Efforts which was suggested by Louis Kriesberg, (Kriesberg, 2016) He refers 'conflict escalation' as most dangerous stage because of its explosive and expandable nature. If no timely intervention by local, regional and international mediators is made, the situation culminates into a full scale war that threatens regional and world peace. The fifth stage is Mutually Hurting Stalemate which is known as a plateau of relationships. If peace making initiatives become successful to keep the conflict actors in a state of negative peace (i.e. absence of war), it may push them to reach to the realization of hurting deadlock. William Zartman explains, "when the parties find themselves locked in a conflict from which they cannot escalate to victory and this deadlock is painful to both of them (although not necessarily in equal degrees or for the same reasons), they seek a way out." (Zartman, 2000) In mutually hurting stalemate stage, conflict actors tend to calculate losses of being in the conflict and prospective benefits of peace. The sixth stage comprises de-escalation and negotiation. Conflict actors start reducing the size of their armies or militant forces and de-escalate by withdrawing warring factions from the battlefield. De-escalation may entail demobilizing of the armed groups, initiating and

encouraging communication between them and addressing root causes of the conflict. This is also to reduce grievances of parties to the conflict. (Kriesberg, 2016) The seventh and last stage of life cycle refers as 'post conflict peacebuilding phase" which is the combination of rehabilitation of war victims, perpetrators, survivors and rebels, reconciliation process, reconstruction of war torn areas, rebuilding of institutions, reintegration of rebels etc. At the peacebuilding stage, outside actors can play an important role in monitoring the agreement and demobilization efforts. In addition, the construction of civil society may be necessary, something third parties may be able to provide assistance on. (Brahm, 2003)

These are the stages of the conflict life cycle. It is not necessary that all conflicts go through the same stages of maturity and then de-escalation. Conflicts follow different patterns. Sometimes conflict may revert back to violent escalation even after peace-making efforts or upon reaching mutually hurting stalemate stage. In few cases, conflict reaches to de-escalation stage and aims to start a peace process but triggering incident pushes it back to escalated violence. Therefore, a conflict is a variable phenomenon where a diagnosing model such as Conflict Life Cycle has to be kept flexible to see its applicability and relevance.

# Diagnosing Life Cycle of Ethnic Conflict in Karachi

The ethnic conflict in Karachi is unique. Throughout its time span, the conflict has seen various stages and often reverted back to escalated violence. It did not religiously follow the life cycle model of conflict formation and maturity as suggested by Eric Brahm. However, one may find few stages of maturity in the entire tenure of the ethnic conflict in Karachi. This part of the study dwells upon the various stages of Karachi's ethnic conflict.

# **Conflict Formation**

# Latent Stage (1947-1954)

The latent stage for any conflict entails differences between or among conflict actors and unrest in the society. In case of the ethnic aspect of Karachi's conflict, the differences started right after the formation of Pakistan in 1947. The huge influx of migrants from different parts of India was settled in Sindh (Karachi, Sukkar, Hyderabad, and Mirpurkhas), some parts of Punjab (Lahore, Rawalpindi, southern part) and Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP) in immediate post-1947. Sindh received 20% of Indian migrant Muslims. (Siddiqi, 2012) The wave of migration to Karachi changed the ethnic demography overnight. The population increased by 161% due to 600,000 refugees from India in the backdrop of Pakistan's independence in

1947 and it changed the cultural and ethnic nature of the metropolitan city as well. (Hasan, 2003) Sindhi was a widely spoken language till 1947 in Karachi. "In 1941, more than half of the city's less-than-400,000 population was Hindu and spoke Sindhi." (DeZousa, 2012) The creation of Pakistan and Urdu speaking Muslim migration from India to Karachi and migration of Sindhi speaking Hindus from Karachi to India changed the ethnic and lingual demographics of the city. In 1951, Sindhi speakers were lesser in number as compared to Urdu speakers. (Ibid)

In Karachi, Sindhis constitute only the fifth largest ethnic group, outnumbered by Muhajirs, Punjabis, Pathans, and Balochs. Urdu speaking commonly known as Muhajirs emerged as the dominating group in the initial phase of post-partition due to their comparatively stronger educational, cultural and economic background. Though not all migrants/muhajirs who migrated from India to Karachi were Urdu speaking. There were Gujarati, Madrassi, Bengali speaking muhajirs too who came and settled in Karachi in post-1947. The domination of Urdu speaking community in post-independence governing and bureaucratic structure of Pakistan, declaring Urdu as national language and making Karachi as capital of Pakistan rooted the seeds of ethnic conflict between native Sindhis and Muhajirs in Karachi. The social unrest was there between the indigenous Sindhis and Urdu speaking Muhajirs despite the fact that Sindhis welcomed the new Sindhis open-heartedly. (Siddiqi, 2012)

While the initial roots of ethnic conflict are seen between Sindhis and Muhajirs in Karachi, there were other ethnic communities too which became part of this ethnic conflict. The ethnic conflict between Urdu speaking Muhajirs and Pashtoons started brewing up after the first martial law in Pakistan in 1958. In 1965, Gen. Ayub Khan won Presidential elections against Ms. Fatima Jinnah who belonged to Urdu speaking Muhajir community. This win of Gen. Ayub Khan was given color of ethnic prejudice by Muhajirs because Khan was Pashtoon and Ms. Jinnah belonged to the Muhajir community.

### **Emergence Stage (1955-1972)**

The ethnic conflict in Karachi became visible with few state policies. Nawab Liaquat Ali Khan (belonging to the same muhajir community) as first prime minister of Pakistan, making Karachi as a federating unit and capital city and Urdu as national language were reasons to see which ethnic community emerged as more privileged than others. Laurent Gayer (Gayer, 2003) sees the seeds of the conflict in the struggle between indigenous and exogenous communities to take control of the city based resources especially when the city is also federal representative capital. The

indigenous Sindhis felt marginalized after Karachi was made a capital city on 22 May 1948 because Muhajirs became the privileged group as part of bureaucracy and ministries.

In the formative phase after 1947, Muhajirs/Urdu speaking community emerged as a dominating group to have earned senior positions in the bureaucracy and military due to their education and entrepreneurial skill set. By 1973, Muhajirs held 33% of the gazetted positions in the civilian bureaucracy, although their share of the overall population was less than 8%. Similarly, Muhajirs held a disproportionate share of positions in the Pakistan Secretariat, and to an even, greater extent, they dominated Pakistan's business elite. (Kenneday, 1991)

The emergence stage of Karachi conflict was also dependent upon the continuous demographic change which necessitated ethnic stakeholders and claimants for the resource pool and political representation in the mega city. Karachi has received influx of internal and external migrants. Most domestic economic migrants have settled in Sindh since 1965, and by 1981, over 2 million Punjabis, 1.1 million Balochs, and 0.7 million Pathans lived in Sindh. (Ibid) The ethnic friction in Karachi had different dynamics and players such as Muhajirs, Sindhis, Pashtoons, and Punjabis. In one way or another, all these ethnic groups went through an ordeal of deprivation in the seven decades of the country's existence. From 1947 to 1958, differences and conflict between Sindhi-Muhajir were seen. By the end of 1950s, domestic economic migrants from Punjab began to migrate to Karachi; some of them were migrated due to the formation of Karachi as a federal unit. The second wave of domestic migration took place during 1960s, this time essentially composed by Pathans looking for economic opportunities who settled in Sindh's main urban centers. (Lionel, 2008) In the backdrop of Afghan war of 1979, an immense number of Afghan refugees also contributed to the demographic imbalance in Karachi that further aggravated the ethnic fissure. Karachi became the economic and political battleground for the residing ethnic population. Mohajirs, who rose as a threat to the native Sindhis for the privileged status during the first ten years, appeared to struggle with Punjabis in administrative and political spheres in 1960s and 1970s. While Punjabis got hold of administrative and industrial opportunities, the Pashtoons took over the construction labor and transport sectors. Pashtoons migrated to Karachi for better economic opportunities and were ready to take up any job, including construction labor or driving public transports etc. Muhajir community was not in competition with Pashtoons in these employment opportunities.

At the stage of conflict emergence, violence is one of the major indicators to measure the transformation of an issue or differences into a conflict. Karachi had seen violence numerous times. In Karachi, violence happened both at the time of emergence stage of the conflict and then several other times which led to the escalation stage of conflict every now and then in 1980s and 1990s. However, violence became tool to achieve political ends for every political party in the mega city. Various kinds of violence were used in Karachi; from stoning to burning of public and private vehicles, to targeted killing, to kidnapping for ransom, and harming public and private property etc. While Muttahida Qaumi Movement (an ethno-national political party as representative of Urdu speaking Muhajirs in Karachi) is usually blamed as founders of using violence as a political tool, other parties also developed militant wings in Karachi. (Khan, 2011)

### Escalation of Conflict and Peace-making Efforts (1972-1990s, 1992-2000)

Karachi saw its escalation stage on numerous occasions. It is unfair to refer that the conflict in Karachi was escalated only in 1970s or 1980s or 1990s. Every time it was escalated, there were measures, initiatives to control the violent dynamics and control the situation. There were policies, policy revisions, dialogue, political process, efforts by law enforcement to manage the crisis situation in Karachi during 1972-73, 1985, 1991-92, 1995 and onwards. There were three persistent ethnic stakeholders in Karachi; Sindhis, Muhajirs and Pashtoons. While Sindhis, though indigenous but still were minority. Urdu speaking Muhajirs have always a demographic edge against the other co-ethnic groups in Karachi. Pashtoons became stakeholder because of their constant domestic migrations and settlement in Karachi. It is said that there are more Pashtoons in Karachi than in Peshawar. "According to new estimates, Karachi's Pashtun population stands anywhere from a low of 4 million to a high of 6 million; that is some 25 percent of Karachi's residents and around 15 percent of the entire population of Sindh. Karachi's Muhaiir population, residents who identify themselves as Urdu speaking, stands anywhere from a low of 7 million to a high of 9 million; that is some 45 percent of Karachi's residents and around 23 percent of the entire population of Sindh. The changes in demography also change the political realities in the city." (Saleem, 2010)

In Karachi, escalation of the conflict took place many times. The ethnically representative parties of Sindhis, Muhajirs and Pashtoons were not well defined until 1967 when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto formed Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) which was basically a national party but supported by Sindhi speaking community. The manifesto of PPP was concentrated on maximum provincial autonomy, labor rights,

equal distribution of resources, refusal to support military intervention in political affairs of the country and support to strengthening democratic institutions. (Pakistan Peoples Party, 2018) In 1960s, Muhajirs and Pashtoons were politically represented by right-wing religious political parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami or Jamiat-e-Ulema-e-Pakistan in Karachi. These parties were not based on particular ethnic nationalism; they emphasized on politico-religious manifestoes and were joined by like-minded people from any ethnicity.

The ethno-nationalism in Karachi brewed up when the communities found political platforms to channelize their grievances. Generally, communities may have genuine grievances but they are enhanced and later manipulated by ethno-national/political elites to serve their own interest. While Sindhis got the political platform in 1967 in the shape of PPP, Muhajirs were aligned with Jamaate-Islami Pakistan until 1979. Muhajir nationalism was manifested when Muhajir Qaumi Movement (now Muttahida Qaumi Movement, MQM) was formed in 1985. It was an extension of All Pakistan Muhajir Student Organization (APMSO), a student party which was formed by Altaf Hussain in 1979 in University of Karachi. Pashtoons were largely connected with Jamiat-e-Ulema Pakistan and Jamaat-e-Islami till 1990s when Awami National Party started its Karachi Chapter. The political platforms for Muhajirs and Pashtoons were different and not solely aligned with the ethnic manifesto in 1960s and 1970s. So the actual process of political formation of conflict parties took place in 1980s and 1990s for Muhajirs and Pashtoons. But this does not mean that conflict was not active or escalated in Karachi till 1990s.

1970s proved as a crucial decade for Karachi. It had two policies which escalated the conflict i.e. Quota system (1971) and Sindh Language Bill (1972). Quota system was revised in 1972-73 according to which rural population got 60% seats in federal employment and education, whereas urban population got 40% share. In case of Sindh, the Quota system introduced the allocation of greater number of employment opportunities i.e. 11.4% to rural population (who were Sindhis) and 7.6% to Urban Sindh (mostly Urdu speaking Muhajirs). (Kennedy, 1991) This led the urban Urdu speaking Muhajirs to believe that the policy was directed against them and favored the rural Sindhis. This worsened the Sindhi-Muhajir rifts in Karachi further. The Quota system affected Muhajirs since 1971 till to-date because initially it was introduced for 20 years and later it was extended to another 20 years. To deal with linguistic issue due to Sindh Language Bill, Bhutto took initiative for peace-making and made a visit to Sindh and announced a policy that calmed down the violent situation. (Rahman, 1995) Bhutto passed an Ordinance which provided for non-discrimination in the

appointment or promotions in Civil Service on the basis of the knowledge of Sindhi or Urdu language. (Siddiqi, 2012) This Ordinance was a tension defusing initiative for Muhajir community.

Another element of conflict escalation stage is increasing violence with spillover affects sometimes. Karachi has seen violence several times, which is not a new phenomenon. The first time violence erupted in Karachi, it was 1952 when there was unrest between Sindhis and Muhajirs due to some misunderstandings during Ashura procession and they burnt down a police station in Karachi. It was effectively managed by the law enforcement agencies though. (Aziz, 2016) When Gen. Ayub won the presidential elections, there was again some unrest seen between Muhajirs and Pashtoons. In 1964, Muhajirs and Pashtoons were engaged in the ethnic riots for the first time in the backdrop of celebrations for Gen. Ayub Khan's victory by Pashtoon community in Karachi and this caused displeasure to Muhajirs who were mourning over Ms. Jinnah's defeat. (Siddiqi, 2012)

In 1972 after Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto became President of Pakistan, there was a government move to promote Sindhi culture, language and education within the province and declared Sindhi as language of the province besides Urdu as national language via 'The Sind Teaching, Promotion and Use of Sindhi Language Bill' passed on 3 July 1972. It instantly ignited ethnic riots in Karachi, Hyderabad, Sukkur, Larkana, Mirpurkhas and Nawabshah which continued for nine days. Members of both ethnic community started torching houses, shops, vehicles and killing people. The Sindh Bill was taken as discrimination to the Muhajirs in Karachi and they protested. Ethnic violence costed innocent lives of both Sindhi and Muhajir communities. (A Leaf from History, 2012) It was this reason that Bhutto made an emergency visit to Karachi to console and manage the violent situation. On 16 July 1972, the Bill was revised and Sindhi and Urdu both declared as languages within Karachi and Sindh. The visit of Bhutto may be referred as Peace-making effort.

Violence has been a tool to achieve political ends in Karachi. It started with the Muhajir nationalism politics by MQM and later adopted by various other ethnic and political groups in Karachi as well. In April 1985, a Muhajir student Bushra Zaidi lost her life in a bus accident drove by a Pashtoon driver. This accident incited ethnic violence once again between Muhajir and Pashtoon communities. It was the same time when MQM was laying foundation in Karachi and this bus accident gave it a reason to play ethnic politics. In Orangi and Liaquatabad, there were large scale violence, buses were torched and burned, private and public property was destroyed, people of the two communities were harassed and Karachi was going through

violence in worst way. (Aziz, 2016) It was only when Pakistan army was called in and situation defused. It was peacemaking effort by the government.

The beginning of 1990s started with sporadic episodes of violence repeatedly in Karachi between Muhajirs and Pashtoons, Muhajirs and Sindhis. In 1992, government launched "Operation Clean up" against terrorist and criminals (MQM party members and followers) in Karachi. (Fazila-Yacoobali, 1996) It was launched by Pakistan army but soon handed over to Sindh Police and Rangers to target Muhajir and MQM militias. PPP was the ruling party and this civilian operation brought MQM and PPP into more sour relations due to extra-judicial killings of MQM followers/activists. (Yusuf, 2012) The MQM leader Altaf Hussain left the country and went to exile in London in 1993 and since then has been living there. This operation weakened MQM's violent ethnic politics in the metropolitan city and the late 1990s saw a comparatively calm Karachi especially after Gen. Pervez Musharraf took-over through a military coup in October 1999.

The city politics in 2000 onwards saw MQM as an influential government player as coalition partner with the Sindh government under Pakistan Muslim League (PML-Q). MQM was patronized by Gen. Musharraf's regime; who, after holding referendum in April 2002 and declared as President of Pakistan, himself was an Urdu speaking Muhajir required local political support for his non-electoral regime. MQM supported Gen. Musharraf and that became a turning point for Karachi. In 2001, Sindh Local Government Ordinance (SLGO) was promulgated, which was a decentralization plan and it was meant to empower ethnic communities in Sindh. In case of Karachi, it empowered MQM greatly because of its demographic edge over other ethnic communities. Under SLGO, direct elections were held at district, union council levels. MQM was in power in Karachi during 2001-2007. The level of ethnic violence was seen as low during that time. (Ibid)

Situation worsened in 2008-2012 onwards because the violence was no longer ethnic but also increased with sectarian and religious killings. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) established its base in Karachi. An influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) migrated to Karachi from different parts of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and FATA. On the one hand, it increased the population of Pashtoons and on the other hand, the Pashtoon community was blamed for Talibanization in Karachi by MQM. In 2011 Sindh rangers were given a task to launch an operation against criminal and terrorist elements in Karachi. In 2012, search and security operations took place at various places where militias of MQM, criminal elements and target killers were arrested. (Rangers Operation in Karachi, 2012) These continuous operations were peacemaking

efforts by the government to defuse ethno-political tensions, curb the criminal activities from the city and to pin down terrorist activities and incidents from the city.

## **Mutually Hurting Stalemate**

The fifth stage of a conflict is mutually hurting stalemate, a deadlock in the relationship which neither brings victory nor a defeat to the conflict actors. This hanging situation where both parties have invested their human and material resources and not moving into any direction to meet their desired ends bring a realization of a deadlock. A deadlock is a costly predicament and makes parties realize they should seek a way out of their conflict through less violent or peaceful ways; this is called MHS. In the case of Karachi, no MHS has ever been felt. Whenever PPP, MQM, and ANP held dialogue, it was part of the political process to gain maximum stakes in the prevalent governments.

### **Conflict Management and Resolution**

Karachi has always been a migrant city. A migrant city with a seaport, enjoying a good regional and international connectivity via its sea and air routes along with its reputation as a hub of economic activity naturally attracts mass domestic migrations. It has ethnic and religious diversity as its pivotal feature since pre-independence times of Pakistan. It has a claim, belongingness, and ownership of every ethnic and religious community who are settled in Karachi for decades. Karachi is for everyone and therefore the conflict management and resolution mechanism should be evolved by including all stakeholders which includes political/ethnic parties and people of different communities together. Having analyzed different stages of conflict formation and sustenance in earlier sections of this study, this part dwells upon a suggestive framework for conflict management and resolution with a futuristic perspective.

### **Sustainable Political Process**

Karachi has PPP, PTI, MQM-P, PSP, ANP, JI as major stake-holders in contemporary political framework. PPP has formed provincial government in Sindh in 2018. The principle of majority's rule could not work in post general elections 2018 in Karachi. Despite having 48% of Urdu speaking Muhajir population, MQM-P emerged as third political party in 2018 elections after winning 16 seats, while PTI won 22 and PPP got 74 seats in Sindh Assembly. (PPPs 'teer' strikes again, 2018) The major ethnic group in Karachi seems to have rejected its representation through MQM this time. There can be many reasons behind this scenario. The Urdu speaking Muhajirs had lesser choices to cast their vote in 1990s and 2000s onwards. In 2018, PTI was declared as the most popular political party in Pakistan and formed government in the country. In

Sindh and Karachi, PPP stayed as most popular which shows that the vote bank for Sindhis was still intact. The Urdu speaking Muhajirs found their vote bank in PTI besides MQM-P and PSP. Though unconventionally expected results in recent elections, but Karachi requires a continuous dialogue among its major stakeholders including PPP, MQM-P, ANP, PSP and PTI. Nothing can lead to a sustainable management of ethnic conflict in Karachi than a consistent approach through negotiation and political process which evolves through more political integration and inclusiveness. Continuous dialogue needs to be evolved and continued among all the political stakeholders to map the negotiation and conflict resolution mechanism of ethno-political dimensions of Karachi, as it belongs to every ethnic community.

### **Urban Settlement of Domestic Migrants**

The nature of metropolitan city is always diverse and heterogeneous. It does not carry claim from a single community, rather it is owned by everyone. Karachi is a migrants' paradise. It is a centre of economic activity and employment generation. One of the major issues in Karachi's ethnic conflict is its squatter settlements, which are resided by various ethnic groups. Since Karachi will continue to have domestic economic migrants from Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, provincial government should form committees to provide, promulgate, revise migration and urban settlement policies for better management of this human resource. Migrants are human resources for any city, if utilized properly, the domestic economic migrants will elevate the fate of Karachi more thriving and progressive city. Karachi is the backbone of Pakistan's economy, any policy that stabilizes Karachi's political scene and assures common benefit for all residing ethnic communities may work wonder to bring peace to this mega city.

# **Structural and Cultural Governance**

The structural governance is related to economic and infrastructural side of governance in the city. From infrastructural to means of transport and communications to development rea, estate mafia to water management and tanker mafia to electricity and supplies of natural gas, Karachi undergoes issues one after another every single day. It needs a complete overhauling of the process of governance within the city. Cultural governance is more of an anthropological concept which deals with wining the hearts and minds of the local populace. Karachi is the city of migrants but unfortunately Karachi lacks the sense of ownership from its residents. Be it Urdu speaking Muhajir community or indigenous Sindhis or domestic

economic migrants Punjabi, Pashtoons, Siraikis or Balochs, nobody has ever owned Karachi in true letter and spirits.

### **Conflict Resolution**

Karachi has never experienced and realized the hanging deadlock, which could encourage MQM, PPP and ANP to make the cost-benefit analysis, pains of continuing with the conflict and to seek a way out through peaceful approach. Since Karachi has missed this important stage, it is needed to go through the stage of MHS in future. Karachi requires a piecemeal approach to have a sustainable conflict resolution process. Inclusiveness, integrated peacebuilding process, continuous dialogue among all stakeholders and shunning of violent politics from each and every political group is needed. Three times in 1992, 1994-95 and 2012-16, government launched crackdown of militant wing of only one political party i.e. MQM. This is where the grievance of MOM seems justified because every political party has militant wing, extracts extortion money and has committed corruption in respective governing regimes. Demilitarization of all political parties and elimination of their militant wings should be done at all levels in Karachi to balance the process of reformation of Karachi's politics. This will also help MQM to see the balanced approach of the government towards all political actors in the metropolitan city. The issue of governance is not easy. Violence has been managed in Karachi and law and order situation is comparatively better now than in 2012. The law enforcement is pivotal to bring and maintain peace in the city. Yet it cannot provide complete mechanism unless it is taken as a complimenting and supporting element for greater political process to deal with ethnic conflict in Karachi. The root causes need to be addressed, and the root causes are attached with political mobilization of ethnic communities besides their struggle for control over city based resources and governance. Once the three pronged conflict management mechanism is applied, Karachi will emerge as a peaceful zone of Pakistan which may invite foreign investment at greater level.

### Conclusion

Despite being a conflict ridden city, Karachi never surrendered to its rampant episodes of violence. It kept generating almost 65% of total revenues for the country, and contributed to Pakistan's GDP amounted to around 16 billion rupees a day, and its daily tax revenues to two billion. (Karachi contributes...2012) Karachi caters more positive and promising features such as thriving economy, foreign investments, multinational corporations, geographical location and sea, road and air trade routes etc., than the negative characteristics such as ethno-national politics and violence. The

story behind ethnic conflict in Karachi is age-old; while deep grievances among major ethnic communities were genuine in respective decades right since 1947, the recent waves of ethno-national violence were product of political mobilization of the ethnic groups in Karachi. It shelters 15 million people and it has gone through the most mature stage of the conflict escalation with multiple conflict actors and intense level of violence in 1990s and 2008 onwards as per Life cycle model suggested by Eric Brahm.

Various efforts were made to defuse crisis situation and violence in Karachi through policy revisions and sometimes use of force but they all proved temporary. None of the efforts were made with the purpose to manage the conflict via long term approach. More political participation and continuous dialogue among PPP, MQM, PSP, ANP and PTI needs to be done and maintained in the longer run. Karachi needs an effective governing setup to look after continuous migrations and settlement of migrants in the city. A socio-cultural approach to create sense of belongingness and ownership is required for managing cultural diversity within the city. The significance of Karachi in contemporary national, regional and international politics cannot be shunned and a peaceful Karachi promises a progressive and developed Pakistan.

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