

TRANSFORMATION OF IDEOLOGY AS FAULT LINE IN STATE STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN

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Abstract

The development of ideologies in re-construction and transformation of the Indian sub-continent during and after its division into new nation states in 1947 emerged as the fault lines in its structural and organizational imbalances, which is an interesting phenomenon and at times led to the violent and radical political discourses. This ideological transformation became imbalanced, due to the exploitation by opportunists in state and political elements, through consciously planned attitude especially in dogma, religious traditions, ethnicity and political/state governance thereby fulfilling ulterior motives. Resultantly, violence and conflicts emerged in both the fragile states of the Indian sub-continent besides undergoing a series of dictatorship, one party rule, manipulation of elites, and ethnic or national polarization ultimately leading to the weak governmental structure. This research was aimed at ascertaining both at theoretical and practical levels, the causes of intricacies involved in transformation of religious ideology into a fault line besides suppressing ethnic and identity markers of traditional society like Pakistan, exploiting the structural organization of political governments through state/bureaucratic regimes. It was discovered that this transformation became such due to the indulgence of state elements and their practices besides illiberal democratic governments, which were also leading to the violence and militancy where ideology/religion has been used for parochial political interests embodied in desires to hang on to power. Henceforth, the power made the dismemberment of joint Pakistan in post-1971 era, whereas continuously challenged the fragile integrity after 1971.

Keywords: Ideology, religion, ethnicity, partition, organizational and structural imbalances, violence, power, fragile integrity

Introduction

The emergence of imagined community¹ of Pakistan on world map with a religious philosophy since its inception on August 14, 1947, was interacting with the flawed sharing of the ideological ownership confused with its rich traditional culture intertwined in the ethnicity. It was also used as anti-patriotism and against the national harmony or proclaimed volatility in nature and character both at inter and intra state levels. The recent wave of extreme militancy under the name of Islamic *Jehad* (Holy War) and war on terror created a new dimension of associating the ideology of dialectical linkage of Islam, Pakistan and patriotism. This conflict gave new dimension to the research,

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¹A concept coined by Benedict Anderson in his scholarly master piece '*Imagined Communities*', surfaced initially in 1983, which referred to an imagined community may construct itself to a non-existent nation with all the facets of new modern nation may occupy or try to create a sovereign state.

particularly in finding a gap between the non-violent teachings of violence in almost all religions with specific reference to Islam its ownership with reference to Pakistan first approach and the old tied knot of respective ethnic identity of *la longue durree*.²

The Islamic ideology played a distinct role in maintaining public opinion of the Pakistani society in state functioning as highlighted by its founder Quaid e Azam Muhammad Ali Jinnah³ but it was not the only factor that out rightly negated all other supporting or contributing factors even while continuing to claim religious inspiration for politics especially in its emergence as new nation-state.⁴ The problem is complicated once the interpreters of the religious values including the government, state elements and/or religio-political parties used Islamic values to ulterior motives while transforming the masses from radical irritants into charged militants besides, making state elements as the constructors of foreign and associated policies instead of instrument to government planners.⁵

The emergence of Pakistan moreover, embodied with an interesting question of, how a mismatch of fitting ideological construction of imagined community⁶ over modern secular democratic nation-state could over-lap or compromise the governance system. Moreover, continuation of dynastic populist leadership, frequent dictatorships and borrowed flawed democracy of First Past the Post (FPTP) may temporarily involve nation states into despotic rule as well as inapt and incompetent political institutions, as it is the case of Pakistan.

Two distinct phases of Pakistani state's ideological construction i.e. Pre-1971 and Post-1971 era are interesting to probe into the transformation of ethnicity preceding over religious ideology in former period whereas in later era religion suppressing the ethnicity or *la longue duree* in power sharing game amongst the troika of centers of the power in Pakistani polity⁷. Contrarily, besides the fragile construction of ideology of the former era indulged into a more confusing phenomenological transformation in Musharraf regime in the beginning of new millennium and Post- 9/11 that hinged over strong Pakistanism ideological stance suddenly divorced from religious ideology. Presently, after two consecutive but fragile democratic governments the tilt is again diverting to and fro between Islamism and Pakistanism or ethnic diversity.

This research is focused over the construction of ideology of Pakistan, it's unfortunate ulterior usage by the elite and myopic leadership transforming the fluid ethnicity and religiosity into a fault line besides, probing into the inherent weaknesses inbuilt in this social construction that drifted the society and state into subjective structural and

² A phenomenological concept coined by Françoise Simiand, Marc Bloch and Fernand Braudel that refers to old relations based on ethnic indicators including race, tribe, nation, language and/or any particular reference in the past history making it a reason for its existence, survival or cause to unite in the form of a nation.

³ Khan, Hamid, *Constitutional and Political History of Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 34-5.

⁴ Jahan, Rounaq, *Pakistan: Failure in National Integration*, (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp.2-3.

⁵ *Ibid.*

⁶ A concept coined by Benedict Anderson in '*Imagined Communities*', surfaced in 1983.

⁷ Troika of power in Pakistan is referred to powerful executive leadership of parliament, judiciary and military.

conservative organizational imbalances instead of the progressive and prosperous modern nation state.

Methodology

The research was focused on both primary and secondary sources in detail. However, the main thrust of research remained confined to qualitative theory intertwined in empirical analysis based on logical reasoning from the historical documents. The primary methods of research also included the visits/interviews to the scholars and dignitaries of political leadership who participated in statecraft and state analysis of Pakistan. Moreover, the primary research was also inclined to consult the authentic speeches, statements and autobiographies or write ups compiled in this field of ideological construction of states particularly the post-colonial states and imagined communities like Pakistan. Similarly, the secondary source was also extensively used that was available in scholarly work and published from print and mass media by the concerned personalities who were actively involved in statecraft of Pakistan.

Literature Review

Theoretically, the research revolves around the conceptual framework of statecraft and state making process illustrated in the scholarly efforts while discussing the process of post-colonial state making enjoined statism by Max Weber, Rousseau, Micheal Mann, Barry Buzan, Machiavelli, David P Gauthier, Graham Evans, Jeffrey Newham, Robert Jackson, Dwayne N Hunt and Charles Tilly. The focus of research for state practical manifestation remained restricted to the government, bureaucracy, military and intertwined political cum societal factors thereby limiting the important factor of economic problems because of its lengthy separate subjective/objective reasons.

The states emerged after the departure of colonial masters from the Indian sub-continent under the enormous violent phenomenon and segmentation of nations over religion as highly charged ideology, ethnic cleavages, and conflicting social stratification bringing this region as extremely volatile. The concepts highlighted above and their analytical reasons have been researched in detail analyzing the master pieces by the scholars like Cohen, Buzan, Haroon, Varsheney, Iftakhar, Saeed Shafqat, Hassan Abbass, Hassan Askari and Rasul Bakhsh Rais. However, the statecraft and its construction was consulted from the scholarly efforts of various scholars including Weber, Buzan, Benedict Anderson, Mann, Francis Fukuyama, Dr. Moonis Ahmar, Dr. Farhan Hanif and Alex Roland. Besides the research articles, interviews of many scholars and dignitaries have been benefitted in undertaking this research. The researcher bridging the gap of linking state, military, political leadership and the general masses particularly welcoming the dictatorship as their last hope and after a tenure of ten years or so rejecting them altogether while preferring the almost same corrupt political elite derived all the valuable analytical arguments developing a wholesome picture of the structural faults in statecraft and state structure of Pakistan, proved as an evidence of this variance.

Research Question

The research will be undertaken to unearth the question of statecraft, its evolution from imagined ideology with an over-riding clause of its fitment of religious form of governance onto Westminster or more particularly secular form of governance brought practical implications over de-colonial state of Pakistan, with particular focus over power sharing dilemma at executive tiers:-

- Why the disparity in ideological religious construction of unity in statecraft of Pakistan occurred fragile developing into frequent violent and radical phases with a crosscutting power sharing dilemma amongst the military, bureaucracy and political leadership?

Sequence of the Research

The study has been divided into two sub parts, each focused over its emergence and analysis of resultant conclusions i.e. the religious ideological construction of state making and its fallouts; second, the ulterior use of the charged phenomenon of religious ideology and its effects particularly in de-colonial states like Pakistan.

Emergence of Pakistan and Construction of Religion as Ideology

Creation of Pakistan was though a continuous process of decolonization in the world of political uprising after World War II but a moderate Muslim in westernized appearance, Mohammad Ali Jinnah was also embedded to raise the slogan of Islam for creation of new homeland for Muslims of the Indian subcontinent with the persuasion of two-nation theory.⁸ The reason of this intricate relationship of Islam, two nation theory and independent homeland for Muslims was hinged over three essential factors. These include, first in the separation or likely division of the Indian sub-continent on religious ideologies, second due to the failure of Muslim League initially in 1937 elections because of without the pronounced strong religious agenda of imagined community, and finally the developed threat in the minds of UP/CP (United Provinces/Central Provinces) Muslims against Hindu entropy resistant cultures prominently perceived in state functioning and social or economic alienation.

Indeed, the basic question of emergence of Pakistan over religious unity suppressing traditional identity markers besides a series of dictatorships with consecutive intervals highlight the conceptual dichotomy and practical mismatch between modern nation-state based on secular democratic political governance and Islam, political Islam and tenants of functional Islamic state adopted by a society on former ideology. Or the answer of this intricate question lays in twisted divergence by the elite to fit in ulterior motives in prolonging or attaining the political or populist power in Pakistan. The dichotomy of above mentioned fault line continued in the state functioning as well as in society until today however, the present day two continuous tenures of political governance proportionally concealed the tribulations while diverting these into new discourse of

⁸ Khan, Hamid, *op.cit.*, pp. 34-5.

fragile power sharing dilemma amongst aforementioned power troika. The sequential identified inherited imbalances in both pre and post 1971 period are as under:-

Transformation of Religious Ideology as Fault Line

The de-ontological research leads to a conclusion of initial divide of the people of the Indian sub-continent over the religions as a source of power attainment procedure through a popular representation and voting which later culminated over partition of the region on the basis of the fearful religious estrangement. The Doctrine of Lapse,⁹ separate representative electorates¹⁰, Minto-Morley reforms and separation/annexation of Sindh and Bombay¹¹ evidently represented the conceptualization differences of people of India over religions. Conversely, the development of one nation against British Raj to two nations of pre-partition, while setting forth new Islamic and modern imagined community nation-state of two non-contiguous halves as one. Moreover, this fragile status was porously filled with an elite not compromised to create a balance of share in central authority/powers and custodianship of ideology, besides striking equilibrium in executive institutions, governance elements and legislative bodies.¹²

The religious divide of the Indian sub-continent created Pakistan inheriting the ideological fault line under the massive genocide due to this partition. The fault line of constructed ideology of religion or imagined community was exploited further to accentuate the problem of governance making it a continuous source of confusion resultantly oscillating between dictatorial or populist rule instead of mix match of theocracy (*Khilafat*) and democracy through *Shura* (consensus assembly or parliament), consociationalism and/or federalism, as suggested by various scholars and/or think tanks. This gap visibly under nourished the Parliamentary government with simple First Past the Post (FPTP) being a prima-facie of legislation with a lack of democratically educated masses on one hand and unwilling populace to accept the practical bounds of Islam resting on *Quran/Hadith/Ijtihad/Ijma*, the basic sources of Islamic legislation, on the other hand.

Iftakhar argues that the advent of religion biased political power in South Asia was embedded with number of factors including the absence of a strong, central authority in the Indian sub-continent,¹³ but the use of religion for ulterior motives instead of peaceful preaching and prosperity as highlighted by Alavi¹⁴ was the eventually invented

⁹ Hamid in agreement with C Brad Faught highlighted the controversial law passed by the Lord Dalhousie referred as 'Law of Dalhousie or Doctrine of Lapse', the then viceroy of British India from 1848 to 1856, to include any princely states into British control/custody, which would not have a legal heir or any prince if would prove to be incompetent to rule/govern the state', so as to bring almost complete India under their rule.

¹⁰ These reforms were aimed at the divide and rule policy of the Indian sub-continent, however became the basis of religious divide in the times to come.

¹¹ Harron, Ullah K, *Vying for Allah's vote: Understanding Islamic Parties, Political Violence, and Extremism in Pakistan*, (Baltimore: Georgetown University Press, 2013), pp. 7, 16-7 and 52.

¹² Cohen, Stephen P, *The Idea of Pakistan*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004), pp. 161-3 and 183-6.

¹³ Malik H, Iftakhar, *The History of Pakistan* (Westpoint, USA: Greenwich Press, 2008), p. 49.

¹⁴ Hamza, Alavi, *Social Forces & Ideology in the Making of Pakistan*, (Lahore: Democratic Action, Research & Education, 2002), pp. 45-61.

phenomenon of elites' creation for ulterior motives. Alavi also blamed this phenomenological usage of Islam became the source of power grabbing in almost all the historical evolutionary phases of the Indian sub-continent history.¹⁵

The religious ideology permeably made the unity and social structure of the Muslims weak and fragile, that is why the Muslim scholars like the practicing Islamist leaders of *Ulema of Deoband*¹⁶ and likeminded scholars even of Aligarh Muslim foundation did not opt to lead this ideologically constructed political movement besides, apprehending the division of Muslim power/unity in case of the partition of the Indian sub-continent. However, the aforementioned leadership also misjudged the Muslim alliance with Hindu religious ideology as coveted threat like the custodians of *Shudhi* and *Sanghatan* extremism.¹⁷

Haroon's argument of both, alienation of religious elements to independent Pakistan and unmerging of League to religious scholars, lies in the formation of League.¹⁸ Haroon highlights the formation of League as hierarchical and clientelist leading to alienate common Muslims entry into the party by quoting the example of appointment of Agha Khan, the *Ismailia* leader, as the first president of the League.¹⁹ The division and further sub-division over religious ideology started shaping the structural imbalance that forced the westernized secular minded Jinnah to break the ties with Congress and fight from the platform of Muslim League with new religious outlook.

Indeed, the initial development of an ideology for 'Pakistan' was the brain child of students, namely Chaudhary Rehmat Ali, of Cambridge University in 1930s.²⁰ In its essence, these students gave a concept of a separate Indian Muslim political entity including a federation of Ten Muslim States within the union of India. The details of this union is highlighted by Cohen as the Muslim majority areas of Punjab, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Baluchistan resulting into *Pakistan*, spearheading the movement for the

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ These scholars included AbulKalam Azad, HussainMadani, Anwar Shah Kashmiri and other likeminded religious scholars who thought it a division of Muslims making them dysfunctional in assisting each other in future. The same concept was explained by Stephan P Cohen about the 'Paired Minority Complex' in non-resolution and dysfunctional help against Kashmiri Muslims under their oppressive tyranny in Indian occupied Kashmir.

¹⁷ *Shudhi* and *Sanghatan* were the mass movements as highlighted by Gene R Thursby, which was aimed at transformation of complete India into Hindu religion and converting all impure to pure *Hindu 'vata' or Hindu 'asthan'* (Hindu mythology believers). Besides, the aforementioned reason, the Indian National Congress after winning almost all the seats in the British Indian elections of 1937 brought drastic changes of hoisting the flag with Hindu religious identity marker of '*Chakar*', compulsory singing of *BandeMa 'taramin* schools and promotion of Hindu mythology more pronouncedly, which created fear in the minority(s) in general and Muslims in particular.

¹⁸ Haroon, Ullah K, *op.cit*, pp. 55-6.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ Remat, Chaudhry Ali, in 1933 wrote a master piece for the solution of possible division of the Indian sub-continent under a title, 'Now or Never, Are We to Live or Perish for Ever'. The document was focused over the role of Muslims in legislative assembly formulating a federal constitution to be governed under the union of states of Pakistan (comprised of NWFP, Kashmir, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan), Osmanistan (comprised of Hyderabad Deccan and surrounding princely states) and Bengistan (Bengal, Assam and surrounding areas) as Muslim governed areas within the union of India. For complete document refer to 'Rehmat Ali: A Biography', by Vanguard Publications, Lahore, 1987.

political reconfiguration of Indian Muslims and suggested *Bengistan* for Muslims in eastern Bengal also. Their counterparts in southern India, especially those living in the princely state of Hyderabad ruled by the *Nizam*, were advised to group themselves as *Osmanistan* as the third and final portion of this federation. Whereas, the Southern, South Eastern and South Western areas of Hindu majority were dedicated to the Hindus as *Dravidia*, *Maharashtra* and *Hindoostan* respectively.²¹

In a nutshell, the religious ideology may distinctly now be further sub-divided into four segmented phases of two pre and post 1971 Pakistan. The division may be given a title of, Pre-1971 and Post-1971, and Pre and Post-9/11 state structure of Pakistan. The summarized analysis of each phase may be elaborated as under:-

1. **Pre 1971 Pakistan.** The diversity of ethnic political rearrangement of India on the eve of the expected British departure and ethnic or religious divide in already segmented society was turning into a major identity marker for the most pluralistic region in the world.²² Similarly, an interesting argument of Varshney focused the attention of creation of Pakistan on three fold narratives of the Muslim ideology or the Islamic ideology in formation of Pakistan as fragile to Hindu community. His argument of division of the Indian sub-continent revolves around three themes, to which he called as master narratives.²³ The concepts of three narratives were derived to get independence from the British as well as the autonomy of that particular region. The first master narrative was based over the secular ideology that included the political parties²⁴ like All India Congress and Muslim religious scholars of *Deoband* school of thought vis-à-vis Aligarh Muslim Foundation. This theme was declined by Jinnah and his aides under the fearful conceptualization of alienation of Muslims of India besides being sidelined and transformed into ethnic minority. The second ideology was religious,²⁵ which was developed by All India Muslim League and partly by Aligarh School of thought but sidelined by major Muslim scholars like AbulKalam, Anwar Shah Kashmiri and Hussain Ahmed Madani, while Shabbir Usmani and Maududi initially supported but later joined Muslim League against this narrative. Finally, the third theme was based on Hindu class system²⁶ like Bhartiya Jana Sangh (later Bhartiya Janata Party), Rashtrya Swayam Sewak Singh (RSS), later converted to Hindu religious nationalism involving minor fanatic religious parties. Ironically this theme was rejected by almost all the major parties but later in new millennium almost after sixty years or so, the same narrative overshadowed the Indian politics in the success of Narendra Modi or especially after *Ajodhya Mosque* and *Gujarat Massacre* cases.

²¹Haroon, Ullah K, *op.cit*, pp. 55-6.

²²*Ibid*, p. 20; and Cohen, Stephen P, *The Idea of Pakistan*, (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 2004), pp. 24-29.

²³Varshney, Ashutosh, *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 55-6.

²⁴*Ibid*.

²⁵*Ibid*.

²⁶*Ibid*.

2. The ideological disparity overshadowing demographic division persisted after the partition as expected predominantly in East Pakistan as Bengali-speaking region of smaller size, but with slightly more inhabitants than its western counterparts. A total of 75.6 Million population is recorded in 1951 after settlements of *Muhajreen* (migrants) was still in progress, out of which 41.9 was in East whereas 33.7 million were in West Pakistan.²⁷ The population reached to 93.7 million in the year 1961 in both East and West portions with having 50.8 and 42.9 million respectively²⁸. Cohen comparing the demographic statics of Pakistan narrates that its Demographic trends shaped the state in a remarkable increase in population because of the highest birth rates as compared to its mortality ratio over 2 percent a year, doubling the demographic percentage to roughly every thirty to thirty-five years²⁹. Hence the religious sovereignty of imagined community is the prime motive leading to its growth or decline, was a questioning factor in newly emerged part nation-state according to Buzan's model.³⁰ Buzan explaining the model asserts that the strong states like USA, UK and Germany besides monopoly of strong pressure over legitimate violence would cater for extreme welfare, freedom and liberty of its citizen, whereas weak states would lack both ingredients formerly mentioned. Contrarily, the partly fragile in any of aforementioned ingredient would besides fulfilling the requisite of nation state lack the fitment of either of the weak or strong state, which would be termed as the part nation state, and Pakistan including many other falls in same category.
3. Henceforth, Punjab's healthier share in politics and economy, lack of a proper constitutional framework, adoption of Urdu as the national language relegating Bengali language and over-riding clause of banning Rabendernath Tagore's poetry caused major resentment within the eastern wing, besides numerous East Bengalis registered a sense of cultural alienation right after partition in Pre-1971 era. Besides, this cultural rift or denial of rich history as argued by Akbar Zaidi, the state or West Pakistan was also in a conflicting position with religious ideology, forces and parties, and above all masses in the pretext of two-nation theory verses modern nation-state theory of single nation united in ethnic community. Resultantly, the ideology was overtaken by the ethnicity and cultural traditionalism of the imagined community. This factor not only suppressed ethnic national identities ignoring the *la longue duree* cultural differences encompassed in two geographical locations of East and West wings divided in almost thousand miles apart but also shattered the ideological bondage within twenty-five years of its construction. Though the newly born nation-state besides enormous problems faced demise of the founder of the nation and murder of first prime minister besides enormous volume of violence and martial laws by bureaucratic-military alliance duly supported by the judiciary transformed the

²⁷ Ministry of Home and Kashmir Affairs, *Population Consensus of Pakistan, 1961*, in Rounaq, Jehan, Pakistan: Failure in Nation Integration, (Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 11-16.

²⁸ *Ibid.*

²⁹ Cohen, Stephen P, (eds), *The Future of Pakistan*, (Washington, D.C: The Brookings Institution, 2011) pp. 14-15.

³⁰ Buzan, Barry, *People, State and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, (Sussex: Whetshelf, 1982), pp. 43-47 and 96-107.

future political discourse, state structure and history of Pakistan engulfed into turmoil.

4. **Post 1971 and Pre 9/11 Pakistan.** In the process of crisis in identity recognition between religion and ethnicity after 1971, the religious ideology was once again getting extra ordinary attention with a certificate of patriotism in suppressing the ethnic, cultural and traditional markers as secondary or negligible identity factors duly owned by state elements. Moreover, the use/involvement and regular takeovers' of state elements based on illegitimate powers by the elite of both political and state elements, using the masses under the pretext of modernization of Islam and Pakistan in uniformed as well as civilianized role in 1958 and 1999, whereas the authoritarian regime of 1977 had purely covered the veil of Islamization in the country in uniformed role throughout the tenure. Contrarily, the religious parties/elements remained focused over attainment of power in an intermittent role of friends and foes, which created a vacuum in masses to trust them as reliable stake holders of ideological implementers of Pakistan. However, the emergence of Islamization and Islamic *Jehad* transformed the ideology of Pakistan a renewed life with Indian animosity as the trump card in the hands of the state elements. This phenomenon brought enormous volume of violence in Pakistan whereas the territory became home of non-state actors shaping the domestic and international political discourse into its new generation state structure.
5. **Post 9/11 Pakistan.** The ideological stance of Post 9/11 period is quite interesting once the Pakistani state became under limelight as frontline state of international world order against the Islamization ideology proving the clash or ignorance of civilization theories. During this period also Pakistan was viewed acceptable to international as well as domestic public opinion under the dictator, which created either his own favorite political parties or privileged the opportunist politicians/elite for the political survival. The coalition of government and state illegitimacy supported the dictator's legislature process equally supported by both politicians and judiciary to keep the illegitimate ruler in the arena. The conflicting position of benevolent or noble savage dictator was warmly accepted by the public opinion of masses against the hype of politically weak leadership in illegitimate dismissal of elected governments due to vicious cycle of morally corrupt political government. Contrarily, the same morally corrupt government used to be again elected politically under FPTP after the departure of the dictatorship at equally welcome note by the same masses highlighting the democratic mindset of Pakistani society. However, the process of prolonging the dictatorial regime despite the gigantic economic and administrative reforms under realist paradigm to support international world as well as public opinion inherently led to violence, radicalism and militancy in political and masses of Pakistan. The transformation of the religious ideology was beautifully carried out in the favor of 'Pakistan First Policy', which was confusingly engulfed between the religion that was progressive and modern, while the political state structure as conservative yet bringing common citizens to political power through rearrangements at grass-root level under the dictatorship.

6. The Post 9/11 phenomenon besides developing or continuing the fragile construction of imagined community led to a model of survival of Pakistan led by military ideological narratives of Turkish secularism. This model was neither acceptable to masses nor let flourished by political leadership for obvious reasons. The crosscutting segmentation has now more pronounced between *Deo-bandi* or *Jehadi* school and secular or military power that gave a chance of benefit to opportunist leadership in terms of exploitation weakening the ideology manifolds.
 - a. **Effects of Ulterior Use of Religious Ideology against State Structure.** The development of ideologies and their vehicular tools besides effecting public opinion and mass political process, transform state structure both domestically as well as internationally. Fuller highlighting the progressively modern adaptability of political Islam yet backward looking in de jure governance, is the most powerful ideology in Muslim world from Africa to South East Asia on one hand. Whereas on the other hand, the Muslim states also hark back to modern state governance of democratization evolved through Magna Carta, American and French Revolutions for political solutions.³¹ Pakistan being no exception to this phenomenon, fragile state structure verses strong political ideology or vice versa remained under the focus of this analogy. Indeed, the Fuller's argument of religious ideology faced threefold threats in Pakistani society. First, from the local political scene, second from international politics and finally threats of own grievances against the policies and forces of contemporary world.³² The identified set of these factors put the Pakistani state structure weak and fragile due to the vicious circle of dissatisfaction amongst masses, leading to repression and revolution against political set up and intervention from state elements duly supported by international world, and again dissatisfaction of the masses from the state elements thereby handing the government to the almost same political set up. Rais argues that the dictatorship in Pakistan may not be classically termed as Authoritarian regime³³ being in conformity to the concept of 'Illiberal Democracy' in controlled Authoritarian regime by Fareed Zakaria. This aspect was particularly visible in the dictators' later stage generally and transition to hybrid form of democracy or a military authoritarian regime in a civilianized role particularly. In its essence, however the broken promises of authoritarian regimes and inept political governments gave birth to violence and radicalism in Pakistan. The chronological events of violence, radicalization and militancy emerged as expected during the dialecticism of state elements as the ultimate necessity, brought following summarized effects in the Pakistani society and state:-
 1. Divide over political representation on religious basis i.e. Hindu-Muslim religions, of separate electorates due to the inherited British colonization created political insecurity in the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent

³¹ Fuller, Graham E. 'The Future of Political Islam', in, *Essential Readings in World Politics*, ed. Karen A Mingst and Jack L. Snyder in (New York: WW Norton & Company, 2001), pp.173-180.

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Rais, RasoolBakhsh, in an interview conducted by the author at LUMS Lahore, on 14 October 2015.

forcing them to adapt Islamization fallacies alive in post-independence era as well. This insecurity of political divide on religious lines persistently continued and used by elite for their ulterior motives after the independence of Pakistan, thereby relegating public opinion and democratic norms in legislation and governance over fragile ideological abstracts leading to authoritarianism of state elements in instrumentalising the policies.

2. The political insecurity remained evident in politicians besides enormous confusion in ideological changed stance after the 9/11 era as Pakistanis irrespective of religion, ethnicity and/or linguistic diversity under a dictatorial regime. The political elite confusingly accentuated this 'Pakistan First Policy' as invented in dictatorial regime but in the process nourished the under development of political institutionalism and fragile civil society besides a cultural segmentation. This unnatural forced official patriotism of one-nation became the basis of ethnic and religious divide corrupting the political parties by developing militant wings in their set ups, ignoring the rich traditional culture besides a confusing status of ideological foundation in the masses of Pakistan.
3. Power struggle in inept and non-pragmatic political leadership of Pakistan including the ulterior motives added weak governance to the political institutional discourse in all above mentioned phases. The undesirable role of politicians/political parties in weakening the institutions, the intermittent role of judiciary and religious elements as friends and foes simultaneously on doctrine of necessity tarnished the image of religion not only in ideological framework of Pakistan but created a hopeless situation from this great religion as inability to provide solution to this menace. Moreover, the recent increased momentum of religious militancy has further accentuated the already problematic situation.

Conclusion

The de-colonial states almost in all the cases world over with no exception to Pakistan, was generally struck by broken promises of development, poverty, disease, illiteracy and bitter hopelessness that led to being a soft target of violence, along-with a series of dictatorial/populist regimes. These brittle governance imbalance are enhanced many folds with the political oppression, inaptness, incompetence, corruption and nepotism which multiplied geometrically. Moreover, this process of fragile structure of statecraft enhances if marginalization by its state elite in creating confusion amongst masses by using the fluidity of social construction of ideology to hide their ulterior motives of grabbing power visibly occurs by the stakeholders.

The failing governance by the illegitimate populist or authoritarian regimes on one hand, with the intermittent relation of opportunist elite enjoining state elements developing clientelism on the other hand, was important contributing factor of enormous mushroom growth of radicalism in Pakistani society. Unfortunately, the aforementioned flaw of ideological fragile construction with organizational imbalance of power sharing dilemma

in state elements and practically poor governance resulted in a fragile state structure. Religion being an emotionally highly charged ideology was continuously involved in statecraft. This dilemma besides being a fragile theme exploited by opportunist leadership transforming it into a fault line with crosscutting cleavages in the intermittent relationship of state, society and governance system of Pakistan.

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