

POWER RELATIONS IN AN EPISODE OF *KHARA SACH*: A CRITICAL DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

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Abstract

The purpose of this observational case study is to discover power relations in terms of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as manifested in Mubashir Luqman's talk show *Khara Sach*. The episode under consideration was aired on August 26, 2014, in the wake of *Pakistan Awami Tehreek* (PAT) and *Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf's* (PTI) "Aazadi March", (march for revolution) which is the main topic of discussion throughout the show. The guests include ex-President Pervez Musharraf, journalists Sabir Shakir and Arif Hameed Bhatti, and on-call guest, Asad Kharal, also a journalist. The observation illustrated certain aspects of power relations particular to talk shows in our context. First, the host is the sovereign power and everyone acknowledges their role as such. Secondly, political guests are addressed more politely but are challenged more directly, perhaps to create a charged environment to woo viewers. Third, all the participants seem to gradually warm up to the screen and to each other, seeing that overlaps, interruptions and power abuse increase as the program progresses. Last, the analysis reasonably suggests that those who are physically present in a conversation have more opportunities of asserting their dominance, taking turns and holding the floor as compared to those who are absent.

Keywords: critical discourse analysis, power, power relations, power abuse, power resistance.

Introduction

With the sudden influx of news channels in Pakistan's television industry, the media has gained tremendous power in recent years. Many of the fresh news channels started in ex-President Pervez Musharraf's regime, who advocated freedom of expression despite his tyrannical 1999-2008 military coup as army chief. Since then, the trend of openly criticizing politicians has gained much ground. Shows like *Ham sab umeed se hain*, *Hasb-e-haal* and *Banana news* have gained great popularity with a frustrated public that is helpless but to watch and laugh out their sorrows with those who have power to publicly ridicule the oppressors on air.

This is one of the causes behind the power of the media in the current social, economic and political situation of Pakistan: the fact that they act as an outlet of people's troubles. There is emphasis on the phrase "act as", a point we shall address later. Since one of the key tenets of critical discourse analysis (CDA) is to parse "the connection between language and unequal relation of power", as suggested by Fairclough (2001, cited in Panhwar 2010, p. 55), media has a critical role to play in our scenario. This is because the discourse of media is the most public of all. Additionally, since CDA is a research method that aims to uncover the meaning of discourse, which is always culturally and politically embedded, it analyzes how discourse is used to shape society and ideology, in order to understand and resist injustice, power abuse and inequality. This is where CDA and politics align.

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Van Dijk (2008, p. 352) opines, CDA "...primarily studies the way social power abuse, dominance, and inequality are enacted, reproduced, and resisted by text and talk in the social and political context." This definition demonstrates that politics and power are inextricably linked. Therefore a study like the one at hand, which aims to critically analyze the discourse of one particular episode of a talk show, featuring a prominent political entity, can enrich our understanding not just of power relations in discourse but also of the status quo of the current Pakistani populace. Fairclough, (1995) emphasizing the influence of news media, writes "...the news media can be regarded as covertly transmitting the voices of social power-holders." (p. 63).

The show analyzed here *Khara Sach* (pure truth) is hosted by the well-known journalist, Mubashir Luqman. The episode aired on August 26, 2014 was selected because the topic of discussion is one of the major events that took place in Pakistan in the year of writing; one that made waves, and, some might argue, is still creating ripples. The first guest in the show was ex-President Pervez Musharraf, who had been, in a sense, incognito, since the court charges pressed against him were laid to rest some months ago. This was Musharraf's first public interview since then. After Musharraf, the other two guests Luqman conversed with together were Arif Hameed Bhatti and Sabir Shakir, both journalists. The last person to join the discussion (via call) was Asad Kharal, another journalist.

It is hoped that this study will answer questions about power relations in the Pakistani context, particularly in terms of media, the influence of which in politics is growing speedily, as explained above. Politics is a rich field for CDA. Yet political discourse is seldom discussed in Pakistan due to its security ramifications. However, linguists are duty-bound to unearth the hidden meanings in discourse, especially the discourse of social power-holders.

Research Questions

Talk shows in our context are rich in terms of discursual manifestations of power, or lack thereof. They provide much data for analysis of politeness, greetings, turn taking, overlaps, etc., all of which contribute to power relations, which are the focus of the study. To be precise, the research questions are:

1. How is power relations manifested in the talk show?
 - a. Which of the interlocutors are powerful and why?
 - b. Who engages in power abuse and how?
 - c. What patterns of power resistance are observed?

Literature Review

CDA is concerned with "...relations between discourse, power, dominance and social inequality" (van Dijk, 1993, p. 249). One of the means to maintain such relations is through the exercise of power: which refers to the ability to control (a variety of resources). Van Dijk (1993, 2008) explains power in terms of two types of control, that is, control over other's actions or their cognition. He explains that power abuse occurs when the powerful use their control for their own good. In his words, power abuse is "legally or morally illegitimate exercise of control over others in one's own interests, often resulting in social inequality" (van Dijk, 1996, p. 84). Power abuse is viewed as a discourse event where the powerful, or those striving to be, usurp the rights of those who are less powerful.

Where does power come from? Van Dijk (1996) points out that it is access to communicative sources that allows a group to become dominant. Communicative sources include the right to plan, an audience, style and the right to determine who says what to whom, and how, with what perlocutionary effect. This relates to Foucault's (1995) argument that power and knowledge are two sides of the same coin. In other words, those who have knowledge are powerful. Both van Dijk (1996) and Foucault's (1995) points can be understood with reference to the example of an educational institute. Those who have knowledge and access to a large audience whose cognition they can influence, are the most powerful in that context, that is, teachers. In fact, van Dijk (2008) writes that people acquire ideologies and attitudes from sources they deem reliable and informative, including teachers and media. These points explain where the power of the media stems from.

Mayr's (2008) concept of social power is similar: "power belonging to people who have privileged access to social resources, such as education, knowledge and wealth" (Mayr, 2008, p.11). They further suggest that persuasion and domination are two categories of power, which is defined as the ability "...of actors to secure the compliance of others, even against their resistance." (Mayr, 2008, p.12).

Additional types of power are described by Fairclough (1995), who terms the capacity to maintain dominance as "...ideological/discoursal power', which exists alongside economic and political power..." (p. 41). It should come as no surprise then, that the media has great ideological and persuasive power, the way Fairclough (1995) and Mayr (2008) have used these terms.

Moreover, Fairclough (1995, p. 179) argues that there has occurred a 'mediatization of politics' suggesting that politicians' new-found visibility and accessibility, thanks to media, puts them at risk. However; he suggests that media is not solely to be blamed, because it is not just politicians that are on the losing end, but also other professional groups, such as teachers and doctors, who have experienced a paradigm shift towards consumers in the current "consumer society" as termed by Keat et. al (1994) (cited in Fairclough, 1995, p. 180). The spread in consumerism is a primary cause of the media "acting as" or claiming to be the voice of the nation.

Fairclough (1995) further differentiates between power and status, saying that the former refers to real power, the latter to equal or unequal interactional liberties. This is where power relations come in: meaning the symmetrical or asymmetrical distribution of power, as demonstrated in discourse. For instance, those who have the right to interrupt, to silence, to "...utter 'obligating' illocutionary acts (such as requests and questions)..." (Fairclough, 1995, p. 46) etc. have higher status in the discourse, and thus (appear to) exercise their power. Such conversational elements are what Foucault (in Mc Houl, *et. al*, 1995) terms techniques when he proposes that power gains visibility only by means of the techniques through which it is exercised. For the same reason, he argues that power resistance is futile unless it pinpoints at a particular technique. This implies that when one participant exercises his/her power by interrupting the other, the other can resist this abuse by taking back the floor. This is described as resistance to power abuse in the sense that the less powerful strive to take back his/her (discoursal) rights.

Contrarily, Foucault (in McHoul, *et. al*, 1995) feels there is no reason to view power negatively:

“We must cease once and for all to describe the effects of power in negative terms: it “excludes”, it “represses”, it “censors”, it “abstracts”, it “masks”, it “conceals”. In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth” (p.79).

Even though Foucault does not view power as a necessarily negative construct, he opines that power resistance occurs when one points out the source of power, “...to point the finger of accusation...” (Foucault, 1977, p. 214) in order to initiate the “...first step in the reversal of power...” (Foucault, 1977, p. 214).

One of the forms of power resistance is exposing power abuse. For instance, Panhwar (2012), who feels that Musharraf abused his military power, critically analyzed Musharraf’s 2008 address in a public rally on the topic of judicial crisis. They assert “The iota of Musharrafism for absolute power is the trend mark which he has shown through his body language, punitive and raucous verbal language against his opponents” (Panhwar, 2012, p. 58). They also suggest that he engages in ‘ideological square’ which means using positive terms for oneself and negative ones for opponents. A similar observation of theirs is that throughout the address he vacillates between portraying himself as a leader of the masses on the one hand and a formidable army general for his adversaries on the other hand. The credibility of this study seems questionable at times for it is heavily biased from the outset, as is especially illustrated by the coinage of the term ‘Musharrafism’ to mean dictatorship in general.

Bughio *et al.*, (2012) have written an equally biased analysis of PTI chairman Imran Khan’s pre-election speech, but it is biased in favor of Khan. Although power is not their main focus, they have shown how Khan controlled his audience’s actions and cognition during his oration. For instance, in the beginning of the speech he warns his audience “*Mere Pakistaniyo~*” (My Pakistanis) that it is about to rain but implores them not to move from the spot until his speech is over. Later we observe that it indeed does rain and the people stay where they are. This was a successful exercise of power on Khan’s part.

Research Methodology

This research is a case study, and CDA is unique in that the detailed perspective presented in case studies by design is not just appropriate, but is actually vital, to analyzing discourse critically. As Fairclough (1995) asserts, CDA is inextricably linked with the “social and cultural goings-on” the text stems from (as cited in Mayr, 2008, p. 64). The fact that discourse never exists in a vacuum lends credence to the conjecture that it is not possible to understand or analyze discourse the context of which we do not fully understand. Hence, it is imperative that we study discourse in the local context to arrive at an understanding of its underlying ideologies.

This specific show was chosen for three reasons. First, it was a talk show, and our talk shows are literally power struggles, which made it all the more pertinent for this study. Second, it featured Pervez Musharraf, an eminent political personality, albeit one in the past. Lastly, this episode was a “special” one, as quoted by Luqman, and it was 45 minutes longer than his regular program.

Roman Urdu transcription of the conversation is presented where necessary, as only translation would rob the dialogue of the deep meaning of the utterances. Interruptions, overlaps, turn-grabbing and turn-denying, yelling and lengthy turns are seen as some of the signs of power struggle. These, and others, are described in detail below.

Discussion of Findings

Before discussing the findings, a reference to ethical considerations is compulsory. An effort has been made to avoid political comments and/or subjective evaluations of the underlying ideological stances of the participants, to a reasonable extent without compromising on the quality of minutiae crucial to CDA.

In order to avoid plagiarism, all the help and sources have been rightfully acknowledged. It is important to mention here that a detailed analysis of the show was made possible only due to its prompt uploading on the website *Dailymotion*. (See references for the web link).

The host Mubashir Luqman begins the show by informing the viewers that he is going to interview former President of Pakistan, Pervez Musharraf but, using his power as the host he delays the dialogue with Musharraf so that he can first tell the audience that he has a “complete” report that proves that our elections are “totally fraud, I’m telling you.” Two things are important here. First, it was easy for the host to delay greeting Musharraf because the latter was not physically present but instead had a camera positioned in front of him, the video of which was being fed to the show. Second, the self-assertive accusation about the elections is powerful talk, especially considering the use of the personal pronoun. However, it is completely in line with Luqman’s role as the host of a talk show that is obviously part of a media ratings contest.

Luqman then greets Musharraf saying “*General saahib, Assalaam-o-alaikum*,” (greetings, General) who in turn replies “*Wa’alaikum assalaam* Mubashir” (greetings to you too, Mubashir). Note that the former uses a title and a polite address term unique to the culture, *saahib*, (roughly meaning “mister”) while the latter uses just the first name to address his interlocutor, perhaps hinting that the former President still holds a residue of power, or at least respect. Luqman states that he will first ask Musharraf some personal questions. This kind of topical control by Luqman is observed throughout the show, and may be interpreted as power abuse, albeit it is again in accordance with his role as the host of the program.

Luqman first demands an explanation for why Musharraf has taken so long to talk to the media, asserting the authority of the media with this utterance. Musharraf answers in defense, again addressing Luqman by first name only embedded within his reply. He is observed to do this many times during the show. It is either a show of dominance or of polite/sincere familiarity. In answer to the question, Musharraf uses hedges multiple times and, near the end of this turn, he expresses the hope that Luqman will address particular topics which he would like to talk about. This serves as an acknowledgment of the host’s supremacy in the talk show. Meanwhile, Luqman signals that he wants to say something but patiently waits (as he does at many instances during the show) for Musharraf to finish his turn then assures him that he will try his level best to discuss those topics.

The host enquires after the health of Musharraf and his mother, using the polite address term “*aap*.” Normally this might be taken as a show of concern but we know that this is not the case because Musharraf’s illness and that of his mother were crucial elements that worked in his favor when he was in court trial, thus being newsworthy. After this topic is dealt with, Luqman asks Musharraf’s opinion of the protesting parties but before giving his answer, the latter congratulates Luqman on the success of his show. This appears to be a powerless exchange of pleasantries. Luqman thanks him, but brushes aside the compliments impatiently, redirecting the conversation to the main topic. It is observed that Luqman does not provide Musharraf any encouraging backchannels although he does change the slight tilt of his head every now and then. Since

backchannels are intended to support and encourage the interlocutor, this scarcity of response made Luqman appear like a rude interrogator rather than a polite interviewer. During Luqman's turn too, Musharraf does not offer backchannels. This reciprocal response can either be interpreted as an implicit power struggle or may simply be a result of the fact that they are not actually sitting face to face.

There are many instances of powerful talk by Musharraf. He shifts between the polite address term "*aap*" (like the French *vous*) and the informal one "*tum*" (like the French *tu*) throughout the show according to whether or not Luqman agrees with him, respectively. He often uses absolutes like "never", "quite clearly, *is me~ koi shak nahi~ he*" (there is no doubt about this), and "not at all". A few times he categorically raises his index finger and says "*dekhe~*" (look) to snatch the floor. While talking about the purpose and utility of the National Accountability Bureau, Musharraf proudly refers to it as "*hamaare* NAB", with an emphasis on "*hamaare*" (our). He also declares "*me~ challenge se kehta hu~*" (I guarantee) that none of Pakistan's democratic governments helped it progress. Both the utterances mentioned above bolster Panhwar's (2012, p. 62) statement that Musharraf uses "ideological square," an idea explained earlier. About 43 minutes into the interview, he loudly and forcefully says "*bedaar ho jao, Pakistaaniyo...*" (wake up, Pakistanis) in a direct address to the audience, implying that he trusts he is being heard all over Pakistan and that he still wields the power to influence their beliefs and actions.

On the contrary, Musharraf is observed to often talk quite powerlessly too. Other than his repeated use of the hedge "*mera xayaal he*" (I think) or its semantic equivalents, he also praises Luqman on his choice of topic and once says the host has "put it very beautifully." At one point he even asks Luqman about a certain technical word he used before using the same word in his following sentence, which shows that he conceded his relative lack of knowledge in that regard. This is a show of humility rarely found in our culture, where older/senior interlocutors often suppress their juniors (in age and/or experience) to the point that they do not admit when they are wrong or ignorant, and the juniors generally accept this without argument as a sign of respect. Moreover, about 45 minutes into the interview, after Luqman interrupts him during his turn, he pauses and asks the host to repeat what he said by saying "Sorry?" and then incorporates agreement with Luqman's interjection in his subsequent reply. Many times, he pauses to make room for the host's interjections and additions to his remarks, and even apologizes multiple times for talking too long, or discussing something he has not been asked about. This is another quality seldom found in older men in our society, who are notorious for their fondness of lengthy monologues.

Luqman raises the question of how progress can be achieved when there is so much nepotism, phrasing it with, as coined by Brown et. al (1987), bald on-record politeness, "*aap log jo apne hi logo~ ko laga dete he~...*" (the practice of you people appointing your own people). Musharraf confirms that he's included in this collective accusation: "*ye aap log me~ kya aap mujhe bhi shaamil kar rahe he~?*" (are you including me in this 'you people') in a surprised manner, and Luqman counters "I'm including everyone" without even flinching. Musharraf gets really affronted and insists that he is fiercely against nepotism, powerfully challenging the host to find "ONE" example of such an appointment in his regime. At this point, the host tries to interrupt and says he has an example, which is an act of power resistance towards Musharraf's previous utterance. But the former President, in a counter power-resistant move asserts "*ek minute*, let me finish..." (One minute). This is one of the rare moments in which the discussion turns into an argument, however briefly. Luqman's example is "*NRO aap ne apne liye kiya tha*", (you implemented the NRO for your own benefit). Musharraf replies in an outrage "*NRO me~ ne kiya tha but aap ye kese keh rahe he~ ke ye me~*

ne apne liye kiya tha, me~ ne to mulk ke liye kiya tha” (I did implement the NRO but how can you say I did it for myself? I did it for the country). The host concedes then rephrases his question and there are a few seconds of overlapped conversation, after which Musharraf finally admits that the NRO (National Reconciliation Ordinance) was indeed his “biggest mistake” and Luqman nods in agreement before moving on to his next question. If this can be construed as a battle of power, we can safely say that it was the host who won.

The dialogue returns to its mellow tone when Musharraf, in his successive turn, mentions someone and says he would like to talk about that person if Luqman allows, in response to which the host avers that Musharraf does not need his permission: “*aap xud kahe~*.” (Go ahead and say it yourself). This apparent effort for reconciliation is also reflected in the frequent backchannels the host provides during the ex-President’s following comment, including an emphatic “precisely.”

But it again takes a turn towards face-threatening once the host insists that we are all puppets to the US, including Musharraf. The latter immediately raises his index finger and shakes his head in an uncompromising stance, firmly saying “No Mubashir”, adding that he will “never agree with that.” However, he allows Luqman to state his reasons for saying so anyway. Musharraf maintains that he does not obey the US, and says he can look any American in the eye without his knees shaking. Luqman listens but characteristically does not comment, moving on to his next question.

Luqman alleges that he knows for sure that Osama bin Laden’s DNA was found by the US in 2007, but Musharraf flat out denies this, saying “*ye kis ki baat kar rahe ho*” (what are you talking about), “no, this is not a fact”. The host’s certainty immediately falters and after a few seconds of overlapping turns he concedes to his interlocutor’s claim that “*nahi~ ye bilkul sahi baat nahi~ he*” (no, this is not true at all). So in this instance, it is the host who has to back off.

Near the end of their dialogue, when Luqman brings up the issue of the NRO once more, Musharraf directly says “*Ye NRO ki baari pareshaani hui hui he tumhe~ aaj kal*” (you are quite concerned about the NRO these days) and the former confrontationally counters “*haa~ mujhe hui hui he*,” (yes, I am) in yet another power-resistant move.

The talk show host concludes this interview by thanking “General Pervez Musharraf”. The purpose of this “thank you” is not to show gratitude but rather to dismiss.

After a break, the second segment of the show starts, and Luqman introduces the new guests by their full names only *sans* titles: Arif Hameed Bhatti and Sabir Shakir. Note that this is different from the way he introduced and consistently addressed Musharraf. Customarily, the host first directs the conversation to his own desired first topic.

There is much overlap among the speech of the various participants in this part of the show, perhaps because there are more people now or maybe because they are on a more equal footing.

Bhatti often takes a turn by raising his index finger, clearing his throat or most often by saying “*dekhe~*” (look) and “*ek minute*” (one minute).

The other guest, Shakir initially seems nervous as he talks slowly, uses hedges and scratches his eyebrows and neck repeatedly. He silently lets others air their views and at times seems reluctant to present his own even when asked, replying “*kya keh sakte he~ is baare me~*” (what can be said about this). But further into the show when the discussion gets heated he is the one most disruptive of others’ turns. For example,

almost half an hour later, when Bhatti is answering one of Luqman's questions, Shakir repeatedly tries to interject and Bhatti finally relents the floor once Luqman says "hm" to one of Shakir's comments. (This reasserts Luqman's supremacy as the manager of the conversation.) At one point, while Bhatti is answering one of Luqman's questions and is asked another one, Shakir immediately puts forward an answer but is abruptly cut off when another journalist, Asad Kharal, comes on call. It is observed that Luqman addresses Kharal only by his first name, unlike all the other participants in the program. After his introduction is over and Kharal has completed his opening statement, Shakir takes up the conversation. Kharal tries to add something but the former barely acknowledges his word and partly rejects it, which is another example of his power misuse.

In a different but related vein, note that the power abuse in this instance partly stems from the fact that Kharal is the only one who is not physically present in the scene, thus has limited channels through which to assert his dominance. Even though Musharraf too was not physically present, he and Luqman were having a one-on-one conversation and he was an older and political figure, so he did not face the same problems in asserting himself as Kharal. Admittedly, unlike Musharraf, there is no live camera crew feeding Kharal's picture into view.

Later in the conversation, when Luqman reads out a point from his report, everyone gets excited and suddenly they all start talking at once. Bhatti is able to win the floor with both arms raised and a loud "*achchha dekhe~*" (OK, look) but before he can complete his sentence, Shakir interrupts him effortlessly: with arms folded, looking down and in a low volume. Again it is the host who suspends Shakir's remark by insisting that he needs to ask Kharal about this.

This is just one of multiple occasions where the other participants try to dominate Kharal but the host bolsters him. Perhaps it is because he realizes the caller's handicap due to his limited channel; we observe that it is during Kharal's answers that Luqman most frequently offers encouraging backchannels. Also, even though Kharal often pauses during one of his long turns (3 minutes and 20 seconds), Luqman does not intervene. However; Luqman's lack of response extends to Kharal too, because once he asks Kharal a question and interrupts him with another question during his response, characteristically ignoring his preceding answer.

Kharal exhibits powerless talk as he asks the host "*agar mujhe ijaazat he to me~ kahu~...*," (if I may) to which the latter says "*Bismillah*" (please commence). However; Kharal apparently overstates his welcome because he tries to exert his power towards the end of the dialogue by jumping in even when Luqman addresses a question to Bhatti by name. Here, Luqman listens for a while then powerfully reasserts his role as monitor of the discussion by cutting short the caller's sentence and call with a polite "thank you Asad Saahib." Ironically, this is the only time during the show when Luqman addresses Kharal with a title.

This is one of the instances Luqman uses negative politeness, as the term is used by Brown et. al (1987), in order to be assertive but not rude. He also once interrupts his guests by saying "*Sabir saahib, Bhatti saahib, jab aap ka dil kare aap biich me~ bole~ lekin mera ek jumla he...*" (Mr. Sabir, Mr. Bhatti, feel free to interrupt me whenever you want but I must add one point).

Luqman asks Bhatti one last question. Bhatti's successive response is colored with emotion and rife with repetition but, and perhaps hence, neither of the remaining participants interrupts him. In fact, they both add supportive comments. After this, the host dismisses both the guests by addressing them with their full names and titles and thanking them.

It is at this point that Luqman, for the third time in the show, makes a direct camera address to the viewers. The first address was when the show started, before he introduced Musharraf, and then once again after the break right before he introduced Shakir and Bhatti. The direct address, albeit a general feature of this type of program, serves to reinforce the power of the host. This is because here the program becomes a display for the audience, where they know they are being directly addressed yet are denied the right and the means to respond.

On the whole, it can be observed that even though Luqman and Musharraf were not equal participants, in that one is a relatively younger and only recently famous journalist and the other a relatively older past President, it was Luqman who was overall more assertive and powerful. Other than his polite address term for the ex-President, Luqman was the one who controlled the topic, who dismissed Musharraf's responses by not giving those of his own, directly affronted Musharraf thrice, and rarely shifted from his viewpoint. On the other hand, Musharraf, who addressed Luqman by his first name only, was generally polite, especially up to the first instance where the host directly provoked him. He did utter a few firm and powerful statements as mentioned above, but often used hedges to soften them. Also, Musharraf apologized multiple times for interrupting and for taking lengthy turns, asked for Luqman's permission when proposing a new topic, admitted his "biggest mistake" on national television, and complimented the host twice.

Perhaps this apparent imbalance of power can be understood with reference to Fairclough's (1995) assertion that:

A particular set of discourse conventions...implicitly embodies certain ideologies – particular knowledge and beliefs, particular 'positions' for the types of social subject that participate in that practice...and particular relationships between categories of participants. (p. 94)

For example, if A is interviewed for a job by B, the CEO of the company, A will be the participant with lower rank. On the other hand, if B goes to a hospital for a dental treatment and A is the head dentist there, their rank order will be reversed.

In the same way, talk show hosts are naturally held responsible for exercising control over topic and turn-taking, which are both manifestations of power.

Conclusion

Conclusively, the fact that the host had the right to decide the topic, interrupt people, and demand answers to his questions made him the most powerful individual in the program. Whether or not we choose to condemn him for his dominance, and label his control as power abuse, depends on how much we believe in van Dijk's (2008, p. 355) words, "... that power is not always exercised in obviously abusive acts of dominant group members, but may be enacted in the myriad of taken-for-granted actions of everyday life...(Essed 1991)."

It was also observed that Luqman engaged in the highest number of bald on-record politeness dialogue with Musharraf, the guest with the most economic and perhaps political power. This is a license media has by virtue of its role as a storehouse of

information, which is one of the primary forms of power in today's knowledge world, and, to maintain this power, media personnel must constantly display their right to demand answers.

Additionally, the scale of the power struggle peaks near the end of the conversation in both segments of the show, suggesting that perhaps participants generally strive to be more polite during openings and closings even if they (intend to) exercise their power later on.

Finally, individuals who are physically present at the time and place of the discourse get more of a say. This is not surprising, considering the fact that they have more channels through which to exercise their power, without doing which power is invisible (Fairclough in McHoul, 1995).

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Part 2 of video: http://www.dailymotion.com/video/x24ml1g_khara-sach-with-mubashir-lucman-part-2-26th-august-2014_news