

Baloch Ethnicity: An analysis of the issue and conflict with state

Abstract

Simmering tension in Balochistan is the cause of multiple factors. Among them one is the Baloch ethnicity, based on its language, culture and territory. The animosity between state of Pakistan and Baloch started since 1948, when state of Kalat was annexed with Pakistan. The annexation was badly criticized by the Baloch nationalists. On the other hand, the state of Pakistan did not take the matter seriously. esultantly a series of resistant moves were started in Balochistan. The state's reluctance to resolve the issue politically, created further distrust between the two contending actors. All the resistant moves were suppressed forcefully which developed anti-state feeling among the Baloch people. The study is an analysis of the nature of the issue of Baloch identity and conflict with state. It is analysed that when state denies the demands of sharing political power or adequate representation in political and administrative institutions, conflictual situation develops between the state and ethnic groups.

Keyword: Ethnicity, Identity, Nationalist, Provincial Autonomy, Historical Narrative, Factional Politics, Socio-Economic Issues, Politics Of Comparison, Distrust, Insurgency.

In Balochistan the centrifugal forces remained operative since its accession with Pakistan. Although centripetal forces are also working for greater unity and integrity with Pakistan but largely they felt deprived and ignored. The public has great resentment about prolonged denial of their due share in national affairs. In reaction, a large number of people are either the part of banned militant outfits or accusing central authority in some other ways. They have expressed their distrust on those who have their share in power with the federal authority but deliver nothing. The politics of ethnicity is increasing day by day. The conflict is reached at a stage, where insurgents are demanding a separate homeland for their ethnic group. To understand the development of politics of ethnicity in Balochistan, to explore the

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nature of the issue and the direction of conflict with the state of Pakistan, it is necessary to have a bird eye view on the history of Baloch ethnic group.

History of Baloch Ethnic Group

The term “Balochis” refers to a confederation of about five hundred tribes and clans. They claim common subjective and objective markers of identity. These are common culture, religion, ancestors, traditions and language (Bijarani, 1974, p.1). Balochis are avowed as a strong and courageous people remained indifferent and enjoyed their autonomy in every political setup in the past.

The origin and administrative structure of Balochis have remained a point of debate among different historians. The most well known writers narrated that the Baloch migrated northward from Aleppo (Syria) when Arabs were moving in search of pasture land and fresh water. Between the sixth and the fourth century (B.C), they travelled through the Southern shores of Caspian Sea, and settled in the Iranian coast of Bander Abbas and Chahbahar in the south, Southern areas of Afghanistan and in the North-West and North-East to Pakistan (Harrison, 1981, p.271; Wirsing, 1987, p.4; Awan, 1985, p.22; Ali, Shaheen and Javaid, 2001, p.59-63). The migration of Baloch tribes towards Southern Balochistan and to Kalat highlands continued for many centuries. At last, they captured Kalat and ousted Sewai Hindus. They established their capital at Miri, near Kalat (Awan, 1985, p.29). They strengthened their power in this area and it became the nerve centre of Balochi rule.

Owing to its geographical importance, various nations like, Greeks, Afghans, Persians and Sikhs made numerous attempts to gain control over their territory, but remained unsuccessful. From 1506 to 1747, the territory remained associated with either Iran or India (Axmann, 2008, p.18). During the Mughal period and the British Raj in India, three Baloch leaders, Mir Chakar Khan Rind, Abdullah Khan and Nasir Khan brought significant changes in the tribal society of Balochis. Mir Chakar Khan established the tribal confederacy. He managed to shake off the rule of Mughals. He promoted cultural activities and strengthened the literacy asset of Balochi language. The second Baloch ruler, Abdullah Khan made efforts to unify the Balochis politically. Then Nasir Khan, the 6th Khan of Kalat created the Baloch army, consisting of 25,000 men and 1,000 camels. He ruled there for

more than half a century with his structured bureaucratic administration and two legislative councils (Baloch, 1987, p. 103; Khan, 2003, p.282). Owing to their continuous efforts the Baloch principality of Kalat succeeded in to bring most of the Baloch tribes under one political unit (Binder, 1987, p.273).

Despite the fact that new governing tactics introduced by Nasir Khan had improved the overall situation, hence some structural weaknesses had created gap between bureaucracy and various tribes. Except the ruling tribe, others were considered only the providers of force. Due to the fact a clear tension could easily be observed between the central authority and the tribal Sardars (Hewitt, 1996. P.50). Unfortunately, the institutions were not established properly that is why, the death of Khan crumbled down his Political system.

Colonial Division of Balochistan

The death of Nasir Khan I not only caused the decline of Khanate's power but also brought the British into Balochistan. The British occupation of Balochistan was executed in two phases from 1839 to 1876 and 1876 to 1947. The contentious relationship between the British and the Russian Empire placed Afghanistan on an important position. Afghanistan was more inclined towards Russian because of its regional proximity with Central Asia. Due to the threat of Russian advancement towards Asian region Britishers were engaged in Afghan war.

The Afghan war (1839-42) was marked as the beginning of political connection between the British and the Khan of Kalat (Scholz, 2002, p. 90). Due to juxta position of Balochistan and Afghanistan, the former got importance and Britishers extended support to Kalat state. The relationship lost its vitality in a short span and the British attacked and killed the ruler of Kalat Mir Mehrab Khan (Baluch, 1958, p. 73). After a while Mir Nasir II, regained the possession of Kalat state but the deadly confrontations with British did not ease the Balochis. They suffered heavily and ultimately reached an agreement. The treaty made British Companies empowered for a long range trade and free military movement. In return, the Khan of Kalat received an amount of Rs.50000 as subsidy. This agreement is considered as the beginning of purchasing the Khan's loyalty in the form of subsidy.

The British's forward policy to stop Russian move towards warm water compelled it to get direct control on this route. To serve their own interests, they fought a series of wars with the Baloch for more than four decades. In 1876, they became successful to manage a treaty to get control over Kalat, Kharan, Makran, and Lasbella. At that time the British were able to station their military force in Balochistan and Robert Sandman became the first political agent to Governor General in Balochistan (Khan, 2003, p.284). Robert Sandman also laid the foundation of a system that practically treated Balochistan as an agency governed by an indirect rule. The system was known as "Sandemanisation" (Awan, 1985, p.120). Under this system a council of chief and Shahi Jirga was executed. The purpose was to ensure tribal Sardar's participation in the political process. The Britishers applied their tactics of "Divide and Rule" and divided Balochistan's territory in the following ways;

- a) Dera Ghazi Khan was annexed with Punjab and Khengarh and its associated areas were identified by the name of Jacobabad, the areas were included to Sindh's territorial jurisdiction.
- b) The areas of Marri, Bugti, Khetran and Chaghi got the status of tribal areas. The British Balochistan was formed while adjoining the tribal areas and Nasirabad, Bolan, Quetta and Noshki. Naseer (1997) wrote that some Afghan areas were also acquired from Afghanistan.
- c) Apart from this division, Lasbella and Kharan were put under different political system and political agent of Kalat state appointed as its administrator.
- d) The areas of Sarawan, Jhalawan, Kachi, and Makran were given under direct control of Khan-e-Kalat (p.402).

The same territory is known as Pakistani Balochistan (Rehman, 2005, p.3).

The strategic location of Balochistan had made it attractive for colonial powers. Binder (1987) has quoted Bizenjo's views in one of his article, which support the notion,

The Baloch suffered this unhappy fate simply because they happened to live in an area of vital military importance to the British, in contrast to the more fortunately situated Afghans. It was historical accident, that gave the Afghans the opportunity for independence ---- denied to the Baloch. Thus it served the interests of the British to foster a unified

Afghanistan under their tutelage as a buffer state, that would shield their Indian Empire from Russia. Conversely, it was necessary to divide Baloch in order to assure unimpeded control of the resulting imperial frontiers with this Afghan buffer (p.274).

Colonial administration was faced with many political and administrative challenges. The tension remained between Khan of Kalat and tribal chiefs. In fact, Anti British sentiments among the Baloch tribes were not controlled, and the first experience of alien control raised the feelings of modern Baloch ethnic nationalism. Although, the Britishers introduced some industrial advancement in the shape of railway lines, roads, post offices, rest houses and cantonments of British troops, even then, the Baloch society was not ready to accept the foreign intruders as their rulers. Due to a very different social structure of Balochistan the Britishers failed to introduce any political, economic and social reform policy in this region. Resultantly, Baloch nationalism emerged as a response to the intervention of the state. Under nationalist feelings, several political groups were formed and they launched "quit Balochistan movement".

The movement was led by the middle class nationalists. They had strong support of Mir Ahmad Yar Khan. In 1937, these young nationalists, who were graduated from British Universities, announced to form the Kalat State National Party in Sibbi (Naseer, 1979, p. 443). Initially, the Kalat State national Party voiced against the non Baloch administrators in the Balochistan setup, lately, the party worked for the Kalat State as independent entity (Bizanjo, 1999, p. 41). Dr Kundi (1994) has analyzed the role of Kalat National Party in a way that due to its increased socio-political reforms the Sardars considered it a threat to their Sardari system. More importantly, the Khan of Kalat by himself anticipated the threat and banned its activities. All important leaders were exiled. Resultantly the party went underground. (p. 10). In the coming years when Muslim League and Indian National Congress gained popularity as the representative political parties of their respective nations, the Khan of Kalat developed relationship with Muhammad Ali Jinnah and appointed him as the Legal Advisor to the Kalat State. Consequently, Muslim League was established in Balochistan and Khan extended his possible help (Khan, 1975, pp. 130-136).

Balochistan: Accession to Pakistan

During the last years of the united India, when British withdrawal from Sub-Continent became apparent, the nationalist Baloch also speeded up to get independent Balochistan. Under June 3, 1947, princely states got autonomous status. Jinnah also clarified the Muslim league's policy of non interference towards autonomous states (Afzal, 1973, p.427).

In August, an agreement was signed between the British Government and representative of Kalat Muhammad Ali Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan (both were also the representator of future government of Pakistan). In this agreement Kalat State was given the original status as she had in 1838. On the same day, an agreement was also signed between Kalat State and Pakistan that Pakistan would be the legal heir of Kalat after Britishers. The Article 1 of the agreement clarifies that Kalat State would have independent status. Khan (1975) quoted Article IV in his autobiography which stated that "a standstill agreement will be made between Pakistan and Kalat state". According to it, Pakistan shall stand committed to all the responsibilities and agreements signed by Kalat and the British Government from 1893 to 1947 and Pakistan shall be the legal, constitutional and political successor of the British" (Khan, 1975, pp. 147-149). Axmann (2008) pointed out Article four of this agreement, the most important one which put "the existence of the Khannate of Kalat at the mercy of Pakistan" (p. 225).

On August 12, 1947, the Khan of Kalat announced the establishment of independent state of Kalat. At the same time, Shahi Jirga and Quetta Municipality (both were nominated bodies by the British) decided to join Pakistan. Contrary to this verdict, the Khan of Kalat formed a Parliament, despite the fact that he had already signed the agreement, conducted first ever elections, in which the Kalat National Party (KNP) participated in private capacity, had won 29 seats (Baloch, 2009, p.352).

Shortly, after the formation of Pakistan, all other Indian Muslim states, situated in Sindh, Punjab and the then Frontier Province announced their merger with Pakistan. The state of Kalat offered special relations in the areas of defence, foreign affairs and communication. It was written in the article V of the agreement that on the mentioned matters final deliberations will be held in Karachi, the negotiations did not give fruitful results because the nascent Pakistani State demanded the integration with Pakistan. After a nine months tug

of war, on March 27, 1948, the Khan of Kalat accepted unconditional annexation with Pakistan. The decision was resisted by KNP and other leaders but Kalat was forcibly annexed with Pakistan (Dehwar, 1994, p.311-324). After controlling the administrative power, the state of Pakistan started to deal it with heavy handed tactics. The independent status was to be finished. Political agent was appointed as an officer sub-ordinate to Governor General to look after the administration. All important leaders of the state were sent behind the bar and the Kalat State National Party was disallowed to work throughout Pakistan (Naseer, 1979, p. 522). The Nationalist evaluated this action as a “systematic political elimination” of Baloch representation that further aggravated the animosity between the state and the Baloch (Bizanjo, 2011, int).

Ethnic Composition of Balochistan and Tribal Setup

The people of Balochistan are divided into three main ethnic groups, and 27 major tribes. These three groups are Baloch, Brahui and Pashtoons. The Pakistan statistical book (2008) explains that about 40% of the population speaks Balochi language. Brahui speaking people are 20% and Pashto language is also spoken by around 40 percent. Urdu and Siraiki are also the languages spoken by these ethnic groups. The Baloch mainly concentrated in the West, East, South and South Eastern sparsely populated areas. The Centre of the province is dominated by Brahui speaking people. The Pashtoons have majority in the north. In Balochistan, both the categories of tribal system nomadic and settled are present (Shah, 1994, p.21). During the last 25 years, a drift towards modernity has slightly changed the nomadic life style of the people. The tribal people prefer now to settle down in settled areas. The tribal bases are rooted in Sardari and Khan System. Sardari System is the major feature of Baloch and Brahui tribes while Khan System exists in Pashtoon tribes (Kundi, 2003, p.89)

Nature of the Issue

The issue of Baloch ethnic identity and their socio-political rights are multifaceted, and complex in nature. The intricacy of the issue could be highlighted through these variables.

i. Baloch Nationalism: The issue of identity

The nationalist’s struggle for Baloch identity was initiated in the twentieth century against the Britishers. Inayatullah (1987) gave its credit to the middle class who were educated from Britain. He also viewed that these nationalists were highly influenced from Indian politicians (p. 147). “The Young Baloch” was the first nationalist

movement, propelled in 1920. It published various articles in different newspapers and magazines. In these articles the message of Baloch unity was frequently communicated. Later on, the first political party Anjuman-e-Ittehad-e-Balochistan was formed. Its basic demand was a united and independent Balochistan (Inayatullah, 1987, pp. 151-154). The Anjuman was not only struggling against Britishers but also against the then government of Shams Shah in Kalat (Naseer, 1979, p. 420). The movement went slow when Mir Ahmad Yar Khan became the Khan of Kalat. He extended his sympathy towards Anjuman. In 1937, Khan of Kalat formed another party. Kalat National party was also based on the same middle class. The struggle against the Britishers and for an independent Balochistan was going on. In the meantime, Britishers introduced the partition plan. The KNP exerted its influence on the Khan of Kalat for neither to merge Kalat State with India nor with Pakistan but to go independence. The members of Kalat State Assembly also spoke against its merger with Pakistan. Apart from other speeches the most crucial speech was delivered by Mir Ghous Bakhsh Bizenjo in 1947. He said, "Pakistani officials are pressuring to join Pakistan, because Balochistan would not be able to sustain itself economically... we have minerals, we have petroleum and ports. The question is where would be Pakistan without us" (Tahir, 1992, p. 49). After various talks and agreements, ultimately Kalat State was merged into Pakistan but since then a new phase of identity issue and question of nationalism got importance in the politics of Pakistan in general and Balochistan in particular.

ii. The issue of provincial autonomy

The issue of provincial autonomy of Balochistan and the question of ethnic identity of Baloch and their rights are intertwined and cannot be separated. Since 1971, the issue has been raised by various Baloch leaders. They vowed for confederation, maximum autonomy within federation, and demand for change in provincial boundaries to create a comparatively homogeneous province. Since Balochistan got the status of a province, it had never performed as an active federating unit. All the governments, whether civilian or military, focused on centralization of power. Their refusal to give provincial autonomy is primarily responsible for the rise of ethnic conflict. Although PPP's government in 2008, tried to resolve the issue and abolished the concurrent list. It was an effort to ensure political autonomy of the provinces but the government of Balochistan was not satisfied. (Fair, 2012, p. 29)

iii. Historical narrative and the issue of greater Balochistan

The demographic boundary of the Baloch ethnic group is straddles to three countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. The majority of Baloch are residing in Pakistani Balochistan (Khan, 2005, p.112). The Baloch disagree with a view that they are an ethnic group. They imagine themselves a nation that has proper territory and culture (including religion and specific language) (Abdul Hay, 2011).

Nowadays, different areas are occupied by different tribes which are not cohesive to each other. Some of the tribes have also formed their political parties to show their presence in main-stream politics. For instance Balochistan National party Mengal Group (BNP.M). The Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) of Bugti tribe and Baloch Haq Talwar was organized by Nawab Khair Bukhsh Murri. Despite the fact that these Baloch Tribes are struggling for Baloch identity and rights but their system is not integrated with each other. The internal cleavages within numerous tribes further complicate the issue. It has been said that the state authorities used to intervene the tribal affairs. They also pick and choose their favourite for instance in 1970s when P.M Zulfikar Ali Bhutto dismissed the Mengal government in Balochistan he chose another Baloch Sardar Nawab Akbar Bugti for the Governor of the Province. Though, in later years Nawab Akbar Bugti became the hero of nationalists and all tribes but initially he was considered pro-state and anti Baloch nationalist.

The historical narrative of the Baloch is also supportive for the notion of greater Balochistan. It stresses that before partition the areas which were given to Afghanistan and Iran by British government should be included in greater Balochistan. The approach is responsible of insurgent movement not only in Pakistan but in other neighbouring states as well.

iv. Inter and intra-tribal conflict

Baloch society is tribal in nature. In determining the Baloch identity, much importance is given to tribes and clans. Through decades the Baloch are used to live under tribal confederacy. There are almost seventeen (17) major tribal groups and some four hundred (400) sub groups (Jetly, 2004, p. 10). The Tribal affairs are conducted by their tribal traditions and their Sardars hold all the power. Hasil Bizenjo has pointed out in one of his interviews that under Sandman system of governance, during the British rule the concept of tribal chiefs was properly introduced. Not only more tribes were created but converted in to a hereditary institute. Sandman also determined the salaries of some

tribal chiefs. If the sardars were refused to obey the British orders they were denied from their salaries. (Dawn, 2006)

Nowadays, different areas of Balochistan are occupied by various tribal chiefs, that is the major reason of the lack of cohesiveness. Some of the tribes have also formed their political parties to show their presence in main-stream politics. For instance Balochistan National party Mengal Group (BNP.M). The Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP) of Bugti tribe and Baloch Haq Talwar was organized by Nawab Khair Bukhsh Murri. Despite the fact that these Baloch Tribes are struggling for Baloch identity and rights yet their tribal system is not integrated with each other. All the tribes follow norms of their own. They have their own separate traditions to govern the tribesmen. Some tribes have traditional animosity with each other.

Apart from intra tribal conflicts, the internal cleavages also remain an important problem. The murder of important personalities on the basis of support caused more problems. Matheson (1997) quoted that Nawab Akbar Bugti who was the minister of state for defence during 1958, killed his elder Haibat Khan. On this charge Nawab Bugti was put behind the bar. (p.187). During the imprisonment, he was removed from the office of tribal chief. Attaullah Mengal was also accused of murdering of his uncle and sent into jail. (Janmehmad, 1982, p.229)

v. Factional politics

As far as the movement for Baloch rights is concerned, there are two groups. The Nationalist Baloch having anti-state sentiments and promoting the voice of "Azad Balochistan". The other group is known as moderate Baloch, claiming maximum autonomy under 1973 constitution. They are facing strong resistance from the nationalist group, notwithstanding participating in the political process. It is being said that their voices are being silenced for the cause of Balochistan. Although they are convinced of their political alienation and antagonism yet they believe in making struggle within the system. Among the tribal Sardars, the Mengal tribe which have BNP.M and JWP of Bugti tribe is in favour to work within political system. There are some other Sardars or tribes who have joined hands with the main stream National Parties like PPP and PML (N) and (Q). Other Than these tribes, there are activists representing the Baloch middle class like the National Party (NP). Its main stream leadership including Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch and Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch are also in favour of finding political resolution of the dispute. The other group which is

known as militant groups like Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) and the Baloch Haq Talwar believed to have full control over their territory (Nation, 2006). The ideological stance of the two factions about independence and political autonomy is another source of destabilization of Baloch society.

vi. The issue of representation and the politics of comparison

The complexity of the issue increases and supplants a different magnitude through politics of comparison. Baloch compare their province with rest of the three units especially with the Punjab. They have strong reservations about their representation in civil bureaucracy and in military. From 1947 to 1977, in Central Cabinet only four persons were ethnic Baloch. Same was the situation in military. About 70 percent belonged to Punjab and rest of the 30 percent constituted by Pathan, Mohajir, Sindhi and Balochi population. Even in the top ranks, there was hardly any Baloch (Kukreeja, 2003, p.133). In 1991, the quota for recruitment was raised to 15 percent. The educational and height standards were also relaxed. As the recruitment done on provincial basis, mostly were Pathan settlers in Balochistan and not the Balochi with their ethnic origin. In civil bureaucracy including police department, the Baloch representation had 3.9 percent share. In 2002, within Balochistan, there were only 4 Baloch secretaries. In Balochistan university only 30 faculty members were Baloch (Weaver, 2002, p.105-106). Although the PPP's government once again enhanced the Baloch quota in civil and military bureaucracy but the gulf between centre and province remained unabridged. They still feel that Punjabi dominance in both the institution has made them alien to the system (Mir, 2001).

vii. The geo-strategic prominence and exogenous influence

Apart from all these aspects, the geo-strategic importance of Balochistan's location and energy reservoirs has given it an immense importance in regional as well as international politics. Historically, the geo-strategic location of Balochistan compelled the colonial rulers to make special policies for this region. Recently, the development in various sectors has further sparked its importance. The development of a Seaport in Gawadar, Pakistan's participation in the US led war against terrorism, the Reckodeck project and regional political dynamics have forced the central government of Pakistan to strongly expand its authority in the province. The increased military presence and influx of foreign workers has kindled the belief among Baloch nationalists that they are only the subject for subjugation and the central

authorities exploit their resources for the benefit of Punjabi dominant elite group. (abdul Haye, 2012 Int)

The nature of Baloch issue has various aspects. As far as the dominant facet is concerned, the issue of ethnic identity has eclipsed all the other controversies. How did the Baloch identity politics evolve in Pakistan? The question could not be comprehended without understanding the responsive actions of Baloch. The actions were against the policies of various central governments in the past.

Development of Conflict (A Chronological Order)

The Balochis are resisting against the inflexible and intolerant behaviour of the central government of Pakistan. The present day insurgency which is transformed into a secessionist movement is a continuum of guerrilla struggle in Balochistan against federation of Pakistan since 1948.

i. The issue of accession and revolt in 1948

The Khan of Kalat was forced to sign the instrument of accession and the legal authority of Khan-e-Azam came to an end on 15th April 1948. Within 24 hours several ministers of Kalat government were exiled and arrested (M.A.Y.K, Baloch, 2009, p.164). Quaid-i-Azam the then Governor General of Pakistan acquainted a governor general's council for governance and administration. The action was considered as the first step for direct federal authority over Balochistan.

The forcible annexation ignited the nationalistic sentiments and it led to the first rebellion in Balochistan. The younger brother of the Khan led this movement (Jonnes, 2002, p.133). He moved towards Afghanistan, where he organized the liberation movement. He also shaped a liberation force in the name of "Baloch Mujahedeen". Prince Karim started its guerrilla operation from Jhalawan district. The authorities of Pakistan Army influenced his brother to surrender. In response he will get amnesty from the army. They signed an agreement with Abdul Karim. But when he surrendered, the army arrested him along with 126 militants, dishonouring the agreement. The KSNP was banned (Titus and Swidles, 2000, p.50). After this move, the Baloch nationalists were divided into two factions. One favoured to continue armed struggle as guerrilla war while the other presented themselves as a moderate group favoured to resolve the issue through dialogue (Kundi, 2009).

ii. The one unit policy and second insurgency in 1958

The task of nation building has remained difficult in ethnically diverse societies. Pakistan has the same case. In 1955, the one unit scheme was introduced to bridge the gap between various ethnic groups to promote national unity. Under this scheme, Balochistan, Sindh, NWFP and Punjab were integrated into one unit. The merger of Balochistan into one unit was strongly reprehended by Baloch Nationalist leaders (Ziring, 2004, p.71) including Abdul Karim who had completed his prison.

When the Baloch leaders especially the Khan of Kalat raised voice against one unit plan and re-organized already existed ethno-nationalist movement, they were arrested. Moreover, Khan of Kalat was disrobed of all privileges, given by the federal authority and sent to jail. Khan of Kalat explained the story of his arrest in his autobiography.

The 6th day of October 1958 will ever remain fresh in the memory of the people of Balochistan; for it was on this day that the forces of tyranny, oppression and bloodshed were let loose on the simple and innocent Baloch of Kalat for no fault of theirs..... I gave up myself to the army which paraded with me on the roads and streets of Kalat. I witnessed several of my men falling dead on the ground by the indiscriminate firing of the army (M.A.Y.K, Baloch, 2009, pp.181-183).

The imprisonment of the Khan sparked another revolt. This time Nauroz Khan the Sardar of Zarakzai tribe led the armed resistance. He presented three demands before the government, (i) Withdrawal of one unit plan (ii) extrication of Khan of Kalat and amnesty for his men (iii) exemption of his area from the land reforms (Axamann, 2008, pp.286-287). Sardar Nauroz and his impulsively organized guerrilla force fought a series of battles. The militants managed to ambushed government escorts and installations. The ninety years old, Nawab Nouroz Khan fought the guerrilla war against the army in Jhalawan and surrounding areas. The struggle lasted for about two years and gave a hard time to the government. Pakistan army responded with more anger by bombing nearby villages when they did not get desired result, negotiations were opted for.

In early 1960s talks were started between the army and resurgent, but reached no conclusion. At last, Nauroz Khan and his men were assured by the Army on the Quran that they were ready for negotiations. When the militants surrendered on the assurance of Sardar Doda Khan Zehri that all their demands had been accepted by the authorities, once again, the army dishonoured its pledge. Nauroz Khan and his insurgents were arrested and tried by a special military court (Janmahmand, 1982, p. 201). His son and eight nephews were hanged in Hyderabad. Nauroz Khan's death sentence was alleviated to life imprisonment because of his old age (Rehman, 2005, p.4). After this revolt Pakistan Army sat up new garrisons at key points in Balochistan.

Despite the government's success, the insurrection fuelled the Baloch nationalism and changed it into jingoism. It enhanced the feelings of distrust between the Baloch and the central government.

iii. The parari resistance (1962)

When Field Martial Ayub Khan assumed power and imposed Martial Law, in 1958, the second insurgency in Balochistan was crushed. To strengthen the centralized policies, Ayub Khan instituted the programme of Basic Democracies. Through this system, he won the elections and introduced a Presidential system in 1962. Under these elections, for the first time, several Baloch Sardars, were elected. Sardar Khair Bakhsh Murri, Ataullah Mengal and Ahmad Nawaz Bugti became the Member of Parliament. However, their presence in the parliament was felt a threat to Ayub's personally oriented policies. Therefore, these elected nationalists were replaced by some nominated Sardars. Moreover, Pakistan army started building new cantonments at key points in Balochistan. This triggered another guerrilla movement. The movement which is known as "Parari" (a Balochi word used to illustrate a person or persons whose afflictions cannot be addressed through negotiations). They sat up a network of base camps, expanded in the South from the Jhalawan; the Mengal tribal area to the north; the Murri and Bugti tribes. They eluded large scale encounters with the army, tried to distraught the forces by ambushing convoys, bombing trains and raids on military camps. It was responded with inflexible counter strike, included air bombardments on their tribal areas, which not only bull-dozed of several tribal leaders but ruined vast agricultural fields. The sporadic fighting ended when in 1969 General Yahya seized power and withdrew one unit plan (Asia Report, 2006, p.4). General Yahya's martial law was short lived. He conducted elections in 1970s. In Balochistan NAP got majority. In the NAP led provincial

government, Ataullah Mengal became the Chief Minister and Ghaus Bukhsh Bizenjo became the Governor. The most important development regarding Balochistan was that it was given the status of a province.

iv. The 1973 uprising

This time the insurgency began when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto a democratically elected P.M dismissed the Baloch provincial government and banned the ruling NAP. Furthermore, he jailed the prominent Baloch personalities including Khair Bukhsh Murri, Ataullah Mengal and Ghaus Bukhsh Bizenjo. This led to another uprising against the federation (Weaver, 2003, p.111).

Numerous causes have been narrated behind the aggressive action of P.M Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. He perceived negatively the new Baloch government's endeavour to indigenize the administration by replacing the non-Balochi bureaucrats to Baloch. The provincial government also focused to the promotion of Balochi culture. The first provincial government also desired to get greater share of natural resources in their province, and a fair deal in the allocation of industries. These progressive reforms and demands produced concerns in Islamabad (Jetly, 2004, p.15). Apart from these factors the discovery of sizeable weapons from the Iraqi Embassy in Islamabad was associated with the Baloch nationalists that they were conspiring against the centre (Janmahmand, 1982, p. 302). Though, the Iraqi government responded that these weapons were assigned for Iranian Baloch guerrilla activities against Iranian Shah's support of Iraqi Kurds. During this time the government of Pakistan published a white paper of Balochistan. In this document, the government of Pakistan alleged that the people belonged to Murri tribe came with automatic weapons and they attacked the dwellers in Pat Feeder canal area of the district Kalachi. They all were Punjabi origin (Pakistan, 1974, p. 17). It was also stated that the Chief Minister (CM) of Balochistan displaced the Balochistan reserve police, just because of the non-Baloch officers. He introduced the new police structure by the name "The Balochistan Dehi Mohafiz (BDM). In the new system they preferred to recruit those loyal to NAP (pp. 17-18). It was said that the central government began to fear with the rising popularity of NAP in Balochistan. Particularly, their political party Pakistan People Party, (PPP) had no base in the province. Their ethnic demands and reforms were translated into a threat to the survival of Pakistan's integrity (White Paper, 1974, p. 15). The central government's action to sack the provincial government was adhered with the tribal belief that it was a deliberate insult to all Baloch and needed to respond militarily.

Baloch guerrillas started their activities after the ouster of the provincial government. The Murri tribesmen and Baloch students under the leadership of Khair Bukhsh Murri formed the Balochistan people's liberation front (BPLF). The main source of their strength was Parari's guerrilla forces, which continued to expand their reach, influence and number after the ceasefire in 1969. In April 1973, first encounter was reported between the Pakistan Army with the guerrillas. They often ambushed the Army's convoy and then attacked. 18th May incident is considered serious in this respect. In the Murri area at Tandoori, some tribesmen trapped the scouts, who were on routine patrol, after that these scouts were killed and their weapons were taken away. The Balochistan government blamed that the foreign support is available to these guerrillas in the shape of weapons (Dawn, 1973). With this backdrop, the central government arrested Sardar Attaullah Mengal, Khair Bukhsh Murri, and Ghaus Bakhsh Bizanjo, charging them that they were supporting the struggle against Pakistan army.

The 1973's insurgency was the worst of all. Though the exact number of casualties from both the sides was never known hence, it is presumed that some 53000 Baloch guerrillas and 3300 army men were killed. There were 55000 Baloch combatants fought against around 80,000 trained military force (Harrison, 1978. p.139). During four years of insurgency, there were around one hundred and seventy four major encounters took place. The militants evaded direct encounter with the army. They were successful in ambushing the convoys and halting of drilling and survey operations of leading Pakistani and American oil companies. While in counter insurgency tactics against Baloch militants the army used gunship helicopters. The Iranian government had supplied Huey Cobra Helicopter to Pakistan army because they were also feared of Baloch nationalists living there (Harrison, 1981, p.33). The fierce firing from Pakistani forces including F86 and Mirage fighter jets, participated 15000 Murri tribesmen and Parari guerrillas, gathered in Chamalang Valley.

In spite of the fact that most of the insurgents were arrested, the Baloch resistance continued for many years. It again engendered the fury against the central authorities. As Mir Hazar Khan explained,

If we can get modern weapons, it will never again be like the last time.....next time, we will choose the time and place, and we will take help where we can get it. In the beginning, the Bengalise didn't want independence, but if Pakistan continues to use force to crush us, we'll have no alternative to go that way (Harrison, 1978, pp.139-140).

The Baloch revolt came to an end in 1977, When Z.A Bhutto government was overthrown by General Zia-ul-Haq. Some observers considered that change, "a fresh attempt to rework the basis of state-society relations in Pakistan" (Hewitt, 1998. p.60). However, the most aggressive and fierce organization of all factions, "the Baloch Student Organization" (BSO) reorganized itself. Murri and Mengals were released and they went to Europe, while Bizenjo followed the politics of reconciliation.

v.The 2005 insurgency and direction of conflict

The fifth insurgency after around twenty seven years was the result of simmering tension. It also included complains about Punjabi colonization and exploitation of Balochistan's natural resources.

The post 80's scenario is considered as effective truce by most of the writers. The nationalist leaders started to participate in political process, despite the fact that main issues still remained unresolved (Raman and Bangalore, 2005). Unfortunately, the democratic period and the process of democratization remained precarious due to confrontational politics. Even, then many of the tribal sardars inclined to cooperate with the centre. During this democratic interlude Mengal and Bizenjo formed Balochistan National Party (BNP) and Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti established Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP). They also made coalition governments which were positive sign. When the military took power in 1999, the Baloch nationalists completely rejected military government and showed complete distrust. It has been argued that the upcoming tension between nationalist leaders and central government was the consequence of social and electrical engineering by the military regime. They sidelined the main stream political parties and favoured a crafted religious group Mutahidda Majlis e Amal (MMA) in 2002 elections (Swami, 2006, p.1).

In the current phase of resistance, the second generation of Baloch nationalist leaders, i.e. Hasil Bizanjo, Balach Marri, Mir Herbyar Murri and Akhtar Mengal desired to work together in this nationalist movement. The most sensitive areas, where the upsurge is going on are still under the control of these sardars. The Baloch encounter with Frontier Corp has become regular and intense in these areas.

The simmering tension between the government and nationalist Sardar further aggravated when they announced mega developmental projects and started a series of political migration from Punjab on key positions in Balochistan. This made them felt that they were being alienated from their share to the power. They also viewed that the influx of Pushtoon and other ethnic groups in Balochistan is an effort to marginalize the Baloch in their own territory (Bansal, 2006, p.50). When General Musharraf led government announced the development of Gawadar Port, the Baloch Sardars opposed this plan. Despite the fact that this type of mega projects could cause greater economic opportunities, they expressed strong resentment. Sardar Akhtar Mengal has recorded the fear in a way that,

If there are jobs in Gawadar, people would flock there with time, they would get the right to vote. The problem is that one Karachi in Gawadar is sufficient to turn the whole population of Balochistan into minority. We would lose our identity, our language, everything. That is why we are not willing to accept these mega projects (Bakhtair, 2004, p.51).

The resistance from the Baloch nationalists to such federal efforts for development was due to their past experience that the development will benefit only Punjab. The tension started when after September 11 event, Pakistan allowed US to establish its bases in Pasni, Gwadar, Dalbandin and Jacobabad. The tension regarding the development of Gawadar Port took another height when General Musharraf again passed an autocratic decision to involve regular army for the safety and security of foreigners. With this decision the struggle of Baloch nationalists became more intensified. The new wave of insurgency that started from 2000 on a low scale was gathering momentum slowly.

The increased involvement of military in political decisions without the consent of nationalist leaders exacerbated the tension and led to sporadic attacks on military installations, gas pipelines,

foreigners, army check posts, and on civilians. The situation became worst when 32 years old female Baloch doctor was caught an alleged gang rape. The BLA launched a large scale resistance. They made massive attack on government installations. From both the sides large scale damage was inflicted. The JWP's leader Nawab Akbar Bugti headed the protest and felt it an act of insolence against their honour. They set off a wave of attacks on major military installations and obstructed the Suigas supply lines to almost half of the population of the country. In January 2005, the nationalists started to capture Suigas field. The battle lasted for four days with heavy firing and Nawab Akbar Bugti showed his support to those banned outfits. Furthermore, the situation got worst when General Pervaiz Musharraf and Commander of the Paramilitary force in Balochistan were separately attacked by the insurgents during their visit to Kohlu Town to lay the foundation-stone of a new cantonment (Ahmad, 2005). The military led government responded aggressively. As General Pervaiz Musharraf threatened Baloch Sardars in one of his interview, he said, "It is not the 70's and we will not climb mountains behind them, they will even not know what and from where something has come and hit them" (Zaidi, 2005, p.64). Sardar Mengal responded in the same tone, when Zahid Hussain from Newline Magazine (2005), approached him, "It is not the 70's for us, it is also not the 70s for them. If there is any change, it will be for all. If we have to face severe consequences of change, then they will also not be in a comfortable position"(p.23).


In December, 2005 some armed men made attacked with rocket fires on a paramilitary camp in Kohlu where General Musharraf was meeting with some tribal chiefs. BLA accepted the responsibility of the attack. After this event the security forces launched massive attack against the Marri tribes. The operation not only damaged Marri tribesmen but also affected the neighbouring area of Dera Bugti (Shahid, 2005).

The Baloch militants responded to challenge the writ of the government. Throughout the province, they started hitting government installations and targeted gas pipelines. The government was also blamed to use poisonous gases against the Baloch people. Although the government continuously denied using its regular force but independent sources viewed that at least six army brigades, and paramilitary forces were used in the operation (Asia Report, 2006, p.9). The Pakistani paramilitary force used combat jets, gunship helicopters and artillery to pound militant camps (Swami, 2006, p.4).

The current spate of violence reached at its peak when on 26 August 2006, the military forces killed Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, the JWP leader. His death further flared the Baloch resistance not only in Balochistan but in other provinces as well. The Nawab's death made them more unite and determined about their cause. He became the symbol of Baloch resistance for their identity and independence (S. Baloch, 2010, Int).

In spite of the fact that the violence broke out across the length and breadth of Balochistan, the central authorities were still insisted to establish "the writ of the government" by using all means (Dawn, 2006, p.7). The extending insurgency was supporting not only by the other tribes but now most of the Baloch across the globe are mentally and spiritually involved in this struggle for identity. The Baloch nationalist Mir Herbyar Khan Murri (2010) has pointed out that "Baloch is not the name of an ethnic group but they are a nation, having distinguish culture, heritage, and martyrs. So the nation cannot live under dominance. We need independence. We cannot be the slave of the slaves(Int Dunya T.V). The death of Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti further worsened the situation. This time, the nature of conflict is different in a sense that the 1973 uprising was concluding as the P.M. Z.A Bhutto was out from power and the military government released all the important personalities. This time, though the new civil government started to console and negotiate with the Baloch leaders but a clear distrust has been seen between the two actors. That is why the situation is still uncontrolled and challenging to the process of national integration. In the proceeding chapter a discussion has been made to highlight the factors responsible for aggravating the politics of ethnicity in Baloches.

Figure: Baloch Ethnic Movement; A Threat Matrix to National Integration



Source: Compiled by the researcher

The figure presents a clear picture that how distrust was started between the Baloch ethnic group and the state of Pakistan. The issue was not tackled properly from the two sides resultantly the state strategy and the tactics of Balochis both became counter productive. Apart from the fact that Baloch insurgent activities are damaging the relationship with the state but still there are some Baloch groups participating and representing their views on the national political scene. The figure also shows some constraints which are yet to be removed. There is dire need to address them properly.

Role of Leadership

The positive attitudes of governing elite furnish to reduce the conflict while their stubborn behaviour strengthens the demands of nationalist elite. In Pakistan, the governing leadership whether they are military rulers or civilian elected personals, provided opportunities to the nationalist leaders to mobilize their group against the federation. As in the case of Balochistan, the demand of maximum autonomy is not addressed by any regime. Their inflexible behaviour has made them contumacious. Although the Baloch nationalist leaders of Murri, Bugti and Mengal tribes have no direct communication with the Baloch common people because either they have self axile or forced, yet they are successful in getting support from the masses.

Gorenburg (2006) viewed about ethnic minority mobilization in Russian federation that minority ethnic group performed as purely reactive. (p.2) The Baloch nationalists are also reactive of the policies of central government. Their reaction against the central authorities has gradually increased. They used to register their response through violent means as hitting and bombing of government installations. Due to the gradual increase of violent behaviour and terrorist activities the number of annual fatalities is also increased.

Militant Out Fits

Baloch militant out fits are hamaring the efforts of normalization. Militants attack on government installations and civilians is strengthening the perception that these are the attacks from Baloch terrorists who took the lives of the thousands of civilians. The Baloch leaders should pay serious attention to this issue and militant violent activities must be stopped if they want to resolve the issue.

Distrust of MIDDLECLASS ON THE CENTRE. Dr Abdul Hayee Baloch, one of the moderate nationalist leaders of Baloch argues that “we have mobilized the middle class in Balochistan to support the Baloch cause”. He clearly says that that extreme economic poverty and underdevelopment of the province has strengthened our views against the Punjabi dominated central elites (Dr. Abdul Hayee Baloch 2010).

The Balochistan Students Organization (BSO) and BLA are the affiliated groups of BNP belonging to the Baloch middle class. These groups are involved in various violent activities. With the gradual rise of Baloch middle class, the sentiments of Baloch nationalism are once again becoming active. In the current uprising, the situation is reported to be worsening. Baloch nationalist have complained about indiscriminate firing from the security forces; have caused large scale deaths and destruction. According to reports, in one month 72 tribesmen were killed and 228 were injured in Dera Bugti alone (Zulfiqar, 2006, pp.35-36). The HRCP’s detailed report about missing persons and mutilated bodies of enforced disappearances also show that the Baloch middle class is the victim of these atrocities. The middle class in Balochistan is nascent and alienated. The development lag in the province is sufficient to enhance anti-centre emotions. The middle class is more tilted towards nationalists and it has completely disowned the activities of F.C in the province.

Geo-Strategic Compulsions and Exogenous Influence

Donald Horowitz (1985) explained the importance of external backing for an ethnic movement that needs support to gain strength. (p.230) According to him if an ethnic group is failed to obtain external support for their cause can contribute to the failure of the movement. External support provides material and moral backing. It includes finance, training, weapons and a safe place for militants. External factor is also important in escalating or defusing the conflict.

However, as far as the Baloch ethnic movement is concerned the widely held perception is, that Baloch never secured the international support for their separatist cause. (Jones, 2002, p.135) Despite the fact, it is argued by the Pakistani media that without foreign assistance, insurgency of this magnitude cannot be sustained. A widely held belief is that Indian, Iranian, Afghani and U.S agencies are involved to strengthen the Baloch insurgency. Although a substantial number of Baloch are also the Iranian citizens, so any action that strengthens the cause of Baloch ethnic nationalism could be equally dangerous to Iran as well. One perception is that Iran is also developing its own deep sea port with Indian help at Chabahar, a gate way to

Central Asia. The common perception is that the development of Gawadar port is contemplated as a threat to their economic interest (Babar, 2006). That is why Iran could support the local insurgency movement to create law and order situation in Gawadar and related areas.

The geographic and demographic boundaries of Balochistan are also extended to Afghanistan. The Afghan's concerns are centred on Baloch support of Taliban along their shared borders. Afghanistan accuses that Pakistan has allowed Taliban to find shelter in Baloch area while Pakistan blames Afghanistan for arming Baloch militants. Apart from Afghan's concern the U.S government has also demonstrated its concerns about the presence of Al-Qaeda and Taliban in Balochistan. Currently, there is no prove has been found of the presence of a Taliban network within Balochistan, even then US is concentrating on this point.

It is argued by different independent think tanks in Pakistan that the Baloch separatist movement is being hijacked by different foreign powers. The resource rich Balochistan is in the eye of those powers who have ambition to explore new energy resources for their better future (Abid, 2010). In one of the report of metaexistence organization it has been reported that Washington favours the creation of "Greater Balochistan". In the issue of June 2006, in the Armed Forces Journal in USA a military scholar Lt. Colonel Ralph Peter suggested that Pakistan should be broken up. A separate country Greater Balochistan or Free Balochistan would be a single entity that will be incorporated Irani and Pakistani Baloch areas (Meta existence organization) It was alleged by senate committee on defence on June, 2006 that British intelligence is supporting Balochistan separatists (Press trust of India, 2006).

As far as the foreign support to Baloch militants is concerned, Pakistan has repeatedly blamed India for its overt involvement in Baloch movement. It was reported that the last military government gave "proof" of Indian involvement to Afghanistan President (Mariana Babar, 2006) while India denies such accusations.

Conclusion

The disempowerment of the Baloch from administration alienated them from the main stream system. It is also an established fact, that those who are more alienated to power are more responsible to secessionist appeals. In this way the Baloch ethnic movement can

pose a serious threat to the national integration of Pakistan because it has a combination of structural, political, economic, social, cultural and perceptual factors. The Study reveals that at present Baloch people are divided into two groups, i.e. (a) those who are part of main-stream politics and want to preserve their identity through constitutional means, (b) those who are involved in insurgent and terrorist activities. They have organized militant outfits and have relationship with other terrorist groups. To avoid this situation, the state of Pakistan has to make policies with the consensus of Baloch leaders and implement them with political commitment and dedication.

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