

Indian Ocean: A Prospective Potential Theatre of Pakistan-India Conflict

Abstract:

The Earth is comprised majorly of waters. The man cannot survive without water. The life of humans is dependent upon water not only through its intake but also through the dependence of transport and trade on oceans. This has been a way of communication for mankind for millennia. Mahan said that the Indian Ocean would be the most important ocean in twentieth century. He also emphasized that the influence over oceans would be decisive for influence over lands. India did never pay such attention to the influence in Indian Ocean as it is paying now. Although Nehru acknowledged the reality to have influence in Oceans but never lead such policy. The initiative was taken in 2004 with the introduction of first naval doctrine. This was upgraded in 2009. Indian emphasis is on a leading role of India in Indian Ocean. This aspiration has far reaching security threats for Pakistan. Pakistan has long been victim of Indian hegemonic designs and has been in quest to balance the Indian power. This paper endeavors to investigate the contours of Indian designs in Indian Ocean affecting Pakistan's interests negatively. This may trigger a conflict in Indian Ocean, a new theatre, between old traditional rivals.

Keywords: Indian Ocean, Indian Naval doctrine, theatre of conflict

Introduction:

The third largest water body of the world, Indian Ocean, had political significance always. But the political profile of this blue body remained at low ebb during cold war. It emerged as a theatre of political interests and clash of interests after the end of cold war, during which Pacific and Atlantic remained stimuli of greater politics. The oil trade had earned it much importance during the twentieth century but the dawn of twenty first century unfolded extra ordinary character for it. The emergence of Asia as an unavoidable and important chunk of global economy and politics bore the Indian Ocean its due share. History had always a considerable mention of this ocean. Christopher Columbus actually drove towards this ocean to find India where he incidentally moved towards Pacific. During colonization in Asia and Africa, this was the way and trade route for European wealth from Asia and Africa. Great Britain, France, Portuguese, Holland and other European powers earned their interests through this strategic water way. Mughals in India ignored its importance but East India Company found its way to Indian wealth through Indian Ocean. Arabs had also entered in to India from here during eighth century. The Indian Ocean littoral presented to the world great civilizations too.

¹ *Prof. Dr. Iram Khalid, Department of Political Science, University of the Punjab, Lahore.*

² *Zainab Ahmed, M.Phil Scholar, Department of Political Science*

The traditional rivalry of Pakistan and India since the partition, in 1947, remained confined to territorial borders. Although Nehru had a vision to expand the defense and role of India to Indian Ocean yet the Indian Navy largely remained “Cinderella”. The quest of India to achieve a global role demanded a proactive naval strategy too. China had never been a naval power but in recent past it had also showed tendency to play a critically important role in Indian Ocean. The United States’ *pivot of Asia* policy also puts emphasis on active and prudent role in Indian Ocean. Pakistan’s defense has always been predominantly centered on threat perceptions from India. Thus, the increasing role of India in Indian Ocean and the aspirations of *blue water navy* require Pakistan to pay heed to prospective challenges and potential interests in Indian Ocean. This paper will try to address this issue from the perspective of following research dimensions:

1. How is Indian Ocean politically so important?
2. How is this ocean significant to Pakistan and India?
3. What are the military strategies of Pakistan and India in Indian Ocean from which the clash of interest may emanate?
4. Whether there is any role of global and regional powers which may become the cause of escalation of this bilateral conflict?

Strategic Location of Indian Ocean:

The Indian Ocean is the third largest ocean of the world after Pacific and Atlantic Oceans, covering 20 percent of the Earth’s sea surface with an area of 73.56 million square miles. From the western end it is separated from Atlantic Ocean through Suez Canal and the meridian running South from Cape Agulhas in South Africa. In east it touches Pacific Ocean at 147 E meridian. The northern most end of Indian Ocean meets the Iranian port of Bandar Imam Khomeini. Several important seas and sea areas also form part of Indian Ocean. Among them Arabian Sea is an important and volatile part of this water body. The chokepoints of Indian Ocean are of immense strategic importance, which facilitate the travel through it. These chokepoints provide with opportunity to shorten the long distances through the ocean and links to other water bodies (Michael & Sticklor, 2012, p. 10)

Figure 1: Indian Ocean and Littoral



Source:<http://www.futuredirections.org.au/files/IndianOceanASeaofUncertainty%20.pdf>

Commercial Significance:

The littoral states of Indian Ocean have about world's two-third world's known oil reserves. It has about 35 percent of world's gas reserves, 60 percent uranium, 40 percent of total gold and 80 percent of total deposits of diamonds (International, 2012, p. 12). The states surrounding the Indian Ocean have diverse economic potentials. In 2010, the estimated GDP of US\$ 1,367.2 billion which was twelfth largest in the world that of Australia of about US\$ 1,192.9 billion which is thirteenth largest. Contradictorily the states of Somalia, East Timour, Maldives, Zimbabwe and Comoros are economically meagre states (International, 2012, p. 13).

The Indian Ocean Region inhabits about one-third of the world population. This region's population in 2010, was 2.49 billion representing about 35.7% of the world population. It is estimated that by 2030 this population will increase by another 27 percent. Yet the region is not economically overall prosperous. According to Human Development Index formed by United Nations Development Program in 2011, Australia was ranked second while Mozambique 184th (Michael & Sticklor, 2012, p. 10). The fishing industry in Indian Ocean is another striking feature of this region. This region is home to 45 percent of the world's fishers and contributes annually around eight percent annually by giving an output of seven million tons per year. The fishing industry is flourishing particularly in Western Indian Ocean by the exploitation of deep sea fishing (Michael & Sticklor, 2012, pp. 103-104).

The oil and mineral wealth of Indian Ocean enhances the commercial significance of this water body multi folds. Around 55 percent of known oil reserves and around 40 percent of gas reserves are in Indian Ocean. Only the Gulf

region possesses about 21 percent of known oil reserves. The sea lanes of Indian Ocean serve as important route for oil trade which is 17, 262 million barrels per day forming 43 percent of the total global trade (Khalid, 2013, p. 22). The volume of all other trade conducted through Indian Ocean is around 30 percent. The trade routes through Straits of Hormuz, Malacca and Bab el Mandeb are of immense importance. The markets and region of Africa is a potential trade hub (Ranasinghe, 2011, p. 1).

Figure 2: Chokepoints of Indian Ocean



Source: http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research/pdfs/Book_IOR_2.pdf

Theoretical Framework:

The core aim of any state is the preservation and pursuance of its interests. The practical actions taken by the states for pursuit of their interests may contradict with other states. The convergence of interests among states draws them closer to each other. However, the contradiction leads to clash of interests leading to the burgeoning conflict. Galtung explains the mutual relationship of actors (states) and the resultant convergence or divergence of goals. The actors, by the natural law of life, enter in to exchange relationship with each other. They tend to enter into this exchange relationship on equal footing. The incompatibility of goals being pursued gives birth to contradiction. Galtung defines *Conflict* as, “A conflict simply involves incompatible goals. But there is more to it: the goals are pursued leading to Conflict=Actors in pursuit of incompatible goals” (Galtung, 1973, p. 24)

The areas of convergence and divergence of interests are presented by Galtung in the form of areas of compatibility or incompatibility of goals. The conflict theories analyze the areas of compatibility and incompatibility by taking

the course of dimensions taken by the actors to achieve these goals. The game theory is action specific. It deals with the actions taken by actors in pursuit of its goals. These two paradigms translate each other in explaining the conflict (Galtung, 1973, pp. 38-39). The actors choose among the best opportunities available to achieve their goals and interests. This situation conceives a course of actions taken by the actors which may negatively affect other actor's area of goals. This apprehension by either actor initiates a quest for balancing of actions leading to attain maximum power.

The actors' course of action to attain power is the endeavor to neutralize the power of other actor which may negatively affect the goals of that actor. Balance of power is the most important theory of realist paradigm. Hans Morgenthau termed it as 'iron law of power' and Henry Kissinger said that it was more an art than science (Fortman & Paul, 2004). Art has more to do with the discrete strategies in pursuit of goals rather than following a scientific method. Kenneth Waltz averred that 'hegemony leads to balance and has done so through all ages we may contemplate' (Kang, 2007, p. 1). The notion of balance of power was somehow conceived during the Greek period which was a quest of equalizing power among the Greek city states. The most dominant were Athens and Sparta. This notion took prominence during Renaissance in Italy. Machiavelli also emphasized upon the need by states to equalize power with the rival. The efforts of Lorenzo Medici were an important instance of the attainment of power of Florence in all spheres (Danilovic, 2002, p. 73).

The power balancing game among the states has assumed central role in world politics. It has emerged as the primary function of hegemons, both global and regional. Relative capabilities of states determine the deterrence among them and also put a balance in conflictual situations. The balance of power has assumed central position in modern realism. Morgenthau (1948) developed four stages of power attainment. Later, Haas (1953) and Wight (1966) also discussed this paradigm in depth. Haas gave various meanings to this including balance of equilibrium, hegemony leading to peace, stability leading to peace, instability leading to war and power politics generally (Danilovic, 2002, pp. 74-75). Lord Palmerston declared 'balance of power' doctrine founded on nature of man. Thus, it attributes to the ever growing effort of states to achieve maximum power in order to strengthen its defense and deter others to take any negative action against it.

The clear lines of separation between realism and liberalism are not as sharp today as they had been. The notion of use of force is collaborated with the ideal of liberal democracy of liberalism by 'neoconservatives'. They endeavor to base their ideal on strict adherence to democratic values but security of state through all means of use of force. The central emphasis, however, remains on the balancing of power (Snyder, 2004, p. 54). Kenneth Waltz declares the World War II as the prelude to the longest state of peace in world. This peace or absence of total war is achieved and maintained through bipolarity and nuclear weapons. The behavior and intentions of states can be analyzed by their various actions. Among them the most prominent are their armament policies and interventions abroad (Waltz, 1993, pp. 44-46).

The case of South Asia presents various conflict and situations having global impacts. This is marked by the traditional rivalry between India and Pakistan. The threat perception of both states is deep rooted in the partition of sub-continent in 1947. This instigated both states to strengthen their defense in every possible way. Three wars (1948, 1965, 1971) and various war like situations between the two kept the situation tensed. The traditional military superiority and hegemonic designs of India kept Pakistan busy in following the course of armamentation. The achievement of nuclear weapons by both states in 1998 created the environment of deterrence. However, the situation always remained tensed due to ever growing aspirations of India to become a regional hegemon and now a global competitor.

The Indian Ocean Region has been established as most important theatre of their world politics. The global and regional powers have diverted their attentions to attain supremacy in this water body. (Ranasinghe, 2011, pp. 1-2). United States has focused on Asia through Indian Ocean in its policy of Pivot of Asia. China has never endeavored in history to focus on outer waters. Now it is heavily investing to balance the power spectrum of United States in Indian Ocean and enhance its influence. India's aspiration to attain the status of a global power and balancing Chinese influence in the region has dragged it in to Indian Ocean. India is trying hard to develop Blue Water Navy and maximize its military influence in Indian Ocean. Indian efforts have alarmed Pakistan as Indian influence in Indian Ocean threatens Pakistan. Pakistan wants to keep these waters open for it to exploit the global needs of oil and trade through sea lanes of communication in Indian Ocean.

Place in Literature:

South Asia is the region with immense geographical and historical significance. Dr. Robert D. Kaplan in his report "South Asia's Geography of conflict" puts forward a historical anatomy of the conflicts of the region. India had enjoyed supremacy over the entire region with strong empires like Mauryan. The greatest threat it had always faced had been from its north west constituting present Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia. The rivalry with China has always been of competing nature. The creation of an ideological state in Pakistan is a threat to the secular traditions of India developed over centuries. Various religions and civilizations nurtured in this land which is the essence of this largest democracy of the world. Currently India is apprehended by the security in Afghanistan and if United States abruptly leaves the region, it would be a blow to Indian interests in Afghanistan. India gives special importance to Afghanistan to deny Pakistan a secure backyard. However, Dr. Kaplan ignores the route of Indian Ocean from which India experienced two trade caravans which altered its history completely. The Arabs came from Indian Ocean for trade purpose and the British too (Kaplan, 2012, pp. 2-17).

Oliver Steunkel in his report "India's National Interest and Diplomatic Activism: Towards Global Leadership?" states that India's emergence as a leading actor in Asia cannot be ignored. It attained this position with a long course of effort to consolidate its economy and strengthen its democracy. During the period of cold war it remained non-aligned. After becoming nuclear power in 1998, it became a regional rival. The world certainly looks up to it to compete China and

deny it becoming regional power. However, there are various internal economic and human rights issues in India which are obstacle to it rising to global arena. The regional issues with all regional states generally and with Pakistan and China specifically. Before becoming a global power India has this compulsion to become a regional power. The region has many challenges in its path which the author ignored to list down. Specially, Pakistan will try hard to compete it militarily to deny India the status of regional power. Also China has so many challenges in the gamut to put in India's way (Steunkel, 2011, pp. 32-38).

A report of Indo-Pacific Governance Research Centre titled "Securing Indian Ocean? Competing Regional Security Constructions", takes a deep look on to the regional security paradigm of Indian Ocean. There are various perspectives of the securitization of Indian Ocean. The Ocean is usually divided in to Eastern and Western. Out of the total Indian Ocean States, the Rim states are considered most important. Technically the Indian Ocean Region Association Rim States (IOR-ARC), comprising a group of 19 states is most significant in securitizing this region. Australia is keen to secure this region with collaboration of India. United States is interested only in the military and political securitization of East Indian Ocean. This report takes a liberal point of view and the non-traditional aspect of securitization is more asserted. The role of other states of this region which is immensely important is completely ignored in this report. Particularly the conflict areas of India Ocean Region are vital for the security of the water region too (Rumley, Doyle, & Chaturvedi, 2012, pp. 1-8).

The Indian Ocean has been the theatre of trade winds and active diplomacy since times unknown. The regional dynasties kept the balance equilibrium sharply in notice and always adhered to this equilibrium. Emrys Chew in his working paper "Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon: The Indian Ocean and the Maritime Balance of Power in Historical Perspective" deeply analyzes the balance of power quest in the ocean over millennia. The Chola dynasty of India was first to show its naval power and competed Sri Lankan Buddhist dynasty. China always kept security of its trade routes tight. The ocean is immensely important as linking four continents, the two most important to global geography; Asia and Africa. This water body is a link between east and West. The Ottomans had substantive naval control. But the Mughals ignored this decisive factor. Later, it became the area of European sphere of influence. British, French, Dutch and Portuguese competed to adjust themselves. Trade was again a striking factor. Post 1945 scenario presented a challenging situation as the newly independent states in the region were establishing post-colonial environment. The states had a definite boundary both land and water and territory with sea laws. The author however, leaves the conclusion to the reader to infer the role of militarily strong nations in the ocean. He takes account of only trade hubs of present time in Indian Ocean (Chew, 2007, pp. 2-26).

C. Raja Mohan in his research Paper "India and Balance of Power" analyzes the aspiration of India to become the global power and the related adjustments in this wake. India had aspired for decades to become global power but the hindrances are various in this way. The most important is the partition of sub-continent and the creation of Pakistan disconnecting India from Afghanistan and

Central Asia. Kashmir dispute had been a major obstacle and issues with China too. India was also affected by Cold War in which it had to side with Soviet Union and it was overly affected by United States' support to Pakistan. To achieve the goal India has divided the world in to three circles. One is the immediate vicinity of India, second is the region and the third level is the global outlook of India. The region is abounding in conflict and challenges with India. India has initiated with diversified trade approach mitigating issues with China. The civil nuclear deal with United States is the hallmark of its potential and policy. However, the author takes a partial look at the matter ignoring Indian atrocities and hegemonic designs in the region (Mohan, 2006, pp. 17-32).

The India has now moved to pay special attention to its navy to play a remarkable role in Indian Ocean. Abhijeet Singh in his report "The Indian navy's New Expeditionary Outlook" gives a detailed outlook of Indian Naval Doctrine and "expeditionary look". The Naval Doctrine in 2004 and the 12th Defense Plan in 2012 gave a special place to naval expansion and 'Indian Stand-off' in outer Indian Ocean. It is the essential way to reach the level global power. In 2008, China initiated to show its presence in Indian Ocean by developing PLA's Naval presence near Gulf of Aden to check piracy. India started rapid upgrading of navy in 2005. It also started to check the regional disputes and took special role in dissolving any such tension. India is clearly pursuing the policy of 'pro-active' action in Indian Ocean (Singh, 2012, pp. 1-20)

Dr. Iram Khalid in her research paper "Indian Ocean: Global and Regional Strategies" endeavors to discern in to the global and regional actors' interests in the Indian Ocean. The Ocean is not entirely Indian as aspired by India rather it is the theatre of greater global interest game. The trade route, trade volume and the oil trade has increased the strategic importance of this Ocean manifolds. United States has special interests here to keep influence in Asia and check the Chinese influence in the region. China has this opportunity to exploit the potential through Indian Ocean to assert itself as an important global actor. India is in full swing to compete China. Indian designs have most negative impact for the region generally and for Pakistan specially. The author however, only took notice of the economic strategies and left the military aspect which is integral to economic security (Khalid, Indian Ocean: Global and Regional Strategies, 2013, pp. 21-36).

Global and Regional military interests in Indian Ocean:

The growing economies of Asia have immensely increased the importance of Indian Ocean. The trade of raw material requires extensive reliance on sea lines of communication of Indian Ocean. The communication of Asia to Europe and United States is possible through the broadband undersea cables traversing Indian Ocean. These factors put much pressure on the security of straits of this Ocean to smoothly carry out the trade. The straits of East Indian Ocean are much safer than the West. The East Asian and South East Asian states have joined hands to secure those trade routes particularly Strait of Malacca. The Strait of Hormuz is sensitive due to conflict in Gulf Region. The issue of piracy near Ba el Mandeb further weakens the security of Western Indian Ocean (Centre, 2011, pp. 11-12).

United States:

United States, being the sole super power, holds it important to keep massive military strength in Indian Ocean Region. It has clearly stated policy and manifestation of it through its military and political alliances and collaboration in the region (Hastings, 2011, pp. 2-3). United States holds its Fifth Fleet in Bahrain which has most important relations with it in Indian Ocean Region. The Eagle Resolve exercises are held annually to mark the military relation of United States with western littoral states of Indian Ocean. It has also close ties with Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Qatar. Kuwait and Bahrain are officially major non-NATO allies. US CENTCOM commander David Patreus called this approach 'multi-bilateralism'.

In South East Asia United States has well placed itself. It has strategic partnership with Singapore, formal alliances with Thailand and Australia and military-to-military relations are burgeoning with Indonesia and Malaysia. The Combined Task Forces 150, 151 and 152 are glaring examples of United States' presence and alliances in the region (Hastings, 2011, pp. 7-8). In South Asia, most important part of Indian Ocean Region, United States is now more tilted towards partnership with India. In 2010, United States Quadrennial Defense Review devoted a paragraph to India (Defense, 2010, p. 60). It now recognizes India's growing role as military power in Indian Ocean. India's military technological advancement serves the interests of United States.

China:

China has emerged as a significant economic power. It is now wary about the trade routes for smooth trade of its goods and also incoming supply to meet its energy needs particularly. The land link between Myanmar and Yunnan is of significant importance (Zheng, 2012, p. 16). China is enhancing its influence in Indian Ocean by providing diplomatic and aid support to small islands in the water body. Maldives is of special importance to China as Strait of Malacca is immensely significant to Chinese trade. For India, these factors are critically important and a plausible hindrance to India's strategy of increasing its influence in the region. Maldives cancelled various contracts with India and Malaysia. China is also providing military hardware to Maldives. Maldives has this importance owing to its strategic location. China's interest in Pakistan's Gwadar port is also an irritant for India. India's trade and oil route will be checked by Pakistan and it will immensely increase Pakistan's importance and role in the region. China's plan to open up supply routes to Central Asia from Gwadar further limits Indian role (Khalid, Indian Ocean: Global and Regional Strategies, 2013, pp. 26-27).

Indian military build-up in Indian Ocean:

Indian military rise in Indian Ocean is part of broad Indian military strategy in the region and cannot be analyzed separately. Broad contours of Indian defense policy are the real prism from which to see and analyze the Indian naval strategy in Indian Ocean. As discussed earlier in the article, Indian defense policy centers on its historical rivalry with two important neighbors i-e China and Pakistan. Both these states have major role to play in the Indian backyard in Indian Ocean which

is the major reason for increased Indian focus in the ocean. Growing Indian concern in Indian Ocean is partially driven by increased Chinese focus in tiny states in the region specially its unstated 'string of pearls' policy. Chinese ever growing defense ties with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives and other island states has rang alarm bells in indian policy makers for some time. These developments have forced the Indian defense establishment to focus, modernize and expand the Indian naval force.

Although all the wars that India fought with these two neighbors were primarily land based traditional war, it had little or very low focus on its navy and specially it didn't have any policy in Indian Ocean as part of its defense policy. However, geo-strategic environment changed significantly in the post-cold war world that necessitated Indian policy makers to weigh options on this aspect too. This re-evaluation of Indian defense policy is also supported by growing economic muscles of rising Indian Economy that funds any ambitious plans related to Indian naval buildup in Indian Ocean. It was in this context that Indian navy started its ambitious program of modernization and expansion in the Indian Ocean.

India's advent into 21st century was with a very small but strong regional naval posture. Its navy has traditionally been called 'blue water' navy. However, it faced numerous challenges of human resource, technology and the numbers. It had poor indigenous infrastructure to develop naval weapons and other equipment and mostly relied on Soviet supplied equipment. However, indian navy was fifth largest navy in the world by end of 20th century. Indian navy consisted of over one hundred naval vessels including 15 submarines, 2 aircraft carriers and other destroyers and frigates. This fleet was however aging and most of them were to expire. Even not all of these could be used at one time and only half of them were operation at one time. This was mainly due to lack of focus as well as lack of funding (<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/in-navy-development.htm>)


In its drive to modernize navy, India developed indigenously designed and built aircraft carrier called INS Vikrant that made India only the fifth country in the world to have such capability. The launch was carried out with great fanfare projecting the leaps in Indian naval buildup in the Indian ocean. This was coupled with the first indigenously built nuclear powered submarine INS Arihant that was a great step in order to establish a nuclear triad. That made India only the fourth country in the world to possess such capability after US, Russia and China.

Although the aircraft carrier INS Vikrant is in its initial trial stage, it shows the great leap India has taken in modernizing its military in Indian Ocean. It also helped India in posturing an emerging naval power in the indian Ocean. This highly secretive project took more than a decade to complete and will complete India's nuclear triad, with the submarine's ballistic missiles giving India a second-strike capability.

Besides modernization, India is also trying to increase its control around the Strait of Malacca. This is evident from establishing a new Naval base "INS Baaz" at the controversial Andaman and Nicobar Island's southernmost end of Campbell Bay. (<http://www.jdslanka.org/index.php/2012-01-30-09-31-17/geopolitics/173-indo-us-navy-buildup-in-indian-ocean>)

However, despite this rise, Indian naval ambitions face serious problems and challenges. Most important of all is the financial constraints involved in naval buildup in the Indian Ocean. Although the focus of Indian defense establishment has changed over the period of time, however, still navy ranks lowest in terms of defense spending in Indian budget as has been shown in the chart below:

2010-2011



Source:

<http://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR010/rehman.pdf>

The most expeditionary nature and ambitions of Indian navy are revealed in Indian Naval Doctrine, 2009, in which the naval capability has been clearly ascribed to security and constabulary operations and humanitarian missions in far off regions. The purpose of Indian Navy has moved forward from the security of its coastline to a very affective role in far Indian Ocean. The changed pattern of Indian navy was emphasized by Admiral Arun Prakash in 2005, then naval chief who was more concerned about expeditionary capabilities of navy. However, India has never used the term of expeditionary capabilities rather it has always preferred to use the term 'preventive deployment'. This term rightly explains the Indian proactive designs in Indian Ocean (Singh, 2012, pp. 4-6).

Implications for Pakistan:

Pakistan inherited the threat of Indian aggression with its inception. The two states have been traditional security rivals since then. The quest of equalizing power drove them to acquire even nuclear weapons. Pakistan has always been at the disadvantage of being at lower ebb in traditional military security. It succeeded to get a cover of security through nuclear deterrence. However, Indian rise to the status of global power is directly detrimental to Pakistan's interests. India's aspiration of Blue Water Navy is a huge challenge to Pakistan's security interests. The importance of Indian Ocean in twenty first century cannot be ignored owing

to its political significance, economic importance and relevance to the growing energy needs of the world. United States has special interests in this water body. In Us Strategic Guidance, 2012, it has paid special consideration to the economic and security interests in Indian Ocean. This will be best served by the elevation of India to the status of 'strategic partner' with a special role of regional anchor in Indian Ocean (Khan & Eijaz, 2012, p. 35).

The challenges for Pakistan in Indian Ocean are numerous. The growing terrorism, of which Pakistan is the worst victim, has also reached the oceans. The maritime terrorism is a big threat now. The Bombay attacks are its glaring example where the terrorists reached Bombay allegedly from Pakistan through Arabian Sea. Maritime terrorism includes the acts of terrorism emanating from sea route whether actually conducted on sea or land (Khan & Eijaz, 2012, p. 40). This has enhanced the challenges to Pakistan many times. Now, India has the justification of securitization of its interests in land and sea. But these securitization designs will certainly hamper Pakistan's security interests. Also, India has the plans of nuclearization of its navy. It is nuclearizing its sub-marines. Although it is facing difficulties due to lack of quality yet the danger persists for Pakistan as in near future it may achieve the capability (Rehman, 2012, pp. 66-68). The Indian Naval Doctrines of 2004 and 2009 which clearly gave India a direction to develop navy and also emphasized the need to enhance nuclear capability through navy. The addition of Arihant in Indian naval fleet is glaring example.

Pakistan is already under threat of Indian hegemonic designs. The escalation of its pace and intensity directly hits Pakistan's interests. Pakistan has also focused on developing its navy and particularly nuclearization of its naval forces. India plans to spend \$ 45billions on its naval development over next 20 years (Khan & Eijaz, 2012, p. 48). Pakistan cannot compete such a huge budget. It does not have much cards to play. Yet it owns a strategic move that is Gwadar. Gwadar is a deep sea port at such an influential location which can oversee whole of Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean can be controlled through a check on oil trade, goods trade, supply of goods to landlocked Central Asia and Russia and a base for their energy exports. This will also check India's activities in Indian Ocean.

Conclusion:

Pakistan and India are traditional rivals. They have apprehensions from each other which are deep rooted. The Indian Ocean is the most significant and relevant water body. It has political, economic, security and energy imperatives for whole world. It is the global trade route encompassing oil and energy trade which is the driving force of whole world's industry. The Indian Ocean is the theatre of new game for global powers. There are various rivals in competition for influence. Indian designs are to become a global power with active role in every sphere. It has a first priority to compete Chinese influence. Pakistan has a main security threat from India. Its foreign policy has long been hostage to this threat. The rivalry, which reached to the nuclearization of both states may reach Indian Ocean as Pkistan has always been in quest of balancing the power as against India. Pakistan needs robust efforts to achieve security in Indian Ocean to safeguard its interests.

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