Abstract
The possibility of morality in a causally determined physical
world engages philosophers in a serious debate. Many philosophers think
morality is not possible in a world where everything, including human
actions, is determined by antecedent causal conditions. However, attempts
to reconcile these apparently contradictory views have come forth. What
emerges through the debate is that even if all human actions are causally
determined, moral commitments are irreplaceable. Therefore, it is argued
that causal determination of our thoughts and actions does not change the
truth of morality. However, a morality involving determinism seems to rely
heavily on the causal efficacy of moral judgments rather than the possibility
of a free action. The deterministic morality focuses on human motivation as
a cause and ignores the possibility of a free choice. Moreover, a
deterministic morality is unable to account for the freedom of the will.
However, in serious climate of opinion, morality essentially involves moral
responsibility based on a free choice and action. Thus, philosophical
attempts to reconcile determinism and morality under the assumption of
irreplaceable human interpersonal attitudes seem not so convincing. This
paper brings forth the philosophical arguments involved; centralizing on the
contention that morality cannot be subsumed under determinism.
Dr. Zahoor H. Baber. (2016) DETERMINISM AND THE POSSIBILITY OF MORALITY, Al-Hikmat: A Journal of Philosophy, Volume 36, Issue 01.
-
Views
682 -
Downloads
125
Article Details
Volume
Issue
Type
Language
Received At
Accepted At
