Abstract
India‟s ongoing nuclear modernisation does not seem
compatible with its declared nuclear doctrine of 2003.
Several influential voices from within the country have
argued for the need to review its nuclear posture. As a
consequence, and to restore the credibility of its deterrence
posture, some former senior Indian decision-makers have
hinted that the country may have already moved from its
traditional posture of No First Use (NFU) and could
possibly contemplate a comprehensive first-strike against
Pakistan. This potential shift in India‟s nuclear posture,
along with operationalisation of second-strike capability,
suggest that India may have drifted away from its stated
policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). It is not
yet clear whether this shift is real, intended to maintain
deliberate ambiguity, or else a result of prevailing
dissonance within India‟s strategic elite. The resultant
discord between its declaratory position and its ongoing
developments may force Pakistan to take remedial
measures that could lead to action-reaction syndrome, thus,
causing instability in South Asia.
Dr Adil Sultan. (2018) India’s Nuclear Doctrine: A Case of Strategic Dissonance or Deliberate Ambiguity, IPRI Journal, Volume-18, Issue-2.
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