Abstract
The concept of Credible Minimum Deterrence has no definition
and seems problematic in nature given its context of the IndoPakistan nuclear relationship. Though Pakistan does not aim,
and cannot afford, to indulge in a nuclear arms race with India, it
cannot be contended that a nuclear arms race does not exist
between the two states. Quest for “credible minimum nuclear
deterrence” may not be a finite goal as it is a dynamic concept
itself, and even within either state, there is no consensus on what
can be quantified as a credible minimum nuclear deterrent. In
fact, the value of the concept possibly lies more in what it
conceals rather than what it reveals—providing yet more space
for both sides to hide behind terms that are ambiguous. There
have been many constructive suggestions on moving forward on
a bilateral level which could be pursued—beginning with the
clarification of basic nuclear concepts. It is argued here that both
states should engage in a sustained nuclear dialogue that goes
beyond rudimentary risk reduction measures
Dr Farah Zahra. (2012) Credible Minimum Nuclear Deterrence In South Asia, IPRI Journal, Volume-12, Issue-2.
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