Abstract
The overt nuclearization of south Asia changed the strategic dynamics of this region and deterred India and Pakistan from indulging in any major wars. However, the possibility of limited war under the nuclear overhang cannot be ruled out because of the unresolved issues including Kashmir, change in the Indian military‟s strategic thinking, massive military modernization and consistent war mongering by the Indian military and political leadership. The article argues that tactical or strategic nuclear weapons will not prevent India from any limited war, surgical strikes or any other below the nuclear threshold military operations. However, the study suggests that consolidation of „Conventional Deterrence‟ by Pakistan will increase the cost for the Indian military‟s misadventure under their limited war doctrines, sub-conventional operations or surgical strikes. At present, Pakistan has maintained adequate balance in some conventional capabilities including the modern MBTs, third generation ATGMs, gunship helicopters, advance Artillery Guns, armed UAVs and second-strike capability. However, there are certain areas including Long Range Air Defense, Nuclear Submarines along with SLBMs, Fifth Generation Aircraft and Spy Satellites where Pakistan military needs an improvement to establish credible conventional deterrence backed by strategic weapons to dissuade the Indian military from any undesirable action against Pakistan under CSD, proactive Military Ops, subconventional warfare or surgical strikes. Keywords: Conventional Deterrence, Strategic Stability, Sub-conventional Warfare Operations, Surgical Strikes, Security Dilemma
Dr. Masood Ur Rehman Khattak. (2019) Conventional Asymmetries between India and Pakistan: A threat to the Deterrence Stability of South Asia, Journal of Political Studies, Volume 26, Issue 1.
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