Abstract
Execution of a mathematically secure encryption algorithm on hardware is known to leak certain
information to the side channels of the hardware. These side channels include current consumed from
power supply and electromagnetic radiation emitted from cryptographic hardware. The information
thus leaked can be utilized to mount an attack to reveal secret information about the algorithm (e.g.
encryption key). This method of extracting the information is broadly classified as “Side Channel
Attacks”. A type of side channel attack called “Power Analysis” utilizes the power/current consumed
information as a source of information leakage. Several measures including “hiding” have been
proposed to counter these attacks. These counter measures are based upon inserting randomness or
consuming nearly constant current thus reducing the value of this information. In this research, we
propose a new hiding countermeasure which uses dual keys to perform cryptographic operations. This
method cannot be bypassed by increasing the number of traces.
Muhammad Uzair, Kashif Javed, Haroon A. Babri. (2016) Increasing Resistance Against Power Analysis Attacks Using Dual Key Scheme, Pakistan Journal of Engineering and Applied Sciences, VOLUME 18, Issue 1.
-
Views
2096 -
Downloads
189
Article Details
Volume
Issue
Type
Language
